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Preface
Plant genetic resources (PGR) for food and agriculture are the basis of world food 
security. Access by farmers and plant breeders everywhere to the widest possible 
range of plant germplasm is of crucial importance for crop improvement, for 
confronting environmental and agricultural challenges such as climate change, 
and for ensuring economic and social development as well as food security for 
a world population expected to reach 9 billion people by 2050. In this context, 
the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) adopted the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (‘the Treaty’) on 3 November 2001, following seven years of 
negotiations. The Treaty, which came into force on 29 June 2004, establishes 
a binding international framework for the conservation and sustainable use of 
PGR for food and agriculture, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising from their use. As of 1 April 2013, the Treaty had been ratified by 127 
states.
As coherent international policy architecture for the conservation, sustainable 
use and exchange of resources fundamental to food security, the Treaty makes 
a sizeable, direct contribution to world economic growth and social welfare. 
However, accurate quantification of the Treaty’s economic benefits and an 
assessment of its full economic potential have not so far been attempted because 
of the complexity of this task. The full economic potential of the Treaty, including 
its many non-monetary benefits and its overall impact on social welfare, needs 
to be better understood.
In particular, no methodology has been developed to date to provide a 
preliminary projection of funds likely to result from the exchange of PGR for 
food and agriculture under the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA), 
the centrepiece of the Treaty’s Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
Sharing (‘Multilateral System’). Because of the uncertainty regarding the Treaty’s 
overall economic impact and especially the resources that are likely to become 
available to the Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund in the short and medium term, 
the Government of Australia decided to support an innovative research project 
entitled “Identifying the potential monetary and non-monetary benefits arising 
from the utilization of plant genetic resources under the Multilateral System of 
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”. 
The research undertaken in the project focuses on laying methodological 
foundations, assessing the adequacy of current data sources, and identifying 
potential new data sources that could be utilized or modified for quantifying 
benefits flowing from the Treaty. Five interlinked technical studies were prepared 
between July 2011 and March 2012 by a team of experts from various disciplines. 
This is the first systematic step towards delineating in economic terms the 
potential magnitude of monetary benefit-sharing and assessing the importance 
of non-monetary benefits arising from the use of PGR for food and agriculture. 
Moreover, they provide a first hypothetical projection of possible income over 
time to the Treaty’s Benefit-Sharing Fund. 
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Together, the five studies initiate the capacity for an ongoing analysis of volume 
and trends relating to the exchange and use of PGR for food and agriculture under 
the SMTA. The mathematical algorithm that was developed to project possible 
income to the Benefit-sharing Fund is a flexible methodology, where the various 
elements of the model can be manipulated to create a variety of scenarios and 
to test factors such as the relative value of the PGR currently listed in Annex 1 of 
the Treaty and other PGR for food and agriculture, resources held by Contracting 
Parties and by countries that are not Contracting Parties, and resources held 
by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. It can also 
evaluate the relative importance of mandatory and voluntary payments, in 
accordance with the SMTA, and the effects of breeders choosing to use or avoid 
the use of SMTA materials. While it is crucial to note that the model’s predictions 
are strictly hypothetical and based on data of unequal quality, the articulation 
of the various factors that need to be evaluated and the relative values that 
the model generates are a major contribution to understanding the Treaty’s 
potential. A further important outcome of the project is that it provides an 
estimate of the value of the current international seed market. Here, a number 
of methodologically innovative analytical tools have also been developed. 
Access to a high-end computing facility at Lancaster University, United Kingdom 
has enabled large-scale querying of multiple databases and associated text 
mining, which has resulted in the refinement of digital methods available for the 
generation of statistics regarding PGR for food and agriculture cited in patent 
applications, with the specific aim of generating data for monetary and non-
monetary benefit quantification.
The studies brought together in this book aim to provide quantified information 
to Treaty stakeholders and the wider interested audience to help understand 
the economic dimensions of the Treaty as a whole and the Multilateral System 
and its benefits in particular. While the results are indicative due to the data 
limitations, the research has clearly demonstrated the utility of economic and 
quantified approaches to understanding the Treaty; they offer a foundation on 
which, it is hoped, other scholars will be tempted to build.
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Executive summary
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(the ‘Treaty’) makes a sizeable, direct contribution to world economic growth 
through the establishment of a coherent international policy architecture for 
the conservation, sustainable use and exchange of resources fundamental 
to food security. The Treaty’s Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
Sharing and its Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) make it the 
first international instrument to provide a practical method of access and 
benefit-sharing, facilitating the exchange of genetic resources of 64 crucial 
food crops and forages (Annex 1 crops) without the need for complex bilateral 
negotiations.
In June 2006, the Treaty’s Governing Body adopted the SMTA, and since 
then, a large number of SMTAs have been entered into. However, at the 
time of writing, no payments have been made to the Benefit-sharing Fund 
in accordance with the provisions contained in the SMTA, and the picture of 
possible income for the Benefit-sharing Fund under the SMTA remains unclear. 
Moreover, no methodology has been proposed to provide the Governing 
Body with a preliminary projection of funds likely to result from the exchange 
of plant genetic resources (PGR) for food and agriculture under the SMTA. 
Furthermore, the full economic potential of the Treaty, including its wide non-
monetary benefits and overall impact on social welfare, needs to be better 
understood.
This book presents the findings of five interlinked technical studies carried 
out with the financial support of the Government of Australia to address the 
present uncertainty about the overall economic impact of the Treaty and, in 
particular, regarding the resources likely to become available to its Benefit-
sharing Fund in the short and medium term. Due to data constraints and 
resource limitations, the studies were forced in many instances to work with 
proxies and estimates, and as such are best understood as paving the way for 
further work in this highly underdeveloped field of inquiry.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of both the conceptual bases for assigning 
economic values (monetary and non-monetary) to PGR for food and agriculture, 
and the existing methodologies for establishing such values. Chapter 
2 comprises an economic analysis of the values of global seed production 
and their distribution across crops, regions and countries in order to provide 
estimates for potential monetary flows as well as the overall value levels used 
in the mathematical model of Chapter 3, which constitutes the core of this 
book, modelling potential flows of income into the Benefit-sharing Fund. 
Chapter 4 develops and tests informatics methodologies that make possible 
large-scale computational analyses of patent and other databases. Its aim is to 
assess the commercial use of material brought under the terms and conditions 
of the SMTA, and to value and quantify non-monetary benefits. The Annex 
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presents the results of a preliminary expert consultation of the plant-breeding 
community that was carried out through interviews and questionnaire surveys.
Quantification of the Treaty’s non-monetary benefits is complex. Methods 
to assess the non-monetary benefits in question are under development, but 
need refining. Assessing potential monetary benefit flows arising from the use 
of the SMTA is equally difficult, especially given the lack of relevant experience 
and adequate data. The SMTA was only adopted in 2006, and the build-up of 
a steady stream of monetary benefits will take many years, not only due to the 
slow nature of plant breeding, but also because a large number of Contracting 
Parties have not yet made all or part of their PGR available under SMTAs. 
Moreover, the unpredictability of technological development in plant breeding 
further complicates projections over the long period of time that is involved for 
the Treaty’s full potential to be reached.
For best possible results given the constraints, a pragmatic approach to the 
estimation of the flow of income to the Benefit-sharing Fund has been chosen. 
This approach is based largely on past data drawn from use of Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) materials (see Chapter 2), 
and a mathematical modelling approach (see Chapter 3) employing estimates 
provided by the other studies. Time and resource constrictions forced the 
authors to limit their focus to a few important crops for which information 
was available and easily accessible. The crops chosen were wheat, maize and 
rice, but other Annex 1 crops and non-Annex 1 crops were also investigated 
as groups.
Key findings
The Treaty’s overall economic benefits are extensive and reach far beyond the 
commercial value of PGR for food and agriculture. Through the promotion 
of the conservation and sustainable use of PGR for food and agriculture, the 
Treaty has a direct impact on social welfare and contributes to non-monetary 
benefits such as climate change adaptation and food security, which underpin 
the very continuation of human civilization. Moreover, mobilization by the 
Treaty of international-level monetary benefits translates into non-monetary 
goods and services at the national or local level through projects supported by 
the Benefit-sharing Fund. 
With a view to establishing broad orders of magnitude of potential benefit 
flows, Chapter 2 established an upper bound level of US$97 million as a 
reasonable estimate for annual payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund arising 
from SMTAs. These levels will not be reached for many decades. Even under 
the most favourable conditions (e.g. fully effective participation by Contracting 
Parties, participation of more countries in the Treaty, full compliance with 
voluntary payment stipulations, and no deliberate avoidance of use of material 
from the Multilateral System in institutional breeding programmes), payment 
flows will not surpass this bound within a foreseeable timeframe.
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Chapter 3 uses a different methodology for estimating monetary benefits 
and estimates the likely speed with which they will build up. It suggests that 
maximum levels will not be reached until the 2080s. The model shows that even 
without expansion of Annex 1, the estimated annual return by 2030 could reach 
$24 million, at a relatively high level of effective voluntary payment, if current 
members make all their resources available immediately. The projection based 
on material currently known to be available, however, is only $10 million. If all 
potential members had already joined the Treaty, $39 million annually might 
theoretically be available in 2030.
Benefit flows are contingent on a range of factors, including some of the 
following important ones:
Treaty membership: The participation of more countries in the Treaty 
(especially countries with major gene bank holdings, such as China, Japan and 
the United States of America) would substantially enhance the potential level of 
benefit-sharing flows.
Effective performance: Although the Multilateral System covers nearly two-
thirds of global ex situ holdings of Annex 1 crops, its utilization in crop improvement 
programmes is constrained by a lack of effective access to resources held by 
Contracting Parties and by inadequate characterization and evaluation information 
on the accessible resources. To date, a large number of Contracting Parties have 
failed to make all or part of their PGR available as stipulated by the Treaty. More 
effective participation by Contracting Parties, including making the necessary legal 
and administrative arrangements for access to PGR for food and agriculture, need 
to be made to optimize benefit flows. In addition, improving germplasm collection, 
conservation and characterization efforts would increase possible income levels of 
the Benefit-sharing Fund, and the rate at which they build up.
Intellectual property choice and effective payment rates: Benefit-sharing 
provisions apply in cases in which material accessed under an SMTA has been 
incorporated into a commercial plant variety. In such cases, mandatory payment 
of 1.1 percent (minus 30 percent) of the income from seed sales of the variety 
in question is required (under Article 6.7 of the SMTA) when the new variety 
is restricted with regard to further research and development, such as when 
a patent protects the product. In the event that the product is not subject to 
intellectual property protection and may be freely used without restrictions in 
the development of follow-on products, payment is voluntary (under Article 6.8 
of the SMTA). No level of payment is stipulated in such cases. Evidence from 
the initial survey of plant-breeding experts (see Annex) suggests that voluntary 
payments are in practice likely to be minimal at best. In strategic terms, 
voluntary payments by one company, which competitors avoid, would create 
uneven competition and a market disadvantage. Lack of certainty regarding the 
intentions of competitors creates a situation in which companies hesitate to be 
the first to make payments. The magnitude of potential income to the Benefit-
sharing Fund is acutely contingent on institutional arrangements that incentivize 
a high level of voluntary payments.
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SMTA use and avoidance: Different institutional players may have different 
propensities for requesting and using materials from the Multilateral System for 
their breeding programmes. Private sector institutions that seek to appropriate 
returns from their innovations may be inclined to avoid the use of materials 
subject to SMTA conditions that would force them to make payments to the 
Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund. This is particularly the case when products are 
brought under patents, due to the mandatory nature of the payments required. 
The avoidance of materials under SMTA conditions is, however, not necessarily 
related to financial decisions, but must also be viewed in the light of technical 
process: the difficulties of documenting all ancestral materials throughout the 
many crosses in breeding populations may affect overall willingness to use 
material under SMTA conditions. Moreover, plant genetic materials are of little 
use to breeding programmes unless passport data and characteristic information 
on agronomic traits, agro-climatic adaptability, and susceptibility to diseases and 
pathogens is available and accessible. The use of materials under the Multilateral 
System will depend on the extent to which such critical information is accessible 
to potential users. This may vary by crop, country and institution hosting the 
collection. Even large, diverse and accessible collections may not be utilized 
unless supported by available, relevant information. Making the use of materials 
under SMTA conditions more attractive would enhance benefit-sharing flows.
Research intensity: In using grants of PVP certificates for different crops as a 
measure of research intensity in developed countries, it has been revealed that 
non-Annex 1 crops account for two-thirds of all PVP certificates. The coverage 
of crops in Annex 1 of the Treaty, therefore, omits nearly two-thirds of research 
efforts in plant breeding from its purview. Research effort into non-Annex 1 
crops and resulting innovations will not translate into benefit-sharing payments. 
The share of Annex 1 crops in research effort has also been declining; their share 
in PVP certificates declined from 75 percent in the 1960s to less than a third in 
2010. Over time, the share of plant breeding research effort has increased for 
non-Annex 1 crops due to increased research over the last two decades on crops 
that are not included in Annex 1, such as soybean, cotton and sugarcane. The 
share of these crops in the value of the global commercial seed market is also 
increasing. The limited coverage of crops currently included in Annex 1, not 
including certain major crops that have attracted considerable research effort in 
recent years, severely constrains the potential for generation of benefit-sharing 
payments through the exchange of PGR under SMTAs.
Based on the preliminary results of the mathematical model, which projects 
benefit flows according to alternative future scenarios, a key conclusion of this 
work is that the potential income to the Benefit-sharing Fund is high, but that 
projections based on current arrangements are low. Obstacles to substantial 
success, in particular avoidance of SMTA materials and low level of voluntary 
payments, are very real.
Maize plays a key role in potential income to the Treaty, as it is currently the 
main crop to attract mandatory payments. Avoidance practised by breeders 
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of transgenic maize varieties would proportionally reduce the only significant 
mandatory source of income. Coupled with a failure to make substantial 
voluntary payments, the projected income to the Treaty would vanish.
Finally, the results of the mathematical model suggest that, even under 
favourable assumptions, the initial build-up of income will be slow. With present 
membership and availability it will take a minimum of 38 years to reach the 
current fund-raising target. Even under two very favourable sets of assumptions 
– that all members immediately make available all their material and that 
voluntary payments reach the same predictability as mandatory payments; or 
that all potential members immediately join the Treaty and make available all 
their materials, and voluntary payments reach a 50 percent level – it would take 
approximately 15 years to reach the current annual fund-raising target of US$23 
million set by the Governing Body for the Benefit-sharing Fund.
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Introduction
Background
Access to a rich diversity of PGR for food and agriculture may be more 
important today than it has ever been. Conservation and development of 
these genetic resources play a crucial role in confronting serious environmental 
and agricultural challenges such as climate change, and in ensuring current 
and future food security for a growing world population. Whereas broadening 
the genetic resource base allows farmers to successfully address changing 
climatic conditions, and protects and improves the livelihoods of the 
economically marginalized,1 genetic erosion increases household vulnerability 
to pedoclimatic stresses and world crop price fluctuations, undermining the 
stability of rural household livelihood, especially in developing countries.2 And 
yet, genetic erosion of these resources continues worldwide.
By promoting the conservation and sustainable use of PGR for food and 
agriculture, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (hereinafter ‘the Treaty’), adopted by the Conference of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations in 2001 and in force 
since 2004, contributes to food security and agricultural resilience, both of 
which underpin the very continuation of human life and society. By aiming to 
establish a global system to provide access to plant genetic materials, the Treaty 
supports farmers, plant breeders and scientists in their crop improvement work 
for an optimal adaptation to unpredictable environmental changes and future 
human needs.
Although the scope of the Treaty covers all PGR for food and agriculture,3 it 
has established a special regime of facilitated access for, at present, 64 food 
crops and forages listed in its Annex 1 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Annex 1 
crops’).4 This regime, known as the Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
1   See, for example, Asfaw and Lipper, 2011.
2   This has been clearly shown through studies such as Gore, 2002 and Thrupp, 2000.
3   Treaty Article 3. 
4   These crops have been chosen based on criteria of food security and interdependence (Treaty 
Article 11). The list also reflects a number of other factors, important among which are: (i) the 
historical legacy of crop genetic resource exchange between regions and countries dating back 
to Neolithic times; (ii) the international exchange regime for plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture, and paradigms prevalent prior to the International Treaty and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (particularly, the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources); 
(iii) international collaboration on agricultural research facilitated by the IARCs of the CGIAR; 
and (iv) the progressive application of intellectual property rights with regard to plant variety 
innovations over the last four decades in developed countries, and the extension of intellectual 
property regimes in developing countries following the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement under the WTO. Finally, the provisions of the Treaty defined 
the boundaries of the Multilateral System, representing the outcome of an extended and 
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Sharing (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Multilateral System’),5 considers 
the materials listed in Annex 1 to form part of a common pool shared by 
Contracting Parties and the entities under their jurisdiction.
The world’s ex situ collections of PGR for food and agriculture are distributed 
among national and international gene banks, and other institutional 
repositories. The provisions of the Multilateral System apply to all Annex 1 
crops held either by Contracting Parties or in trust by international institutions 
that have signed Treaty Article 15 Agreements. International institutions are 
obliged to make certain non-Annex 1 holdings available, in accordance with 
Article 15.1b. Both these sets of materials are available free of charge and 
without any other condition for access with the exception of the acceptance 
of a Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA).
The SMTA is a private law contract between the provider and the recipient 
of the material in question, and sets the terms and conditions for benefit-
sharing, which take both monetary and non-monetary forms. Benefit-sharing 
is not only a way to achieve the Treaty’s objectives through the funding of 
sustainability and conservation projects, but is also understood as a matter of 
equity.
The Multilateral System and its SMTA make the Treaty the first international 
instrument to provide a practical method of access and benefit-sharing, 
facilitating the exchange of genetic resources of Annex 1 crops without the 
need for complex bilateral negotiations.
The material distributed to individuals or institutions under the terms and 
conditions of the SMTA can be used in plant-breeding programmes (public 
or private), some of which may be incorporated into a new plant variety as 
part of its parentage. A number of new plant varieties thus developed will 
enter the market as commercial products, very often protected by intellectual 
property rights. In certain cases, utility patents are used for new plant varieties, 
in particular if these are also transgenic. More often, however, plant variety 
protection (PVP) is sought, although it is possible that a commercial variety 
may be released without being subject to any form of intellectual property 
protection.
complex political negotiating process (Frison et al., 2011).
5   Part IV of the Treaty, Articles 10–13. The Treaty has now been recognized as a constituent 
instrument of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the CBD: “The international regime 
is constituted of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising from their Utilization, 
as well as complementary instruments, including the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture and the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources 
and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization” (emphasis added) 
(UNEP/CBD/COP/10/Decision VII/19 D, 4th recital). Annex 1 to the Decision (the Protocol itself), 
in this regard, Recital 15 recognizes the “interdependence of all countries with regard to genetic 
resources for food and agriculture as well as their special nature and importance for achieving 
food security worldwide and for sustainable development of agriculture in the context of poverty 
alleviation and climate change and acknowledging the fundamental role of the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.”
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The SMTA provides for monetary benefit-sharing when material accessed 
under an SMTA has been incorporated into a commercial plant variety. The 
payment provisions are stipulated in the SMTA itself: Article 6.7 provides for 
a mandatory annual payment of 1.1 percent, less 30 percent, of the total 
sales of any product or products that are not “available without restriction to 
others for further research and breeding”. Article 6.8 provides for a voluntary 
payment in the case of any product or products that are “available without 
restriction to others for further research and breeding”, and the Treaty does 
not state what the expected level of such payments is. Under its Article 6.11, a 
recipient may opt for an alternative payment scheme, at the time of receiving 
an SMTA, for a specific crop or crops, whereby an annual payment is due for 
any product or products of this crop, independent of whether or not these 
are available without restriction. The rate of payment is 0.5 percent of sales. 
The SMTA is an unusual contract in that it creates a beneficial interest for 
the Treaty (rather than for the provider), which provides for payments to the 
Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund on commercialization of “a product that is a 
plant genetic resource for food and agriculture and that incorporates material 
accessed from the Multilateral System” (Article 13.2d(ii)). The Benefit-sharing 
Fund forms part of the Treaty’s Funding Strategy, whose overarching aim is to 
mobilize funds “for priority activities, plans and programmes, in particular in 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition” (Article 18) 
in order to assist farmers in conserving and sustainably using plant genetic 
resource for food and agriculture, with a particular focus on adaptation to 
climate change. Furthermore, the SMTA enjoins the recipients of material 
to share non-monetary benefits resulting from research and development 
carried out on the material through “the exchange of information, access to 
and transfer of technology, [and] capacity-building” (Article 13.2).
The wider economic benefits of the Treaty, however, reach far beyond the 
monetary and non-monetary sharing of benefits stipulated by the SMTA. 
In particular, it is important to note that access – the very basis of crop 
improvement, and crucial for sustainable economic and social development 
and food security – “constitutes in itself a major benefit of the Multilateral 
System” (Article 13.1). By defining access as a major benefit in itself, the 
Treaty makes clear that its economic impact is wider than the commercial 
benefits that access generates. Access under the Treaty expressly encourages 
the greatest possible use of PGR in plant breeding, which impacts positively 
on food security, sustainable agricultural development and wider economic 
growth. Moreover, the Treaty provides for the development of PGR networks 
(Article 16) and a global information system on PGR for food and agriculture 
(Article 17).
As the first international instrument to provide a functional mechanism 
for multilateral benefit-sharing, the Treaty promotes an institutional policy 
harmony with direct economic benefits. As a multilateral instrument, it 
expands the range of beneficiaries to whom benefits flow and thereby 
differs fundamentally from bilateral institutional arrangements such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, or CBD. “Access and Benefit-Sharing” 
under the CBD invariably amounts to an exclusive bilateral use licence, with 
monetary payment to the provider of materials, who constitutes the ultimate 
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beneficiary. Under the Treaty, both access and monetary benefit-sharing are 
multilateral. Materials from the Multilateral System may be accessed as a 
non-rival good, and monetary benefits paid to the Benefit-sharing Fund are 
transformed through the projects it funds as a cascade of non-monetary 
benefits that reach a wider set of beneficiaries.
While the commercial value of PGR for food and agriculture has been shown 
to constitute only a relatively small component of its total economic value,6 a 
certain part of this commercial value can be expected to flow into the Benefit-
sharing Fund of the Treaty, and thereby directly contribute to furthering its 
objectives through projects aimed at the conservation of PGR for food and 
agriculture and sustainable practices for their use. A reliable prediction of the 
magnitude of these flows would help with the strategic planning and agenda 
setting of the Governing Body with regard to implementation of the Treaty 
and its Funding Strategy. The studies brought together in this book constitute 
the first steps toward such a prediction.
A large number of SMTAs have been entered into since the Governing Body 
adopted the SMTA in June 2006. It is estimated that, on average, around 
800 materials are transferred every day via SMTAs.7 The Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) collections are important in 
this context, given that they hold at least 50 percent of all materials in the 
Multilateral System. For example, between 1 August 2008 and 31 November 
2009, the IARCs released 608 664 samples of accessions under SMTAs, 
and received 41 902 accessions of Annex 1 crops under SMTAs.8 Moreover, 
21 countries of the European Region reported to the Fourth Session of the 
Governing Body that they had issued 2 687 SMTAs, covering 318 001 samples.9 
Several Contracting Parties have also issued a large number of non-Annex 1 
accessions under SMTAs, as an independent policy decision, thereby creating a 
beneficial interest for the Treaty in products resulting from those accessions. For 
example, the Nordic Council of Ministers (grouping Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden) decided by the Nordic Ministerial Declaration, Access 
and Rights to Genetic Resources (2003) that “the Nordic Gene Bank should 
provide access to all its accessions on equal terms, regardless of whether they 
are covered by the scope of the multilateral system of the IT-PGRFA or not”. 
Canada, Germany and the Netherlands have also decided to make all their 
PGR for food and agriculture available under the terms and conditions of the 
SMTA.
However, at the time of writing, no payments have been made to the 
Benefit-sharing Fund in accordance with the provisions contained in the 
SMTA. One reason is that a large number of Contracting Parties have failed 
6   See Smale, 2005, in particular, but also Chapter 1 of this volume.
7   Experience of the IARC of the CGIAR with the implementation of the agreements with the 
Governing Body, with particular reference to the use of the standard material transfer agreement 
for Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 crops (IT/GB-4/11/Inf. 05).
8   Report on the Implementation of the Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing, para. 39 
(IT/GB-4/11/12).
9   Compilation of Submissions by Contracting Parties on the Implementation of the Multilateral 
System, Appendix 9 (IT/GB-4/11/Inf. 9).
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to make all or part of their PGR available as actually stipulated by the Treaty.10 
The performance of each Contracting Party in giving effect to the Treaty 
(e.g. notifying the Governing Body of materials available under the Multilateral 
System and making the necessary legal and administrative arrangements for 
access) plays a major role in determining the quantity of materials actually 
available through the Multilateral System for use in the innovation process, 
and hence affects benefit flows.
Another reason for the lack of payments to the Benefit-sharing Fund is 
that plant breeding is, by its nature, a slow process. Additionally, parental 
germplasm originating from a gene bank will in most cases require pre-
breeding efforts for developing a commercial variety. This period of time 
can vary greatly depending on the trait complexity and the ‘wildness’ of the 
original germplasm. Pre-breeding (also called ‘parent-building’) within applied 
breeding programmes takes years if not decades and may account for 10 to 
20 percent of the total of crosses made. Furthermore, a large majority of 
breeding crosses do not result in a commercial variety. In the private sector, 
breeders will typically start tens if not hundreds of new breeding populations 
every year, with the development of a single new commercial variety per 
year considered as a success. Since no payments have so far been made to 
the Benefit-sharing Fund in accordance with the provisions contained in the 
SMTA, it has to be assumed that no products deriving from materials accessed 
under an SMTA have yet been commercialized.
Aware that the build-up of a steady stream of monetary benefits from the 
use of the SMTA is likely to take many years, the Governing Body established a 
target for fund-raising for the Benefit-sharing Fund of $116 million by 2014,11 
to be mobilized through contributions from donors, not directly deriving from 
the workings of the Multilateral System and the SMTA. Contributions are 
actively encouraged from Contracting Parties and international institutions 
as well as from foundations and private donors. In 2009, Norway made the 
important decision to donate a sum equal to 0.1 percent of all annual seed 
sales in the country to the Fund. Voluntary contributions from several other 
countries allowed the Benefit-sharing Fund to exceed the target for 2010, and 
have already enabled the Treaty to fund a number of projects in developing 
countries.
The broader picture of possible income for the Benefit-sharing Fund under 
the SMTA remains, however, unclear. Moreover, there is a lack of recognition 
regarding the Treaty’s wider economic benefits, which are extensive and reach 
far beyond the commercial value of PGR for food and agriculture exchanged 
under SMTAs. Policy makers generally fail to recognize this full range of 
10  “Considering that there are 127 Contracting Parties to the Treaty, a significant number of 
them is yet to provide information or notify the Secretariat of plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture within their jurisdictions that are in the Multilateral System”, Report on the 
implementation of the Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing, para. 28 (IT/GB-
4/11/12).
11  Resolution 3/2009.
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economic dimensions of PGR for food and agriculture, engendering policies 
that risk sub-optimal levels of genetic resources conservation and sustainable 
use.12
This book brings together a set of studies that, for the first time, address 
the question of how to identify the panoply of benefits to which the Treaty 
gives rise, and in particular, how to achieve a robust estimation of income to 
the Benefit-sharing Fund.
Structure of the book
In Chapter 1, Adam Drucker and Francesco Caracciolo provide an overview of 
both the conceptual bases for assigning economic value to PGR for food and 
agriculture, and of the existing methodologies for establishing such values. 
While determining the Treaty’s overall economic value is an important task, 
quantification is beset by complexity and would moreover require comparison 
against other possible institutional arrangements, including those in which 
bilateral exchange of PGR or open access predominate – rather than multilateral 
exchange. Some promising approaches to such quantification are suggested in 
Chapter 1.
In Chapter 2, C.S. Srinivasan approaches the determination of the potential 
income that may flow from the use of SMTAs into the Benefit-sharing Fund 
through an innovative empirical investigation, which bases its estimations on 
the proportion of value of the global seed market attributable to plant varieties 
incorporating material accessed under SMTA conditions. In the absence of 
reliable information on the use in product development of materials accessed 
under SMTA conditions, Srinivasan uses the proxy measure of the value share in 
the commercial seed market of varieties incorporating germplasm traceable to 
CGIAR collections, which has always been freely available to and substantially 
used by private and public sector institutions in developed and developing 
countries. It can therefore serve as a historical indicator of the likely use of crop 
genetic resources now in the Multilateral System.
Another pioneering approach to determine the potential income to the 
Benefit-sharing Fund from the use of the SMTA is presented in Chapter 3. Clive 
Stannard, Francesco Caracciolo and Peter Hillery have developed an algorithm 
that models the process of developing commercial products from materials 
accessed under an SMTA. The factors of this algorithm can be varied so as to 
simulate the magnitude of flows into the Benefit-sharing Fund under a number 
of possible scenarios. The approach applied by the model, similar to Srinivasan’s 
economic analysis, begins with valuing the international seed and planting 
material market, and within this overall value, the seed market for Annex 1 
crops. It then estimates the proportion of products likely, at a given date, to 
12  See also Wale, 2011.
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be derived from materials accessed under an SMTA. A number of functions 
are then applied to these values in order to estimate the part of the market to 
which the terms and conditions of the SMTA apply at a particular time.13 This is 
the first attempt to develop a methodology to project monetary benefits likely 
to flow into the Benefit-sharing Fund, in order to estimate the time needed for 
these benefits to build up to a significant annual level. By varying its parameters, 
the model can test the relative importance of a number of factors for the likely 
flow of income to the to the Benefit-sharing Fund over time, as well as evaluate 
the sensitivity and importance of the individual factors within the algorithm. It is 
clearly a theoretical construct that produces hypothetical estimates, with a wide 
range of uncertainty: given current data constraints, it is not a calculation of real 
values, with a strong degree of certainty. The results of implementing the model 
must be seen as indicative, to be adjusted in future work and when robust data 
become available. For now, the relationship of the estimates under different sets 
of assumptions is more significant than the actual numbers.
With a view to developing methods to assess the use of material under SMTA 
conditions in plant variety development, Paul Oldham and Stephen Hall test 
an informatics-based approach in Chapter 4 through the coordinated use 
and mining of multiple databases. This approach assesses the commercial use 
of material brought under the terms and conditions of the SMTA by linking 
protected plant varieties that potentially involve the use of materials under 
SMTA conditions – i.e. Annex 1 species, through detailed breeding histories 
and genealogy information – to materials actually accessed under SMTA. Their 
work brings together plant variety innovation databases,14 genealogy databases 
and breeding histories, as well as information on SMTA-use, and uses high-
end computing capacity and purpose-designed algorithms to analyse these 
resources. Oldham and Hall also take steps to estimate the value and quantify the 
Treaty’s non-monetary benefits by large-scale computational analyses involving, 
in particular, patent and plant variety-protection databases, text-mining tools 
and digital collections of scientific publications.
Some of the parameters of the mathematical model (Chapter 3) are set using 
values yielded by Srinivasan’s investigation (Chapter 2) and the informatics-based 
approach (Chapter 4) yield. Moreover, the results of a survey of plant-breeding 
13  The absolute margin of error therefore lies within the bounds of these empirical values, and is 
likely to be less subject to the errors of other approaches. An alternative approach might, for 
example, identify the number and kind of materials accessed under SMTAs since the adoption 
of the SMTA, project forward the likely releases of further materials under the SMTA, and then 
attempt to estimate the products derived from them over time and their likely value. Such an 
alternative, however, would be subject to increased cumulative error.
14  In developed countries, some form of intellectual property protection is almost universally applied 
to plant varieties. Intellectual property databases can serve as good sources of information 
on new plant varieties intended for commercialization. Of particular use in this context are 
patent databases and PVP databases. In developing countries, intellectual property is still mostly 
rarely applied to plant varieties, in spite of the extension of PVP regimes to these countries, in 
accordance with the TRIPs Agreement. The identification of relevant products in developing 
countries may require reliance on other types of data sources, such as variety registration 
systems or recommended variety lists. See also Chapter 2 below.
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experts led by Maryline Guiramand (see Annex) have been key in supplementing 
and bolstering the data used in the modelling process. This survey has used 
direct inquiry and expert consultation of the plant breeding community, through 
interviews and questionnaires, to obtain figures for the mathematical model 
based on best estimates, where harder data have been impossible to find 
elsewhere. Its results are based on too small a sample size to be representative, 
and further work in this area is envisaged.
Monetary benefit flows
Monetary benefit flows to the Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund are directly 
contingent on the use of materials governed by the Multilateral System and 
distributed by means of a SMTA. The use of materials under SMTA conditions 
is in turn influenced by a range of factors, some of which can be significantly 
affected through policy choice. 
The Multilateral System currently covers nearly two-thirds of global ex situ 
holdings of Annex 1 crops. The duplication of crop germplasm across multiple 
collections implies that some material may be available both in collections 
that are part of the Multilateral System and collections that are not. While the 
availability of materials outside of the Multilateral System will vary by crop, 
little information is available on the size and coverage of these collections. 
During the consultations undertaken with plant breeding experts (see Annex), 
diverse opinions were expressed regarding private collections and the holdings 
of natural and legal persons. Some indicated that few commercial breeders 
maintained collections of material, but rather immediately introduced new 
material samples into their breeding programmes, relying on the national 
and international public sector for conservation. Others suggested that some 
of the larger breeding companies had built up ex situ collections in order to 
be able to work independently of the Treaty. With a view to achieving the 
fullest possible coverage of the Multilateral System, all holders of PGR for 
food and agriculture listed in Annex 1 have been invited to notify the Treaty’s 
Governing Body of materials that they are effectively making available through 
the Multilateral System, under the terms and conditions of the SMTA. The 
Governing Body has also stressed the importance of adequate information on 
these resources being made publicly available. As more of such holdings are 
covered by the Multilateral System, product development incorporating these 
materials, and therefore benefit flows, are likely to increase. The participation 
of more countries in the Treaty would also significantly enhance the potential 
level of benefit-sharing flows, especially given that countries with major gene 
bank holdings, such as China, Japan and the United States, have not yet joined 
the Treaty.
In practice, the demand for materials from the Multilateral System is 
also likely to be influenced by ease of access and related transaction costs. 
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Although one of the main objectives of the Treaty is to facilitate access to 
materials included in the Multilateral System through standardized terms and 
conditions, ease and speed of access and associated transaction costs can 
vary across Contracting Parties and institutions, depending on how effectively 
the Treaty has been implemented. At the time of writing, a large number of 
Contracting Parties have failed to make all or part of their PGR available as 
stipulated by the Treaty. More effective performance of Contracting Parties, 
including making the required legal and administrative arrangements for 
access, would increase possible income levels into the Benefit-sharing Fund, 
and the rate at which these build up. Relatedly, ex situ collections are generally 
maintained with relevant information for the identification of individual 
accessions (‘passport data’) and their potential use, albeit the level of detail 
and comprehensiveness of information may vary considerably both within and 
across gene banks and repositories. Plant genetic materials are of little use 
to breeding programmes unless passport data and characteristic information 
on agronomic traits, agro-climatic adaptability and susceptibility to diseases 
and pathogens are available and accessible. The use of materials under the 
Multilateral System will depend on the extent to which critical characterization 
information is accessible to potential users. This may vary by crop, country and 
institution hosting the collection. Even large, diverse and accessible collections 
might not be utilized unless supported by availability of relevant information. 
The utilization of germplasm under SMTA conditions in crop improvement 
programmes may hence be constrained by lack of effective access to resources 
held by Contracting Parties and by inadequate characterization and evaluation 
information on those resources that are accessible.
Another factor influencing use of materials under the Multilateral System 
is the composition of crop germplasm. For any crop, the materials in 
collections included in the Multilateral System may consist of: (i) wild relatives; 
(ii) traditional cultivars or landraces; (iii) pre-bred lines (i.e. current research 
material) and (iv) advanced improved cultivars or elite lines. As new pathogens 
emerge or agro-climatic adaptation needs shift, breeding programmes may 
be forced to go back to wild relatives or traditional cultivars, but the demand 
for these decreases rapidly as their useful traits are incorporated into breeding 
lines and advanced cultivars. Breeding lines are usually incorporated quickly 
into commercial varieties, whereas wild relatives take much more work and 
longer periods of time. Improved materials are therefore likely to be in greater 
demand by breeders than unimproved materials and will be included in a greater 
number of commercial products over a shorter period of time. A considerable 
proportion of the material released under SMTAs by the CGIAR Centres is a 
result of their research and development breeding programmes. The Centres 
reported to the Governing Body in 2011 that, for Annex 1, 71 percent of their 
distributions were of improved materials, and for non-Annex 1, 31 percent. 
The CGIAR Centres  are, therefore, likely to have a relatively very high weight 
in generating payments to the Benefit-sharing Fund, not least because of the 
high proportion of improved material in their collections.
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The demand for materials from the Multilateral System in breeding 
programmes is likely to vary with the amount of innovation activity that a 
particular crop attracts. This, in turn, is likely to be influenced by the size of the 
commercial market for that crop, research capacity available for that crop, and 
the research priorities and mandates of institutional breeding programmes. 
Using the grants of PVP certificates for different crops as a measure of research 
intensity in developed countries, Srinivasan presents the striking data in Chapter 
2 that non-Annex 1 crops account for two-thirds of all PVP certificates. The 
coverage of crops in Annex 1 of the Treaty, therefore, omits nearly two-thirds 
of the research effort in plant breeding from its purview. Research effort in 
non-Annex 1 crops and resulting innovations will not translate into benefit-
sharing payments. The share of Annex 1 crops in research effort has been 
declining over time, with their share in PVP certificates decreasing from 75 
percent in the 1960s to less than one-third in 2010. An increasing share of 
plant breeding research effort has been applied to non-Annex 1, the result of 
increasing research efforts attracted over the last two decades by crops not 
included in Annex 1, such as soybean, cotton and sugarcane. The share of 
these crops in the value of the global commercial seed market is also increasing. 
The limited coverage of crops currently included in Annex 1 severely constrains 
the potential for generating benefit-sharing payments through the exchange 
of PGR under SMTAs. Based on survey data from the FAO’s Global Partnership 
Initiative for Plant Breeding Capacity Building (GIPB), Chapter 2 further reveals 
that the potential for generation of innovations in Annex 1 crops, based on 
materials exchanged under SMTAs, is greater in developing countries. Yet, this 
potential may not translate into a larger flow of benefit-sharing payments, 
because these innovations are produced predominantly in the public sector, 
whose mandate to encourage the widespread adoption of improved varieties 
is likely to prevent the forms of intellectual property protection that lead to 
mandatory payments.
The relative importance of institutional players in the innovation process 
differs by country and crop, and has changed significantly over the last three 
decades (Anderson et al., 1994; Pardey et al., 1991). In most developing 
countries, the public sector has been and remains the dominant player in plant 
breeding research, although the private sector has started to play an increasing 
role with respect to several crops (Morris, 1998). In developed countries, the 
role of the public sector in ‘near-market’ plant breeding research has declined 
over the last two decades with the private sector now playing a dominant role 
in the breeding of new varieties of key crops (e.g. maize in the United States), 
particularly those involving the application of biotechnology.15 These different 
institutional players may have different propensities for demanding and using 
materials from the Multilateral System for their breeding programmes. Private 
sector institutions that seek to appropriate returns from their innovations may 
be inclined to avoid the use of materials subject to SMTA conditions that would 
15  See, for example, Alston et al., 1998.
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oblige them to make payments to the Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund. This is 
particularly the case with products brought under patents due to the legally 
enforceable mandatory nature of the payments required. The emergence of 
the CBD, the extended negotiation process leading to the Treaty, and the 
uncertainties surrounding the nature of the plant genetic resource exchange 
regime that would eventually emerge may have created additional incentives 
for private sector breeding programmes to stockpile materials before the Treaty 
came into force. Moreover, technical difficulties and transaction costs are imposed 
on a breeder by the need to document all ancestral materials throughout the 
many crosses in breeding populations, which might also impact willingness 
to use material under SMTA conditions. Some programmes may hence have 
adopted breeding strategies that avoid the use of materials brought under SMTA 
conditions and, if necessary, seek to access material from collections that do not 
form part of the Multilateral System. The preliminary survey of plant breeding 
experts (see Annex) found evidence for such explicit avoidance in the private 
sector. Making the use of materials under SMTA conditions more attractive, 
particularly to the private sector, would enhance benefit-sharing flows.
Monetary benefit-sharing provisions apply in cases in which material accessed 
under an SMTA has been incorporated into a commercial plant variety. In the 
event that the new variety is not subject to intellectual property protection and/
or may be freely used without restrictions in the development of follow-on 
products, payment is voluntary (under Article 6.8 of the SMTA). Evidence from 
the plant breeder survey suggests that voluntary payments are in practice likely 
to be minimal at best. In strategic terms, voluntary payments by one company, 
which competitors avoid, would create uneven competition and a market 
disadvantage. Lack of certainty regarding the intentions of competitors creates 
a situation in which companies hesitate to be the first to make payments (see 
also Chapter 3). The magnitude of potential income to the Benefit-sharing Fund 
is acutely contingent on institutional arrangements that incentivize a high level 
of voluntary payments.
Furthermore, at the time of writing, the Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund has not 
received any payments in accordance with provisions contained in the SMTA; 
therefore, the studies in this book all proceed on the assumption that no 
products incorporating materials accessed under SMTA conditions have to date 
been developed. In order to empirically assess the potential development of 
such products and the concomitant payment obligations in the future, however, 
access to detailed breeding histories of new plant varieties is necessary. Since 
mandatory or voluntary payments arise from the SMTA when material received 
under an SMTA is used in the development of new varieties of plants, genealogical 
information of new plant varieties is necessary to project payment obligations. 
Yet, the availability of such genealogical information varies considerably across 
countries, crops and sectors. While the CGIAR has set up fairly extensive 
genealogy databases for four to five major crops through the International Crop 
Information System (ICIS), no pedigree information is available on proprietary 
varieties developed by the private sector. This makes it extremely difficult to 
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assess the use of material under SMTA conditions in product innovation. The 
empirical assessment of such use requires the collation of information from 
product innovation databases, genealogy databases and crop databases; such a 
methodology is tested by Oldham and Hall in Chapter 4.
Initial caveats
Information currently available to evaluate and quantify the benefits presently and 
potentially flowing from the use and exchange of PGR for food and agriculture, 
under the Multilateral System, is extremely deficient. In many instances, the 
studies in this book had to make us of proxies and estimates, and their results 
need to be understood as preliminary.
Due to time and resource constrictions, the studies presented here had to 
limit their focus to a few important crops for which information was available 
and easily accessible. Wheat, maize and rice were chosen as objects of study.16 
Moreover, these large crops are expected to contribute a substantial part of 
the overall flow of income to the Benefit-sharing Fund, and are the mandate 
crops of the CIMMYT, IRRI and the Africa Rice Centre. These three international 
institutions have concluded Treaty Article 15 Agreements and their collected 
germplasm is available by means of the SMTA. For completeness, Annex 1 crops 
and non-Annex 1 crops were also studied, as groups.
The magnitude of income flows into the Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund is 
directly related to the commercial value of new plant varieties incorporating 
material accessed by means of an SMTA; however, severe data constraints 
make the determination of this value very difficult. Particularly problematic 
for the purposes of the studies brought together in this book has been the 
state of information on the value of the global commercial seed market. Given 
the timeframe of the project, aggregate data published by the International 
Seed Federation (ISF), itself based largely on estimates, have had to be used in 
conjunction with a commercial report prepared by Global Industry Analysts (GIA, 
2010). The problems arise in particular from lack of adequate statistical sources 
on the seed market. There are only three main sources of seed statistics: (i) seed 
companies in the public and private sector; (ii) the seed regulatory system 
(i.e. seed certification); and (iii) trade statistics on seed exports and imports. 
None of these statistics provide reliable information at the crop or variety level, 
which is critical for assessment of likely payments in accordance with the SMTA.
16   It is important to note that during the consultations undertaken with plant-breeding experts 
(see Annex to this volume), the commercial importance of vegetables as a potential source of 
income to the Treaty was stressed. However, vegetables as a category are very heterogeneous 
in agronomic terms, with some included in, and some excluded from, the Multilateral System. 
For this reason, and given the time constraints of the research project that produced the present 
studies, it was decided not to include vegetable crops as a distinct category in the first iteration 
of the mathematical model in Chapter 3. This, however, should be a priority in any further 
development of the model.
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An initial report summarizing the findings was submitted to a number of 
peer reviewers from all regions and sectors, whose valuable suggestions are 
reflected in the chapters of this book. Some peer reviewers from the plant 
breeding industry highlighted the need for realism regarding the assumptions 
in the scenarios modelled in Chapter 3. They expect extensive avoidance of 
materials under SMTAs and believe that voluntary payments will be minimal. 
These two factors are simulated in the model and are tested at different rates of 
performance, from high to low. The results confirm that they are indeed crucial. 
A consistent, relatively high acceptance of SMTA materials as well as consistent 
voluntary payment were assumed when testing other factors. This was to 
ensure comparability between scenarios and should not be misunderstood as a 
statement of likelihood.
Moreover, the computational model is restricted to ex situ collections of 
countries and international institutions due to lack of information on the size 
and the nature of the holdings of PGR by natural and legal persons. For this 
reason, no attempt was made to model the latter, despite the importance given 
to them in Articles 11.2 to 11.4 of the Treaty. Nor does the model adequately 
reflect the very high value of materials issued by the breeding programmes of 
the CGIAR, rather than by their ex situ collections.
All findings indicate that there may be long timescale for the build-up of 
income to the Treaty. Moreover, the longer the timescale, the more likely that 
plant breeding methodologies and market conditions will change. With respect 
to the mathematical model, the probability of accuracy declines with distance in 
time; no methodology can remedy this intrinsic uncertainty.
None of the authors seek to propose changes to the provisions of the Treaty 
and the SMTA, or suggest alternative benefit-sharing systems. This is not the 
purpose of this book and the studies on which it is based. Changes to the 
Treaty or the SMTA are the prerogative of Contracting Parties, and there are no 
indications from the Governing Body on which such speculation could be based. 
The research presented here therefore strictly reflects the actual provisions of the 
Treaty and the SMTA.
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Chapter 1
THE ECONOMIC VALUE 
OF PLANT GENETIC 
RESOURCES FOR FOOD 
AND AGRICULTURE
Adam Drucker and Francesco Caracciolo
IdentIfyIng BenefIt flowS 
2 Equity and food for all
1.1 Introductory note:  scope of this chapter
The potential benefits that may be associated with access, exchange and use of PGR for 
food and agriculture under the Treaty arise from: 
•	 the establishment of an agreed international framework for the conservation, 
sustainable utilization, exchange and use of PGR for food and agriculture generally; 
and 
•	 at the level of the Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-sharing, the economic 
value of the collections of the crops that it covers (“Annex 1 crops”), made available 
under facilitated access.
An understanding of the wide range of monetary, indirect monetary and non-monetary 
(broadly and narrowly defined) benefits arising from access, exchange and use of SMTA 
materials provides a basis for the estimation of the magnitude of monetary contributions 
to the Benefit-sharing Fund as performed in Chapter 2 and for the modelling of these 
contributions in Chapter 3. The present chapter contributes to this understanding by 
undertaking a review of existing literature, leading to the documentation and synthesis 
of the underlying conceptual basis for assigning economic values to PGR for food and 
agriculture, the methodologies for valuing it, as well as the attributed values. In particular, 
this chapter:
•	 provides a general framework for improved understanding of the potential monetary 
and non-monetary values that may be associated with the access, exchange and use of 
PGR for food and agriculture in general, and more specifically under the Treaty, as the 
relevant international policy framework;
•	 reviews the existing conceptual and quantitative literature regarding the total economic 
value (including use and option values) of PGR for food and agriculture, and the 
methodologies for establishing such values. 
Our review indicates that the indirect monetary and (broadly defined) non-monetary 
benefits generated by the existence of the Treaty and its Multilateral System are indeed 
likely to be significant. The commercial value of the use of PGR for food and agriculture 
has in general been shown to be only a relatively small component of its total economic 
value to society compared to the overall social welfare impact of productivity benefits 
accruing to society as a whole and especially to consumers in terms of lower food prices. 
Although methods that could be used for attributing the benefits of specific plant 
breeding programmes are extensive and continue to be refined, in determining the 
impact on overall social welfare of the benefits arising from the institutional existence 
of the Treaty and the Multilateral System, it would first be necessary to compare them 
against some alternative bilateral and/or open access exchange scenarios, for example, 
through a simulation model approach. Such approaches should account for the associated 
transaction costs, which include implementation, monitoring and enforcement, which are 
implicit in each scenario.
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For the narrowly defined non-monetary benefits, a potentially innovative and promising 
way in which to identify such benefits (as a first step to assessing their impact on overall 
social welfare) could involve drawing on scientometrics or bibliometrics (the analysis of 
scientific literature). Through the mapping of research networks, it appears to be increasingly 
possible to identify such non-monetary benefits in terms of actual collaborations between 
researchers, and the training and exchange of students and postdoctoral researchers and 
staff between institutions. Through such an approach, such collaborations embodying 
knowledge exchange and transfers within networks may also be revealed to be a major 
component of non-monetary benefit-sharing. In Chapter 4, the practical execution of 
such an approach is tested.
1.2 the nature of the monetary and non-monetary values that 
may be associated with access to, and use and exchange of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture
Overviews and surveys discussing the sources of economic value of PGR for food and 
agriculture have been numerous, including Pearce and Moran (1994), Swanson (1996), 
Evenson and Santaniello (1998), and Gollin and Smale (1998). 
In general, all sources of economic value associated with crop biodiversity, as with 
other goods and services, are considered to emanate from human preferences, given 
economics’ utilitarian and anthropocentric underpinnings (Randall, 1988). Pearce and 
Moran (1994) argue that the maintenance of biodiversity generates economic values (use 
and non-use), which may not be captured in the market place. The result of this ‘failure’ 
is a distortion where the incentives are against biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
use and in favour of the economic activities that erode such resources.1 Such outcomes 
are, from an economic viewpoint, associated with market, intervention and/or global 
1   Institutional arrangements can contribute to such distortions. For example, genetic resources conservation 
and sustainable use concerns arise from the way property rights have been assigned within the plant 
breeding “industry”. Swanson and Göschl (2000) argue that in a vertical industry, the location of a property 
rights assignment is a crucial factor determining the incentives for efficient levels of investment at various 
levels of that industry. In the context of plant genetic resources, the current assignment of property rights 
has been at the retail end of the pharmaceutical and plant breeding industries. The assignment of plant 
breeders’ rights (PBRs) has consequently led to an increase in: the number of research and development 
(R&D) programmes; the total number of plant breeders; and in the aggregate amount of R&D expenditure 
and private R&D (see Swanson and Göschl, 2000. p. 84). At the same time, however, there is no evidence 
that investments increased in the essential input activities that would maintain a flow of genetic resources 
into the future (e.g. habitat and biodiversity conservation). Hence, PBRs have tended to create incentives to 
invest at the end of the industry (i.e. the plant breeding sector), but not in the earlier parts of the industry 
(i.e. the genetic resource providers sector). This has had an impact on both efficiency and equity within the 
industry. Farmers’ rights have been proposed as a form of counterbalance to PBRs, leading to the protection 
of traditional knowledge and equitable participation in benefit sharing. The Treaty Benefit-sharing Fund may 
be viewed as a different type of institutional arrangement that also contributes to such outcomes.
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appropriation failures. As a result, genetic resources are unlikely to have an exchange 
value that reflects their economic scarcity. Furthermore, when such goods (i.e. biodiversity) 
have both private and public attributes, a social dilemma results. Although such goods 
generate benefits for society, their public good nature will result in a tendency for them 
to be under-maintained relative to national, regional, or global needs. Policy interventions 
to support their production would therefore be considered justifiable if society’s goals are 
to be met, provided that it can be demonstrated that such interventions can generate net 
benefits.2 An example of a social goal is the sustainable management of crop and livestock 
biodiversity (Drucker et al., 2005).
Concerns about genetic erosion in crops have led to a genuine effort to “insure” against 
losses by sampling and storing large numbers of landraces and wild relatives of cultivated 
plants ex situ (out of place or origin, or source) in collections, or gene banks. Some experts 
consider that a large proportion of genetic variation in a number of major crop plants 
is conserved ex situ, in gene banks or plant breeders’ collections (Evenson et al., 1998, 
p. 2; Fowler et al., 2001). However, ex situ efforts have focused mainly on major staple 
crops and their wild relatives3  and do not cater to safeguarding the larger spectrum of 
agrobiodiversity and its associated knowledge, culture and traditions.
Effective policies to stem agrobiodiversity loss also require improved tools and the 
capacity to both properly account for the values associated with the services and benefits 
derived from agrobiodiversity, as well as to design appropriate instruments to capture 
such values, given that many of them are not reflected in the marketplace. Without such 
tools, cost-effective interventions and associated policies can neither be designed nor 
implemented.
In a review of methodologies for the economic analysis of genetic resource conservation 
and sustainable use, Drucker et al. (2005) and Smale and Drucker (2007) note that such 
methods, when used in conjunction with rural appraisal methodologies, can reveal useful 
estimates of the values that are placed on market and non-market attributes. Such data 
are generally considered crucial, inter alia, for:
•	 identifying trait values in breeding programmes;
•	 demonstrating the benefits, as well as the costs of conservation;
•	 identifying cost-efficient, diversity maximizing, or optimal conservation strategies;
•	 orienting policies aimed at genetic resources conservation/sustainable use, including 
through incentive and benefit-sharing mechanism design.
The potential utility and contribution of economics to crop genetic resources conservation 
and sustainable use is further highlighted by the CBD Conference of the Parties (COP) 
8 Decision VIII/25, which, for biodiversity in general, encourages the strengthening of 
“research activities including research cooperation and exchange at national, regional 
2   In the case of the Treaty and the Multilateral System, its implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs 
should be considered in the process of determining the existence of net benefits.
3   See Gepts (2006) for a review on conservation of plant genetic resources.
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and international levels [...] in order to promote a common understanding of valuation 
techniques among governments and stakeholders” (para. 7) and “to explore options for 
the design and application of flexible and reliable innovative tools for assessment and 
valuation of biodiversity resources and functions and associated ecosystem services” (para. 
10c). The development of positive incentives is further called for under the CBD’s Strategic 
Plan for 2011–2020.4 
1.2.1 Total Economic Value Framework
In order to determine the degree of the importance of the market and non-market values 
associated with access to, use and exchange of crop genetic resources and how they can 
be taken into account to support conservation and sustainable use, it is useful to consider 
the different types of value that can be associated with these resources.
In this context, a total economic value (TEV) framework approach (Turner et al., 2003; 
Pearce and Moran, 1994) is generally used in order to allow an effective categorization 
or taxonomy of the different types of value that one may attribute to PGR for food and 
agriculture (see Figure 1.1). 
Although the exact terminology changes among studies, such values can broadly be 
categorized into use and non-use values (Smale and Koo, 2003). Use values may be direct 
or indirect. direct use values derive from the utility gained from the food, fibre and 
medicinal products contributed by the PGR, including the amenity and socio-cultural 
values associated with their attributes. Such values may consequently be associated 
with a mixture of private and public goods; the latter are more difficult for individuals to 
appropriate. 
There are also many current and future uses for these resources other than their direct 
use in breeding new crop varieties. Indirect use values reflect the contribution of crop 
genetic resources to surrounding habitats or ecosystems. In addition, a use value, option 
value, which is a type of insurance against unknown future change, provides flexibility to 
deal with unexpected future demand (such as that resulting from climate change). Subtly 
different but related to option values are quasi-option values. The latter relates to the 
extra value attached to future information made available through the preservation of a 
resource. Quasi-option values arise from the irreversible nature of species or variety loss 
(after which no further learning can take place) and can occur even in the absence of 
uncertainty (FAO, 2007). 
non-use values, such as existence or bequest values, reflect the satisfaction 
individuals or societies may derive simply from knowing that something exists or will be 
passed on to future generations, independently of whether or not it is used. 
Policy makers generally fail to recognize this full range of the economic dimensions of 
PGR for food and agriculture (Wale, 2011), engendering policies that risk sub-optimal levels 
4  COP 10 Decision X/2, available at: www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12268
IdentIfyIng BenefIt flowS 
6 Equity and food for all
of genetic resources conservation and sustainable use. Although it is generally assumed 
for crop genetic resources that most of the value associated with their diversity is related 
to use, rather than non-use, or existence values (Smale and Koo, 2003),5 the full range of 
public/private goods associated with the use values still needs to be accounted for.
The significance of these values has led crop genetic resource gene banks to be widely 
established, with the aim of enhancing direct use values of these resources, while at the same 
time safeguarding option values. Determining such values is not straightforward, however, 
even conceptually, because it should be appreciated that, under the TEV framework, values 
may not be mutually exclusive and overlap. Accurate quantification of the benefits of PGR 
for food and agriculture remains a difficult task. This assignment is further exacerbated given 
the multidimensional and inter-temporal nature of germplasm stocks. The peculiarity of the 
natural reproducibility of the good and the impossibility to clearly establish property rights 
and to distinctly identify beneficiaries intensify its public good characteristics, which together 
with the existence of a significant number of non-monetary benefits (see section 1.4.3 below 
for further details) makes the valuation task even more complex (Smale and Koo, 2003). 
5   It is interesting to note that this is a feature that tends to distinguish agrobiodiversity from other types of 
diversity.
 
  
 
 
Total economic 
value 
Use value  Non-use value  
Direct use 
value 
Consumptive Non-consumptive 
Indirect use 
value 
Existence 
value 
Bequest value Option value 
TEV = UV + NUV = (DUV + IUV + OV) + (XV + BV) 
Figure 1.1 Total economic value (TEV) framework: a taxonomy of biodiversity
Source: Pearce and Moran, 1994.
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In practical terms, the evaluation of a marginal accession value often requires 
“significant expense in time, talent and money” (Pardey et al., 1999) and generally ends 
up underestimating the total value of the resource stock as the material is often used 
more than once, in subsequent breeding efforts, at different times and in different places 
(Rubenstein et al., 2006). Furthermore, strong uncertainty characteristics associated with 
the option and non-use values aggravate this tendency. 
In addition to such challenges, some have argued that using economics to assign any 
value to a species is inherently unethical (Ehrenfeld, 1988). By ignoring ‘intrinsic values’ 
(i.e. values nominally unrelated to human use, such as the ‘right’ of a species to exist) 
and by putting economic conditions on the conservation decision, it is argued that these 
rights are contravened (Pearce and Moran, 1994). Others have viewed valuation as self-
serving, seeking to justify, rather than explain or predict. At other times, the emphasis on 
the valuation is perceived as “distancing economists from natural scientists” (Dyer Leal, 
2002). However, Pearce and Moran argue that: the economic view can also be regarded as 
a moral view given that it takes an effectively utilitarian approach to conservation; due to 
the current situation of crisis, a utilitarian approach is likely to be superior from the point 
of view of saving biodiversity in real world contexts; current human population growth 
makes further loss of biodiversity inevitable and therefore is essential to establish priorities, 
which is inconsistent with arguing that everything has an equal right to exist; given that 
‘economic’ causes are important, whatever one’s moral standpoint, a practical agenda 
for conservation should begin with economic factors; and finally, that since people are 
often utilitarian, it is the only approach that truly explains why biodiversity is being lost, 
and hence the process of policy correction. Nevertheless, even proponents recognize that 
valuation should not be viewed as an end in and of itself, but rather as a tool that can 
assist in designing policies to support the sustainable management of biodiversity. 
Despite such challenges to the effective valuation of PGR for food and agriculture, an 
increase in the scientific literature (reviewed by scholars such as Drucker et al., 2005,6 among 
others) has eased major methodological/analytical constraints, and over approximately the 
past 20 years, a wide range of tools and analytical approaches have been successfully 
applied to a number of crops/species and domestic animal breeds, production systems 
and locations. These methods and their associated findings are considered in the following 
section.
6   This review was undertaken as a result of a specific recommendation of the “Managing Agricultural 
Biodiversity for Sustainable Development” workshop organized by the International Plant Genetic Resources 
Institute (IPGRI) for the System-wide Genetic Resources Programme (SGRP) of the CGIAR (Nairobi, October, 
2003). Subsequently, SGRP agreed to support an expert workshop entitled “Valuation tools for managing 
agricultural biodiversity: state of the art and future directions” (Washington, DC, October 2005) and 
contributed to the discussions at SBSTAA 11 (Montreal, Nov/Dec. 2005).
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1.3 economics of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture – 
state of the art
There is a large literature regarding the economic benefits of improved crop varieties in 
commercial agriculture, and an extensive amount of conceptual and theoretical literature 
concerning the sources of value in crop genetic resources and biodiversity.7 
At the more general level of biodiversity, the Annex to COP 8 Decision VIII/25 (“Options 
for the application of tools for valuation of biodiversity and biodiversity resources and 
functions”) draws on the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment to categorize valuation tools 
as being based on revealed-preference methods (change in productivity; human capital 
approach; cost-based approaches; least-cost approaches; travel cost method; and hedonic 
price approaches), stated preference methods (contingent valuation and choice modelling) 
and “other” (benefit transfer studies). 
In the specific context of agrobiodiversity valuation, Smale and Drucker (2007), 
Drucker et al. (2001) and Drucker and Scarpa (2003) review existing tools that involve: 
econometric methods; mathematical programming (including optimization models); 
Monte Carlo simulations; search theoretic frameworks; contingent valuation and 
choice experiments; production loss averted, opportunity cost, and least-cost methods; 
aggregate demand and supply (including economic surplus methods); cross-sectional 
farm and household methods; farm simulation and breeding programme evaluation 
(including aggregated productivity models); genetic production functions; market share 
methods; intellectual property rights (IPR) and contract values; and safe minimum 
standards approaches. Such valuation tools involve the identification of information 
requirements, data collection and econometric methods and analytical techniques. 
Nevertheless, important gaps remain. 
COP 8 Decision VIII/25 (para. 6 of the Annex) notes that “the choice of the valuation 
tool or valuation tools in any given instance will be informed by the characteristics 
of the case, including the scale of the problem and the types of value deemed to be 
most relevant, and by data availability”. Smale and Drucker (2007) and Drucker et al. 
(2005) consequently find it useful to carry out their analytical overview in the context 
of a number of key research and development questions, summarized in the following 
sections.8
7   An annotated bibliography of related literature is available at: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/bioconserv-
2nd-edition (to 2008); and http://www.mendeley.com/groups/1269631/economics-of-agrobiodiversity-
conservation-and-use-bibliographic-database/ (2009 onwards).
8   All references in the following subsections are available at: http://www.bioversityinternational.org/
fileadmin/bioversity/publications/pdfs/1060_Valuation_and_Sustainable_Management_of_Crop_and_
Livestock_Biodiversity.A_Review_of_Applied_Economics_Literature.pdf 
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1.3.1 What are the costs and benefits of ex situ conservation? 
Methods and tools: To estimate the benefits expected from using an additional gene bank 
accession in crop breeding, studies have employed mathematical programming, Monte Carlo 
simulations, and maximum entropy methods in a search theoretic framework, combined with 
partial equilibrium estimates of the productivity impact of the bred materials in farmer’s fields. 
Findings cannot be broadly generalized, and tools for widespread application have not yet been 
developed. Costs of conserving accessions have been estimated by applying the micro-economic 
theory of the firm and capital investment decisions. Based on these methods, tools could be 
developed and directly applied with spreadsheet analysis to gene bank cost data. 
Findings: The expected marginal value of exploiting an individual accession in commercial 
agricultural use justifies the cost of conserving it in a gene bank. The costs of conserving 
accessions in gene banks are relatively easy to tabulate compared to the expected benefits from 
the accessions they conserve (Pardey et al., 2001). If, as is shown in a set of studies compiled by 
Koo et al. (2004), the costs of conserving an accession are shown to be lower than any sensible 
lower-bound estimate of benefits, undertaking the expensive and challenging exercise of benefits 
estimation is not necessary to justify its conservation. 
Zohrabian et al. (2003) found that the expected marginal benefit from exploring an additional 
unimproved gene bank accession in breeding resistant varieties of soybean more than justified 
the costs of acquiring and conserving it.9 It has been suggested that many gene bank resources 
are primarily used when other options have failed, with low probabilities of success (Cox et al., 
1988). Since the payoff can be large for problems of economic importance when the desired 
traits are rare, conserving some categories of materials “untapped” for years can be justifiable; 
infrequent use of individual accessions by plant breeding programmes does not in itself imply that 
an additional accession will have low value (Gollin et al., 2000). 
A study of a large national gene bank indicates higher rates of direct utilization in plant breeding 
than suggested earlier, secondary use through sharing within and outside respondents’ institutions, 
and proportionately higher use rates among respondents in low- and middle-income countries 
(Day-Rubenstein and Smale, 2004). Most plant genetic resources (PGR) conserved in gene banks 
reach commercially oriented farmers when they are bred into improved varieties, although there 
are outstanding examples of direct distribution of gene bank materials to farmers, including those 
that are more subsistence-oriented (Hawkes et al., 2000; King, 2003). 
Other than this literature, sample surveys have been conducted to assess the extent of gene 
bank utilization by plant breeders, other scientists, and farmers (Brennan et al., 1999; Smale and 
Day-Rubenstein, 2002; Duvick 1984; Rejesus et al., 1996). These do not apply economics analysis 
frameworks, although they are motivated by notions of use value, and breeder demand for and 
supply of materials.
Limitations: Costs and benefits estimated from detailed studies of large national and international 
gene banks cannot be generalized. The range in benefits is extremely sensitive to assumptions 
concerning the lag until variety release, and the discount rate, or time value of money. Although 
the statistical theory used in the search models accounts for relative abundance and the genetic 
differences among accessions with respect to the trait of interest, the range in simulated benefits 
is too wide for confidence. The cost analyses distinguish between crops and types of collections, 
but treat each accession as genetically equivalent.
Source: Smale, 2005.
9   A further review of search theoretic models can be found in Appendix 1.1.  
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1.3.2 What is the commercial value from exploiting an individual plant species 
or crop genetic resource?
Methods and tools: The value of diversity in crop or animal species has been modelled theoretically, 
supported in some cases by empirical data (Brown and Goldstein, 1984; Weitzman, 1993; Polasky 
and Solow, 1995; Evenson and Lemarié, 1998; Simpson et al.,1996; Craft and Simpson, 2001; 
Rausser and Small, 2000). 
The global values of genetic resources, along with other ecosystem services, have been assessed 
in an ecological economics framework with large-scale secondary databases (Costanza et al., 
1997). The values of PGR and their diversity in crop breeding had been estimated by applying a 
combination of production economics and forms of hedonic analysis (Evenson et al., 1998).
Findings: The marginal commercial value expected from an individual PGR in agricultural use 
will not be high enough, in general, to fund national innovation or conservation efforts at 
levels desirable for society. The perception that individual PGR have great commercial value 
is based largely on anecdotal cases in which substances identified in wild, indigenous plants 
have generated profits for pharmaceutical companies. Economics research has cast doubt on 
the likelihood that the willingness to pay for prospecting these resources in the pharmaceutical 
industry would be sufficient to promote the conservation of their habitats (Craft and Simpson, 
2001; Simpson et al., 1996; Koo and Wright, 2000). Evidence to suggest that any one landrace 
or improved variety will generate large commercial returns in agricultural use – and therefore 
huge benefits through restricting access to it – is even more modest. Gollin and Smale (1998, 
244–6) cautioned against ‘the myth of enormous value’ associated with an individual crop 
genetic resource. Although there are instances in which a single plant genetic resource has 
proved extremely valuable, these cannot be generalized. Economists are skeptical for the 
following three reasons: 
1. The process of plant breeding. In plant breeding, numerous genetic resources are continually 
shuffled and reshuffled in an uncertain search for traits that are well expressed in a crop 
variety destined for highly differentiated production conditions. Economically important traits 
are distributed statistically across PGR, with varying likelihood of encountering useful levels. 
The traits demanded by societies, such as resistance to plant pests and diseases, and quality 
attributes preferred by consumers also change frequently in response to environmental stress 
and economic changes, keeping plant breeders on a treadmill to surpass past accomplishments. 
Breeding products (crop varieties) contain many ‘ingredients’ that are also genetic resources, 
which are in turn combined with others to produce the next variety. There may be a weak 
result from the marginal contribution of the last resource. Attributing value to each ingredient 
is difficult.
2. The nature of crop production. Changes in productivity that underlie economic benefits from 
new varieties involve multiple factors in interaction with the seed. A well-known example is 
the Green Revolution in wheat. The economic benefits associated with the Green Revolution 
cannot be ascribed solely to the dwarfing genes, the landrace that contained them, or the 
scientist who initially bred it into another cultivar. An estimated 1 749 spring bread wheat 
cultivars were recorded as released by national breeding programmes in low- and middle-
income countries from 1966 to 1997, with a growing proportion carrying the semi-dwarf 
genes; by 1997, 88 percent of all spring bread wheat grown by farmers in these countries was 
sown to semi-dwarf types (Byerlee and Moya, 1993; Heisey et al., 2002). A number of farm 
physical, social, economic and policy factors influenced the widespread adoption of those 
cultivars, generating economic benefits through yield gains. Concurrently, major changes 
in the growing environments for varieties enhanced those yield gains, such as increased 
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water use, fertilizer application and the expertise of farmers. Production benefits were then 
distributed to society through effects on producers’ and consumers’ incomes. 
3. The existence of substitutes. To what extent are the traits and gene complexes embodied in 
seed unique to one PGR? The same trait may be apparent to one degree or another in many 
other PGR. Seed samples of the same genetic resource may also be found in more than one 
ex situ collection, in more than one political jurisdiction. Even when rare in a given collection, 
accessions carrying useful traits might be duplicated among seed samples (accessions) in 
multiple collections. Similarly, although locally rare in farmers’ fields, they could be globally 
abundant.10 
The commercial value11 of PGR in agricultural use is a relatively small component of its total 
economic value to society, however. Since other values are not captured well in market prices (and 
this is not likely to change in the near future), public investments in innovation and conservation 
will continue to be needed for social welfare (Brown, 1990; Swanson, 1996). Since the potential 
usefulness of any single genetic resource is often highly uncertain and time horizons for developing 
products from genetic resources are long, private investors typically under-invest in conserving 
them at the levels needed by society. As a consequence, the public sector has played a pivotal role 
in conserving these resources and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
Limitations: This literature has advanced the theoretical and conceptual understanding of issues. 
More conceptual and theoretical work is needed to develop a better understanding of feasible, 
cost-effective approaches to valuing multiple components of agricultural biodiversity and services 
(see, for example, Ceroni et al., 2005).
Source: Smale, 2005.
10  With regard to issues related to ‘what to conserve?’, the Weitzman approach (Weitzman, 1993 and 1998; 
Metrick and Weitzman, 1998) arises from a question related to the process by which it is possible to decide 
“which species to take on board Noah’s Ark”. The suggestion was that Noah should take species on board 
“in the order of their gains in utility plus diversity, weighted by the increase in their probability of survival, 
per dollar of cost”. The Weitzman approach thus combines measures of diversity, current risk status and 
conservation costs so as to permit the identification of a cost-effective diversity-maximizing set of species/
varieties or breed conservation priorities. Hence, for any given quantity of conservation funding available, it 
is possible to identify a priority conservation portfolio that maximizes the diversity that can be conserved.
11  Note that commercial value is not synonymous with – and may represent only a part of – ‘direct use values’.
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1.3.3 What is the rate of return to improvement of crop genetic resources?
 
Methods and tool: The compendium and state-of-the-art of methods used to assess the economic 
benefits or productivity gains are found in Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1998). Economic surplus 
or econometric methods are commonly used. Methodological challenges within the framework of 
assessing the commercial economic benefits of agricultural research are explored in a large body 
of literature, including Alston, Norton and Pardey (1998), Alston et al. (2000), and Morris and 
Heisey (2003).
Findings: There is ample evidence that the successive, continuous releases of improved varieties by 
plant breeding programmes, many of them publicly financed, have generated economic returns 
that far outweigh the costs of investment. The important role of PGR in the development of world 
agriculture is clear, both historically (Cox et al.,1988; Fowler 1994) and more recently (Fowler 
et al., 2001). Economists have repeatedly demonstrated that rates of return to investment in 
plant breeding programmes are high (Byerlee and Traxler, 1995; Morris and López-Pereira, 1999; 
Alston et al., 2000; Evenson, 2001; Heisey et al., 2002; Evenson and Gollin, 2003), although not 
necessarily mean in terms of appropriable commercial profits. 
Research on the farm-level adoption of these varieties was also extensive, reviewed in 1985 by 
Feder et al. (1985) and in 1993 by Feder and Umali. Although the marginal benefit that can be 
attributed to a single gene or genetic resource in plant breeding is likely to represent a relatively 
small proportion of the total, the productivity benefits accruing to society as a whole and especially 
to consumers in terms of lower food prices are large relative to the costs of investing in plant 
breeding.12 This is particularly true in less advanced agricultural economies where consumers 
spend a much larger proportion of their budgets on food. Successful innovation has depended on 
access to a wide range of materials (for example, Smale et al., 2002). 
Limitations: This literature is extensive and advanced, and methods for attributing the benefits 
of specific plant breeding programmes continue to be refined (Pardey et al., 2004). By contrast, 
methods for apportioning the benefits among ancestors and progenitors 13 require the imposition 
of unrealistic assumptions, even in highly bred crops. There are some examples of attempts to 
calculate these benefits in the literature (Gollin, 1998; Gollin and Evenson,1998; Johnson et al., 
2003). Similarly, assessing the economic benefits from crops that are not highly bred would require 
the use of other methods. 
Source: Smale, 2005.
A further review of the economics literature related to returns to plant breeding can 
be found in Appendix 1.2.
12  Such benefits are generally assessed in terms of impact on overall social welfare, measured through changes 
in consumer or producer surplus. Where improved productivity enhances supply, consumer surplus may 
increase because they are able to purchase a product for a lower price than the highest price that they 
would be willing – or had previously been willing – to pay. Similarly, producer surplus may change where 
productivity improvements allow producers to benefit by selling at a market price that is higher than the least 
that they would be (or had previously been) willing to sell for.
13  See Appendix 1.5 for further details regarding genetic resources interdependence.
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1.3.4 What is the effect of crop biodiversity on productivity, vulnerability and 
efficiency?
Methods: Initial attempts linked diversity in modern varieties in a partial productivity, production 
function framework, expanding to a mean-variance framework (Just and Pope, 1979) and a 
simultaneous equation system with cost shares. Data have been largely secondary, measured at 
the township, provincial, or regional level. Most diversity indices have been constructed from 
pedigree data, including a Herfindahl index, a Solow-Polasky index, and others based on the 
number of landrace progenitors or unique parental combinations in the genealogy. Temporal 
diversity indices (the area-weighted average age of varieties) and Shannon indices from agro-
morphological groups calculated with biometric techniques have also been constructed (Franco 
et al., 1998).
Findings: Studies testing the relationship of crop genetic diversity to productivity, vulnerability, 
and efficiency are inconclusive to date because methodologies require further development and 
validation. Associations are sometimes positive and sometimes negative. Findings cannot be 
generalized because they are specific to location, time period and cropping system. Several studies 
have tested the relationship of crop biodiversity to productivity, yield variability, and economic 
efficiency, particularly in farming systems dominated by modern varieties. Heisey et al. (1997) 
demonstrated that higher levels of latent genetic diversity in modern wheat varieties would have 
generated costs in terms of yield losses in some years in the Punjab of Pakistan. In others, the mix 
of varieties and their spatial distribution across the region generated both lower overall yields and 
less diversity than was feasible; that is, a yield-diversity trade-off was evident in some years, but 
not in others. 
In another study on wheat varieties in the Punjab of Pakistan, Smale et al. (1998) found that 
the production environment determines the relationship between diversity and productivity. For 
instance, among rainfed districts, genealogical distance and a greater number of different varieties 
grown of smaller areas were associated with both higher mean yields and lower yield variability. In 
the irrigated areas, by contrast, a high spatial concentration of wheat area among fewer varieties, 
or greater genetic uniformity had an important, positive effect on expected yields. Applying a 
similar approach, Widawsky and Rozelle (1998) concluded that rice variety diversity reduced both 
the mean and the variance of yields in townships of Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces of eastern 
China. Testing the relationship of wheat variety diversity to productivity and economic efficiency 
in China, Meng et al. (2003) found that although evenness in morphological groups contributed 
to higher per hectare costs of wheat produced, potentially important cost savings were apparent 
for some inputs, such as pesticides. A greater concentration of cooperative market associations in 
regions of southern Italy contributed to greater diversity of durum wheat varieties, which positively 
affected productivity over a number of years (Di Falco, 2003). 
Limitations: Temporal and dynamic concepts of resilience and stability need to be better 
incorporated, in addition to analyses based on expected or mean levels, to test vulnerability 
hypotheses. More general approaches require a more complete theoretical framework of decision-
making under risk with multiple outputs and differentiated genetic inputs, estimated structurally 
where data permit. A wider cross-section of case studies conducted in commercially oriented, as 
well as mixed and or subsistence-oriented systems are required in order to generalize and validate 
empirical findings. The shortcoming of the primal approach is that it enables tests on technical 
efficiency effects, but not on effects of crop biodiversity on allocative or economic efficiency. 
Source: Smale, 2005.
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1.4 Benefits generated by accessing and exchanging plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture under SMtAs 
Having identified the types of value associated with PGR for food and agriculture, the 
conceptual approaches and methods to quantify such values and the associated challenges, 
we now turn to an analysis of the specific benefits generated through accessing and 
exchanging these resources under the Treaty.
For this purpose, it is useful to consider the terminology and type of benefits identified 
within the text of the Treaty. Article 3 of the Treaty states that its scope relates to PGR 
for food and agriculture, which is understood to refer to “any genetic material of plant 
origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture”. Such an all-encompassing 
scope suggests that a wide range of benefits arising from access to, exchange and use of 
these resources may be attributed to the Treaty, which goes well beyond the Multilateral 
System. Other economic benefits flow from the policy harmony promoted by the Treaty 
with regard to conservation and sustainable use of PGR for food and agriculture, from the 
development of a Global Information System to facilitate the use of all PGR of interest to 
food and agriculture, the technical assistance and international cooperation foreseen in 
several articles of the Treaty, and from the implementation of the Treaty’s Funding Strategy.
 Through the Multilateral System, established by Article 13, the Treaty is the first 
international instrument to provide a functional mechanism for benefit-sharing, including 
monetary benefit-sharing. Here, the Treaty notes that the Contracting Parties consider 
that facilitated access to Annex 1 crop germplasm itself constitutes a major benefit of the 
Multilateral System (Article 13.1). The Parties also agree that benefits arising from use, 
including commercial use, of materials under the Multilateral System shall be shared fairly 
and equitably through the following mechanisms: the exchange of information; access to 
and transfer of technology; capacity-building; and the sharing of the benefits arising from 
commercialization (Article 13.2). Articles 13.2a–c then provide further details regarding 
the information, technology and capacity-building benefit-sharing mechanisms, while 
Article 13.2d considers the sharing of “monetary and other benefits of commercialization” 
through the involvement of the private and public sectors in activities identified under 
this Article, through partnerships and collaboration and in research and technology 
development.14 
14   The Treaty’s website further illustrates the potential range of benefits and beneficiaries, which include: (i) the 
scientific community, through access to the plant genetic resources crucial for research and plant breeding; 
(ii) both the public and private sectors, which are assured access to a wide range of genetic diversity 
for agricultural development; (iii) present and future generations, because of increased food security; 
(iv) consumers, because of a greater variety of foods, and of agriculture products, as well as increased food 
security; (v) the environment, and future generations, because the Treaty will help conserve the genetic 
diversity necessary to face unpredictable environmental changes, and future human needs; (vi) international 
Agricultural Research Centres, whose collections the Treaty puts on a safe and long-term legal footing; 
and (vii) farmers and their communities, through farmers’ Rights (available at: http://planttreaty.org/
faq?tid=137).
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In addition to the provisions of Article 13.2, voluntary monetary contributions from 
countries, international foundations and the private sector also support the Benefit-
sharing Fund. These contributions are not a direct result of access under the Multilateral 
System, but part of the larger funding strategy of the Treaty, provided for in Article 18. 
The Governing Body has established a target for mobilizing such resources of $116 million 
between July 2009 and December 2014.15
The legal provisions whereby the monetary benefits deriving from access to material 
from the Multilateral System are shared are contained in the legal contract between 
the provider and the recipient, i.e. the SMTA, which creates a beneficial lien in favour 
of the Treaty. The SMTA provides for a mandatory payment of an equitable share of 
financial benefits into the Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund whenever a commercialized 
product resulting from material obtained from the Multilateral System is not made freely 
available for further research and breeding. When the commercialized product is freely 
available, payment is voluntary. It is in this context that the Treaty website16 specifically 
refers to “monetary benefits” as being related to the appropriable “financial benefits” 
deriving from such commercial product development, as well as those from voluntary 
contributions. 
It is therefore apparent that the Treaty considers access to be a benefit per se. There are 
also references in the Treaty to monetary and other benefits of commercialization; a set 
of narrowly defined non-monetary benefits are also identified. Although the term ‘non-
monetary’ per se is not specifically used in the Treaty, it is nonetheless used in the Treaty 
website.17 
Looking at a wider range of sources relevant to PGR for food and agriculture with regard 
to the definition of benefits, the following should be noted:
1. The CBD also considers access itself to constitute a benefit by referring to the 
“sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including 
by appropriate access...” (Article 1). 
2. The Bonn Guidelines (p.19) define monetary benefits to include “special fees to 
be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity”, 
which would clearly encompass the Treaty Benefit-sharing Fund. non-monetary 
benefits are defined as including inter alia sharing of research and development 
results, collaboration in scientific research, participation in product development, 
contributions to the local economy, and food and livelihood security benefits.
3. Raymond and Fowler (2001) classify such access-related benefits as “non-monetary”, 
associated with the ability under a multilateral agreement to access more germplasm 
and improved material than can be found in any single country. They also link such 
access in the context of multilateral exchange to generating “indirect monetary” 
15  Governing Body Resolution 3/2009.
16  Available at: http://www.planttreaty.org/content/benefits-multilateral-system
17   Ibid.
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benefits as a result of reduced transaction costs, since alternative bilateral exchange 
arrangements can have high costs, especially when considering monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. Such benefits are derived from the existence of the Treaty 
as an international policy institution.
From the above, it is clear that there are potentially inconsistent terminologies and 
classifications requiring further clarification.
“Monetary benefit-sharing” in the Treaty, a term used exclusively within the context 
of the Multilateral System, is implemented through the SMTA, and takes the form of 
payments due to the Benefit-sharing Fund related to the commercialization of a product 
that incorporated material accessed under an SMTA. The Treaty and the SMTA also provide 
for a narrowly defined set of non-monetary benefits, namely, the exchange of information, 
access to and transfer of technology and capacity building.
In the context of the Funding Strategy, that is, the wider framework of the Treaty, 
voluntary monetary contributions from countries, international foundations and the 
private sector are also made to the same Benefit-sharing Fund, and thus are used for 
the same purposes. Viewed in this way, the benefits being shared by the Treaty are 
therefore wider than those derived from access to the materials in the Multilateral 
System alone. 
As seen above, the Treaty identifies access as a benefit in its own right. It should also 
be noted that these benefits are derived from the institutional role of the Treaty and its 
more general framework of conservation and sustainable use, in which access under 
the Multilateral System is only one part. Yet, in the context of the overall Treaty, such 
access cannot be categorized as a non-monetary benefit, as suggested by Raymond and 
Fowler, due to the way that the latter term has been narrowly defined within the context 
of the Multilateral System. At the same time, access under the Multilateral System 
would seem to generate more than just monetary or indirect monetary benefits in terms 
of reduced transaction costs, since such access also contributes to food and livelihood 
security improvement, economic development and environmental sustainability, as well 
as supporting future technological innovation. Based on the terminology of the Bonn 
Guidelines, we should consider at least the first two of these categories (i.e. food security 
and economic development) to constitute a non-monetary benefit. A similar argument 
can be made for what is referred to in the Treaty as “other benefits of commercialization” 
(encompassing partnerships and collaboration, as well as in research and technology 
development).
Furthermore, the definition of benefits needs to distinguish between benefits deriving 
from the Treaty as a whole, and within this, the generation of monetary benefits through 
the Multilateral System implemented by the SMTA. Moreover, these monetary benefits 
are subsumed into projects supported through the benefit-sharing fund, which also 
receives donations that do not derive from access under the SMTA. All of these may be 
subsequently translated into non-monetary benefits as part of the process of approving 
and implementing projects, with priority “given to the implementation of agreed plans 
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and programmes for farmers in developing countries, especially in least developed 
countries, and in countries with economies in transition, who conserve and sustainably 
utilize plant genetic resources for food and agriculture”.18
By contrast, we note that the broader economics literature tends to consider that the 
actual value of any type or form of “benefit” should be associated with its impact on 
overall social welfare as measured through changes in consumer and producer surplus. 
From this conceptual perspective, improved access, exchange of information, transfer of 
technology and capacity building leading to food and livelihood security improvement, 
economic development, environmental sustainability and future technological 
innovations would rather be considered the “results” or “outcome” of the Treaty rather 
than the monetary, indirect monetary or non-monetary “benefit” or social welfare 
impact of the Treaty per se. Instead, they should be seen as elements in a chain that 
may lead to improvements in overall social welfare. Similarly, the benefit associated 
with the Benefit-sharing Fund’s income being used to finance projects would be related 
to its eventual impact on economic surplus measures, many of which would clearly 
be reflected in the market place and therefore may be considered (in this conceptual 
perspective) “monetary” benefits.
Although a number of studies have documented the global productivity gains 
in agriculture resulting from some types of crop genetic improvement in terms of 
economic surplus measures (see below), attributing to the Treaty the actual social 
welfare improvements generated would also require comparison against some kind 
of bilateral and/or open access counterfactual. While some studies have attempted 
to calculate some of the reduced transaction costs associated with the Multilateral 
System relative to different types of bilateral exchange regimes (see below), these 
studies fall short of comparing actual economic surplus measures. Further, they do not 
take into account additional transaction costs related to implementation, monitoring 
and enforcement. 
Additional data requirements and the ability to model an appropriate counterfactual 
would be necessary to realize such work.
Furthermore, given the current institutional use (e.g. in the Treaty, Bonn Guidelines 
and CBD) of the term “benefits”, it does not seem practical to rename these as “results” 
or “outcomes”, even while acknowledging the conceptual shortcomings of the current 
terminology. We therefore continue to refer to the type or form of benefit that we are 
discussing (i.e. monetary, indirect monetary, non-monetary), while being aware that 
these are measures that are distinct from the overall social welfare impact (as expressed 
in economic surplus terms), which would be considered to be the true overall “benefit” 
arising from the existence of the Treaty.
18  Treaty Article 18.5.
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Given the above, we propose the following classification of the type of benefits arising 
from access to, exchange and use of PGR for food and agriculture under the Treaty. 
As can be seen in Table 1.1, these can be grouped across a monetary/non-monetary 
continuum and involve:
 i)  monetary benefits, arising from the benefit-sharing obligations of recipients 
of material under an SMTA, contributed to the Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund, 
and disbursed through the projects funded in the context of the Treaty’s Funding 
Strategy. These monetary benefits are a share of the revenue accruing to recipients 
of material under an SMTA, who commercialize a product that contains materials 
accessed under and SMTA;
 ii)  indirect monetary benefits and broadly defined non-monetary benefits, 
resulting from the reduced transaction costs (net of any Treaty implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement costs) that arise from the use of a SMtA rather than 
individually negotiated instruments, as well as the wide socio-economic impact of 
Treaty-facilitated access, exchange and use; and 
iii)  non-monetary benefits (narrowly defined), specific to the SMTA and recipients of 
material under SMTAs, related to information exchange, access to and transfer of 
technology and capacity building. 
Each of these benefit categories may or may not be appropriable from a private/public 
goods perspective and may involve direct monetary flows or some other form of benefit 
leading to social welfare improvement. 
It should also be worth noting who the beneficiaries of benefit-sharing under the 
Treaty are. The Treaty itself is not a beneficiary; instead it acts as a conduit to transfer 
these benefits to the ultimate beneficiaries, for example, recipients of project funding via 
the Benefit-sharing Fund, as per the details of Treaty Article 18.5 mentioned above. The 
multilateral nature of both access (where the materials of the Multilateral System may be 
accessed as a non-rival good) and benefit-sharing under the Treaty (where the immediate 
provider is not the immediate or ultimate beneficiary) is at the root of the difference 
between benefit-sharing under the Treaty, and benefit-sharing under the CBD. Access and 
benefit-sharing under the CBD almost invariably means having an exclusive bilateral use 
licence, with monetary payment to the provider, who is the ultimate beneficiary. In the 
multilateral Treaty, the provider is not the ultimate beneficiary of these monetary benefits, 
but rather, those who receive support under the projects (as well as those beneficiaries of 
the cascade of non-monetary benefits generated that go beyond the immediate recipients 
of project support). Hence, all the monetary benefits are subsequently transformed so as 
to generate benefits in line with Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty, and form part of its wider 
Funding Strategy.
Each of these benefit types are discussed in further detail below.
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1.4.1 Monetary benefits
Monetary benefits generated by the access, exchange and use of SMTA materials result in 
projects funded with the mandatory and voluntary payments made to the Benefit-sharing 
Fund. Depending on the types of project funded, the benefits derived from such projects 
may be privately appropriable or not.
Understanding the potential magnitude of such direct benefits is directly related to 
understanding the likely payments into the Treaty Benefit-sharing Fund over time. The 
legal obligation to make payments is assigned to the recipients of materials under SMTA 
conditions, who commercialize products containing these materials. In the case of any such 
product that is not freely available without restriction to others for further research and 
breeding, a mandatory payment of 1.1 of gross sales (minus 30 percent to cover marketing 
costs) is required (Article 6.7 of the SMTA).19 If a final product is instead available without 
restriction to others for further research and breeding, the recipient is only encouraged to 
make a voluntary payment into the Benefit-sharing Fund (Article 6.8 of the SMTA). As an 
alternative to these payment options, recipients may choose instead to pay a discounted 
rate to 0.5 percent of their gross sales of a particular crop or crops, regardless of whether 
the products are available without restriction, and whether or not they incorporate materials 
accessed from the Multilateral System20 (Article 6.11 of the SMTA). Payments are generated 
not only by the initial product developed incorporating materials under SMTA conditions, 
but also all the future products derived from it (Article 6.1 of the SMTA). 
Such voluntary and mandatory payments result from the direct use value of genetic 
resources arising from their effective commercialization and farmers’ adoption of improved 
crop genetic resources. 
Currently, the Treaty estimates that, on average, around 800 SMTA materials are transferred 
every day, but it is uncertain what part of these transfers results in a product incorporating 
such materials. The CGIAR collections are important in this context, given that they hold at 
least 50 percent of all Multilateral System materials. From August 2008 to January 2010 
(latest available figures), the collections maintained by the CGIAR distributed more than 
600 000 samples of SMTA materials; 71 percent of the distributed samples were improved 
material and were accessed mainly by developing countries (ITPGRFA, 2011).
19   The level of payment is stipulated in Annex 2 of the SMTA as follows: “If a Recipient, its affiliates, contractors, 
licencees, and lessees, commercializes a Product or Products, then the Recipient shall pay one point-one 
percent (1.1) of the Sales of the Product or Products less thirty percent (30); except that no payment shall be 
due on any Product or Products that: “(a) are available without restriction to others for further research and 
breeding in accordance with Article 2 of this Agreement; (b) have been purchased or otherwise obtained 
from another person or entity who either has already made payment on the Product or Products or is 
exempt from the obligation to make payment pursuant to subparagraph (a) above; (c) are sold or traded as 
a commodity.”
20   “The discounted rate for payments made under Article 6.11 shall be zero point five percent (0.5%) of the 
Sales of any Products and of the sales of any other products that are Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture belonging to the same crop” for which the Recipient has accepted Article 6.11 in the context of 
an SMTA.
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Continuum of monetary and non-monetary benefits
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Aware that plant breeding is a slow process and that the build-up of a steady stream of 
monetary benefits from the use of the SMTA is likely to take many years (at the time of 
writing, no single such payment had yet been received), the Governing Body has established 
a target for the Benefit-sharing Fund of mobilizing $116 million by 2014 through voluntary 
contributions, and not directly deriving from access under an SMTA. Contributions are 
actively encouraged from Contracting Parties and International Institutions, such as 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), as well as foundations and private donors. Voluntary 
contributions from several countries have allowed the Benefit-sharing Fund to significantly 
exceed the target for 2010, and have enabled the Treaty to fund a number of projects in 
developing countries, supported with these monies.
Also not directly deriving from access under an SMTA,21 in 2009, Norway decided to 
donate a sum equal to 0.1 percent of all annual seed sales in the country to the Fund. In 
March 2008, the Norwegian Minister of Agriculture estimated that if all Contracting Parties 
that are Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
donated the same percentage of their national seed sales, the Fund would have an annual 
budget of around $20 million. This amount corresponds to an estimated OECD Annex 1 
germplasm market size of approximately $20 billion.22 The Governing Body “commended 
the Norwegian decision to provide 0.1 percent of the annual value of all seed sold in its 
territory as an example of innovative approaches to allow for the provision of resources to 
the Benefit-sharing Fund on a regular and predictable basis”.23
Table 1.2 Average no. of US patents related to rice, wheat and corn genetic 
resources per month
time period Rice wheat Corn
 1981–85 1.0 1.2 2.1
 1986–90 2.6 3.1 4.5
 1991–95 6.9 8.3 13.6
 1996–2001 44.0 47.4 73.0
 Jan. 2002 – Oct. 2009 175.1 149.8 289.3
Nov. 2009 – Nov. 2011 252.3 205.1 410.5
Note: Applications containing the terms rice, wheat, or corn, as well as the term gene.
Source: Gotor et al., 2010 (available at: www.uspto.gov).
21   Available at www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/01/14/fao-plant-treaty-to-operationalise-benefit-sharing-fund/ 
22   Note that Srinivasan suggests in Chapter 3 that the value of the global seed market (not just OECD) ranges 
from US$36.1 billion to US$42 billion (GIA, 2010; ISF, 2011). As concerns the Annex I crops, the seed market 
value Is estimated as equal to US$19.4 billion.
23   IT/GB-3/09/Report, para. 27.
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As previously noted, although building up a steady stream of monetary benefits 
from commercialization may take many years, it is likely that the number of mandatory 
payments will grow in the future. This expectation may be supported by the fact that the 
US Patent and Trademark Office has documented a steady increase in patent applications 
and grants for genetic resources (see Table 1.2) following the ratification of the CBD 
(Falcon and Fowler, 2002; Gotor et al., 2010). Such an expected growth in mandatory 
payment requirements may, however, be moderated by attempts – especially by larger 
commercial companies who are some of the main potential users of crop genetic 
resources – to avoid materials that fall under the Multilateral System (Michael Halewood, 
personal communication, 2012).  This outcome is also confirmed by results of the survey 
of plant-breeding experts (see Annex), suggesting that commercial breeding programmes 
are avoiding the use of SMTA material. (See also footnote 42 regarding the potentially 
dynamic nature and implications of avoidance.)
1.4.2 Indirect monetary and non-monetary (broadly defined) benefits
Indirect monetary benefits derive from the effective and less confrontational international 
policy framework provided by the Treaty as an institution, which is considered to have 
greatly reduced many of the international tensions that had resulted in diminished access 
to PGR for food and agriculture. This is one reason for which the Contracting Parties 
consider that facilitated access to Annex 1 crops itself constitutes a major benefit of the 
Multilateral System (Article 13.1). The institutional value of the Treaty may consequently 
be expected to have a positive impact on the demand and utilization of crop genetic 
resources, thereby causing changes in overall social welfare as measured through changes 
in economic surplus measures24 and contributing to the attainment of non-monetary 
benefits (broadly defined, as per Bonn Guidelines and others). 
Indirect monetary benefits also derive from the reduced transaction costs25 associated 
with the use of a Standard MTA, rather than an instrument that needs to be separately 
negotiated for separate transfers, in bilateral negotiations for access.
Broadly defined non-monetary benefits generated by accessing, exchanging and using 
SMTA materials are related to the public and global benefits resulting from food and 
livelihood security improvement, economic development and environmental sustainability. 
They also establish the basis for future technological innovations in agriculture. The 
Treaty’s institutional framework has recognized the importance of the role of the CGIAR, 
in the conservation and sustainable utilization of PGR for food and agriculture. Additional 
24   Strictly speaking and as noted previously, it is in fact these changes that economists would associate with the 
generation of benefits, rather than access itself, i.e. the input or institutional arrangement. 
25   Moore (2010) has partially estimated such Multilateral System transaction costs relative to a bilateral system 
of exchange as resulting in an annual saving of $19.5–73 million (Moore, 2010); Visser et al. (2000) arrived 
at similar figures ($20.8–76.1 million).
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benefits arising from CGIAR’s ex situ collections, for which the Treaty has now provided on 
an internationally agreed legal status (see Appendix 1.3), are identified as being related 
to health, self-sufficiency and conflict/disaster recovery. Non-use existence and bequest 
values are also secured. Such benefits may be difficult to observe over the short term, but 
their economic impact is cumulative over the long term (Wale, 2011). In addition, there 
is reason to believe that such social welfare impacts are significant, as previously noted, 
as a result of the productivity benefits accruing to society as a whole and especially to 
consumers in terms of lower food prices (Smale, 2002).
A part of the indirect monetary and broadly defined non-monetary benefits also 
corresponds to the real added value, arising from the effective use of PGR for food and 
agriculture promoted by the Treaty, analysed through the market prices of commercial 
seeds. As suggested by Smolders (2005), landraces or unimproved materials are perceived 
as having little economic value for commercial companies, because their development 
into breeding lines is costly, time-consuming and with low chances of success. Smolders 
(2005) estimates that payment, if any, for a sample of exotic and unadapted material, and 
even pre-bred materials will normally not exceed a nominal fee, such as $5 to $20, while 
improved materials in advanced development stages, showing interesting traits, may be 
valued by commercial companies in the range of $5 000–50 000. Clearly, many factors will 
influence the marketable value arising from the utilization of SMTA materials, depending on 
the chance of success, the length of the development cycle and the final economic return 
of the materials. Furthermore, the factors are crop-specific and depend on the state of 
development of the materials. Similar results of the value of a commercial trait are reached 
by Evenson and Gollin (1997). Focusing on IRRI germplasm, the authors estimated the 
present value, not wholly privately appropriable, of a single accession bred successfully into 
a modern rice variety to be worth nearly $50 million, and that 1 000 catalogued accessions 
accounted for $325 million, corresponding to $3 250 for an accession. Finally, Smolders 
indicates for a successfully implemented trait, a potential range of 10–60 percent added 
value (around 10–20 percent for corn and 50–60 percent for cotton in the United States).
A number of studies have documented the global productivity gains in agriculture 
resulting from crop genetic improvement. For example, Johnson et al. (2003) find 
that nearly 50 percent of increased US yields during 1930–1980 may be attributed to 
genetic resources. Similarly, Thirtle (1985) values the long-term economic contribution of 
‘biological change’ including genetic enhancements, estimating the production function 
of five major U.S food crops during the period 1939–1978. The author, nesting CES and 
Cobb-Douglas production functions, infers that the biological component has assured a 
yield improvement on average of 1 percent per year, or nearly 50 percent of the total yield 
growth observed. 
PGR for food and agriculture also continue to play a leading role in confronting 
environmental and agricultural challenges such as climate change and in ensuring current 
and future food security for a growing world population. As stated by Asfaw and Lipper 
(2011), the broadening of the genetic resource base has allowed farmers to successfully 
tHe eConoMIC VAlUe of PlAnt genetIC ReSoURCeS foR food And AgRICUltURe
25
Chapter 1
address changing climatic conditions, as well as to protect and improve the livelihoods 
of the poor. It is well known that genetic erosion increases households’ vulnerability 
(Table 1.3) to pedoclimatic stresses and to world crop price fluctuations, undermining the 
stability of rural household livelihood, especially in developing countries (Thrupp, 2000; 
Gore, 1992). 
Global impacts of close collaboration between the National Systems and CGIAR are 
to be found in the development of the Green Revolution varieties of wheat and rice for 
South Asia and later in the development of high-yielding maize varieties in Africa. The 
importance and utility of the germplasm distributed by the CGIAR in the development of 
improved varieties in different developing countries has been well documented (Hossain et 
al., 2007; Bellon et al., 2007; Dixon et al., 2006, Lantican et al., 2005). The development 
of the Green Revolution varieties was largely made possible by the free flow of PGR 
between national and international research centres, facilitated by the CGIAR Centres. 
Many National Agricultural Research Systems (NARSs) have relied and continue to rely 
heavily on breeding lines provided by CGIAR Centres  to develop locally adapted improved 
varieties. CGIAR germplasm has been an important source of desirable traits sought by 
National Systems for their plant breeding programmes. 
Table 1.3 Genetic erosion-related agricultural impacts
date location Crop effects
1846 Ireland Potato Famine
1800s Sri Lanka Coffee Farms destroyed
1940s U.S.A Various Crop loss to insects doubled
1943 India Rice Famine
1960s U.S.A Wheat Rust epidemic
1970 U.S.A Maize $1 billion loss
1970 Philippines, Indonesia Rice Tungo virus epidemic
1974 Indonesia Rice 3 million tons destroyed
1984 Florida, US Citrus fruits 18 million trees destroyed
Source: Thrupp, 2000.
Varieties developed by CGIAR Centres  have been directly transferred for commercial 
cultivation in developing countries; for example, “62 percent of the wheat area in the 
developing world is estimated to be planted to varieties with CIMMYT ancestry” (Heisey et 
al., 1999). Similarly, material developed at IRRI is estimated to figure in the pedigree of 70 
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percent of commercially successful rice varieties grown in developing countries: according 
to Evenson and Gollin (1997), “for varieties released in 1981-90, IRRI delivered 72 percent 
of ancestors”. Major impacts have been seen in terms of conservation, crop improvement 
and production, with consequent improvement in economic or environmental conditions. 
In order to assess these benefits in economic terms, Evenson and Gollin (1997) evaluated 
the economic role of IRRI in improving rice cultivars. IRRI’s activities include germplasm 
collection and exchange, and direct supply of bred varieties to farmers. A genealogical 
analysis was conducted to highlight progenitor traits in 20 improved modern varieties. 
IRRI’s global economic impact was estimated through an econometric analysis aimed at 
determining the contribution of accessions to the average value of modern rice varieties. 
Using a conservative discount rate, over a period of 20 years, the IRRI impact was estimated 
at approximately $1.9 billion. 
More recently, a study by Brennan and Malabayabas (2011) revealed that, since 1985, 
the impact of IRRI’s germplasm contribution to rice varietal yields in the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Viet Nam have ranged from 1.8 percent in northern Viet Nam to 9.8 percent 
in southern Viet Nam, 6.7 percent in the Philippines and 13.0 percent in Indonesia; in 
2009, it averaged 11.2 percent. The economic benefits have therefore been estimated 
at approximately $1.46 billion per year across the three countries. Further examples of 
the critical role played by the CGIAR collections in the development of new varieties with 
desirable characteristics are shown in Appendix 1.3.
1.4.3 Non-monetary benefits
The Funding Strategy of the Treaty (Article 18) is seen as crucial for non-monetary benefit 
sharing, because it seeks to mobilize a wide range of resources, from a wide range of 
stakeholders for priority activities, plans and programmes (Visser et al., 2005). However, 
the Treaty addresses non-monetary benefit-sharing according to three narrowly defined 
categories (see Appendix 1.4), which are as follows; they are largely associated with public 
and global good use values:
• Exchange of information, which may involve catalogues and inventories, information 
on technologies, and results of research relevant to the PGR for food and agriculture 
under the Multilateral System.
• Access to and transfer of technology, including access to materials and access to 
relevant technologies for the characterization, evaluation and utilization of PGR for 
food and agriculture.
• Capacity-building, which may include programmes for scientific and technical 
research, education, and training in conservation and sustainable use of PGR for food 
and agriculture, and for developing and strengthening relevant facilities.
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Visser et al. (2005) provide a series of recommendations to the Governing Body regarding 
the sharing of such non-monetary benefits, as follows:
1. The development of the Global Information System, provided for in Article 17 of the 
Treaty, including the establishment of a Focal Point for Good Practices.
2. The provision of information to agencies that may want to contribute to the 
implementation of the Treaty through the provision of non-monetary contributions.
3. The strengthening of regional networks and national capacities in developing countries 
using available expertise in national and international organizations, including the 
CGIAR Centres.
4. The strengthening of national capacities for needs assessments regarding the 
conservation and utilization of PGR.
In the context of PGR in general, Ten Kate (1995) notes that information can be exchanged 
through multilateral channels such as the Treaty’s Global Information System and the 
CBD’s Clearing-House Mechanism, through publications, or communicated between 
individual organizations. By contrast, technology transfer, joint research and capacity 
building can occur through courses, staff exchanges and conferences and by sponsoring 
students or research at academic institutions or within communities (e.g. supporting the 
work of shamans, documenting local knowledge, or creating community gene banks) and 
by supporting institutions such as ex situ collections. It can be carried out by individual 
partners, or by joint efforts through networks, for example, placing students in industry. 
Collectors and companies will need the help of local communities and organizations to 
identify suitable communities and institutions to receive benefits such as equipment and 
training.
1.5 Potential methods for treaty benefit quantification
The above typology of Treaty benefits provides some indication of the types of economic 
tools and methods that could be used to support the quantification of benefits arising 
from the Treaty.
A. With regard to the monetary benefits arising from commercialization of products 
incorporating material accessed under an SMTA, benefits are expressed as a percentage 
of the sales value. As such, the actual total economic value of the genetic resource is not 
directly relevant, and a modelling approach (see Chapter 3) to estimate existing and future 
SMTA material commercialization is required. 
Such modelling will have to contend with the fact that there is little systematic 
information and no developed methodology to provide a fair projection of what 
monetary benefits are actually likely to result from the access, exchange and use of 
SMTA material. 
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Among the specific challenges to be confronted, there is uncertainty about what 
proportion of existing SMTA transfers result in products incorporating material accessed 
under a SMTA. There is also no current basis for assessing the ratio of products from which 
a mandatory payment would be due (because the product is not freely available to others 
for research and breeding) compared to those for which voluntary payments would be 
due (because the product is freely available for such purposes). It is also likely that crop 
differences will have to be accounted for. Furthermore, there is as yet no estimate of what 
proportion of materials used in plant breeding is being accessed under an SMTA, and 
what proportion from other sources, as well as of relevant practices of entities engaged 
in breeding activities. 
The mathematical model developed by Stannard, Caracciolo and Hillery (see Chapter 3) 
aims to identify and define these and other variables that need to be taken into account 
for the empirical modelling of the expected contributions. Moving from a model to an 
empirical investigation of likely future payments to the Treaty’s Benefit-sharing Fund 
will require investigating, inter alia, trends in the exchange of materials under an SMTA, 
including:  the crops and type of genetic resources being exchanged; between whom these 
exchanges are taking place (countries, researchers, farmers and breeders); the degree to 
which such resources are being used to develop products; the type of products likely to be 
developed and the length of the product development cycles; as well as the timing of the 
likely build-up of contributions to the Benefit-sharing Fund. 
On this basis, a methodology would first be developed through which a more precise 
projection of the likely income over time of the Benefit-sharing Fund could be attempted. 
In the process, the adequacy of current information for such purposes can be assessed and 
proposals advanced as to how the information base can be improved for future analyses. 
It must be noted, however, that much of the information required for this purpose is held 
by private entities that do not accept to make it public, for trade confidentiality reasons.
It should nonetheless be appreciated that even in the presence of perfect information 
regarding present and future SMTA payments, such monetary payments may be translated, 
through Benefit-sharing Fund project funding, into non-monetary goods and services at 
a regional, national or local level. Multiplier effects and the generation of a broad range 
of non-monetary benefits would then ideally need to be taken into account through 
an assessment of the impact on social welfare, including relative to a counterfactual. 
Nevertheless, estimation of possible or probable Benefit-sharing Fund income would at 
least constitute a first step in this process. 
In terms of future modelling approaches, given the current possibility for breeders 
and breeding companies to gain access to alternate sources of certain genetic resources 
that would otherwise have to be accessed through the SMTA, and the impact this may 
have on incentives to avoid SMTA materials  and therefore generate payments into the 
Benefit-sharing Fund, game theory approaches to exploring payments under a range 
of access, use and exchange scenarios with different implicit costs might be worth 
considering. 
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B. The indirect monetary benefits have been defined in terms of reduced transaction 
costs and, again, a modelling approach is the most appropriate way to estimate such 
benefits. As previously noted, Moore (2010) and Visser et al. (2000), among others, 
have partially estimated such transaction costs under the Multilateral System relative to 
alternative systems of exchange. Given that Moore found, relative to a bilateral system of 
exchange, annual savings of $19.5–73 million, it is clear that this benefit category may 
be substantial even once implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs have been 
accounted for.
Broad non-monetary benefits were identified as being largely related to food and 
livelihood security improvement, economic development, environmental sustainability and 
support for future technological innovations. As may be appreciated from the literature 
reviewed in sections 1.3 and 1.4.2, these values may also be very substantial. However, 
in determining the actual Treaty-related impact on overall social welfare, it would be 
necessary to compare this impact against some hypothetical (non-Treaty) alternative in 
order to appreciate how indirect and non-monetary benefits as well as impact may arise 
from changes in institutional arrangements. A number of bilateral exchange scenarios 
considered by Moore (2010) – i.e. purely bilateral, only CGIAR collections and national 
cereals in the Multilateral System, CG collections and national collections of cereals and 
grain legumes in the Multilateral System, and all food crops covered by the Multilateral 
System – could be considered for this purpose, as could an open access scenario. Under 
each of these scenarios, broadly defined transaction costs (i.e. implementation, monitoring 
and enforcement) need to be accounted for, since they would also need to be under 
assessments of the Treaty.26 As noted previously, intervention would only be justified 
where net benefits are generated. The degree to which Benefit-sharing Fund financed 
projects contribute to ensuring that the net economic impact is positive would certainly 
be expected to contribute to encouraging widespread participation in the Multilateral 
System.
With regard to assessing food/livelihood security improvement and economic 
development, it is noted in section 1.3 that studies seeking to estimate benefits 
expected from using an additional gene bank accession in crop breeding have employed 
26   Of further relevance to the consideration of the relative benefits and costs is the uptake of genetic material 
under the Treaty. The Treaty effectively involves resources that were previously free being subject to a positive 
price. Conceptually it can be expected that less genetic material will be used with the positive price. Users of 
operations such as the CGIAR network’s breeding programmes may then be expected to decline or alternative 
mechanisms for developing improved varieties will be found. That is, economizing will occur and cheaper 
substitutes will be found. The process of developing those substitutes will be accelerated. For instance, 
the manipulation of genetic material ‘in-silica’ may be enhanced. This means that the Treaty may have the 
unintended consequence of reducing the activities of operations such as the CGIAR Centre initiatives. This 
raises concern when the goal of the CGIAR is to produce ‘international public goods’. Charging for the 
genetic material (previously an international public good) will reduce the benefits of plant varieties compared 
with what would have otherwise been the case (J. Bennett, personal communication, May 2012). Whether 
the social welfare improvements associated with the funding of projects from the Treaty Benefit-sharing 
Fund can outweigh such a reduction in benefits remains to be demonstrated.
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mathematical programming, Monte Carlo simulations, and maximum entropy methods 
in a search theoretic framework, combined with partial equilibrium estimates of the 
productivity impact of the bred materials in farmers’ fields (Smale, 2005). However, such 
studies generally refer to monetary benefits arising from commercialization rather than 
broadly defined non-monetary benefits. This is in part related to the argument that the 
costs of conserving accessions in gene banks are relatively easy to tabulate compared to 
the expected benefits from the accessions they conserve (Pardey et al., 2001), while Koo et 
al. (2004) consider that in many cases, undertaking the expensive and challenging exercise 
of benefits estimation is not necessary to justify conservation. 
The commercial value of PGR for food and agriculture has been shown to be only 
a relatively small component of its total economic value to society. By contrast, the 
productivity benefits accruing to society as a whole (a broadly defined non-monetary 
benefit) and especially to consumers in terms of lower food prices are large relative to the 
costs of investing in plant breeding, particularly in less advanced agricultural economies. 
Such benefits are distributed to society through effects on producers’ and consumers’ 
incomes. The literature of relevance to this type of benefit valuation is extensive and 
advanced, and methods for attributing the benefits of specific plant breeding programmes 
continue to be refined (Pardey et al., 2004).
For other types of non-monetary benefits, such as those associated with environmental 
sustainability, and with particular regard to ecosystem service provision, Ceroni et al. (2005), 
note that the relevant valuation methods need to be supported by a better understanding 
of the relationships between agrobiodiversity and ecosystem functions. In terms of the 
climate change adaptability ecosystem service, Asfaw and Lipper (2011) argue that much 
of the current understanding of the potential effectiveness of PGR management for 
adaptation is based on simulation model results. However, the benefits of adaptation 
activities, which should be measured against a counterfactual, are often highly uncertain 
and thus very difficult to estimate reliably ex ante (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007).
C.  narrow non-monetary benefits were identified by the Treaty as being related to 
the exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology and capacity-building. 
Specific recommendations regarding mechanisms for the sharing of such non-monetary 
benefits were made by Visser et al. (2005). They also note that since “non-monetary” 
does not mean without financial cost to the provider, there would appear to be some 
scope for identifying the magnitude of such costs as a lower bound for the value of such 
non-monetary benefits.
The work presented in Chapter 4 in fact suggests one promising way in which such 
an approach might be implemented. This would involve drawing on the relevance of 
scientometrics or bibliometrics (the analysis of scientific literature), as published research is 
generally the outcome of monetary investments in particular research projects, which can 
be accounted for in national systems and by research organizations. Given that research 
on PGR for food and agriculture is typically international in nature, and publications 
frequently involve collaborations between countries and organizations, these networks 
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can be mapped using network visualization tools such as Gephi. As shown in Chapter 4, 
it appears to be increasingly possible to identify non-monetary benefits in terms of 
actual collaborations between researches, and the training and exchange of students, 
postdoctoral researchers and staff between institutions. These collaborations embody 
knowledge exchange and transfers within networks and can be considered a major 
component of non-monetary benefit-sharing. The potential application of this approach 
is further discussed in Chapter 4.
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2.1 Introductory note
The aim of this chapter is to develop an approach to the quantitative assessment of 
benefit-sharing flows from the exchange of PGR through SMTAs under the Treaty based 
on an analysis of the economic values of global seed production and their distribution 
across crops, regions and countries. A macro-level approach will be followed, starting with 
an assessment of the overall value of seed production at the global and regional levels, 
and identifying components of the aggregate economic value that may potentially be 
appropriated under benefit-sharing provisions of the SMTAs under a range of scenarios 
for Treaty implementation. 
Section 2.2 explains the conceptual framework on which this chapter is based. The 
following sections 2.3 and 2.4 will carry out an empirical assessment of the different 
elements of the framework drawing inferences for the magnitude of potential flows into 
the Benefit-sharing Fund of the Treaty. These empirical assessments also provide some 
important parameters for the micro-level model presented in Chapter 3 to simulate the 
magnitude of flows into the Benefit-sharing Fund under different scenarios. The detailed 
empirical assessments are focused on three major crops – wheat, rice and maize – owing 
to data availability constraints. Section 2.5 explains the methodology used for assessing 
the use of PGR exchanged under SMTAs in the development of final product innovations. 
Section 2.6 develops estimates of the value of the global commercial market for seeds 
related to Annex 1 crops. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 provide an assessment of the potential 
flows of mandatory and voluntary payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund as a result of 
the use of PGR from the Multilateral System (MLS) of the Treaty in product innovations. 
Section 2.9 develops information methodologies for assessing the use of MLS material 
exchanged through SMTAs in commercial innovations while Section 2.10 presents the 
main conclusions of this chapter.
2.2 Conceptual framework
The approach used here is underpinned by a conceptual framework (Figure 2.1) that views 
PGR available for exchange through the MLS primarily as a resource for plant variety 
innovations. The utilization of this resource in innovation processes generates products 
with commercial value. Institutional arrangements, which include market structures 
and intellectual property regimes, determine how the commercial value of innovations 
is appropriated by different actors. SMTA-mediated PGR exchange under the Treaty is 
part of the institutional architecture that determines the appropriation of value and the 
magnitude of flows into the Benefit-sharing Fund. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework for assessment of benefit-sharing flows from PGR exchange
Source: Pearce and Moran, 1994.
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation 
processes
 
Factors influencing utilisation
of PGR in innovation process 
• Innovative activity or 
research intensity for
different crops 
• Conditions of access and 
transaction costs 
• Availability and accessibility
of information –  
characterization and 
evaluation data 
• Type of institutional 
breeding programme and 
institutional mandates 
• Alternative sources of PGR 
 
Resource base for innovation – PGR in the MLS 
Characteristics 
• Size of MLS collections for different crops in relation to global ex 
situ  collections and available diversity of different crops 
• Composition of PGR in the MLS (Biological status – land races, 
breeding lines, advanced cultivars, wild and weedy relatives  etc.) ,
 
Commercial 
product 
development 
Factors influencing appropriation of value from
PGR  innovations 
• Public sector mandates for dissemination of 
innovations 
• Intellectual property regimes 
• Institutional arrangements for international 
exchange (International Treaty, CBD, etc.) 
• Marketing regulations 
• Market structure and efficacy of institutional
arrangements 
Commercial 
value of PGR
innovations
Appropriation 
of value
IdentIfyIng BenefIt flowS 
36 Equity and food for all
2.2.1 Resource base for innovation
From the perspective of institutional or community-based plant breeding programmes, the 
sources of PGR for innovation can divided into ex situ and in situ resources. Ex situ sources of 
PGR are mainly national and international gene banks, and other institutional repositories 
where PGR collected from the field are stored under controlled conditions to maintain 
viability, and may be regenerated periodically. Ex situ collections are generally maintained 
with information relevant for the identification of individual accessions (‘passport data’) 
and their potential use (e.g. agronomic traits and agro-climatic adaptability), although 
the level of detail and comprehensiveness of information may vary considerably both 
within and across gene banks and repositories. In situ PGR refers to PGR found in the 
wild or on farmers fields, and may not have been systematically identified, explored on 
characterized. On-farm in situ PGR may have been selected, conserved and developed by 
farmers over generations and may be constantly evolving. The PGR included under the 
MLS of the Treaty is a subset of the ex situ sources of PGR that breeding programmes 
– both institutional programmes in the public and private sectors as well as community-
based participatory breeding programmes – may aim to access. It should be noted that 
there may be a considerable degree of overlap between MLS and non-MLS sources of PGR 
since the duplication of PGR across multiple collections implies that some PGR may be 
available in both MLS and non-MLS collections. 
The content of PGR that is now included in the MLS has been shaped by a number 
of factors, some of the most important being: (i) the historical legacy of PGR exchange 
between countries that goes back centuries; (ii) the international exchange regime for PGR 
and paradigms that were prevalent prior to the Treaty and the CBD; (iii) the international 
collaboration in agricultural research facilitated by the International Agricultural Research 
Centres (IARCs) of CGIAR; and (iv) the progressive application of intellectual property 
rights to PGR innovations over the last four decades in developed countries and the 
extension of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in developing countries following 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) 
under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Finally, the boundaries of the MLS have been 
defined by the provisions of the Treaty, which represented the outcome of an extended 
and complex political negotiating process (Frison et al., 2011). 
2.2.2 Utilization of PGR
The key factors influencing the use of PGR included in the MLS in innovation processes 
(development of new varieties of plants through plant breeding programmes) are discussed 
below.
(a)  Size of PGR collections in the MLS in relation to all of the available PGR: For any 
given crop, the reliance of breeding programmes on PGR from the MLS is likely to 
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be greater if the MLS includes a significant portion of the total agro-biodiversity 
of that crop. The use of MLS-PGR in breeding programmes will depend on the 
relative size of the MLS collection, as well as on whether they contain critical traits 
of interest to breeders. 
(b)  Composition of PGR collections in the MLS: For any crop, the PGR included in the 
MLS may consist of several different elements such as:
• Wild/weedy relatives
• Traditional cultivars /landraces
• Breeding lines/research material
• Advanced improved cultivars.
 The composition of PGR will influence the uptake of material by breeding 
programmes, which may also change over time. The demand for traditional 
cultivars and wild/weedy relatives may decrease as their useful traits are 
incorporated into breeding lines and advanced cultivars, although breeding 
programmes may occasionally be forced to recur to weedy relatives or traditional 
cultivars for relevant traits as new pathogens emerge or as agro-climatic adaptation 
needs change. The time lag between the use of PGR in a programme and the 
development of a commercial product (variety) will also depend on the type of 
PGR accessed. Breeding lines may be transformed fairly quickly into a commercial 
variety whereas landraces or wild/weedy relatives may take much longer to be 
incorporated into commercial varieties. 
(c)  Innovative activity related to the crop: The demand for PGR from the MLS in 
breeding programmes is likely to vary with the amount of innovation activity that 
a particular crop attracts. This in turn is likely to be influenced by the size of the 
commercial market and the research capacity available for this crop, the research 
priorities and mandates of institutional breeding programmes, and the incentives 
for innovation offered by intellectual property regimes.  
(d)  Conditions of access and transaction costs: The demand for PGR from the MLS 
is likely to be influenced by the ease of access and the related transaction costs. 
Although one of the main objectives of the Treaty is to facilitate access to PGR 
included in the MLS through standardized terms and conditions, in practice, the 
ease of access, the speed of access, and associated transaction costs can vary 
across Contracting Parties and institutions depending on the effectiveness of 
implementation of the Treaty. The performance of individual Contracting Parties 
in giving effect to the Treaty (e.g. in designating and notifying PGR available 
under the MLS, facilitating administrative arrangements for access) will play a 
major role in determining the quantum of PGR from the MLS (MLS-PGR) that is 
actually available for use in the innovation process. 
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(e)  Availability of information: PGR in ex situ collections is of little use to breeding 
programmes unless passport data and characteristic information on agronomic 
traits, agro-climatic adaptability and susceptibility to diseases and pathogens are 
available and accessible. The use of PGR in the MLS will depend on the extent to 
which critical characteristic information is accessible to potential users. This may 
vary by crop, country and institution hosting the collection. Even large, diverse 
and accessible collections may not be utilized unless supported by availability of 
relevant information. 
(f)  Type of institution: The use of PGR from the MLS may also be different between 
public sector (national or international) and private sector research institutions. 
Private sector institutions that seek to appropriate returns from their innovations 
by seeking IPR protection may seek to avoid the use of PGR subject to SMTA 
conditions that would force them to share the benefits of commercialization with 
the providers of PGR. Private sector breeding programmes may have incentives to 
adopt breeding strategies that avoid the use of MLS-PGR or access the material 
from non-MLS sources. 
(g)  Alternative sources of PGR: The availability of and access to non-MLS sources 
of PGR for plant breeding programmes is also an important determinant of the 
demand for MLS-PGR. While the availability of non-MLS PGR will vary by crop, 
little information is available on the size and coverage of these collections. Access 
to private sector collections may be feasible only within a network of affiliated 
or group companies, or it may have to be negotiated on a contractual basis 
within research collaboration agreements. Access to in situ sources of PGR will be 
increasingly governed by biodiversity access legislation developed in conformity 
with the CBD, especially in developing countries. 
2.2.3 Innovation process
The innovation process related to PGR takes place in a number of settings. The IARCs 
under the auspices of the CGIAR, the NARSs in developed and developing countries 
and the private sector (including global seed companies as well as independent 
domestic seed companies) are the major institutional players, while community-based 
participatory breeding programmes bringing together the expertise of crop scientists 
and farmers are also emerging as engines of innovation. The relative importance of 
institutional players in the innovation process differs by country and crop, and has 
changed significantly over the last three decades (Pardey et al., 1991; Anderson et 
al., 1994). In most developing countries, the public sector has been and remains the 
dominant player in plant breeding research, although the private sector has started to 
play an increasing role in several crops (Morris, 1998). In developed countries, the role 
of the public sector in ‘near-market’ plant breeding research has declined over the last 
two decades with the private sector playing a dominant role in the breeding of new 
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varieties of key crops (e.g. maize in the United States), particularly those involving 
the application of biotechnology (Alston et al., 1998). These different institutional 
players may have different propensities for demanding and using PGR from the MLS 
for their breeding programmes. For the purpose of this chapter, the innovation process 
can be segmented into two components – one which utilizes PGR from the MLS, and 
another that proceeds without the use of MLS-PGR. The innovation processes produce 
innovations that will be selected (depending on market potential and the availability 
of infrastructure for scaling up multiplication and distribution) and marketed on a 
commercial scale. It is important to note that only a fraction of the new innovations 
developed through the innovation processes will be eventually marketed commercially, 
while others will be discarded. The innovations that are commercialized contribute to 
the overall value of the commercial seed market. 
2.2.4 Value of the commercial seed market
The volume of seed sold commercially in most countries is much smaller that the volume 
of seed used by farmers. This is due to the use of farm-saved seed for planting, a well-
established traditional practice in agriculture. The use of farm saved seed for planting is 
generally infeasible in the case of hybrid varieties, where farmers are required to procure 
fresh seed every year.1 The volume of seed sold commercially is related to the volume of 
seed used by farmers through the seed replacement rates (SRRs), which measure how 
often farmers replace their seed stocks using fresh bought-in seed. In many developing 
countries, the volume of seed sold commercially may be less than 10–15 percent of 
the volume of seed used for planting. SRRs are higher in developed countries than in 
developed countries.  However, even in developed countries SRRs may be 50 percent or 
less for non-hybrid crops such as wheat. 
For our purposes, the value of the commercial seed market can be divided into three 
components:
•	 value of established varieties developed prior to the implementation of the Treaty/
SMTAs;
•	 value of new varieties commercialized post-Treaty involving the use of SMTA/MLS 
material; 
•	 value of new varieties commercialized post-Treaty not involving the use of SMTA/
MLS material.
Since it has only been five years since the Treaty has been implemented, components 
2 and 3 will be small in relation to component 1. As newer varieties replace established 
varieties in the commercial seed market, the value of component 1 relative to components 
2 and 3 will decline. However, it is only component 2 that will attract the benefit sharing 
1   The use of farm-saved seed may also be infeasible in the case of varieties covered by utility patents (mostly 
GM varieties developed through biotechnology) in some countries where the contractual terms of seed sales 
may preclude the use of farm-saved seed by farmers. 
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provisions of the SMTAs. Therefore, the inflows into the Benefit-sharing Fund through 
voluntary or mandatory payments can be expected only from a small, albeit growing, 
proportion of the value of the commercial seed market. 
2.2.5 Appropriation of value – flows into the Benefit-sharing Fund
The commercialization of innovations involving the use of PGR exchanged through 
SMTAs can give rise to (i) mandatory payments and (ii) voluntary payments depending 
on the nature of IPRs sought for the innovation. Article 6.7 of the SMTA provides 
that if the commercialized innovation is not freely available for further research and 
development, then it will attract mandatory payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund. 
In practice, this implies that only commercialized innovations (involving the use of PGR 
exchanged under SMTAs) that are protected by patents (with limited or no experimental 
use exemptions) will trigger mandatory payments. But if these commercialized varieties 
are not subject to IPRs or are subject only to PVP, which generally allows unrestricted 
research exemption or ‘breeders exemption’), then they will give rise to only voluntary 
payments under Article 6.8 of the SMTA. Therefore, the proportion of commercialized 
plant variety innovations that are subject to patents will be an important determinant 
of the potential payments into the Fund. It is important to note that utility patents 
for plant varieties are presently available only in a limited number of countries. On 
the other hand, plant variety innovations developed by NARS in developing countries 
are generally not subject to any form of protection and may only be subject to PVP as 
and when PVP regimes are established and implemented in these countries. The SMTA 
also allows institutions accessing PGR from the MLS to opt for a ‘discounted’ payment 
(Article 6.11). Under this option, institutions accessing SMTA-PGR related to a crop can 
opt to make a payment (at a lower rate of 0.1 percent) on all commercial sales of seeds 
of that crop – instead of making payments on individual commercialized innovations. 
This option may be advantageous for relatively heavy users of PGR, whose commercial 
seed sales of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR exceed 65 percent of their seed sales of 
a crop, and does not call for information on the use of SMTAs and their incorporation in 
commercialized products. The prevalence of use of this option by institutions accessing 
PGR from the MLS will also be a determinant of the flows into the Benefit-sharing 
Fund. The magnitude of the flows of mandatory and voluntary payments will also 
depend significantly on the effectiveness of Treaty implementation by the Contracting 
Parties. The policies adopted with regard to voluntary payments (especially those 
related to SMTA-PGR use by public research institutions), information and data flows on 
commercialization of innovations using SMTA-PGR and the visibility of these innovations 
in international trade and domestic seed markets will be key elements influencing the 
magnitude of potential mandatory and voluntary payments realized in practice. 
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2.3 PgR in the MlS as a resource base for innovation
The size, composition and characteristics of PGR in the MLS for different crops in relation to 
the global ex situ holdings of PGR and the available diversity of individual crops are important 
determinants of the use of MLS-PGR in the development of plant variety innovations. FAO’s 
Reports on the State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture of 
1997 and 2010 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SoWPGR-1’ and ‘SoWPGR-2’, respectively) 
provide one of the few authentic sources of information on the global holdings of PGR in ex 
situ collections. SoWPGR-2 (FAO, 2010) estimates that in 2009, there were more than 1 750 
gene banks2 with approximately 130 holding more than 10 000 accessions each. These 
1 750 gene banks include international, regional, national and sub-national gene banks 
located on all continents in a variety of institutional formats of ownership and management. 
The Report estimates that approximately 7.4 million accessions are currently maintained 
globally, of which between 25–30 percent are distinct (1.9–2.2 million accessions), with 
the remaining ones being duplicates mostly held in different collections (including safety 
back-up collections). Of the global holdings of 7.4 million accessions, it is estimated that 
4.6 million accessions are related to Annex 1 crops and are conserved in 1 240 gene banks 
worldwide; of these accessions, approximately 51 percent are conserved in 800 gene banks 
of the Contracting Parties of the Treaty and 13 percent are stored in the collections of the 
IARCs of the CGIAR. Therefore, the MLS covers approximately 64 percent of the global 
holdings of the PGR of Annex 1 crops. The inclusion of the nearly two-thirds of the global 
holdings of the PGR of Annex 1 crops in the MLS, however, does not translate into ‘facilitated 
access’ to all these accessions because this depends on how effectively Contracting Parties 
to the Treaty participate in the MLS. SoWPGR-2 also estimates that of the total 7.4 million 
accessions, national governments conserve about 6.6 million, of which 45 percent is held in 
only seven countries. The concentration of PGR holdings in a few countries underlines the 
importance of mechanisms of facilitated access such as that provided by the MLS. 
A key feature of the MLS is that some of the largest collections within it are held by 
CGIAR gene banks which have implemented robust systems to provide ‘facilitated access’ 
to their holdings. These collections have been built up over the last four decades and are 
held ‘in-trust’ by the CGIAR for the world community. In 1994, the CGIAR Centres signed 
agreements with FAO, bringing these collections into an international network of ex situ 
collections. These ‘in-trust’ collections have been brought under the purview of the Treaty. 
While the share of CGIAR gene banks in global collections varies by crop, it is particularly 
strong for wheat (17 percent), rice (14 percent), maize (8 percent) and Phaseolus (beans) 
(14 percent).
The crop species coverage of global ex situ holdings of PGR based on information from 
the FAO’s WIEWS database is presented in Figure 2.2.
2   The coverage of ex situ and working collections of the private sector appears to be limited in the assessments 
of ex situ holdings made in the SoWPGR reports. 
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Figure 2.2 shows that 45 percent of the accessions in the world’s gene banks are of 
cereal crops, followed by food legumes, at nearly 15 percent of all accessions, while 
vegetables, fruits and forage crops account for 6–9 percent each; roots and tuber crops 
as well as oil and fibre crops account for 2–3 percent each. The distribution of global ex 
situ holdings of PGR of 50 major selected (Annex 1 and non-Annex 1) crops are shown 
in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Global ex situ PGR holdings of 50 major crops
genus (crop) Crop group Status no. of accessions
 Triticum (wheat)  Cereal Annex 1 856 168
 Oryza (rice)  Cereal Annex 1 773 948
 Hordeum (barley)  Cereal Annex 1 466 531
 Zea (mays)  Cereal Annex 1 327 932
 Sorghum (sorghum)  Cereal Annex 1 235 688
 Avena (oat)  Cereal Annex 1 130 653
 Pennisetum (pearl millet)  Cereal Annex 1 65 447
 Aegilops (wheat)  Cereal Annex 1 40 926
 x Triticosecale (wheat)  Cereal Annex 1 37 440
 Phaseolus (bean)  Food legume Annex 1 261 963
 Cicer (chickpea)  Food legume Annex 1 98 313
 Pisum (pea)  Food legume Annex 1 94 001
Figure 2.2 Crop species coverage of global ex situ holdings of PGR (2008)
Source: FAO, 2010.
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genus (crop) Crop group Status no. of accessions
 Vigna (cowpea) Food legume Annex 1 65 323
 Lens (lentil) Food legume Annex 1 58 405
 Vicia (faba bean) Food legume Annex 1 43 695
 Medicago (medicago) Forage Annex 1 91 922
 Trifolium (clover) Forage Annex 1 74 158
 Festuca (fescue) Forage Annex 1 33 008
 Dactylis (grasses) Forage Annex 1 31 394
 Malus (apple) Fruit Annex 1 59 922
 Musa (banana) Fruit Annex 1 13 486
 Helianthus (sunflower) Oilseed Annex 1 39 380
 Beta (sugarbeet) Others Annex 1 22 346
 Solanum (potato) Root and tuber Annex 1 98 285
 Ipomoea (sweet potato) Root and tuber Annex 1 35 478
 Manihot (cassava) Root and tuber Annex 1 32 442
 Dioscorea (yam) Root and tuber Annex 1 15 903
 Colocasia (taro) Root and tuber Annex 1 7 302
total Annex 1 crops   4 111 459
 Panicum (millet) Cereal non-Annex 1 17 633
 Eragrostis (millet) Cereal non-Annex 1 8 820
 Gossypium (cotton)  Fibre non-Annex 1 104 780
 Psophocarpus (bean)  Food legume non-Annex 1 4 217
 Prunus (prunus)  Fruit non-Annex 1 69 497
 Vitis (grape)  Fruit non-Annex 1 59 607
 Mangifera (mango)  Fruit non-Annex 1 25 659
 Glycine (soybean)  Oilseed non-Annex 1 229 944
 Arachis (groundnut)  Oilseed non-Annex 1 128 435
 Elaeis (oil-palm)  Oilseed non-Annex 1 21 103
 Olea (olive)  Oilseed non-Annex 1 2 629
 Hevea (rubber)  Others non-Annex 1 73 656
 Saccharum (sugar cane)  Others non-Annex 1 41 128
 Coffea (coffee)  Others non-Annex 1 30 307
 Theobroma (cocoa)  Others non-Annex 1 12 373
 Corylus (nut)  Others non-Annex 1 2 998
 Bactris (peach palm)  Others non-Annex 1 2 593
 Pistacia (pistachio)  Others non-Annex 1 1 168
 Lycopersicon (tomato)  Vegetable non-Annex 1 83 720
 Capsicum (capsicum)  Vegetable non-Annex 1 73 518
 Cucurbita (cucurbita)  Vegetable non-Annex 1 39 583
 Chenopodium (chenopodium)  Vegetable non-Annex 1 16 263
total non-Annex 1 crops   1 049 631
total for all 50 crops   5 161 090
Source: FAO, 2010.
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The 50 major crops in the Table 2.1 account for a total of 5.16 million accessions, 
more than two-thirds (70 percent) of the global holdings of 7.4 million. Among these 
major crops, Annex 1 crops account for nearly 80 percent of the holdings, while non-
Annex 1 crops account for 20 percent. Among Annex 1 crops, cereals are predominant, 
accounting for 57 percent of the holdings of major crops, followed by food legumes 
accounting for 12 percent; forage and root and tuber crops account for 4 percent 
each, while fruits and oilseed account for 1 percent. Among non-Annex 1 crops, the 
important crop groups are oilseed crops (7 percent) and vegetable crops (8 percent).
The type of material available in the MLS, whether it is advanced cultivars, breeding 
lines, landraces or wild relatives, etc., has implications for the potential use of the material 
in breeding programmes and the speed with which they are likely to be incorporated 
into final products. Thus, breeding lines are likely to be transformed into ‘finished’ 
varieties relatively quickly, while landraces may go through several rounds of breeding 
and transformation before they are incorporated into final products. Information about 
the biological status of material conserved ex situ is currently available only for half 
of global accessions. Information from the FAO’s WIEWS database is presented in 
Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Biological status of ex situ PGR of crop groups
Commodity group
no. of 
accessions
 wild 
species
(%)
landraces
(%)
 Breeding 
materials 
(%)
Advanced 
cultivars 
(%)
 others 
(%)
 Cereals  
 3 157 
578  5  29  15  8  43 
 Food legumes   1 069 897  4  32  7  9  49 
 Roots and tubers   204 408  10  30  13  10  37 
 Vegetables   502 889  5  22  8  14  51 
 Nuts, fruits and berries   423 401  7  13  14  21  45 
 Oil crops   181 752  7  22  14  11  47 
 Forages   651 024  35  13  3  4  45 
 Sugar crops   63 474  7  7  11  25  50 
 Fibre crops   169 969  4  18  10  10  57 
 Medicinal, aromatic, spice 
and stimulant crops   160 050  13  24  7  9  47 
 Industrial and ornamental   
plants   152 325  46  1  2  4  47 
 Other   262 993  29  4  2  2  64 
 total/overall mean   6 998 760  10  24  11  9  46 
Source: FAO, 2010.
ASSESSING THE POTENT IAL FOR MONETARY PAYMENTS FROM EXCHANGE OF PLANT GENET IC 
RESOURCES UNDER THE MULT ILATERAL SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT 
GENET IC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
45
Chapter 2
It may be seen from Table 2.2 that the proportion of different types of material varies 
by crop group. On average, for accessions for which biological status is known, nearly 17 
percent are advanced cultivars; 22 percent, breeding lines; 44 percent, landraces; and 17 
percent, wild and weedy relatives. 
The poor state of documentation and characterization of PGR in the MLS has been 
recognized as a serious obstacle to its utilization in plant breeding programmes (FAO, 
2010). Plant breeding programmes are unlikely to access PGR from the MLS unless they 
can access information on the traits and adaptation of the accessions. For plant breeding 
programmes to utilize PGR from the MLS, not only must characterization and evaluation 
data be available, but they also must be standardized and made available in a form that is 
accessible to programmes worldwide, for example, in an electronic format. Information on 
the extent of characterization of some CGIAR collections and selected national collections 
is presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
Table 2.3 Extent of characterization for selected CGIAR and AVRDC PGR 
collections
Crop groups  
 Percentage 
of accessions 
characterized (%)
total no. of 
accessions
Reporting centres
 Cereals  88 292 990 6
 Food legumes  78 142 730 4
 Vegetables  17 54 277 1
 Fruits (banana)  44 883 2
 Forages  45 69 788 3
 Roots and tubers  68 25 515 3
 total  73 586 193 11
            
Source: FAO, 2010.
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Table 2.4 Extent of characterization and evaluation in national collections  
of 40 countries
Crop groups  Percentage of germplasm holdings (%)
 
 Characterized  evaluated
 total no. of  
accessions
 Morphologically Agronomically Biochemically
for 
abiotic  
factors
for 
biotic  
factors
Accessions
Reporting 
countries
Cereals  63 44 10 13 23 410 261 34
Food legumes  67 56 14 13 20 139 711 33
Vegetables  65 44 12 7 14 48 235 27
Oil crops  63 42 52 11 17 40 700 18
Fibre crops  89 84 9 19 18 37 879 15
Fruits, nuts and 
berries  66 54 12 24 30 31 838 26
Forages  43 50 15 13 15 27 120 20
Roots and 
tubers  66 54 13 17 24 22 834 27
Spices  82 81 39 7 22 755 10
Stimulants  53 64 20 22 35 413 15
Sugar crops  46 80 22 36 57 413 14
Medicinal 
plants  65 64 24 11 43 744 7
Ornamental 
plants  74 23 0 48 47 622 8
Others  34 85 3 8 22 20 189 11
total  64 51 14 14 22 319 528 40
Among CGIAR collections, cereals and food legumes are well characterized, but 
vegetables, fruits, forages, and roots and tubers much less so. Only two-thirds of national 
collections are characterized on average, with considerable variation among crop groups. 
Only half of national collections have been evaluated agronomically, while biochemical 
evaluation for biotic and abiotic factors has only been conducted on a limited scale. 
The data presented in this section show that, although the MLS covers nearly two-
thirds of the global ex situ holdings of Annex 1 crops, its utilization in crop improvement 
programmes may be constrained by the lack of effective access to PGR held by Contracting 
Parties and by inadequate characterization and evaluation information on PGR that is 
accessible. It is extremely difficult to assess what proportion of the total agro-biodiversity 
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of different crops is covered by the MLS and the extent to which PGR currently in the 
MLS is accessible from alternative (non-MLS sources). Both these factors are important 
determinants of the extent to which plant breeding programmes will need to rely on 
the MLS. SoWPGR-1 (FAO, 1997) estimated that ex situ collections hold 95 percent of 
all landraces and 60 percent of wild species for wheat, 95 percent of landraces and 10 
percent of wild species for rice, and 95 percent of landraces and 15 percent of wild species 
for maize. Efforts have been made under the auspices of the Global Crop Diversity Trust 
to develop crop conservation strategies3 based on the identification of major gaps in ex 
situ collections as identified by different stakeholder groups. With the exception of gaps 
in the coverage of wild species and cultivars, an important gap in the MLS collections is 
likely to be in the coverage of breeding lines and cultivars developed by the private sector.
 It should be noted that the potential for payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund of 
the Treaty arises not only from the exchange of PGR of Annex 1 crops under SMTAs, but 
also from the exchange of PGR of non-Annex 1 crops under SMTA conditions. This may 
arise in a number of different ways. Under Article 15.1 of the Treaty, the non-Annex 1 
PGR accessions of CGIAR Centres acquired before the commencement of the Treaty are 
to be exchanged under material transfer agreements (MTAs) that conform to the benefit-
sharing provisions of the Treaty. Similarly, under Article 15.5 of the Treaty, international 
institutions can opt to place their collections within the MLS, which may bring some of 
their non-Annex 1 material (acquired prior to coming into force of the Treaty) under the 
purview of benefit-sharing arrangements. International institutions that have entered 
into agreements with the Governing Body of the Treaty under Article 15.5 include:
•	 Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Centre
•	 International Coconut Gene bank for Africa and the Indian Ocean
•	 International Coconut Gene bank for the South Pacific
•	 Mutant Germplasm Division of the FAO/IAEA Joint Division
•	 Centre for Pacific Crops and Trees (CePACT) – SPC Community.
It is also open to international gene banks and repositories to make their exchanges 
of PGR (even those that do not come under the purview of the MLS) subject to SMTAs 
applicable to Annex 1 crops. This practice appears to have been adopted on a significant 
scale by many European gene banks for the exchange of PGR of vegetable crops (not 
included in Annex 1).4 An important contribution of the Treaty to international exchange 
of PGR may be in the creation of a widely accepted template for exchanges that could 
be applied to PGR not formally included in the MLS. The potential for benefit-sharing 
payments from the exchange of non-Annex 1 PGR brought within the purview of the 
MLS and the use of SMTAs in the exchange of PGR not included in the MLS may be 
significant. 
3   See crop strategy documents, available at www.croptrust.org.
4   When PGR of non-Annex 1 crops are exchanged subject to SMTAs at the discretion of providing institutions, 
it may not be possible to use the enforcement mechanisms available in the Treaty.
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dissemination of plant genetic resources in the MlS
Information on the dissemination of PGR in the MLS by gene banks is a very useful 
indicator of the potential use of PGR by different groups of users. Dissemination of PGR 
by gene banks may take place for a number of reasons, all of which may not be related 
to their use in the innovation process. For instance, some exchanges of PGR may be for 
safety duplication or repatriation of PGR to countries of origin. The focus in this chapter 
will be on the dissemination of PGR by gene banks to plant breeding programmes for crop 
improvement. 
SoWPGR-2 (2010, p. 83) notes the limited availability of data at the level of national 
and sub-national gene banks. It notes that even in cases where some information on the 
dissemination of PGR is available, it is often not broken down by crop or by the type of 
germplasm, and little information is available on the nature of the providing or recipient 
institution. Information on these factors is necessary to enable a better understanding 
of the patterns of use. Comprehensive data on the distribution of PGR are available only 
for gene banks of the IARCs of the CGIAR. The SoWPGR-2 notes that over the 1996–
2007 period, the CGIAR Centres and The World Vegetable Center (AVRDC) distributed 
nearly 1.1 million samples, 5 615 000 of which (nearly 50 000 per year) went to external 
recipients. In general, total distribution has remained steady over the period 1996–2007 at 
about 100 000 accessions each year [p. 83]. The figures are similar to those reported for 
the period 1993–1995 in SoWPGR-1 (FAO, 1997).
The distribution of PGR from the gene banks of the IARCs of the CGIAR over the 1996–
2008 period is summarized in Table 2.5. The pattern of distribution by type of PGR and 
type of recipient institution is presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
Table 2.5 Distribution of PGR from gene banks of IARCs of the CGIAR, 1996–2008
type of 
accession  
 within/ 
between 
IARCs 
(%)  
 nARS 
developing 
countries  
(%)
 nARS 
developed 
countries
(%)  
 Private 
sector 
(%) 
 others
(%)  
 total 
no. of 
accessions 
Percentage 
of total (%) 
Landraces   57.9  48.5  45.0  51.7  65.7  194 546  51  
Wild species   29.2  19.0  40.5  7.1  19.1  104 982  27  
Breeding lines   8.5  23.1  5.4  36.0  6.5  56 804  15  
Advanced 
cultivars  
 3.5  8.0  9.1  5.1  8.6  24 172  6  
 Others   0.9  1.4  0.1  0.1  0.1  3 767  1  
   
Source: FAO, 2010.
5   It is not possible to estimate the number of accessions distributed because the same accessions may be 
distributed to several recipients. 
ASSESSING THE POTENT IAL FOR MONETARY PAYMENTS FROM EXCHANGE OF PLANT GENET IC 
RESOURCES UNDER THE MULT ILATERAL SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT 
GENET IC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
49
Chapter 2
Figure 2.3 Distribution of germplasm held by IARCs by type of germplasm, 1996-2007
Source: FAO, 2010.
Figure 2.4 Distribution of germplasm held by IARCs by type of recipient institution, 1996-2007
Source: FAO, 2010.
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Figure 2.3 shows that the largest proportion of PGR distributed by the IARCs are landraces, 
followed by wild species, breeding lines and advanced cultivars. Figure 2.4 shows that 
nearly half the PGR distributed by IARCs was within the Centres, while 30 percent went 
to developing country NARS. Developed country NARS accounted for 15 percent and 
private sector recipients for around 4 percent. Developing country NARS mainly requested 
breeding materials and advanced cultivars, whereas developed country NARS requested 
mainly landraces. Wild species were requested equally by most types of institutions. The 
pattern of distribution of PGR by type of recipient institution described above is similar to 
a more detailed break up of distribution of ‘in-trust’ accessions by CGIAR Centres reported 
from the System-wide Information Network for Genetic Resources (SINGER) database in 
Table 2.6.
Table 2.6 Distribution of CGIAR in-trust accessions, 1994–2008
In-trust accessions distribution to:  In-trust samples    Percentage (%) 
 CGIAR Centres   690 721  42.4 
 National Agricultural Research Systems   499 492  30.6 
 Universities   304 586  18.7 
 Gene banks   31 222  1.9 
 Germplasm network   28 607  1.8 
 Commercial company   27 183  1.7 
 Unknown   14 599  0.9 
 Other   11 235  0.7 
 Regional organization   9 699  0.6 
 Non-governmental organizations   6 371  0.4 
 Farmers   4 372  0.3 
 Individuals   1 958  0.1 
 Other categories   107  0.0 
 total   1 630 152  100.0 
  
Source: Gotor et al., 2010.
It is estimated that CGIAR Centres annually distribute about 10 percent of their accessions, 
a rate that is likely to be much higher than that for national gene banks (FAO, 2010). 
Thus, for PGR in the MLS as a whole, the annual distribution is likely to be lower than 10 
percent of accessions. The limited distribution of PGR in the MLS reflects the inadequate 
information systems for PGR – particularly the lack of characterization and evaluation 
data on accessions and the means for accessing/disseminating the data where they exist. 
It also reflects the fact that despite a wide range of genetic resources being available 
nationally and internationally, plant breeding programmes may prefer to select a majority 
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of their parental material from their own working collections.6 The legacy of international 
exchange through CGIAR Centres and national gene banks over the last several decades 
may result in a good proportion of valuable PGR that is now in the MLS being incorporated 
in the working collections of plant breeding programmes, reducing the need for directly 
accessing the MLS. These previous exchanges of PGR may have created alternative sources 
of PGR that may be outside the purview of the MLS. This affects the potential for benefit-
sharing payments arising from the use of MLS-PGR. When plant breeding programmes 
rely on their working collections or on non-MLS sources of PGR in the development of 
plant variety innovations, no obligations for benefit-sharing payments arise. 
One of the striking features of the data presented above is that nearly half of PGR 
exchanges from CGIAR Centres take place within or between these Centres. These 
exchanges of PGR between CGIAR Centres for use in their own breeding programmes 
will not be expected to give rise to any benefit-sharing payments until the breeding 
lines or advanced cultivars developed by the Centres are transmitted to other national-
level institutions for further development of commercial cultivars. Developing country 
NARS are the largest users of breeding lines and advanced cultivars from CGIAR Centres 
and, therefore, have the largest potential for generating innovations derived from PGR 
exchanged under SMTAs. However, innovations developed by developing country NARS 
may not be subject to IPRs and may give rise only to voluntary payment obligations. 
Developed country NARS appear to rely on the MLS mainly for landraces, possibly for 
traits that may not be available in their own working collections or gene banks. The use 
of PGR from the MLS by developed country NARS is likely to be farther away from final 
product development than in developing country NARS. This implies that the lead times 
for generation of benefit-sharing payments following the exchange of PGR under SMTAs 
is likely to be greater in the case of developed country NARS. The use of MLS material by 
the private sector has an important bearing on the potential magnitude of benefit-sharing 
payments. This is because of the increasingly important role being played by the private 
sector in the breeding of Annex 1 crops and the likelihood of private sector innovations 
being subject to stronger forms of IPRs that give rise to mandatory payment obligations. 
The direct access of PGR in the MLS by the private sector appears to be very low – with 
the private sector accounting only for 4 percent of the accessions distributed by the CGIAR 
Centres. However, as seen in the later sections of this chapter, the proportion of private 
sector varieties in wheat, rice and maize incorporating CGIAR germplasm is much higher 
than what would be implied by the figure of 4 percent. This suggests that the private sector 
may have alternative sources of access to PGR in the MLS, including through incorporation 
of MLS-PGR in their working collections as a result of previous exchanges over the last 
few decades. It may also suggest the use of breeding strategies that purposively avoid the 
direct use of MLS material to circumvent benefit-sharing obligations. 
It must be noted that data on the ‘first round’ distribution of PGR in the MLS by 
national and international gene banks may provide only a limited/partial picture of the 
6   It may easier for plant breeders to transfer traits from ‘adapted’ materials. 
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utilization of PGR in the innovation process. PGR exchanges proceed through a complex 
maze of transactions between different institutions within and across national borders. The 
incorporation of PGR exchanged under an SMTA may take place at a point in the transaction 
chain that is far removed from the original recipient. Assessing the extent of MLS-PGR use in 
final product innovations, therefore, requires the analysis of the entire chain of transactions, 
which may extend over several years, and information on how transformation/development 
of PGR at each stage.
2.4 Research intensity for different crops
It is noted in Section 2.2 that a key factor influencing the use of PGR from the MLS (and 
hence the potential for benefit-sharing payments) is the innovative activity attracted by crops 
included in the Annex 1 of the Treaty. The innovative activity or research effort attracted by 
each crop is likely to depend on the commercial potential (size of the market) for variety 
innovations of the crop, the research priorities and mandates of public research institutions, 
and the incentives for innovation afforded by intellectual property and regulatory regimes. 
In this section, the relative research intensity of different Annex 1 crops and the research 
intensity of Annex 1 crops in relation to that of non-Annex 1 crops will be examined.
The research effort for plant breeding in different crops in most countries will be spread 
over a range of institutions in the public and/or private sector. Research expenditures and 
research personnel (plant breeders and other scientists) deployed for plant breeding are the 
most relevant indicators of research effort. Availability of data on these indicators of research 
effort at the crop level is very limited in both developed and developing countries. For most 
developed countries, the OECD Science and Technology Indicators7 provide comparable 
time-series of research expenditure and personnel at the sectoral level (e.g. for agricultural 
research) by type of institution. However, it is not feasible to identify plant breeding 
expenditures from such data because aggregate sectoral data cover several different types 
of research activities. For agricultural research, sector-level data may cover research on agro-
chemicals and agricultural mechanization, and plant breeding expenditures may be only a 
small part of aggregate agricultural research expenditures. For developing countries, the 
Agricultural Science Technology Indicators (ASTI) database8 developed by the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) provides data on agricultural research expenditures 
and scientists deployed in NARS of these countries. Here again, the identification of plant 
breeding expenditures at the crop level may not be feasible. Even where research expenditure 
data are available at the level of institutions, it may be difficult to identify expenditures 
devoted to different crops or activities. FAO’s Global Partnership Initiative for Plant Breeding 
Capacity Building (GIPB)9 is building up a database of plant breeding effort (financial and 
7   Available at: www.oecd.org/document/26/0,3746,en_2649_34451_1901082_1_1_1_1,00.html 
8   Available at:_www.asti.cgiar.org/timeseries.aspx 
9   Available at: http://km.fao.org/gipb 
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scientific resources devoted to plant breeding) in developing countries through a detailed 
plant breeding survey; to date this database has been completed in 42 countries. 
In the absence of data on direct indicators of research effort, the research intensity for 
different crops may have to be inferred from indirect indicators constructed for the purpose. 
In developed countries, where the application of IPRs to plant variety innovations is nearly 
universal, IPR grants provide a fairly robust indicator of the outputs of plant breeding effort in 
different crops. Most plant variety innovations in developing countries are protected through 
PVP systems. Although utility patents are applied to plant variety innovations in some 
countries (and are being increasingly applied to transgenic varieties), plant variety patents 
still constitute a very small fraction of all protected plant variety innovations. Therefore, for 
developed countries, we propose to use the grants of PVP certificates for different crops 
as a measure of research intensity. It must, however, be noted that the relative number of 
new varieties protected by PVP in any crop may not reflect the relative commercial value of 
innovations in that crop. The value of a new cereal variety protected by PVP is likely to be 
very different from the value of a protected ornamental variety. For developing countries, 
we propose to use an indicator derived from the plant breeding capacity assessment survey 
conducted by FAO’s GIPB in a number of developing countries. The indicator of research 
effort is the weighted full-time equivalents (FTE) of plant breeding personnel devoted to a 
crop in each country – i.e. the FTEs scientific personnel deployed for research in each crop 
weighted by the resources allocated for plant breeding in that crop.  
The research intensity for Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 crops in developed countries based 
on the grants of PVP certificates are summarized in Table 2.7. The data are derived from the 
PLUTO database of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) on PVP certificates granted in member-countries of UPOV. The cropwise distribution 
of PVP certificates of Annex 1 crops in UPOV member countries is presented in Appendix 2.
Over the 1960–2010 period, Annex 1 crops accounted for only 34 percent of all the 
PVP certificates granted in UPOV member countries. Food crops accounted for 30 percent 
of all PVP certificates, with cereals being the largest category accounting for 15 percent. 
The most striking feature of the data presented above is that non-Annex 1 crops account 
for two-thirds of all PVP certificates. The coverage of crops in Annex 1 of the Treaty, 
therefore, leaves out nearly two-thirds of the research effort in plant breeding from its 
purview. Research effort in non-Annex 1 crops and resulting innovations will not translate 
into benefit-sharing payments. The share of Annex 1 crops in research effort has also 
been declining over time, with their share in PVP certificates dropping from 75 percent in 
the 1960s to less than one-third in 2010. Over time, an increasing share of plant breeding 
research effort has been applied to non-Annex 1. This is the result of the increasing 
research effort attracted over the last two decades by crops such as soybean, cotton 
and sugarcane, which are not included in Annex 1. The share of these crops in the value 
of the global commercial seed market is also increasing. The limited coverage of crops 
in Annex 1 and the exclusion of certain major crops that have attracted considerable 
research effort in recent years severely constrain the potential for generation of benefit-
sharing payments through exchange of PGR under SMTAs. 
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The research intensity of different crops in developing countries expressed in terms 
resource-weighted FTEs devoted to plant breeding by NARSs derived from GIPB’s plant 
breeding survey is presented in Table 2.8. It should be noted that the correspondence 
between the crop categories used in the plant breeding survey and Annex 1 crops is not 
exact. Certain categories used in the plant breeding survey include both Annex 1 and non-
Annex 1 crops, and it has not been feasible to separate the FTEs devoted to Annex 1 and 
non-Annex 1 crops in all the categories. The figures are, however, useful for providing an 
understanding of the research priorities in developing countries at the crop group level. 
FTEs devoted to plant breeding in the NARS of developing countries have shown a 
marginal decline over the period from 1985 to 2003–05. It may be seen from Table 2.8 
that the research effort in developing countries is focused on Annex 1 crops to a much 
greater extent than in developed countries – and the share of Annex 1 crops in the plant 
breeding research effort has shown a marginal increase over the last 25 years. Nearly 83 
percent of the research effort in 2003–05 was devoted to Annex 1 crops with cereals 
accounting for 55 percent. The three principal food crops, wheat, rice and maize, account 
for nearly 38 percent of the research effort. The potential for generation of innovations 
in Annex 1 crops as a result of PGR exchanges under SMTAs appears to be greater in 
developing countries. This is reinforced by the pattern of distribution and use of PGR in 
the MLS discussed in the previous section. But if these innovations are produced mainly 
in the public sector in developing countries, then they are unlikely to be subject to strong 
forms of IPRs such as patents due to public sector mandates to encourage the widespread 
adoption of improved varieties. The greater potential for innovation in Annex 1 crops 
in developing countries may, therefore, not translate into potential for a larger flow of 
mandatory and voluntary payments. 
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Table 2.8 Research intensity of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 crops in developing 
countries based on resource-weighted full-time equivalents devoted  
to plant breeding
Status Category
Crop or crop 
group
1985 1990 1995 2000–01 2003–05
Share 
2003–05 
(%)
Annex 1 Cereal Barley 130 117.3 134 121.3 124.7 2
Annex 1 Cereal Buckwheat 12.1 2.1 1.5 5.3 8.2 0
Annex 1 Cereal Maize 801 792.7 688.9 648 596.2 11
Annex 1 Cereal Oats 16.4 18.5 26.9 16.4 10.6 0
Annex 1 Cereal Grain legumes 283.2 287.5 349.4 353.4 392.7 7
Annex 1 Cereal Small grains 200.7 170.8 183.4 192.4 228.2 4
Annex 1 Cereal Rice 266.1 298 294.9 305.6 357.2 7
Annex 1 Cereal
Sorghum and 
millets
182.2 198.1 173.2 169.4 142.7 3
Annex 1 Cereal Unknown 4.6 4.3 6.9 5.3 5.3 0
Annex 1 Cereal Wheat 987.7 991.9 945.8 946.4 1 088.8 20
Annex 1 Horticulture Fruits 221.1 213.2 193.9 176.6 156 3
Annex 1 Horticulture
Vegetables 
and Fruits
688.7 715.5 739.9 731.1 767 14
Annex 1 Oilseed Oilseed 281.2 372.3 323.5 341.3 321.6 6
Annex 1
Roots and 
tubers
Roots and 
tubers
271.2 300.2 269.2 246.5 288.6 5
Total Annex 1   4 346.2 4 482.4 4 331.4 4 259 4 487.8 83
Non-Annex 1 Fibre Fibre crops 355.3 350.6 355.3 376.1 329.3 6
Non-Annex 1 Forage Forages 289.3 274.4 269.6 275.3 260.1 5
Non-Annex 1 Forage
Perennial 
legumes
36.2 15 4.6 18.6 13 0
Non-Annex 1 Horticulture Chilli 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.1 0.7 0
Non-Annex 1 Horticulture Grape 371.6 351.9 293.8 228.6 187.1 3
Non-Annex 1 Horticulture Onion 2.3 2.0 3.5 2.0 1.1 0
Non-Annex 1 Ornamental Ornamental 27.1 31 20.9 25.5 57.1 1
Non-Annex 1 Sugarcane Sugarcane 68.7 75.9 82.2 80.9 84.6 2
Total non-
Annex 1
  1 150.5 1 100.8 1 031.3 1 008.1 933 17
All crops   5497 5583 5363 5267 5 421 100
Share Annex 1   79 80 81 81 83  
Share non-
Annex 1
  21 20 19 19 17  
Source: FAO GIPB Plant Breeding Survey.
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2.5 Assessing the use of SMtA-PgR in product innovation
Voluntary or mandatory payments under SMTAs arise when SMTA-PGR are used in the 
development of commercial innovations that are themselves a PGR (Article 6.8).10 The 
product innovation space relevant for payments is that of new varieties of plants of Annex 1 
crops that are marketed commercially. The potential for benefit-sharing payments is, 
therefore, related to the use of SMTA-PGR in plant breeding. Plant breeding programmes 
aim to develop new varieties of plants with desirable characteristics that may include higher 
yield potential, specific agronomic traits, resistance to pathogens and diseases, adaptation 
to agro-climatic conditions, and resistance to biotic and abiotic stresses. It may involve 
the use of PGR related to the crop accessed from diverse sources for extraction of useful 
traits to be incorporated in the final product (variety). The product development cycle may 
involve several rounds of breeding extending over several years. The time lag between 
the access and use of specific PGR and the development of the final variety can be large, 
ranging from five to 20 years (Brennan, 1992), depending on the crop, and possibly longer 
for certain horticultural crops. When a new plant variety is developed incorporating PGR 
from diverse sources, one question that arises is the extent of contribution made by specific 
PGR to the development of the variety. Several different methodologies or algorithms have 
been suggested in the literature to assess the genetic contribution of ancestral PGR to 
a new variety (Pardey et al., 1996). But the extent of contribution of SMTA-PGR to the 
development of a new variety is not relevant to the benefit-sharing payments under SMTAs. 
Under SMTAs any use of SMTA-PGR in the development of a commercial innovation will 
give rise to payment obligations, irrespective of the extent of the contribution. 
The identification of the use of SMTA-PGR in new plant varieties, therefore, requires 
detailed information on breeding histories of new varieties, including information on 
PGR used in different stages of the breeding cycle. Genealogy information is essential for 
assessment of the use SMTA-PGR in the development of new plant varieties. SMTA-PGR 
may not appear in the immediate parental ancestry of a variety – the pedigree of a variety 
may have to be traced back several generations in the breeding cycle to identify the use 
of SMTA-PGR. The non-availability or inadequate availability of genealogy information for 
new commercial varieties is possibly the most important constraint on reliable assessments 
of SMTA-PGR use. The availability of genealogy information for varieties in the public 
domain varies considerably across NARS and crops. Relatively good information appears 
to be available for varieties, breeding lines or crosses made by IARCs of the CGIAR. The 
CGIAR has set up fairly extensive genealogy databases for four to five major crops through 
the International Crop Information System (ICIS). The ICIS focuses on crop varieties in 
countries that have seen extensive collaboration between CGIAR and NARS. An important 
issue is the non-availability of pedigree information of proprietary varieties development 
by the private sector. When IPR protection is sought for new plant varieties through PVP or 
patents, there is generally no obligation to disclose the full breeding history or genealogy of 
10  Innovations that are not in the nature of PGR, e.g. pharmaceuticals, will not attract the provisions of SMTAs.
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the variety. Under both PVP and patents, the requirement for ‘disclosure’ of an invention (a 
pre-requisite for obtaining IPR protection) is met by the deposit of the seeds of the variety 
and/or the parental material in a national repository. Breeding histories (or ‘description of 
an invention’) provided in PVP or patent applications will generally not be adequate for 
identifying the source of the PGR used in the breeding (including use of PGR accessed 
under SMTAs). The ‘closed’ pedigrees of proprietary varieties in the private sector render 
the assessment of the use of SMTA-PGR extremely difficult. The empirical assessment of 
the use of SMTA-PGR in new plant varieties requires information to be brought together 
from product innovation databases, genealogy databases and PGR databases. In Section 
2.9, some methodologies for assessment of SMTA-PGR use in product innovations using 
such an approach are suggested. 
The implementation of the Treaty, including the use of SMTAs developed under the 
Treaty, is only around six years old. Given the long lags between PGR access and final 
product development, and the data constraints discussed above, very little information 
is currently available about the incorporation of SMTA-PGR in commercial plant variety 
innovations. In this section, we therefore propose to assess the potential use of SMTA-
PGR in product innovations based on the historical patterns of use of PGR developed by 
CGIAR institutions and distributed through institutional arrangements similar to the MLS.11 
The mandate of CGIAR institutions has been to assist developing countries in increasing 
agricultural productivity. To this end, CGIAR institutions have undertaken extensive plant 
breeding programmes in collaboration with NARS in developing countries and facilitated 
the international exchange of PGR in their gene banks. They have developed improved 
cultivars that have been directly released by NARS in developing countries, but more 
importantly, have made crosses to develop breeding lines for use by NARS in their own 
breeding programmes. The material developed by CGIAR institutions (now part of the 
MLS) has remained freely available to private sector institutions in developed countries and 
there is evidence of the substantial use of CGIAR material in private breeding programmes 
(Pardey et al., 1996). The use of CGIAR material in the development of new varieties is 
therefore a good indicator of the potential use of PGR from a large international ‘commons’ 
that remains accessible to all countries (subject now to the conditions of SMTAs). It should 
be emphasized that the historical pattern of use that have emerged over a period of three 
decades may not necessarily be an accurate indicator of the use of SMTA-PGR in product 
innovations at the time of writing (2012). The extent of use of CGIAR PGR in new varieties 
is an indicator of the level of use of SMTA-PGR that may build up over a period of time. 
There are certain factors that may contribute to future patterns of use being different from 
historical patterns. The MLS is a much larger collection that the CGIAR collections, although 
the CGIAR collections represent a component that is relatively well-documented and easily 
accessible. As more Contracting Parties take steps for the effective implementation of 
the Treaty, the pool of PGR effectively available for international exchange will increase. 
This implies that the use of MLS material in innovations may be larger than the use of 
11  The reference here is to arrangements for international exchange of PGR that preceded the MLS. The gene 
banks maintained by CGIAR have served as hubs of international PGR exchange over the last four decades. 
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CGIAR material in variety innovations in the past. At the same time, the use of avoidance 
strategies in relation to MLS material by private sector breeding programmes (deterred 
by benefit-sharing provisions in SMTAs) may lead to a decline in the use of MLS material 
in product innovations, especially those subject to stronger forms of IPRs. Nevertheless, 
historical patterns of use provide a benchmark for assessing the potential use of SMTA-
PGR in plant variety innovations over time. Summarized below are the available data on 
the historical patterns of use of CGIAR PGR in wheat, rice and maize, principally drawn 
from periodic impact assessment studies undertaken by the CGIAR. 
2.5.1  Wheat
Wheat is a crop where the public sector has been dominant in plant breeding in developing 
countries. This was also true of developed countries until the late 1980s, when the private 
sector started to play a more important role in the development of new varieties. CIMMYT 
is the principal CGIAR institution involved in wheat development and its role in international 
wheat research, and the ‘Green Revolution’ in wheat has been well documented in the 
literature (Evenson and Gollin, 2002). An impact assessment study conducted by CIMMYT 
in the late 1990s (Pingali, 1999) found that over the period 1966–1997, the NARS of 
developing countries had released 2 200 wheat varieties, a quarter of them released 
between 1991 and 1997. The use of CIMMYT-related PGR in the varieties released from 
1991–1997 is summarized in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9 Use of International Wheat and Maize Improvement Centre germplasm 
in wheat variety releases of developing countries, 1991–1997
International wheat and Maize 
Improvement Centre (CIMMyt) 
plant genetic resources 
Spring bread 
wheat  (%)
Spring durum wheat 
(%)
winter wheat/
facultative wheat 
(%)
CIMMYT crosses
56 77 19
NARS crosses with at least one 
CIMMYT parent 28 19 13
NARS crosses with CIMMYT 
ancestry 5 2 9
NARS semi-dwarfs with other 
ancestry 8 41
Tall varieties 3 2 18
Source: Pingali, 1999.
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The study found that with the exception of China, which used its own material to a 
considerable extent), almost all developing countries made substantial use of CIMMYT 
material. CIMMYT’s contribution was relatively low for temperate zone wheats (winter/
facultative wheat). The study noted that NARS in developing countries such as India and 
China had improved their ability to make their own crosses and were relying less on the 
direct use of CIMMYT crosses. However, the use of CIMMYT material in their breeding 
programmes remained high. 
The study noted that although the public sector was dominant in wheat research in 
developing countries, private wheat improvement programmes were strong in Latin American 
countries such as Argentina and Brazil. Nearly 50 percent of private wheat varieties in Latin 
America had incorporated CIMMYT material. In Argentina, nearly 60 percent of the wheat 
varieties protected by PVP had CIMMYT ancestry, while it was 45 percent in the case of 
protected varieties in Chile. Therefore, there is evidence to suggest that private sector wheat 
breeding programmes have also been significant users of CIMMYT material. 
In terms of area, it has been estimated that nearly 80 percent of the wheat area in developing 
countries is planted to improved or modern varieties (Heisey et al., 2002); 62 percent of the 
wheat area in developing countries is estimated to be planted with varieties with CIMMYT 
ancestry. Slightly less than half of wheat area is planted to varieties produced from crosses 
made by CIMMYT or that has at least one parent from CIMMYT. Table 2.10 summarizes the 
area planted to different wheat types by the type of cross or source of germplasm.
Table 2.10 Area grown to different wheat types by origin of germplasm, 1997 
(million ha)
nARS crosses 
wheat type
International 
wheat and Maize 
Improvement Centre 
(CIMMyt) cross
CIMMyt 
parent
CIMMyt 
ancestor
other 
semi-
dwarf
tall land races
Unknown 
cultivars All
Spring bread 
wheat 17.8 22.4 12.6 7.7 5.2 1.4 1.0 68.1 
Spring durum 
wheat 3.4 1.2 0.02 0.11 0.3 1.5 0.1 6.7 
Winter/facultative
bread wheat 0.6 1.9 4.2 11.6 2.2 4.1 2.6 27.2 
Winter/ facultative 
durum wheat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 
All wheat types 21.8 25.5 16.8 19.5 8.7 7.0 3.8 103.2
Source: Pingali, 1999.
It should be noted that from the perspective of benefit-sharing payments under SMTAs, 
the different types of CIMMYT contribution to varieties would all be treated alike. A direct 
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CIMMYT cross released as a variety and variety with some CIMMYT material in its ancestry 
(accessed through SMTAs) would give rise to the same payment obligation. 
For developed countries, no recent estimates of the use of CIMMYT material in variety 
releases or the area share of varieties with CIMMYT ancestry. An earlier assessment made 
by CIMMYT in the 1990s is summarized in Table 2.11.
Table 2.11 Estimates of area sown to wheat varieties containing CIMMYT 
germplasm in some industrialized countries
Country year
wheat area 
(million ha)
Percentage of area 
with International 
wheat and Maize 
Improvement 
Centre (CIMMyt) 
germplasm (%)
total area 
with CIMMyt 
germplasm 
(million ha)
Australia 1990 8.7 85 7.4
Italy (durum only) 1990 1.7 60 1.0
New Zealand 1987 0.04 79 0.03
South Africa 1990 1.6 60 1
United States of 
America
1984 25.5 34 8.7
Western Canada 1992 12.3 28 3.5
total 49.9 21.5
Source: Byerlee and Moya, 1993.
Byerlee and Moya (1993) found that by the early 1990s, nearly 40 percent of the area 
planted to wheat in developed countries was sown to varieties with CIMMYT ancestry and 
that the proportion was rising. The increasing role of the private sector in wheat breeding 
in developed countries over the last two decades may mean that the share of area sown to 
varieties with CIMMYT ancestry may be lower at present. However, two points need to be 
noted. The first is that most wheat area in developed countries is in temperate production 
environments where the contribution of CIMMYT germplasm has been lower. At the same 
time, data for Latin America show that private wheat breeding programmes have also 
made substantial use of CIMMYT germplasm. Many of the international companies that 
are holders of PVP certificates in Latin America are also the leading breeders of wheat 
in the United States and Europe (e.g. Monsanto). Therefore, it would be reasonable to 
assume that CIMMYT germplasm would have diffused through the breeding pools of 
these companies and found its way to wheat varieties released in developed countries. A 
pedigree analysis of leading (winter) wheat varieties in the United Kingdom (Srinivasan et 
al., 2003) showed that private sector varieties, which had acquired dominant market share 
by the late 1990s, incorporated significant proportions of CIMMYT germplasm. 
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Table 2.12 Contribution of different sources of germplasm in leading UK wheat 
varieties (pedigree expansion to five generations)
Country/source of 
parent 
Varieties (%)
Apollo
Cappelle- 
desprez
galahad
Maris 
Huntsman
Mercia norman Riband Slepjner
Av. 
contrib.
France 12.52 18.76 18.77 18.77 18.77 3.13 12.52 6.26 13.69 
UK 25 12.51 25 12.5 12.5 10.94 
CIMMYT 9.39 12.52 21.9 12.52 6.26 12.52 9.39 
Netherlands 62.5 7.81 
USA 3.13 3.13 15.63 3.13 3.13 9.39 3.13 5.08 
Belgium 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 3.91 
Germany 3.13 6.26 3.13 3.13 6.26 3.13 3.13 
Canada 6.26 3.13 3.13 6.25 3.13 2.74 
UK/France 3.13 3.13 3.13 3.13 3.13 1.96 
Japan 3.13 3.13 3.13 1.17 
Australia 6.25 0.78 
USA/France 3.13 0.39 
Sweden 3.13 0.39 
Russian 
Federation
3.13 0.39 
Denmark 3.13 0.39 
Unknown 56.25 81.25 25 6.25 53.13 50 31.25 37.89 
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Srinivasan et al., 2003.
Table 2.12 shows that although the contribution of CIMMYT germplasm to selected 
UK wheat varieties is only around 10 percent when pedigrees are expanded to five 
generations, six out of eight varieties have CIMMYT ancestry. In the absence of recent data 
on the area share of varieties with CIMMYT ancestry in developed countries, an estimate 
of 20–30 percent appears to be a reasonable conservative figure for use in our simulations 
of potential benefit-sharing payments under SMTAs. 
2.5.2  Rice
Developing countries are predominantly the major producers of rice. Only two developed 
countries – Japan and the United States – figure among major rice producers. The public 
sector has remained dominant in rice breeding in developing countries, although in some 
countries the private sector has started to play a significant role in the development of hybrid 
rice. IRRI is the principal CGIAR institution12 for the development of rice, and its activities 
12   West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA) has a mandate for rice development in West Africa. 
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have focused on the major rice-producing areas in South and Southeast Asia, where it 
has made a significant contribution to the Green Revolution in rice. A key feature of IRRI’s 
contribution to rice research and development has been the extensive direct use of IRRI-
bred varieties (e.g. IR-8, IR-64) in many of the countries with which IRRI has collaborated 
(Evenson and Gollin., 2002). Several impact assessment studies have been conducted (e.g. 
Hossain et al., 2002; Brennan and Malabayabas, 2011) to assess the contribution of IRRI 
to rice varietal development and productivity gains since the mid-1960s. We propose to 
rely on these impact assessment studies to derive empirical estimates of the use of IRRI 
germplasm in rice variety innovations. 
Hossain et al. (2002) analysed 2040 varieties released in 12 countries of South and 
Southeast Asia over the period 1970–1999. Table 2.13 shows the breakdown of these 
varieties by country. 
Table 2.13 Contribution of IRRI to rice varieties released in South  
and Southeast Asia, by country
Percentage of total releases (%)
Country
IRRI crosses 
released as 
varieties
Varieties with an 
IRRI parent
Varieties with 
IRRI material in 
previous ancestors
Released varieties 
linked with IRRI 
materials
Bangladesh 11.0 46.0 8.0 65.0
Cambodia 23.8 7.2 0.0 31.0
India 5.2 33.1 9.5 47.8
Indonesia 10.0 42.0 16.0 68.0
Lao PDR 4.8 38.1 0.0 42.9
Malaysia 11.5 28.9 7.7 48.1
Myanmar 23.9 20.2 0.7 44.8
Pakistan 22.2 25.0 0.0 47.2
Philippines 26.6 38.2 4.7 69.5
Sri Lanka 2.7 30.7 21.3 54.7
Thailand 0.0 10.7 4.9 15.6
Viet Nam 20.5 28.8 3.7 53.0
total 10.7 31.1 7.9 49.7
Source: Hossain et al., 2002.
Of the 2040 varieties for which pedigree information was available, 219 were identified 
as IRRI lines released directly (without further breeding) in the countries, constituting 
approximately 11 percent of the releases. Including the varieties with IRRI parents and 
varieties with IRRI material in previous ancestry, the share of varieties with IRRI linked 
materials was almost 50 percent. Within the aggregate data, however, there were 
important differences across countries. The contribution of IRRI to released varieties in 
South and Southeast Asia by time period is summarized in Table 2.14.
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Table 2.14 Contribution of IRRI to rice varieties released in South and Southeast 
Asia, by time period
time period
IRRI crosses releases as 
varieties
Released varieties with 
IRRI parents
Released varieties with 
IRRI ancestry
Pre-1970 11.6 15.6 16.0
1971–75 16.9 59.1 61.0
1976–80 17.7 60.4 64.7
1981–85 11.9 42.8 54.7
1986–90 10.7 40.2 49.6
1991–95 3.3 35.9 49.3
1996–99 3.1 45.8 54.2
total 10.7 41.8 49.7
Source: Hossain et al., 2002.
The data in Table 2.14 suggest that, as a percentage of released varieties, IRRI developed 
varieties reached their highest level (about 18 percent) in 1976–80 and declined thereafter. 
However, the overall contribution of IRRI germplasm increased from 16 percent in the 
1960s to over 60 percent in the 1970s and thereafter remained at a level of 50 percent. 
The vintage of IRRI germplasm used in varieties released during different time periods is 
summarized in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 Vintage of IRRI germplasm used in rice varieties released in different time periods
Source: Hossain et al., 2002.
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In Figure 2.5, successive waves of IRRI germplasm can be seen in the released varieties 
of different periods. A key feature of the data is the continuing importance of first and 
second generation IRRI germplasm. The more recent vintages of IRRI germplasm appear 
to be following essentially the same pattern as earlier vintages. The newer material is 
being used but it takes at least ten years for it to show up in any substantial number of 
released varieties. 
In terms of area, it is estimated that by the late 1990s, 75 percent of rice area in 
Asia was planted to improved or high-yielding varieties (HYVs). Hossain et al. (2002) 
also analysed the area share of the five leading varieties in each of the 12 countries 
of South and Southeast Asia (listed in Table 2.13) and found that the leading varieties 
accounted for 45 percent of the total rice production. Of the 55 varieties observed in 
11 countries, 36 varieties had some IRRI ancestry and accounted for nearly 30 percent 
of the rice area in these countries. Hargrove and Cabanilla (1998) noted from a similar 
study that 30 percent of widely grown varieties were introduced from IRRI, 60 percent 
were locally developed and 10 percent were from other countries. Locally developed 
varieties incorporated varying degrees of IRRI germplasm in them. 
A more recent assessment of IRRI’s contribution to rice varieties yield improvement in 
Southeast Asia (Brennan and Malabayabas, 2011) has examined IRRI’s contribution in 
three countries – the Philippines, Indonesia and Viet Nam. Previous studies (e.g. Hossain 
et al., 2002) have classified varieties into:
•	 IRRI crosses released as varieties;
•	 varieties released by NARS with an IRRI parent;
•	 varieties released by NARS with IRRI material among previous ancestors;
•	 other varieties without IRRI connection. 
In this study, as a quantitative measure of IRRI’s contribution to new varieties, a rule 
of thumb based on attribution for the parentage and pedigree was used. Varieties 
with two IRRI lines as parents were calculated as having 100 percent IRRI contribution, 
whereas with one parent this contribution was 50 percent. The contribution is estimated 
as 25 percent when there are no IRRI parents, but IRRI lines appear in the ancestry. The 
contribution of IRRI to each variety was then weighted by the area share of the variety to 
derive an index of IRRI’s contribution. Table 2.15 shows the IRRI contribution to varieties 
released in terms of numbers using the categories described above, in the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Viet Nam over different time periods.
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Table 2.15 IRRI contribution to rice varieties released in Philippines, Indonesia 
and Viet Nam, by time period
1980–89 1990–99 2000–09
total
 1980–2009
Philippines
Total no. of varieties released 22 43 83 148
IRRI releases 14 22 33 69
IRRI parent 1 13 11 25
IRRI ancestor 1 0 8 9
Total IRRI link 16 (73%) 35 (81%) 52 (63%) 103 (70%)
Indonesia
Total no. of varieties released 70 41 83 194
IRRI releases 17 2 0 19
IRRI parent 34 25 49 108
IRRI ancestor 12 7 26 45
Total IRRI link 63 (90%) 34 (83%) 75 (90%) 172 (89%)
Viet nam
Total no. of varieties released 60 98 68 226
IRRI releases 28 21 8 57
IRRI parent 20 51 28 99
IRRI ancestor 4 5 8 17
Total IRRI link 52 (87%) 77 (79%) 44 (65%) 173 (77%)
Source: Brennan and Malabayabas, 2011.
In the Philippines, the average share of IRRI linked varieties over the period 1980-2009 
was 70 percent, although there has been a decline in recent years to 63 percent. In 
Indonesia, the share of varieties with IRRI links has remained at a high level of around 
90 percent. In Viet Nam, the average share of IRRI linked varieties has been 77 percent 
(1980-2009), although the share has declined to 65 percent in recent years. The area 
weighted share of IRRI’s contribution to varieties over the same time period is summarized 
in Table 2.16.
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Table 2.16 Area weighted index of IRRI contribution to rice varieties released in 
Philippines, Indonesia and Viet Nam, by time period
IRRI contribution (%)
year Philippines Indonesia Viet nam
1985 73 47 59
1990 90 70 59
1995 81 73 73
2000 95 73 62
2005 87 75 51
2009 60 69 35
Source: Brennan and Malabayabas, 2011.
In the Philippines, IRRI’s area weighted contribution to varieties has declined from 73 
percent in 1985 to 60 percent in 2009, while in Indonesia, it has increased from 47 to 69 
percent over the same time period. In Viet Nam, IRRI’s contribution has declined from 59 
percent in 1985 to 35 percent in 2009.
It must be noted that the classification of varieties based on the extent of IRRI contribution 
is not relevant from the perspective of benefit-sharing payments under SMTAs, since the 
incorporation of any IRRI material obtained under SMTAs would give rise to payment 
obligations. From the data examined above, it would appear that 30 percent would be a 
fairly conservative estimate of the area share of IRRI linked varieties in South and Southeast 
Asian countries that have seen IRRI contribution to rice varietal development.
2.5.3  Maize
In relation to the other two crops considered in this chapter – wheat and rice – maize has 
a certain distinctive characteristics. Unlike wheat and rice, which are self-pollinated crops, 
maize is an open-pollinated variety (OPV). A key feature of maize breeding has been the 
development of hybrid varieties that have come to dominate maize area in developed 
countries and have acquired significant market shares in developing countries (Morris, 
1998). The development of maize hybrids has facilitated the participation of the private 
sector in maize breeding programmes. The private sector is now the dominant player 
in maize breeding in developed countries and is playing an increasingly important role 
in developing countries. In developed countries, maize is grown mainly in temperate 
environments, while in developing countries it is grown mainly in non-temperate regions. 
This difference has important implications for the flows of PGR and improved technology 
in maize breeding. Maize germplasm that performs well in temperate regions generally 
cannot be introduced into non-temperate regions; consequently, maize varieties developed 
for the United States and Europe are of little direct use to developing countries. CIMMYT 
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has been the principal CGIAR institution13 for maize development, and its breeding efforts 
have focused on non-temperate production environments (Morris et al., 2002).
We propose to base our assessment of the use of MLS material in variety development 
on the use of CIMMYT germplasm in the development of maize varieties for developing 
countries, drawing mainly on a number of maize research impact studies conducted by the 
CGIAR (Morris, 1998, 2001 and 2002).
Table 2.17 presents the trends in public sector maize variety releases in developing 
countries and the estimated share of varieties incorporating CIMMYT germplasm. 
Table 2.17 Trends in public sector maize variety releases in developing countries 
and contribution of CIMMYT germplasm
1966–
1970
1971–
1975
1976–
1980
1981– 
1985
1986–
1990
1991–
1995
1996–
1999
1966–
1999
Total no. of varietal releases  97 114 137 205 216 266 137 1 172 
Type of material 
Open-pollinated varieties 
(OPVs) (%) 
0.69 0.57 0.69 0.65 0.69 0.50 0.48 0.61 
Hybrids (%) 0.31 0.43 0.30 0.35 0.32 0.50 0.52 0.39 
Containing CIMMYT 
germplasm 
All materials (%) 0.41 0.28 0.50 0.58 0.65 0.56 0.64 0.54 
Non-temperate materials 
(%) 
0.45 0.29 0.50 0.60 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.59 
Source: Morris, 2001.
OPVs have constituted the dominant proportion of public sector releases. On average, 
59 percent of varieties for non-temperate environments have incorporated CIMMYT 
germplasm. The share of varieties incorporating CIMMYT germplasm has also shown an 
increasing trend from 45 percent in the period 1966-70 to nearly 73 percent in the period 
1996-99. While no time-series data was available for private sector varietal releases, the 
data on private sector maize variety releases in different developing country regions for 
1997 is presented in Table 2.18. 
13   The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) also has a mandate for maize development, among 
other crops. 
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Table 2.18 Maize variety releases by private sector in developing countries, 1997
latin 
America 
eastern and 
Southern Africa 
South, east, and 
Southeast Asia 
All 
regions 
Total no. of varieties 498 25 330 853 
Type of material 
Open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) (%) 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.02 
Hybrids (%) 0.97 0.92 1.00 0.98 
Containing CIMMYT germplasm 
All materials (%) 0.73 0.21 0.19 0.58 
Non-temperate materials (%) 0.89 0.15 0.18 0.70 
Source: Morris, 2001.
The variety releases by the private sector are almost entirely concentrated in hybrids 
(97 percent share). There appears to be significant use of CIMMYT germplasm by the 
private sector in developing countries – although the share of varieties incorporating 
CIMMYT germplasm varies widely, from 15 in Eastern and Southern Africa to 89 percent 
in Latin America. The private sector also produces a larger share of varieties intended 
for temperate environments. It is important to note that the use of CIMMYT germplasm 
in private varieties remains high even when varieties for temperate environments are 
included in the analysis. 
In terms of area, it has been estimated nearly 62.4 percent of the maize area was planted 
to improved varieties in the late 1990s (Morris, 2001) and this proportion is likely to have 
increased over the last decade. The share of area planted to improved OPVs and hybrids 
and the share of commercial seed in maize area for different developing country regions 
is summarized in Table 2.19.
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Table 2.19 Maize area planted to improved open-pollinated varieties and 
hybrids in developing countries, late 1990s
Area planted using commercial seed
total maize 
area (million 
ha)
Area planted 
using farm-
saved seed 
(%)
open-
pollinated 
varieties 
(oPVs) (%)
Hybrids 
(%)
All modern 
varieties 
(MVs) (%)
Latin America 27.1 55.1 5.0 39.9 44.9
w/o Argentina 24.5 59.6 5.3 35.1 40.4
Eastern and Southern Africa 14.9 47.5 6.9 45.7 52.6
w/o South Africa 10.9 64.1 8.3 27.6 35.9
Western and Central Africa 8.2 63.2 33.1 3.7 36.8
East, South and South-East Asia 42.3 17.6 12.3 69.6 82.4
w/o China 20.5 35.3 22.1 42.6 64.7
All regions 94.2 37.6 11.5 51.0 62.4
All non-temperate regions 65.7 52.8 14.8 32.4 47.2
Source: Morris, 2002.
For all regions taken together, 62.4 percent of the maize area was planted to commercial 
seed, while for non-temperate regions, the share was 47.2 percent. In non-temperate 
regions, the share of area planted to hybrids was 32.4 percent, while the area planted to 
OPVs (with commercial seed) was 14.8. Commercial seed is therefore used for nearly half 
the area planted to maize in developing countries. 
The share of maize planted to varieties incorporating CIMMYT germplasm in developing 
countries in the late 1990s is presented in Table 2.20.
Table 2.20 Maize area planted to modern varieties with CIMMYT material, late 1990s
Maize 
area
(million 
ha)
Maize area 
under modern 
varieties 
(MVs)
(%)
Maize area 
under MVs
(‘000 ha)
Seed with 
CIMMyt 
germplasm
(%)
Maize area 
under MVs 
with CIMMyt 
germplasm
(‘000 ha)
Latin America 27.1 44.9 12 171 80.9 9 842
w/o Argentina 24.5 40.4 9 899 92.8 9 183
Eastern and Southern Africa 14.9 52.6 7 834 20.8 1 630
w/o South Africa 10.9 35.9 3 910 36.7 1 433
Western and Central Africa 8.2 36.8 3 013 67.0 2 019
East, South and Southeast Asia 42.3 82.4 34 851 20.7 7 222
w/o China 20.5 64.7 13 244 38.2 5 062
All regions 94.2 62.4 58 805 36.1 21 210
All non-temperate regions 65.7 47.2 31 001 58.7 18 195
Source: Morris, 2002.
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CIMMYT-linked varieties had a share of 58.7 percent in non-temperate regions, which 
fell to 36.1 percent when all regions (including temperate regions) were considered. 
We do not have variety release data for developed countries similar to that for 
developing countries. But since most developed countries have adopted PVP systems 
for over three decades, and it is generally the practice for both public and private sector 
institutions to protect their varieties, the trends in PVP grants can provide an indicator 
of new maize varieties bred in developed countries.14 The trends in grants of PVP 
certificates in three major maize-producing developed countries – United States, France 
and Germany – and for the European Union (EU)15 are presented in Figure 2.6.
It must be noted that that development of transgenic varieties in the United States is 
not reflected in the Figure 2.6 because the latter are generally are protected by utility 
patents and not by PVP. The private sector is dominant in the ownership of maize varieties 
in developed countries, and the pedigrees of private varieties are often ‘closed’ (i.e. not 
disclosed publicly). Therefore, it is difficult to assess the use of CIMMYT germplasm in 
14   Not all protected varieties are eventually sold commercially; some protected varieties may never be marketed 
commercially. 
15   The Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) of the EU grants PVP certificates that are valid in the whole of 
the EU. CPVO came into existence only in 1995. National PVP grants cannot be held simultaneously with a 
CPVO grant for the same variety. In recent years, the use of national PVP systems in France and Germany has 
declined as breeders switch to seeking EU-wide protection for new varieties through the CPVO.
Figure 2.6 Trends in PVP certificates for maize varieties in the United States, France and Germany
Source: UPOV Plant Variety Database.
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maize breeding programmes in developed countries. However, there is evidence of the 
significant use of CIMMYT germplasm in the United States (Pardey et al., 1996), even though 
CIMMYT breeding programmes are mainly oriented to non-temperate environments. It 
may therefore be reasonable to assume that the use of CIMMYT germplasm in developed 
country maize varieties can be conservatively approximated by the share of CIMMYT-linked 
varieties for temperate regions in developing countries (around 11 percent).
2.6  Value of global commercial seed market
Payment obligations under SMTAs are related to the commercial sales of product 
innovations incorporating SMTA-PGR. The value of global commercial seed sales, therefore, 
provides a useful starting point for the assessment of potential benefit-sharing payments. 
In this section we will attempt an estimation of the global commercial seed sales related to 
Annex 1 crops. In the following section, we will attempt to identify the components of the 
global commercial seed sales that could be attributed to product innovations incorporating 
SMTA-PGR for three major food crops – wheat, rice and maize. 
2.6.1  Data sources and constraints
An accurate assessment of the value of the global commercial seed market is a difficult 
exercise because of the lack of reliable and consistent data sources across countries. In 
almost all countries, the extensive use of farm-saved seed for different crops implies that 
commercial seed use is a fraction of the total seed use. The proportion of commercial 
seed use to total seed use is reflected in the SRRs, which vary widely across crop, type 
of variety (hybrid versus non-hybrids) and countries and over time. Thus, even where 
reliable estimates of seed use are available from crop production data, the estimation 
of the volumes of commercial seed requires information on seed replacement patterns 
adopted by farmers. Derivation of the value of commercial seed sold from volume data 
further requires information on seed prices which are also subject to wide variation across 
individual varieties and countries. 
Commercial seed is sold in seed markets by public and private sector companies of 
varying sizes – from small independent seed companies producing and marketing seed 
locally to giant global companies that market seeds across continents. While published 
reports and accounts may provide some information on the seed sales of these companies, 
there is no organized statistical system for the collection and consolidation of seed sales 
data at the provincial or national level in most countries. The information from published 
reports of seed companies may not provide information on the value of seed sales by crop. 
Variety-level information, critical for assessment of payment obligations under SMTAs, 
is invariably never provided as companies regard variety level data to be commercially 
sensitive. For large global companies operating in several countries (often through a web 
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of affiliated, ‘group’ or subsidiary companies) and covering several different types of 
agricultural inputs, the assessment of the value of commercial seed sales by crop from 
published reports may be infeasible or very complex. Seed industry association at the 
national or international level do often compile seed sales of members – but again, data 
coverage of crops and industry segments varies considerably and data may not be made 
available publicly at a disaggregated level. Variety information is again not available. In 
seed markets characterized by intense competition for market share, industry players have 
few incentives to disclose variety-level information. 
Commercial seed is sold in national jurisdictions subject to marketing and quality control 
regulations. The data generated in the enforcement of these regulations provide the most 
reliable data on commercial seed use at the crop (and at times, variety) level. In countries 
with variety registration systems,16 commercial seed can be sold only if a variety has been 
registered or inscripted in a national register. In the EU, varieties of agricultural plant species 
and vegetable seed can be marketed only if they are inscripted in the EU common catalogue 
of varieties, which is updated every year. Many countries also have variety release procedures 
or a list of recommended varieties, which are in the nature of recommendations to farmers 
for adoption. Variety registration systems and recommended variety lists are, therefore, an 
authentic source of information on the varieties that can be commercialized in different 
jurisdictions. Most countries also operate seed certification systems for quality control that 
may be mandatory or optional. In most EU countries, seed certification is compulsory, which 
implies that all commercial seed sales must be subject to seed certification. In countries 
where seed certification is compulsory, seed certification statistics provide authentic data on 
on volumes, per variety, of commercial seed produced.17 However, in other countries such as 
the United States and many developing countries, seed certification may be optional or may 
apply only to a set of varieties (e.g. released varieties) brought under the purview of quality 
control regulations. In such cases, seed certification statistics may provide only a partial 
view of the commercial seed market, although leading varieties may be covered. The OECD 
operates a certification scheme18 for seeds of selected cereal, forage and vegetable crops 
moving in international trade; 58 countries (including some non-OECD countries) participate 
in these schemes. The list of varieties eligible for certification under the OECD schemes is a 
useful source of information on varieties moving in international trade for the crops covered. 
Although the OECD collects information on the volume of certified seeds traded under the 
scheme, variety-level information is not published. 
International seed trade statistics are another potential source of information on the 
size of the global commercial seed market, although, by definition, trade statistics exclude 
16   Registration systems may require a variety to be evaluated for distinctness, uniformity and stability (DUS) and 
also for value in cultivation and use (VCU).
17   Some countries (e.g. France), however, do not publish seed certification statistics at the variety level but only 
at the crop level.
18  For details of OECD certification schemes, see www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,
en_2649_33905_39574151_1_1_1_1,00.html. Currently, around 43,000 varieties are eligible for 
certification under the OECD scheme.
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commercial seed produced and sold in domestic markets. The availability of data on 
seed trade at the crop level for different countries depends on the level of detail in the 
classification of goods adopted for generating international trade data. Trade statistics are 
recommended to be compiled under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System (HS) of tariff nomenclature, an internationally standardized system of names 
and numbers for classifying traded products developed and maintained by the World 
Customs Organization (WCO), an independent intergovernmental organization with over 
170 member countries based in Belgium. The HS system at the six-digit level19 does not 
distinguish between seed and grain for most crops (i.e. the trade in seed is clubbed with 
trade in grain). However, some countries – including all EU countries, the United States, 
China and India – have extended the classification to nine or ten digits (i.e. incorporated 
additional sub-categories), which allows ‘seeds for planting’ to be distinguished as a 
separate category. Therefore, the data on imports and exports of seeds at the crop level 
are available only for some countries that have gone beyond the mandatory six-digit 
classification of traded goods. Trade statistics on seeds, even when they are available, 
do not, however, provide any variety-level information. Estimation of commercial seed 
volumes/value from international trade statistics is also confounded by the problem of 
import and re-export of seeds, which is a significant phenomenon for seeds of several 
crops (e.g. forage crops).
Data on the global commercial seed market are also available from a number of 
commercial market research reports and seed market databases.20 These reports and 
databases are mainly intended to assess market opportunities and competition in different 
markets, and vary greatly in their scope and coverage of crops, countries and companies, 
often focusing on the largest player in the market. For this analysis, the authors have 
principally relied on information provided by ISF, which is the international industry 
association of the seed industry, and a global seed industry report prepared by Global 
Industry Analysts, Inc. (GIA, 2010).
2.6.2  Value of global commercial seed market of Annex 1 crops
There are several estimates of the value of the global seed market, which range from 
US$36.1 billion (GIA, 2010) to US$42 billion of the ISF. The differences in the estimates 
from different sources arise on account of the categories of crops included and the 
methods and coverage of data collection. The ISF estimates of the size of the domestic 
seed markets in selected countries are presented in Table 2.21. 
19   To ensure harmonization, the Contracting Parties must employ all 4- and 6-digit provisions and the 
international rules and notes without deviation, but are free to adopt additional subcategories and notes.
20   Examples include the Global Seed Market Database of The Context Network (www.contextnet.com/seed-
industry.cfm), Seed Services of Phillips McDougall (www.phillipsmcdougall.com/seedservice.asp) and GfK 
Kynetec’s database on biotech seeds (www.gfk.com/imperia/md/content/gfkkynetec/gfk_kynetec_traittrak_
final_12-3-09.pdf ).
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Table 2.21 Estimated value of the domestic seed market in selected countries 
(US$ million), 2011
Country 
US$ 
million
 Country 
US$ 
million
Country 
US$ 
million
 Country 
US$ 
million
USA 12 000 South Africa 370 Morocco 140 Bolivia 40
China 6 000 Mexico 350 Bulgaria 120 Columbia 40
France 2 400 Netherlands 317 Chile 120 Slovenia 40
Brazil 2 000 Czech Rep. 300 Nigeria 120 Peru 30
India 2 000 Hungary 300 Serbia 120 Zimbabwe 30
Japan 1 400 Taiwan 300 Switzerland 118 Libya 25
Germany 1 261 Poland 260 Slovakia 110 Saudi Arabia 20
Italy 780 Greece 240 New Zealand 100 Zambia 20
Argentina 600 Sweden 240 Ireland 80 Ecuador 15
Canada 550 Romania 220 Paraguay 80 Tanzania 15
Russia 500 Belgium 185 Portugal 80 Malawi 10
Spain 450 Denmark 185 Algeria 70 Uganda 10
Australia 400 Finland 160 Uruguay 70
Dominican 
Republic 7
Korea 400 Austria 150 Kenya 60   
Turkey 400 Egypt 140 Iran 55   
United Kingdom 400 Tunisia 45 Israel 50   
Source: ISF, 2011.
The selected 61 countries account for US$37.8 billion of the estimated US$42 billion 
value of the global commercial seed market. The United States has the largest commercial 
seed market valued at nearly US$12 billion, followed by the EU at nearly US$8 billion. 
However, cropwise estimates of the value of the global commercial seed market are not 
available from ISF data. The GIA study provides some breakdown of the global commercial 
seed market at the level of major crop groups, which is summarized in Table 2.22.
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Table 2.22 Global seed market – breakdown of value sales by crop type
Crop group   Share (%) Value (US$ billion)
Grain seeds 37.89 13.94
Horticulture seeds 20.40 7.51
- Flower seeds 12.55 4.62
- Lawn/grass seeds 7.86 2.89
Oilseeds 14.69 5.41
Vegetable seeds 11.80 4.34
Fruit seeds 6.83 2.51
Miscellaneous seeds 8.39 3.09
total 100 36.8
Source: GIA, 2010.
Even the disaggregation of the value of the global commercial seed market into 
major crop groups does not allow to estimate the value of the commercial seed market 
attributable to Annex 1 crops. In Figure 2.7, the authors attempted to map Annex 1 crops 
to the crop group/value segments of the seed market shown in Table 2.22. It must be 
noted that not all Annex 1 crops can be readily mapped to the crop group/value segments 
used in the GIA study; tuber crops including potatoes and pulse crop do not map on to 
any of the value segments and have been shown separately. 
ASSESSING THE POTENT IAL FOR MONETARY PAYMENTS FROM EXCHANGE OF PLANT GENET IC 
RESOURCES UNDER THE MULT ILATERAL SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT 
GENET IC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
77
Chapter 2
Figure 2.7   Global commercial seed market (2010) and Annex I crops
Note: It is not clear under which crop/value segments identified in the GIA (2010) report, root and tuber crops and pulse crops can 
be classified. However, the overall global commercial seed market value includes the value of commercial seed of these crops. 
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To assess the relative important of Annex 1 crops in the respective crop/value segments, 
the relative share of Annex 1 crops in the area harvested and production of these segments 
from FAOSTAT data for 2010 have been estimated, as shown in Table 2.23.
Table 2.23 Share of Annex 1 crops in global seed market crop group/value 
segments
Crop group/
value segment
Share of Annex 
1 crops in total 
area harvested 
(2010)
(%)
Share of Annex 
1 crop in total 
production 
(2010)
(%)
Commercial seed 
market for crop 
group/value 
segment 
(US$ billion)
Commercial seed 
market value for 
Annex 1 crops
(US$ billion)
Cereals/grains 99.5 99 13.94 13.8
Pulses and lentils 92 92 n.a n.a
Roots and tubers 98 98 n.a 0.2*
Oilseeds 33 17 5.40 0.9
Vegetable seeds 20 19 4.34 0.8
Fruit seeds 42 54 2.51 1.4
Forage seeds n.a n.a 2.89 2.3**
Total
Source: Calculated from FAOSTAT data.
*Represents value of annual exports of potato seeds based on average international export prices.
** Based on the assumption that temperate forages seeds account for 80 percent of commercial seed sales. 
Table 2.23 shows that for cereals and root and tuber crops, Annex 1 crops account 
for nearly the entire area and production of the respective crop groups. Annex 1 crops 
of pulses and lentils also account for a 92 percent of the share of area and production 
in the crop group. The share of Annex 1 crops in area and production is much lower for 
other crop groups. In oilseed crops, the exclusion of major oilseed crops such as soybean 
from Annex 1 accounts for the lower share of Annex 1 crops (17 percent of production) 
in this segment. The area and production share of Annex 1 vegetable crops is less than 
20 percent. Due to the inclusion of important fruits such as banana/plantains, strawberry 
and apple in Annex 1, the share of Annex 1 fruits in area and production is much higher 
compared to vegetables. 
For roots and tubers, no data on the size of the commercial market for seed are available. 
For the seed potato market, it is estimated that annual world exports are around one million 
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tonnes, with the Netherlands accounting for nearly 70 percent of the world exports.21 We 
have used the value of world exports as a proxy for the size of the commercial market 
for seed potato. For other tuber crops, the commercial market for propagating material 
appears to be limited, with farmers predominantly using farm-saved tubers or improved 
varieties multiplied and distributed through national extension programmes. No data 
appear to be available for the commercial seed markets of pulse and lentil crops. 
For forage crops, it must be noted that Annex 1 includes mainly temperate forages, while 
tropical forages are excluded. No data are available on the area coverage of temperate 
and tropical forages. But the GIA (2010) study estimates that the share of the United 
States, Canada, Japan and Europe, which are the leading producers of temperate forages, 
account for nearly 80 percent of the value of the forage (grass) seed markets. This figure 
of 80 percent can be taken as a reasonable estimate of the share of Annex 1 temperate 
forages in the global commercial forage seed market. 
If the relative share of Annex 1 crops in the value of the related crop groups/value 
segments broadly corresponds to their share in the total production (or is estimated 
separately as indicated above for roots and tubers and forages), then the value of the 
global seed market attributable to Annex 1 crops will be as indicated in the last column of 
Table 2.23. The total value of the commercial seed market of Annex 1 crops is estimated 
at $19.4 billion. Cereals account for the dominant share of this value (71 percent), while 
other significant contributors are vegetable (12 percent) and fruit seeds (7 percent).
The value of the global commercial seed market for Annex 1 crops does not allow to assess 
the potential magnitude of payments under SMTAs because this requires the identification 
of seed sales attributable to varieties that have incorporated SMTA-PGR. However, the 
value of the global commercial seed market for Annex 1 crops can be used to estimate 
the upper bound for potential mandatory and voluntary payments. As seen earlier, if over 
65 percent of the value of seed sales is attributable to varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR, 
which is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, then it will be beneficial for recipients 
to opt for the ‘discounted’ payment option under Article 6.11 of SMTAs at the rate of 0.5 
percent of the entire commercial seed sales of the crops to which the SMTA-PGR relates. If 
we assume that SMTA-PGR is utilized for the development of new varieties of all Annex 1 
crops and further, that all recipients opt for discounted payment option under Article 6.11, 
then the application of this rate of 0.5 percent to the global commercial seed market 
value of Annex 1 crops gives us the upper bound for payments into the Benefit-sharing 
Fund. Given the value of $19.4 billion of the commercial seed market of Annex 1 crops, 
this would translate into an upper bound of $100 million for benefit-sharing payments 
related to SMTAs. It should be emphasized that this upper bound figure does not reflect 
a realistic assessment of potential benefit-sharing payments, but is only indicative of the 
broad orders of magnitude relevant for discussion of the impact of access and benefit-
sharing arrangements introduced by the Treaty. 
21   Source: Netherlands Potato Consultative Foundation, available at www.nivaa.nl
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2.7  Assessing potential for mandatory payments
Mandatory payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund arise when PGR exchanged under 
an SMTA are used by the recipient to develop products (that are themselves PGR) that 
are not “available without restrictions to others for further research and development”. 
In such cases, Article 6.7 of the SMTA provides for a mandatory annual payment of 1.1 
percent less 30 percent of the total sales of the product into the Benefit-sharing Fund by 
the recipient. It must be noted that Article 6.11 allows a recipient to opt for an alternative 
payment scheme under which an annual payment can be made in respect of any product 
or products of the crop to which SMTA-PGR relates, independent of whether or not these 
are available without restriction. The rate of payment prescribed under this option is 0.5 
percent of the entire sales of products (seeds) of the crop to which the PGR accessed 
relates. The expression “available without restriction to others for further research and 
development” refers to the nature of IPR protection applied to the innovation developed 
using SMTA-PGR. As discussed earlier, the implication of Article 6.7 is that mandatory 
payments will not be triggered if the product innovation derived from the use of SMTA-
PGR is not subject to any form of IPR protection (e.g. where a NARS institution releases a 
new variety without subjecting it to IPRs), or if the product is only subject to PVP where 
breeders’ exemption provisions allow the product to be freely used without restrictions in 
the development of follow-on innovations. In practice, therefore, mandatory payments 
are likely to accrue only when product innovations derived from SMTA-PGR are subjected 
to stronger forms of intellectual property protection such as patents that allow for only 
very limited experimental (research) use exemptions. 
Utility patents for plant varieties are available only in a limited number of countries,22 which 
include the United States, Australia, Japan and Republic of Korea. The present legislative 
framework in the European Union (EU) does not allow the patenting of plant varieties nor 
do developing countries allow plant variety innovations to be patented. Therefore, the 
large majority of plant variety innovations developed in both developed and developing 
countries through the use of SMTA-PGR will not attract mandatory payments. However, 
there is one group of plant variety innovations that is rapidly growing in importance in the 
global seed economy and that may give rise to mandatory payments – the GM varieties 
of important crops that are developed through the application of biotechnology. GM 
varieties are invariably protected through utility patents (in countries where such patents 
are available) and are often sold subject to conditions that preclude the use of farm-saved 
seed by farmers. They may also involve the payment of a separate ‘technology fee’ in 
addition to the basic cost of the seed. It is the current and prospective use of SMTA-PGR 
in GM varieties that is potentially the most important source of mandatory payments. The 
extent of use of SMTA-PGR in the development of GM varieties, where the private sector 
22  Hungary had a plant patent system prior to its accession to the European Union. After accession to the EU, 
its intellectual property laws have been revised to align them with those of other EU members. Hungary now 
has a PVP law for the protection of new varieties of plants.
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has been dominant, is, however, an empirical question. In a later section, information 
methodologies that could be employed to reliably assess the use of MLS material in the 
development of GM varieties are suggested. 
Starting from the mid-1990s, there has been a remarkable surge in the application of 
biotechnology to plant breeding and the commercialization of GM crops in both developed 
and developing countries. ISAAA (2009) estimates that “a record 14 million farmers in 25 
countries planted 134 million ha in 2009” to GM crops. However, the commercialization 
of GM crops has been confined to a fairly narrow range of crops. The main crops that have 
seen the application of biotechnology for the production of GM varieties are:
1. Soybean
2. Maize
3. Cotton
4. Canola
5. Alfalfa.
Figure 2.8 shows the dramatic increase in the area under GM crops over the period 
1996–2009, while Figure 2.9 shows the share of different crops in the global GM area. 
Soybean (69.2 million ha), maize (41.7 million ha), cotton (16.1 million ha) and canola (6.4 
million ha) account for nearly the entire GM area globally. Figure 2.10 shows the global 
adoption rates for the principal GM crops in relation to the total global area. The share of 
GM varieties in the total global area is the highest for soybean (77 percent) and cotton (49 
percent), and is relatively lower for maize (26 percent) and canola (21 percent).
Figure 2.8 Growth in global GM crop area
Source: ISAAA, 2009.
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Source: ISAAA, 2009.
 
Figure 2.9 Share of crops in GM area in 2009
Figure 2.10 Global adoption rates for principal biotech crops, 2009 (million hectares)
Source: ISAAA, 2009.
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Given the environmental, ecological and human health concerns associated with the 
use of GM crops, most countries have devised policies regarding the cultivation and use 
of GM crops and separate regulatory mechanisms for the approval of GM varieties in 
cultivation and use, which are different from those that apply to conventionally bred 
varieties. Consequently, policies related to GM crops and the nature of regulatory 
processes for approval of GM varieties, their complexity and speed of operation have 
become key determinants of the adoption of GM varieties in different countries. While 
the trends in utility patents for GM varieties may provide an indicator of innovative 
activity for genetic modification in different crops, it is the number of approvals given for 
the commercialization of GM varieties in different countries that may better reflect the 
commercial growth potential of GM variety innovations. Table 2.24 presents the approvals 
for commercialization of GM varieties by crop and country. 
Table 2.24 Regulatory approvals for GM varieties by crop and country, 2010  
(no. of GM varieties approved)
Country/crop
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USA 56 15 11 11 10 3 5 2 2 2 2  1 1 121
Japan 50 21 7 10 14 3 1 3 2 1     112
Canada 47 11 9 10 10 2 4 2 1 1 2 2   101
Mexico 37 18 7 7 4 1 3 3 1      81
Republic of Korea 40 17 5 9 6 1         78
Philippines 39 8 6 10 1 2  2       68
Australia 22 16 9 9 8   2 1      67
New Zealand 20 9 7 7 7 2  1 1      54
Taiwan 39 7 46
EU 25 7 3 1 4 1       1  42
China 12 7 3  7  3  1 1     34
Brazil 17 9 5            31
Colombia 15 9 3   1   1     1 30
Argentina 18 3 3            24
South Africa 11 6 2  4          23
Costa Rica  17 2            19
Russian 
Federation 10  4 2  1   1      18
Uruguay 7  1            8
India  6             6
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Country/crop
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Honduras 4              4
Singapore 2 1    1         4
Malaysia 3  1            4
Switzerland 3  1            4
Chile 1  1  1          3
El Salvador 3              3
Czech Republic 1  1 1           3
United Kingdom 2  1            3
Turkey   3            3
Thailand 1  1            2
Spain 2              2
Paraguay  1 1            2
Egypt 1              1
Burkina Faso  1             1
Bolivia   1            1
Sweden    1           1
Pakistan  1             1
Netherlands 1              1
Slovakia 1              1
Iran         1      1
Germany    1           1
Romania 1              1
Poland 1              1
Portugal 1              1
Myanmar  1             1
total 493 184 105 79 76 18 16 15 12 5 4 2 2 2 1 013
Source: Calculated from the GM Approval Database at www.isaaa.org.
The data presented in Table 2.24 show that nearly 44 countries have permitted the 
commercialization of some GM varieties. The pattern of approval is uneven across countries, 
and there are also wide variations in terms of the crops where they allow GM varieties and 
the uses (planting, processing, food, feed, etc.) that are permitted. Notwithstanding the 
impressive growth in area under GM crops over the last decade, less than 25 percent of the 
countries in the world currently permit the commercialization of GM varieties. Regulatory 
approvals are also concentrated in the key GM crops listed above. 
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2.7.1  Implications for benefit-sharing flows
Among the crops that have seen significant application of biotechnology and 
commercialization of GM varieties, only maize and canola are Annex 1 crops with significant 
acreage. Other crops such as rice, wheat, alfalfa, potato and sugar beet are Annex 1 crops, 
but their area under GM varieties is presently insignificant. An important implication is 
that there will be no potential benefit flows from non-Annex 1 crops such as soybean and 
cotton, which been the subject of significant biotechnology based innovation and have 
witnessed the most rapid growth in area coverage and seed (product innovation) markets. 
For maize and canola, any estimation of potential mandatory payments has to be related 
to the size of the GM seed markets in these crops. The size of the global transgenic (GM) 
seed market is estimated in 2010 at nearly $11 billion and has seen significant growth 
over the last decade (Figure 2.11). The share of different crops in the global transgenic 
seed market is presented in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.11 Growth of global GM seed market
Source: Phillips McDougall, 2010.
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The current size of the market (2010) for the transgenic seeds of Annex 1 crops is, 
therefore, estimated at $5.063 billion for maize and $0.26 billion for canola. These markets 
are expected grow at a rate of around 5 percent over the next decade (GIA, 2010). 
2.7.2  Assessing the use of SMTA-PGR in genetically modified Annex 1 crops
The development of GM varieties of crop plants involves the genetic transformation of 
conventionally bred varieties using biotechnology tools and techniques. Conventionally 
bred varieties, therefore, provide the foundation for GM innovations. Varieties that are 
agronomically superior and are well adapted to local agro-climatic conditions are often 
the best candidates for genetic transformation. It is quite common for leading commercial 
(conventionally bred) varieties to be selected for genetic modification and incorporation of 
additional traits of interest. The use of SMTA-PGR in GM varieties is likely to arise through 
their use in the development of conventionally bred varieties that are subject to genetic 
modification. The additional step of genetic modification does imply that the time lag 
between the use of SMTA-PGR in the breeding programme and the development of the 
innovation are likely to be greater for GM varieties than for conventionally bred varieties. 
The exchange of PGR under SMTAs commenced only in 2007 following the entering into 
force of the Treaty. Given the length of the crop breeding cycle for major food crops that 
can range from seven to 15 years, it may be too early to identify the use of SMTA-PGR 
in GM varieties that have been protected by utility patents. However, the potential use 
of SMTA-PGR in GM varieties over time can be approximated by the extent of use of 
PGR accessed from the gene banks of the IARCs of CGIAR, which were available for free 
Figure 2.12 Share of crops in global GM seed market
Source: Phillips McDougall, 2010.
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international exchange even prior to the implementation of the Treaty, in the development 
of conventionally bred varieties by the private sector. It is the private sector that has been 
dominant in the development of GM varieties. The authors propose to rely on the use of 
CGIAR/IARC PGR in the development of conventionally bred varieties by the private sector 
as the indicator of the potential use of SMTA-PGR in the development of GM varieties.
As discussed in the previous section, CIMMYT has made a series of assessments of the 
use of PGR accessed from it for the development of maize varieties in different regions 
of the world by the private sector, as part of its global maize impact studies in the 1990s 
(Morris, 2002). These assessments suggest that during the late 1990s, on average, 
58 percent of private sector maize varieties contained CIMMYT germplasm, with the 
proportion being much higher in some regions of the world. Discussed below are some 
reasons for which the use of SMTA-PGR in the development of GM varieties may be lower 
than the use of CIMMYT material in conventionally bred private sector varieties of maize. 
Taking these factors into account, a conservative estimate of the potential use of SMTA-
PGR in GM maize varieties would be approximately 10–25 percent of GM varieties. If one 
further assumes that variety shares translate approximately into seed market shares for 
GM varieties, then the potential for mandatory payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund 
under different scenarios will be as summarized in Table 2.25.
Table 2.25 Potential for mandatory payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund for 
GM maize
Value of global gM maize market (2010)
US$5 billion
Market share scenarios for gM varieties using SMtA-PgR
10% 15% 25%
Potential payments into 
Benefit-sharing Fund 
(1.1% of seed sales less 30%)
US$3.85 million US$5.8 million US$9.7 million
The potential for mandatory payments under Article 6.7 of the SMTAs, assuming GM 
maize varieties incorporated SMTA-PGR, would be in the range of US$3–10 million. If 
companies producing GM maize varieties were to opt for the payment option under 
Article 6.11 of the SMTAs, then the potential payments into the Fund would be US$25 
million. But the seed industry companies are unlikely to opt for the payment option under 
Article 6.11 until the share of GM varieties using SMTA-PGR exceeds the threshold of 65 
percent of their sales, which is quite unlikely in a highly concentrated market dominated 
by four or five large global companies. 
There are a number of reasons for which the potential for mandatory payments from 
GM maize varieties is relatively modest (under US$10 million) in relation to the size of 
the global maize seed industry, notwithstanding the significant previous use of CIMMYT 
material by the private sector in both developed and developing countries:
(i) CIMMYT’s maize breeding programmes are largely intended for the tropical 
production environments in developing countries and the contribution of CIMMYT 
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germplasm to varieties suited to temperate production environments found in most 
developed maize-producing countries may be lower. 
(ii) There is evidence of the substantial use of CIMMYT germplasm by the private 
sector in the United States, which is one of the largest producers of maize and 
where private sector hybrid varieties have been dominant (Pardey, 1996), even 
prior to the introduction of GM varieties in the 1990s. However, the use of PGR 
accessed from the MLS by the private sector prior to the implementation of the 
Treaty (and hence not subject to SMTAs) will not give rise to any payments to the 
Benefit-sharing Fund. The PGR accessed from the MLS prior to the implementation 
of the Treaty continue to be available to the private sector and may have been 
assimilated into the collections maintained by the private sector. The key traits 
extracted from such PGR may have been incorporated into proprietary varieties/
breeding lines, and the traits of interest may be available to GM maize breeding 
programmes through these proprietary varieties or breeding lines. The private 
sector may no longer need to access this PGR under the terms of SMTAs in order 
to utilize the traits of interest in the GM breeding programmes. Thus, the access 
afforded to the private sector prior to PGR in the MLS prior to the implementation 
of the Treaty may have considerably reduced the need for and dependence on 
SMTA-mediated access to the same PGR.
(iii) The pre-Treaty flows of PGR in the four decades prior to the Treaty through national 
and international gene banks, and the PGR flows prior to the application of 
intellectual property rights on PGR innovations and emergence of CBD paradigms 
may have created large pools of PGR outside the purview of the MLS, providing the 
private sector with alternative sources of access to PGR of interest. The availability 
of alternative sources of access has significant implications for the potential flow of 
payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund.
(iv) The emergence of the CBD, the extended negotiation process leading to the Treaty 
and the uncertainties surrounding the nature of PGR exchange regime that would 
eventually emerge may have created strong incentives for private sector breeding 
programmes to avoid the use of PGR that require the economic returns from 
innovations to be shared with resource providers. There does appear to be some 
evidence of the private sector breeding programmes explicitly avoiding the use of 
PGR (see Annex) that may be subject to benefit-sharing provisions, although much of 
it appears to be anecdotal.
Another key factor influencing the potential for the mandatory payments flowing from 
GM maize varieties is the concentration of the GM maize seed industry, both in terms of 
the IPR ownership of varieties and of seed market share. Table 2.26 shows the share of the 
top companies in utility patents granted for maize varieties in the United States. In terms of 
market share in GM area planted in the United States, the two top companies Monsanto 
and Du Pont/Pioneer account for nearly 70 percent of the market (with a share of nearly 
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one-third of the market for each company), followed by Syngenta, which accounts for 
nearly 10 percent of the market (GIA, 2010).
Table 2.26 Share of top companies in utility patents for GM maize varieties, 
1995–2009
Company Share (%)
Du Pont 45.7
Monsanto 34.7
Syngenta 9.3
Dow 2.3
Other private 7.7
Public 0.3
total 100
Source: Calculated from USPTO data.
The high degree of concentration in the GM maize seed industry may influence the 
speed of diffusion of SMTA-PGR in private breeding programmes. The concentration of 
innovative activity in a few large firms may mean that the diffusion of SMTA-PGR in the 
gene pools of private breeding programmes may be much faster than if the innovative 
activity were to be spread over a much larger number of firms. If one of the leading 
companies would have access to SMTA-PGR, the probability of incorporation of that 
material in a commercially successful product would be greater. However, the uptake of 
SMTA-PGR in private breeding programmes would be considerably limited if the major 
players were to adopt explicit or implicit avoidance strategies regarding the use of PGR 
from the MLS in their breeding programmes.
We have not examined the potential for mandatory payments from GM canola, because 
it appears to be insignificant given the current size of the GM canola seed market (around 
US$250 million) and the very small base of canola-related PGR in the MLS.
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2.8  Assessing the potential for voluntary payments
Voluntary payments under SMTAs arise when SMTA-PGR is used in the development of 
commercial innovations (new plant varieties), which then remain freely available without 
restrictions for further research and development. Such payments may arise when public 
research institutions develop and release commercial varieties using SMTA-PGR without 
subjecting them to any form of IPR protection. Voluntary payments also arise when 
commercial PGR innovations are developed by public or private sector institutions and are 
subjected to IPR protection only through PVP. Innovations protected under PVP systems 
remain available for further research and development under the breeders’ exemption 
clause in PVP legislation. PVP protected innovations, therefore, do not attract mandatory 
payments. 
Incentives for making voluntary payments are likely to differ between public and private 
sector institutions, and between developed and developing countries. Voluntary payments 
by the private sector are likely to be motivated by the desire to maintain unrestricted access 
to MLS-PGR and to avoid the emergence of a highly restrictive international PGR exchange 
regime. Voluntary payments by NARS/public research institutions are likely to be governed 
by the policy mandates or directives that they may receive from governments. Developed 
country governments may offer voluntary payments (with or without contributions from 
the seed industry) to sustain the international PGR regime introduced by the Treaty and 
to underline the potential efficacy of the benefit-sharing arrangements put in place by 
the Treaty. In developing countries, the mandates for voluntary payments are likely to 
be driven by the perceived dependence of the national plant breeding programmes on 
foreign PGR and concerns about the incidence of the fiscal burden that such payments 
may entail and the likely impact on the prices at which innovations can be offered to 
farmers. In developing their mandates, developing countries are also likely to compare the 
costs and benefits of access and benefit-sharing arrangements facilitated by the Treaty 
with alternative regimes that may prevail/emerge in the absence of the Treaty. Finally, 
for all participants, voluntary payment decisions will be influenced by the prospects of 
voluntary payments being converted into mandatory payments, following the review 
envisaged under Article 13.2 d(ii)23 of the Treaty. 
2.8.1  Methodology for assessment
In this section the potential flows of voluntary payments are assessed  with respect to three 
major food crops – wheat, rice and maize. The framework used to assess the potential for 
voluntary payments is described in Figure 2.13. For any crop, we start with the estimates 
of global seed use for that crop (or seed use in the top producers of the crop accounting 
23   This Article provides for “[a]ssessment, within a period of five years from the entry into force of the 
Treaty, of whether the mandatory payment requirement in the SMTA shall apply also in cases where such 
commercialized products are available without restriction to others for further research and breeding”.
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for 80–90 percent of global production). The global seed use is then split into seed use by 
developed and developing countries because the pattern of commercial seed use differs 
considerably between these countries. The seed use in developing countries is further 
divided into the following categories:
•	 seed use related to traditional varieties;
•	 seed use related to improved (or ‘modern’) varieties. 
Seed use related to improved varieties is further divided into the following categories as 
appropriate:
•	 seed use related to transgenic (GM) varieties (if relevant);
•	 seed use related to improved varieties not incorporating MLS-PGR;
•	 seed use related to improved varieties incorporating MLS-PGR.
The share of seed use in different categories is derived based on estimates of the area 
under different types of varieties drawn largely from CGIAR/IARC assessments. Transgenic 
(GM) varieties are excluded from the analysis because they are generally protected by 
patents and will give rise to mandatory payments if they incorporate SMTA material. 
Similarly, seed use of improved varieties not incorporating MLS material will also not give 
rise to voluntary payments. It is only the commercial seed use of varieties incorporating 
MLS material that has the potential to give rise to voluntary payments. 
The estimation of the use of commercial seed in relation to total seed use in any category 
depends on the SRR for that category. The SRR varies considerably between crops, between 
developed and developing countries, and between the types of variety used (hybrid, 
improved non-hybrid, transgenic or traditional variety). Transgenic and hybrid varieties 
involve an SRR of 100 percent since farmers are required to buy fresh seed of these varieties 
every season.24 We use estimates of SRRs to derive the quantity of commercial seed use of 
varieties incorporating MLS material. The quantity of the commercial seed of these varieties 
is multiplied by the average global prices of seeds of respective crops (from international 
trade data) to derive the value of seed sales and the potential for voluntary payments. Some 
estimates of SRRs are available from the literature and/or study reports for some countries 
and some crops but tend to vary considerably. Similarly, estimates of area shares of varieties 
incorporating MLS material may also be changing rapidly and may be subject to large 
margins of error. We therefore simulate a range of values of these two parameters (around 
the best estimates) to derive a range of values for potential voluntary payments. 
For developed countries, a similar approach is followed, except that we assume that the 
use of improved varieties is universal and that the relevant categories would be transgenic, 
hybrid and non-hybrid varieties (depending on the crop). Most varieties in commercial use in 
developed countries are likely to be protected by PVP (except for transgenic varieties protected 
by patents) and will give rise to voluntary payments if they incorporate SMTA-PGR. 
24   For hybrid varieties, farmers generally replace seed in every planting since the use of farm-saved seed will 
result in the loss of hybrid vigour and considerable decline in yields. For transgenic varieties, farmers may be 
precluded from the use of farm-saved seed by contractual agreements under which such seeds are sold. 
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Figure 2.13 Framework for assessing the potential for voluntary payments for Annex 1 crops
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It should be clearly understood that commercial seed use of varieties incorporating SMTA-
PGR is not the same as the commercial seed use of varieties incorporating PGR from the MLS 
(the latter is assessed using the method described above). Where PGR has been accessed from 
the MLS prior to the implementation of the Treaty/SMTAs and incorporated into a new variety, 
no voluntary payments are called for. An important assumption made in these assessments 
is that the present pattern of use of PGR from the MLS will continue and over time the share 
of varieties incorporating SMTA-PGR will be similar to the share varieties incorporating MLS-
PGR. It should be noted that the incorporation of MLS-PGR in varieties is the outcome of 
nearly four decades of international exchange of PGR between national and international 
gene banks, whereas SMTA-mediated exchanges of PGR under the Treaty has occurred for 
only five years. Voluntary payments may take a considerable period of time – two decades 
or more, depending on the speed with which new varieties replace existing varieties. The 
assessment of voluntary payments using the method described above is discussed for the 
three selected crops below.
2.8.2 Wheat
Figure 2.14 shows the trends in global production, area and seed use for wheat over the 
last two decades. The top 20 producers of wheat and their share in world production and 
area are summarized in Table 2.27. 
Figure 2.14 Global trends in area, production and seed use in wheat
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table 2.27 Top 20 wheat producers, 2010
Country Share in area (%) Share in production (%)
China 11.2 17.7
India 13.2 12.4
USA 8.9 9.2
Russian Federation 10.0 6.4
France 2.5 5.9
Germany 1.5 3.7
Pakistan 4.2 3.6
Canada 3.8 3.6
Australia 6.2 3.4
Turkey 3.7 3.0
Ukraine 2.9 2.6
Iran 3.2 2.3
Argentina 2.0 2.3
United Kingdom 0.9 2.3
Kazakhstan 6.1 1.5
Poland 1.1 1.5
Egypt 0.6 1.1
Italy 0.9 1.1
Uzbekistan 0.7 1.0
Brazil 1.0 0.9
total 84.6 85.3
Source: FAOSTAT.
In 2010, global wheat acreage stood at 216 million ha, with production estimated at 
651 million tonnes. The corresponding seed use was 34 million tonnes. The top 20 wheat 
producers accounted for nearly 85 percent of the wheat area and production. Developed 
countries accounted for 58.7 million ha of wheat area and 7 million tonnes of production 
in 2010, while developing countries accounted for 157 million ha of wheat area and 27 
million tonnes of seed use. 
Developed countries
We propose to use the share of varieties having CIMMYT ancestry as a proxy for the share 
of varieties incorporating CIMMYT material. There are no recent assessments of the area 
share of varieties with CIMMYT ancestry in developed countries. As discussed in Section 
2.5, an earlier assessment in the early 1990s suggested that nearly 40 percent of the area 
ASSESSING THE POTENT IAL FOR MONETARY PAYMENTS FROM EXCHANGE OF PLANT GENET IC 
RESOURCES UNDER THE MULT ILATERAL SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT 
GENET IC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
95
Chapter 2
of wheat planted in developed countries had CIMMYT ancestry and the proportion was 
rising. However, the increasing role of the private sector in wheat breeding in developed 
countries over the last two decades may imply that the share of varieties with CIMMYT 
ancestry in total area may be lower at present. For the purpose of our simulations, it is 
therefore proposed to adopt a range of 20–40 percent as the share of area of varieties 
incorporating CIMMYT material. Information from the ISF (Buanec, 2005) suggests that, in 
general, the SRR varies considerably in developed countries except for wheat, which only 
varies from 30–50 percent. Many EU countries have witnessed an increase in the use of 
farm-saved seed for cereal crops – for instance, in the United Kingdom, the share of farm-
saved seed in wheat increased from a low of 20 percent in the early 1990s to around 50 
percent at time of writing (2012). It must also be noted that wheat is a self-pollinated crop 
and there has been almost no introduction of commercial hybrids in wheat. 
Developing countries
As discussed in Section 2.5, it has been estimated that nearly 80 percent of the wheat 
area in developing countries is covered with improved (semi-dwarf) varieties and that 62 
percent of the area is devoted to varieties with CIMMYT germplasm. SRRs in developing 
countries are much lower than in developed countries. Data from India, which has a large 
commercial wheat seed production programme, suggest that SRRs range from 8–16 
percent in different states. Five to ten percent SRR for wheat appears to be a reasonable 
estimate for developing countries, given available data. SRRs are likely to increase as many 
developing countries have sought to increase SRRs to increase agricultural productivity 
(e.g. India).
The simulation of potential voluntary payments under different scenarios (parameter 
values of SRR and area shares of varieties with CIMMYT ancestry) is presented in 
Figure 2.15. We assume that seed use in different categories will be proportional to the 
area share of those categories. We further assume that voluntary payments would be 
made at the same rate as mandatory payments (were they to apply) and that they are 
made by all participants in SMTAs. The average price of wheat seed has been estimated 
based on the average value of wheat seed imported into the United States in 2010 and 
the estimate of wheat prices in different countries estimated by CIMMYT.
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The simulation results show that the potential for voluntary payments in developed 
countries ranges from $0.65–4.31 million; in developing countries, the potential ranges 
from $1.66–8.73 million. Although the share of varieties using CIMMYT material is very 
high in developing countries, the potential for voluntary payments is constrained by the 
persistence of low SRRs. The build-up of voluntary payments to the levels estimated above 
will depend on the policies adopted by public and private sector recipients of SMTA-PGR 
and on the time taken by post-Treaty varieties to become dominant in the market. The 
average survival duration of cereal varieties has been declining in developed countries with 
the average survival duration of cereal varieties in Europe being 6–8 years (ISF). However, 
Figure 2.15 Simulations of voluntary payments for wheat
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the average age of varieties (weighted by area shares) in developing countries has been 
estimated at 10–15 years (Pingali, 1999). This implies that post-Treaty variety innovations 
will become dominant in seed use only over period of two decades or more.
Potential voluntary payment flows    
(@ of 1.1% less 30% of value of seed sales) in US$ million
Area share of varieties with MlS material
SRR 10% 20% 30% 40%
30% 0.65 1.29 1.94 2.59
40% 0.86 1.72 2.59 3.45
50% 1.08 2.16 3.23 4.31
This suggests that voluntary payments will build up to the levels estimated above only 
over an extended period of time. 
2.8.3  Rice
Figure 2.16 shows the trends in global area, production and seed use for rice over the last 
two decades and Table 2.28 summarizes the share of the top 20 producers of rice in area 
and production for 2010.
Figure 2.16 Global trends in area, production and seed use in rice
Source: FAOSTAT.
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
/ S
ee
d 
m
ill
io
n 
to
nn
es
A
re
a 
- m
ill
io
n 
ha
Production (million tonnes) Seed (million tonnes) Area harvested (million ha)
IdentIfyIng BenefIt flowS 
98 Equity and food for all
Table 2.28 Top 20 rice producers, 2010 (share in area and production)
Country Share in area (%) Share in production (%)
China 19.6 29.3
India 24.0 17.9
Indonesia 8.6 9.9
Bangladesh 7.7 7.3
Viet Nam 4.9 6.0
Myanmar 5.2 4.9
Thailand 7.2 4.7
Philippines 2.8 2.3
Brazil 1.8 1.7
United States of America 1.0 1.6
Japan 1.1 1.6
Cambodia 1.8 1.2
Pakistan 1.5 1.1
Republic of Korea 0.6 0.9
Madagascar 0.9 0.7
Egypt 0.3 0.6
Sri Lanka 0.7 0.6
Nepal 1.0 0.6
Nigeria 1.2 0.5
Lao PDR 0.6 0.4
total 92.3 94.0
Source: FAOSTAT.
In 2010, global rice area stood at 153 million ha and production at 672 million tonnes; 
the corresponding seed use was estimated at 17 million tonnes. The top 20 producers 
accounted for 94 percent of global production. Only two developed countries, the United 
States and Japan, are among the major rice producers – all other major rice producers are 
developing countries. 
Developing countries
For rice, we propose to use the area share of varieties having IRRI lines in their ancestry as 
a proxy for the share of varieties incorporating MLS material. The data for rice examined in 
Section 2.5 suggest that nearly 75 percent of the area in developing countries is planted 
to modern or improved varieties. The data also suggest that IRRI’s contribution to the rice 
varieties in South and Southeast Asia was approximately 70–80 percent, but has now 
declined to around 35–40 percent. This decline has been attributed to the increasing 
maturity of national plant breeding programmes in these countries as they become more 
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competent in making their own crosses from IRRI material. However, the increasing 
generational distance between IRRI material and the final products (varieties) makes no 
difference to the magnitude of voluntary/mandatory payments called for, as these are 
related to the use of SMTA material (no matter how far back in the breeding cycle) in the 
new varieties developed. Therefore, the estimate of 50 percent of the area being devoted 
to IRRI-linked varieties in countries such as Viet Nam, Philippines and Indonesia appears to 
be a plausible estimate of the area share of varieties incorporating MLS material. Another 
important development has been the emergence of hybrid rice varieties, which has also 
been supported by IRRI and has seen the private sector play an important role in many 
countries.25 It is estimated that there are nearly 20 million ha under hybrid rice in China and 
less than 10 million ha in all other countries. Hybrid rice varieties have a 100 percent SRR 
and seed prices may be up to eight times the price of conventional seed in rice. However, 
we have excluded hybrid rice from the analysis because there is no information available 
on the area share of IRRI linked hybrid rice varieties. China is reported to have used little 
of IRRI germplasm in its hybrid rice programme, and in other south and southeast Asian 
countries (where IRRI’s contribution is likely to have been substantial), the total area under 
hybrids is relatively limited.26   
SRRs for rice are generally believed to be low because of the feasibility and well-
established practice of using farm-saved seed. However, some studies have suggested 
that SRRs average 25 percent in India with the rates going up to 50 percent in some 
rice producing states (Rao, 2010). SRRs for rice have been estimated at 10 percent 
(SAT, 2007) and around 15 percent for Viet Nam (Giao, 2009),although the rates are 
said to be increasing. Therefore, we use a range of 10–25 percent for SRRs in our 
simulations. 
Developed countries
Among developed countries, Japan is a centre of diversity for rice and also has a long 
tradition of rice research. Although Japan has been the main source of financial support 
for IRRI and has contributed its scientific expertise for IRRI programmes, there appears to 
be no evidence of significant use of MLS material in the development of Japanese rice 
varieties. The United State, on the other hand, is not a centre of diversity for rice. The 
cultivation of rice in the United States is mainly geared towards exports with nearly half of 
the output being exported (Childs and Burdett, 2000). Rice breeding in the United States 
has been confined mainly to the private sector, but the private sector’s reliance on foreign 
germplasm is likely to have been substantial, with the MLS being the main source of PGR. 
Given the export orientation of the United States rice industry, we assume that the share 
of area devoted to varieties with MLS linkages in the United States will be similar to that in 
developing countries. 
25  Although the private sector appears to be playing a significant role in the development of hybrid varieties in 
many countries, it relies mainly on the MLS as a source of PGR. 
26  Available at: www.irri.org/partnerships/country-relations/asia-oceania/china/rice-research-and-capacity-
building-in-china
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The simulation of potential voluntary payments under different scenarios is presented in 
Figure 2.17. We assume that seed use in different categories will be proportional to the 
area share of those categories. The value of seed has been derived using the average seed 
rice seed prices in Viet Nam and Thailand.27 Again, we assume that voluntary payments 
27   Available at: www.oryza.com/content/oryza-rice-recap-vampire-squid-gets-downgraded-rice-and-other-
markets-rally-central-bank
Figure 2.17 Simulations of voluntary payments for rice 
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will be made at the same rate as mandatory payments, should they apply, by all recipients 
of SMTA-PGR.
The potential for voluntary payments from developed country rice varieties appears to 
be insignificant. In developing countries, the potential for voluntary payments ranges from 
$1.55–7.74 million for non-hybrid rice varieties incorporating material from the MLS. The 
expansion of hybrid rice in countries outside China through varieties developed with the 
use of MLS material appears to be the most promising avenue for voluntary payments in 
rice, although it must be noted that the expansion of hybrid rice in both China and South 
and Southeast Asian countries has slowed down over the last decade. 
2.8.4  Maize
Figure 2.18 shows the trends in global area, production and seed use for maize over the 
last two decades. The top 20 producers of maize and their share in area and production 
are presented in Table 2.29.
Figure 2.18 Global trends in area, production and seed use in maize
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table 2.29 Top 20 maize producers, 2010
Country Share in area (%) Share in production (%)
USA 20.4 37.4
China 20.1 21.0
Brazil 7.9 6.6
Mexico 4.4 2.8
Argentina 1.8 2.7
Indonesia 2.6 2.2
India 4.4 1.7
France 1.0 1.7
South Africa 1.7 1.5
Ukraine 1.6 1.4
Canada 0.7 1.4
Romania 1.3 1.1
Italy 0.6 1.0
Nigeria 2.1 0.9
Serbia 0.8 0.9
Egypt 0.6 0.8
Hungary 0.7 0.8
Philippines 1.5 0.8
Viet Nam 0.7 0.5
Tanzania 1.9 0.5
total 76.7 87.7
Source: FAOSTAT 
In 2010, the global maize area stood at 162 million ha and production at 844 million 
tonnes. The corresponding seed use was estimated at 5.71 million tonnes. The United 
States is the largest producer of maize, accounting for 37 percent of global production 
with 20 percent of the area. Developed countries account for only 23 percent of the global 
area but produce 43 percent of the output, while developing countries with 77 percent of 
the total area account for 57 percent of the total output.
For maize, we propose to use the share of varieties having CIMMYT lines in their 
ancestry as a proxy for the share of varieties incorporating MLS material. An important 
factor influencing the assessment of potential voluntary payments in maize is the 
significant share (26 percent) of transgenic maize in the global maize area. As already 
discussed, transgenic (GM) varieties are invariably protected by patents rather than PVP. 
Consequently, transgenic varieties are likely to give rise to mandatory payments and are 
therefore excluded from this analysis of voluntary payments. Out of the 162 million ha of 
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the total area under maize, nearly 42 million ha is estimated to be under GM maize, of 
which 31 million ha is estimated to be in developed countries with the rest spread over 
developing countries. 
Developed countries
Once GM varieties are excluded, the rest of the area in developed countries is dominated 
by hybrid varieties, especially in the United States, where hybrids account for 90 percent 
or more of the non-GM area. We do not have data on the relative shares of hybrids 
and OPVs, and for the purpose of this simulation assume that the entire non-GM maize 
area in developed countries is accounted for by hybrids, necessitating an SRR of 100. 
Based on the data examined in Section 2.5, it is estimated that the total area planted 
to CIMMYT varieties is approximately 36 percent. Due to CIMMYT’s mandate to serve 
developing countries, it has focused on non-temperate maize growing regions rather than 
on the temperate maize growing area predominant in the developed world. We therefore 
expect the share of varieties with CIMMYT germplasm to be lower in developed countries, 
although there is evidence of fairly extensive use of CIMMYT germplasm in the United 
States by private breeding programmes (Pardey, 1996). 
Developing countries
In developing countries, the share of area under improved varieties was estimated at 62 
percent in the late 1990s (Evenson and Gollin, 2002) and has been steadily increasing. 
However, OPVs are still in extensive use in developing countries. Based on previous 
assessments by the CGIAR (CIMMYT), we assume that the share of hybrids in the modern 
variety (MV) area to be 51 percent and the share of OPVs to be 49 percent. For OPVs, SRRs 
are estimated on average to be 24 percent (Evenson and Gollin, 2002). For developing 
countries, we use CIMMYT’s estimate of 36 percent of the area planted to varieties with 
CIMMYT germplasm in the late 1990s as a reasonably conservative estimate of the present 
position. 
The simulation of potential voluntary payments under different scenarios is presented in 
Figure 2.19. We assume that seed use in different categories will be proportional to the 
area share of those categories. We make similar assumptions about voluntary payments by 
recipients of SMTA-PGR as were made in the case of wheat and rice. To derive the value 
of maize seed, we have used the average prices of maize seed exported by the United 
States in 2010 – $3 000/tonne for hybrids with OPV prices estimated at 50 percent of the 
cost of hybrids. 
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The simulation shows that potential voluntary payments in developed countries range from 
$0.72–1.45 million. The low magnitude of these payments is mainly due to the increasing 
area share of transgenic varieties and the lower contribution of CIMMYT germplasm to 
temperate zone maize. In developing countries, the potential for voluntary payments from 
OPVs (non-hybrids) ranges from $0.72–2.31 million. The magnitude of potential payments 
is constrained by the low SRRs and the lower price of OPV seeds. The potential for voluntary 
payments in respect of hybrids ($6.19 –12.38 million) is much greater in relation to OPVs 
and also in relation to other crops because of the large share of hybrids (which call for 100 
percent SRR) and the much higher price of maize hybrids compared to seeds of other crops. 
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Figure 2.19 Simulations of voluntary payments for maize
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2.9  Methodologies for assessing MlS-PgR use in product innovations
The methodology adopted in the previous sections to assess the potential for benefit-
sharing payments is useful only for estimating the broad orders of magnitude of these 
payments based on historical patterns of PGR usage under ‘open-access’ free-exchange 
regimes. An accurate assessment of the use of SMTA-PGR in product innovations requires 
linking individual PGR exchanges to specific final product innovations. Such an exercise 
would be incredibly complex and would pose formidable data challenges. This is because 
PGR exchanges involve a complex chain of transactions as materials move across institutions 
and countries. The eventual use of SMTA-PGR in the development of a new variety may 
take place at a point in the chain that is quite distant from the original recipient of PGR. 
The provisions of SMTAs require that the transfer of PGR beyond the first recipient also 
be subject to SMTAs and to be reported to the Treaty Secretariat. It may, therefore, be 
theoretically feasible to build up a picture of the transaction chains of PGR over time, 
if reporting requirements are complied with by all parties involved in such exchanges. 
However, the lead times from the initial distribution of PGR under SMTAs and their 
incorporation in a product innovation may be very long. More importantly, SMTA-PGR will 
be subject to extensive transformation since it is used in the breeding process by different 
institutions. Tracking the movement and use of SMTA-PGR is much more difficult when it 
occurs through the exchange of improved material derived from SMTA-PGR (rather than 
the exchange of the SMTA-PGR). In practice, tracing the use of SMTA-PGR by following the 
trail of exchanges may be unfeasible. A more pragmatic approach to assessing the use of 
SMTA-PGR may be to start with the identification product innovations (that may potentially 
involve the use of SMTA-PGR), identify the source of PGR used in these innovations, and 
link them through breeding histories and genealogy information to PGR exchanged under 
SMTAs. Such an approach would require bringing together product innovation databases, 
genealogy databases (and breeding histories) and information on SMTA-PGR exchanges, 
and linking them through suitably designed search algorithms to identify the use of SMTA-
PGR in product innovations. This could be labelled as an informatics approach because it 
involves the coordinated use and mining of multiple databases. 
Figure 2.20 describes the principal components of an informatics-based approach for the 
identification of the use of SMTA-PGR in product innovations. For the purpose of benefit-
sharing payments under SMTAs, the relevant product innovations (i.e. innovations that are 
themselves in the nature of PGR) are principally new varieties of plants of Annex 1 crops 
with potential for commercialization. Intermediate innovations (e.g. improved breeding lines) 
would not generally give rise to any payments except where they are subject to protection 
and commercially exploited. In developed countries, the application of some form of IPRs to 
plant variety innovations is almost universal. IPR databases can serve as authentic sources 
of information on plant variety innovations intended for commercialization. In developing 
countries, the application of IPRs to plant variety innovations is still limited in spite of the 
extension of PVP regimes to these countries following the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. 
The identification of product innovations in developing countries may require reliance on 
other types of data sources. Building a picture of product innovations at the global level would 
require the use of different types of data sources; the principal ones are discussed below. 
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Figure 2.20 Informatics-based approaches for identifying the use of SMTA-PGR in product 
innovations
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1. Patent databases: At present, patents can be applied to plant variety innovations only 
in a limited number of countries (which include the United States, Australia, Japan and 
Republic of Korea). Even in these countries, patents are applied mainly to plant variety 
innovations developed through the application of biotechnology (e.g. GM varieties) 
since only these varieties can meet the patentability criteria, which are more stringent 
than the distinctness, uniformity and stability (DUS) criteria required for PVP (see below). 
Although the number of patent-protected innovations is small in relation to the total 
number of plant variety innovations, they are commercially important because of the 
rapid growth of the global area under GM varieties and their share of global commercial 
seed market. It is only patented varieties that give rise to mandatory payments into 
the Benefit-sharing Fund. The application of patents to new plant varieties generally 
precludes the use of farm-saved seed by farmers. Therefore, patent protected varieties 
are likely to give rise to higher volumes of seed sales and consequently higher flows of 
mandatory payments compared to varieties protected by PVP. Since patents are mostly 
national28 in scope, patents have to be applied for and obtained separately in each 
country where protection is sought. International Patent Conventions (e.g. the Paris 
Convention) and the TRIPs Agreement have sought to harmonize patent legislation 
across countries through uniform standards of protection. They have also sought to 
facilitate multi-country protection of innovations, through provisions such as ‘national 
treatment’29 and ‘right of priority’.30 Uniform systems for the classification of patents 
(e.g. the International Patent Classification, or IPC) have also been developed to 
facilitate comparisons of patenting activity and data across countries. There are now 
a number of global patent databases that bring together patent information from a 
large number of countries. These databases provide information on millions of patents 
granted in different countries. The main challenge in using global patent databases 
to identify patent-protected plant variety innovations is that these innovations have 
to be located within specific patent classification categories that include other (non-
PGR-related) innovations. Existing patent classification categories are not adapted 
or designed for the identification of plant variety innovations relevant to the Treaty. 
The identification of plant variety innovations within global patent databases requires 
complex algorithms (or rules for searching) to first identify patent classes and sub-
classes within which such innovations may be found, and then to search within these 
classes to locate innovations of interest.
2. Plant Variety Protection (PVP) databases: PVP is a system of intellectual property rights 
applied to plant variety innovations that is distinct from the patent system with its 
criteria of ‘novelty, inventiveness and industrial application’ and instead is based on 
the criteria of ‘distinctness, uniformity and stability’. In most developed countries, PVP 
28   Europe-wide patents are issued by the European Patent Office under the European Patent Convention. 
29   ‘National treatment’ requires countries to provide foreign applicants for protection the same treatment as is 
afforded to nationals. 
30   When an application is made for patent protection of an innovation in one country, the applicant is afforded 
the priority for seeking protection in other countries for a certain length of time. 
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systems have been in existence for the last three to four decades, and the protection 
of new plant varieties through PVP is almost universal. The TRIPs Agreement requires 
all member-countries of the WTO to put in place some form of IPRs for plant variety 
innovations. While many developing countries have introduced/implemented PVP 
legislation or are in the process of doing so, the application of PVP to plant variety 
innovations is still quite limited in developing countries. UPOV seeks to harmonize 
protection by providing uniform standards of protection and has currently more 
than 60 countries as members. UPOV also facilitates the multi-country protection 
of plant variety innovations through ‘national treatment’ and ‘right of priority’ 
provisions. Moreover, it also provides for rules relating to variety denominations that 
require a new plant variety to be protected under the same denomination in all UPOV 
member countries and for this denomination to be maintained even after expiry of 
protection. Information on PVP applications and grants is published by national PVP 
authorities. UPOV has also developed a plant variety database that brings together 
information on PVP applications and grants in all member-countries. PVP databases 
are authentic sources of information on plant variety innovations with potential for 
commercialization.31 
3. Variety registration systems: Many countries in the developed and developing world use 
variety registration systems to regulate the marketing of plant varieties. Registration of 
a variety in a national register (or ‘inscription’ in a national list) may be a prerequisite 
for commercial marketing of a variety. Registration of a variety may require testing of 
a variety for ‘distinctness, uniformity and stability’ or for ‘value in cultivation and use’ 
(VCU) or may require information to be furnished on the characteristics and claimed 
performance of a variety. Registration may also serve to bring a variety within the 
purview of quality control regulations. In the EU, only varieties that are inscripted 
in the EU Common Catalogue of Varieties32 (for cereal and vegetable crops) can 
be commercially marketed. Registration of varieties may be mandatory or optional. 
However, registration systems do provide authentic information on plant varieties that 
are eligible to be marketed commercially. An advantage of using variety registration 
systems as source of information on product innovations is that they include both 
protected and non-protected varieties. 
4. Variety release systems or lists of recommended varieties: Most developing countries 
(including those that do not have a variety registration system) have variety release 
procedures under which new varieties developed by public or private research 
institutions are evaluated for their performance and recommended to farmers for 
adoption. Variety recommendations may be tailored to different agro-climatic 
environments or use of final product (e.g. use of wheat for bread making or animal 
feed). Recommended lists of varieties are developed on the basis of several rounds of 
31   Some PVP systems permit protection of parental lines that could be used in the development of ‘final’ 
product innovations. 
32   The EU Common Catalogue is based on the national lists of member countries of the EU.
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agronomic trials of candidate varieties. Recommended lists of varieties are also used 
in many developing countries. These recommended lists are again an authentic source 
of information on new varieties with commercial potential. 
Obtaining an overview of plant variety innovation at the global level will require 
the systematic exploration of a range of databases and sources information that vary 
considerably in terms of their design, content and coverage of plant variety innovations 
of interest. 
Once product innovations with possible linkages to SMTA-PGR are identified, the second 
step would be to identify the source of PGR used in the development of these innovations 
and their breeding histories. Information on the sources of PGR and genealogy varies 
considerably across the product innovation databases discussed above. In the case of patent 
applications, the kind of information and the level of detail provided in patent applications 
are different in different jurisdictions. However, patent applications generally need to comply 
with a ‘disclosure’ requirement, that is, they are expected to acknowledge the ‘prior art’ 
(or previous inventions) on which the invention/innovation relies and provide a sufficiently 
detailed description of the innovation for a ‘person skilled in the art’ to reproduce the 
invention. In the case of plant variety innovations, this generally implies that the patent 
application needs to provide details of how the new variety was bred and the parental 
material that was used in its development, although there is no obligation to reveal the 
source of the parental material. For plant variety innovations, the requirement for disclosure 
of parental material can be met by depositing a sample of the seeds of the parental material in 
a designated national depository. Since there are no regulations governing the nomenclature 
to be used for descriptions of parental material, it is possible for applicants to comply with 
the disclosure requirement (through a deposit) without revealing much information on the 
parental material used and the sources from which they were obtained. The information 
provided in the patent application may be only a starting point for exploring the type of PGR 
used in the final product. To understand the nature and sources of parental material used in 
a product innovation, it may be necessary to link the information in the patent application 
with references to the same material in other patent applications, going back over time. 
As SMTA-PGR are not assigned any standard codes or descriptions, it may not be feasible 
to identify their use in protected plant variety innovations through data mining of patent 
databases, except through the use of highly complex search algorithms. 
The disclosure of the pedigree of a variety and the source of parental material is generally 
not obligatory for PVP; however, PVP applications in many countries require information 
to be furnished on the parentage of the variety. In some countries, such as the United 
States), fairly detailed breeding histories are provided together with PVP applications that 
may allow identification of the ancestral material used in the breeding process over several 
cycles. However, it must be noted that even in the case of PVP, the disclosure requirement 
can be met by a deposit of the seeds of the variety (and/or its parental varieties). Data 
mining of PVP databases may also not provide much information regarding the use of 
SMTA-PGR in plant variety innovations. 
Variety registration systems are oriented to regulating the commercial marketing of 
varieties. Although variety registration may be preceded by testing for ‘distinctness, 
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uniformity and stability’ and for ‘value in cultivation and use’, they may provide little or 
no information on the pedigree of the registered varieties. Recommended lists of varieties 
that are based on agronomic trials of candidate varieties against benchmark or control 
varieties provide information on the immediate parents of the recommended varieties. 
However, information on immediate parents alone is unlikely to be adequate for assessing 
the use of SMTA-PGR in the development of a new variety. Product innovation databases, 
therefore, provide very limited information on the pedigree of new varieties. Information 
on the immediate parents used in the development of a variety, even if available, will 
generally be insufficient to assess the use of SMTA-PGR in the development of innovations. 
Linking product innovations to the exchanges of SMTA-PGR requires extensive information 
on breeding histories and pedigrees of new plant varieties going back several generations. 
Pedigrees of new varieties developed by private sector institutions are often ‘closed’–i.e. 
they are not disclosed on account of commercial sensitivity of the information. Pedigree 
information on varieties developed by public research institutions may be more accessible, 
but much of the information may be available within individual plant breeding programmes 
or institutions, and may not be organized in systematic databases. The International Crop 
Information System (ICIS) developed by CGIAR institutions is one of the few PGR databases 
in the public domain that provides pedigree information on varieties going back several 
generations. The crops currently covered by ICIS include wheat, rice, maize, sorghum, 
groundnuts, cassava, beans, cowpeas and chickpeas, and although it is not exclusively 
confined to them, ICIS focuses on varieties in developing countries where CGIAR has 
undertaken collaborative work. It is a germplasm management system with information on 
the characteristics and source (country) of origin of PGR, whose genealogy module allows 
pedigrees of varieties to be traced back to as many generations as the available data will 
allow. The coverage of varieties is extensive for wheat, rice and maize, and pedigrees can 
be expanded to ten or more generations. It has a flexible structure that allows individual 
countries or plant breeding programmes to add pedigree information on local varieties in 
local databases to supplement the variety data contained in the core central databases for 
each crop. While the coverage of material produced by CGIAR breeding programmes is 
very good, its main limitations are that the coverage of varieties varies across developing 
countries due to data availability constraints, and that the coverage of private sector varieties 
is limited. Pedigree information on private sector varieties is often not available in the ICIS 
or is very limited. If systematic effort is made by the CGIAR in collaboration with the NARS 
and the private seed industry to provide comprehensive coverage of both public and private 
sector varieties, then the ICIS could serve as a very powerful instrument to understand the 
use of SMTA-PGR in the development of new varieties. Modern varieties have complex 
pedigrees, and it is only when their pedigrees are expanded to ten or more generations that 
it will be possible to identify possible uses of SMTA-PGR. As a result of the comprehensive 
coverage of varieties in the ICIS, the genealogy of plant variety innovations identified from 
the product innovation databases can be examined in detail to assess the extent of use of 
PGR from different sources, including PGR exchanged under SMTAs.
The third step in the assessment of the use of SMTA-PGR in product innovations would 
be to link the PGR identified as constituents of new varieties to specific exchanges of 
ASSESSING THE POTENT IAL FOR MONETARY PAYMENTS FROM EXCHANGE OF PLANT GENET IC 
RESOURCES UNDER THE MULT ILATERAL SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT 
GENET IC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
111
Chapter 2
PGRs under SMTAs. The distribution of PGR under SMTAs from CGIAR gene banks is well 
documented under the System-wide Information Network for Genetic Resources (SINGER). 
However, distribution of PGR from national gene banks and repositories is generally not 
well documented, especially in developing countries. PGR exchanges subject to SMTAs 
have to be reported to the Treaty Secretariat, and this obligation extends beyond the 
original recipient of the material to all recipients of the material in a chain of transactions. 
If reporting requirements are complied with by all recipients of SMTA-PGR, then over time 
the Treaty Secretariat will have the information required to obtain an accurate overview of 
SMTA-PGR flows across different institutions and countries. Information provided to the 
Treaty Secretariat by transacting parties is confidential and is not made available in the 
public domain. It will therefore be necessary to examine whether transaction information 
(suitably anonymized and aggregated) could be made available for analytical purposes, 
i.e. for understanding the use of SMTA-PGR in product innovations. The analysis would 
attempt to relate the volume of PGR exchanges under SMTAs to the frequency of their 
occurrence in genealogy of product innovations, and would not be intended to assess 
how PGR exchanged in individual transactions has been used.
The coordinated use of product innovation, genealogy and PGR distribution databases 
to assess the use of SMTA-PGR in the development of product innovations requires the 
building up of technical expertise and institutional capacity in the Treaty Secretariat. This 
would require significant informatics capabilities to search and mine very large, complex 
databases using complex algorithms. It would require substantial investment in creating 
an institutional mechanism for assembling and updating data from highly diverse sources 
with the cooperation of member countries. International effort to update and expand the 
coverage of public domain genealogy databases such as the ICIS would be a critical pre-
requisite for the successful application of informatics-based approaches. The feasibility 
of applying the informatics-based approaches would dramatically improve if: (i) IPR 
applications for plant variety innovations (whether for patents or PVP) are required to 
provide information on the source of parental material used in an innovation, or if IPR 
regulations are amended to make it mandatory for applicants to acknowledge the use 
of SMTA-PGR in IPR applications for product innovations; and (ii) a standardized system 
of nomenclature or coding is developed and applied for all MLS-PGR exchanged via both 
international and national gene banks and repositories. The experimental application 
of the above-described approach to patent databases (for identification of plant variety 
innovations of interest) is developed in Chapter 4. This chapter illustrates the scale and 
complexity of the application of informatics based approaches for assessing the use of 
PGR exchanged under SMTAs in product innovations.  
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2.10 Summary and conclusions
This Chapter has developed a framework for the empirical assessment of the potential flow 
of mandatory and voluntary payments arising from the SMTA-mediated exchange of PGR 
under the Treaty’s Multilateral System. The conceptual framework used for this assessment 
principally views PGR in the MLS as a resource for innovation in plant breeding. It is the 
utilization of this resource in the innovation process that generates the flow of payments 
into the Benefit-sharing Fund. Factors influencing the demand for PGR from the MLS for any 
crop in the innovation process include the research intensity of the crop, the importance of 
PGR in the MLS in relation to the overall agro-biodiversity of that crop, and the commercial 
potential of the new plant varieties that may emerge from the innovation process. The 
utilization of PGR from the MLS in the innovation process is influenced by the institutional 
arrangements governing access and exchange of material, and the appropriation of 
value from innovations. The magnitude of potential benefit-sharing payments, therefore, 
depends on the commercial value of innovations supported by exchange of PGR in the MLS 
and the efficacy of the institutional mechanisms put in place by the Treaty for appropriating 
a portion of the commercial value of innovations to the Benefit-sharing Fund.
An accurate empirical assessment of the utilization of PGR from the MLS in the development 
of product innovations would be an exercise of considerable complexity as PGR exchanges 
proceed through a complex maze of transactions across institutions and countries. The 
eventual use of PGR exchanged under SMTAs in a final product innovation may occur at 
a point far removed from the first recipient of the material. Further, PGR exchanged under 
SMTAs may be subject to transformation through several rounds of breeding before they 
are incorporated in a final product. Information on PGR flows within and across national 
boundaries and their use in long breeding cycles of crop improvement are extremely 
limited. Empirical assessment of the contribution of PGR exchanged under SMTAs requires 
identification of product innovations taking place in different parts of the world and linking 
them to the exchange of PGR through the use of genealogy information or detailed breeding 
histories. An outline is provided below of the informatics-based approaches that could be 
used to bring together product innovation databases, genealogy databases and information 
on the distribution/exchanges for such an empirical assessment. These approaches are tested 
in Chapter 4. The development and application of these informatics-based approaches may 
be feasible only over the long term. Given that PGR has been exchanged under SMTAs for 
only six years and given the length of the breeding cycle for modern plant varieties, it may 
be early to make the linkage between the exchange of PGR and the commercialization of 
product innovations using the informatics-based approaches.
Keeping in view the information and data-related constraints, and the infeasibility of 
applying informatics-based approaches described above, an alternative methodology 
has been used to assess the potential magnitude of benefit-sharing payments that 
does not rely on the linkages between individual exchange transactions of PGR and 
product development. This methodology has been applied to three major food crops, 
wheat, rice and maize, which account for nearly 40 percent of the global commercial 
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seed market value. This approach attempts to estimate the proportion of the value of 
the global seed market that could be attributed to product innovations incorporating 
PGR exchanged under SMTAs. The proxy measure used to estimate the proportion is the 
value share in the commercial seed market of varieties incorporating material developed 
by CGIAR institutions. Value shares are derived from estimates of area shares of varieties 
incorporating CGIAR-linked germplasm. Over the last four decades, PGR stored in CGIAR 
gene banks and materials developed by CGIAR breeding programmes have been freely 
exchanged and made available to public and private sector breeding programmes under 
arrangements that are substantially similar to those envisaged under the MLS. The use 
of material developed and distributed by the CGIAR in varietal development for different 
crops can, therefore, provide a reasonable indicator of the potential use of PGR exchanged 
under SMTAs over time. The critical assumption in this approach is that the patterns of use 
of PGR exchanged under SMTAs in the future will be similar to patterns of use of PGR from 
‘open-access’ systems observed in the past. This assumption may hold only if: (i) plant 
breeding programmes, especially those in the private sector, do not resort to the use of 
strategies avoiding the use of MLS material in their programmes, deterred by the prospect 
of benefit-sharing payments; (ii) the need for plant breeding programmes to access the 
MLS has not been significantly reduced by the exchanges over the last four decades; and 
(iii) the MLS remains the principal sources of PGR and associated information for dealing 
with the emerging challenges faced by plant breeding programmes for Annex 1 crops and 
is not supplanted by alternative sources of access to PGR.33
Our analysis shows that the potential for mandatory and voluntary payments arising 
from the exchange of PGR under SMTAs is influenced by certain key factors, which include 
the following:
(a)  The coverage of crops under Annex 1 of the Treaty: The share of Annex 1 crops in 
PGR-related innovation has been declining over time. This is reflected in the declining 
relative research intensity of Annex 1 crops over the last three decades. Non-Annex 1 
crops are attracting an increasing share of the total research effort. But innovation 
in these crops and growth in their seed market value will not translate into any 
payments into the Benefit-sharing Fund. Crops such as soybean and cotton, which 
are excluded from Annex 1, are making a significant contribution to the value of 
the global commercial seed market and its growth. The exclusion of these high-
growth segments from the purview of the Treaty constrains the potential growth 
of benefit-sharing payments.
(b)  Biotechnology-based innovations: GM varieties are the fastest growing segments 
of the global commercial seed market. GM varieties are also predominantly 
protected by patents and would give rise to mandatory payments if they were 
33   Alternative avenues of access (e.g. through bilateral arrangements or contracts) will be increasingly 
constrained by high transaction costs and the emergence of CBD-compliant biodiversity legislation in many 
countries, highlighting the advantages of facilitated access provided by the MLS. 
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to incorporate PGR exchanged under SMTAs. However, maize and canola are the 
only two Annex 1 crops that have been subject to significant genetic modification 
activity. Two crops, soybean and cotton, where GM varieties have seen spectacular 
growth in adoption and area are not included in Annex 1. The present coverage 
of crops in Annex 1 restricts the potential for payments from innovations involving 
genetic modification or application of biotechnology.
(c)  The application of IPRs to plant variety innovations: Mandatory payments into the 
Benefit-sharing Fund arise only when innovations incorporating PGR exchanged 
under SMTAs are protected by patents. Patents for plant variety innovations are 
currently available only in a limited number of countries and are mostly applied 
only to GM varieties. Plant variety innovations in most developed countries are 
predominantly protected by PVP (and not by patents), while most innovations 
in developing countries may not be subject to any form of protection. The 
vast majority of plant variety innovations at the global level do not attract any 
mandatory payment obligations. Thus, the potential for mandatory payments is 
severely constrained by the fact that only a very small proportion of global plant 
variety innovations attract such payments. The potential for mandatory payments 
will remain unaffected by the extension of PVP systems to developing countries 
under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 
(d)  Seed replacement rates: Seed replacement rates continue to be low in developing 
countries with commercial seed use on average accounting for less than 15–20 
percent of total seed use. Low SRRs constrain the growth potential of benefit-
sharing payments since they are related to the value of the commercial seed 
market. The use of farm-saved seed of varieties incorporating PGR exchanged 
under SMTAs gives rise to no benefit-sharing payment flows. 
Taking into account the key factors that constrain the potential for benefit-sharing 
payments, the application of the methodology outlined above yields ‘upper-bound’ 
estimates of mandatory and voluntary payments of around $100 million per year. It must 
be clearly understood that this figure is not an estimate of the level of payments that can 
be expected in the immediate future; the figure of $100 million is the estimated level of 
annual payments that could be reached over the next two to three decades. It should also 
be emphasized that this estimate is based on the assumption that voluntary payments are 
made by all recipients of PGR exchanged under SMTAs (as per the Treaty) at the same rate 
as prescribed for mandatory payments. This estimate is therefore based on 100 percent 
compliance with voluntary payment stipulations, which is why it is called an ‘upper-bound’ 
estimate. A high degree of compliance with voluntary payment stipulations would need to 
be supported by improved information on international PGR flows and their use in plant 
breeding programmes in different countries. The estimate further assumes that institutional 
plant breeding programmes do not resort to breeding strategies deliberately avoiding 
the use of MLS material. The anticipated payments of $100 million include mandatory 
payments of $3.85–9.7 million from GM varieties of maize (mandatory payments being 
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anticipated only from GM varieties of maize and canola). Voluntary payments for wheat 
varieties range from $2.31–13.04 million; for rice, from $1.55–7.74 million; and for maize, 
from $7.63–16.14 million. There are significant differences between the potential for 
benefit-sharing payments between developed and developing countries mainly due to 
the differences in the adoption of modern varieties and in seed replacement rates. This 
analysis has assumed that the PGR resource base in the MLS is largely static. Expansion 
of the resource base through improved PGR collection, conservation and characterization 
efforts, and effective participation in the MLS by member countries and of more countries 
in the Treaty – especially those with major PGR holdings such as China and the United 
States – may substantially enhance the anticipated level of benefit-sharing flows. 
Chapter 3
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“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.”
– George E.P. Box, FRS (1919–2013)1
3.1  Introduction to the model
To date, no methodology has been proposed to provide a projection – even preliminary 
– of what monies are likely to result from the exchange of PGR for food and agriculture 
under the SMTA of the Multilateral System of Access of the Treaty, and when these monies 
may become available. The broader picture of possible income for the Benefit-sharing 
Fund under the SMTA is therefore still very unclear. This chapter will address the challenge 
an algorithm and model in this chapter.
3.1.1 Objectives of the model
The first objective is to provide the best possible immediate estimate of income to 
the Treaty, over time, from the workings of the SMTA, despite the extremely deficient 
information currently available. In this first iteration of the model, the chief aims are to 
propose a framework methodology and proof of concept, and evaluate data sources. The 
model is of necessity schematic, and capable of considerable further refinement.
The second objective is to describe the process of producing commercial products from 
materials accessed under an SMTA, in terms of an algorithm, the factors of which can be 
varied, so as to test a number of possible scenarios. Given data uncertainties, parsimony 
in the number of factors used is a deliberate aim of the model. A minimum set of factors 
that appear to have a substantial influence on this process may then be manipulated 
mathematically, in particular by varying a single factor, the other factors being held 
constant. In this way, the model serves as a ‘tool to think with’.
The objectives of the scenarios are twofold:  to investigate the effects of different sets 
of assumptions on possible income to the Treaty, and to evaluate the sensitivity and 
importance of the individual factors within the algorithm. The relationship of the estimates 
under different sets of assumptions is more significant than the actual numbers.
3.1.2 Initial caveats
It is necessary to make a number of strong initial caveats. It must be stressed that this is 
only a model, that is, a theoretical construct that produces hypothetical estimates, with 
a wide range of uncertainty. It is not a calculation of real values, with a strong degree of 
certainty. The results of implementing the model must at best be seen as indicative.
Some imprecisions derives from the weaknesses of the currently available data. Much 
1  Cited in Box and Draper (1987, 424).
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of the data manipulated is ‘best guess’ estimates, and the lack of directly pertinent 
information means that a number of proxies have had to be used. Moreover, some of the 
data needed are by their nature unlikely ever to be of very great certainty, because they 
are not systematically collected, because great variation within individual factors makes 
averaging hazardous, and because some key data are of a proprietary nature.
In addition, the structure of the model and the assumptions on which it is based reflect 
current conditions and practices within plant breeding and the seed and planting material 
industry, but recent scientific progress in plant breeding has been rapid, suggesting that 
technological progress will accelerate. Changes in industrial strategy and intellectual 
property law are also likely to have very major implications for the working of the SMTA. 
As will be seen, the model suggests that the time-scale for the build-up of income to 
the Treaty will be long, and the further in time one projects from the present day, the 
more likely it is that the conditions and practices that the model seeks to reflect will have 
changed. The probability of accuracy declines with distance in time, and no methodology 
can remedy this intrinsic uncertainty.
The model is also crucially dependent on the strategic decisions of breeders and breeding 
companies, who are under no legal obligation to the Treaty in two crucial ways. First, they 
are not obliged to use materials from the Multilateral System, and there are, in most cases, 
alternative sources of supply outside the jurisdiction of the Treaty. Second, the bulk of 
payments foreseen by the SMTA are voluntary, and there are strong theoretical reasons 
for assuming that the level of voluntary payments will be low. Nonetheless, the model 
assumes, in most scenarios, a consistent relatively high use of the Multilateral System, 
and of voluntary payment. This is in order to ensure comparability between the various 
scenarios, and is not a statement of likelihood. Two specific scenarios test the importance 
of avoidance of material under an SMTA and of varying levels of voluntary payment. As 
will be seen, the importance of these factors is very high.
3.1.3 Relevant provisions of the Treaty and of the SMTA
The model does not seek to propose changes to the provisions of the Treaty and the 
SMTA, or suggest alternative benefit-sharing systems; this is not its purpose. Changes 
to the Treaty or the SMTA are the prerogative of Contracting Parties, and there are no 
indications from the Governing Body on which such speculation could be based. The 
model therefore strictly reflects the actual provisions of the Treaty and the SMTA.
Contracting Parties to the Treaty agree to treat the PGR for food and agriculture of the 
crops listed in Annex 1 of the Treaty that are under their management and control, and 
in the public domain as a pooled good, and invite all other holders of such PGR for food 
and agriculture – i.e. private persons, institutions and companies – to include them in the 
Multilateral System.2
International Institutions bring their ex situ collections of PGR for food and agriculture of 
2  Treaty Article 11.2.
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the crops listed in Annex 1 to the Treaty into the Multilateral System.3 They also distribute 
their non-Annex 1 holdings, at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty, under the 
terms and conditions of the SMTA.4
The SMTA, which is a contract in private law between the Provider and the Recipient, 
creates a beneficial interest for the Treaty such that payments are due to the Treaty’s 
Benefit-sharing Fund on commercialization of “a product that is a plant genetic resource 
for food and agriculture and that incorporates material accessed from the Multilateral 
System”.5
The payment provisions are stipulated in the SMTA itself:6
1. Under Article 6.7, a mandatory annual payment is due of 1.1, less 30, of the total 
annual sales of any product or products that are not “available without restriction to 
others for further research and breeding”.7
2. Under Article 6.8, a voluntary payment is due in the case of any product or products 
that are “available without restriction to others for further research and breeding”. The 
Treaty does not explicitly state what the expected level of such payments is.
3. Under Article 6.11, a recipient may opt for an alternative payment scheme, at the 
time of receiving an SMTA, for a specific crop or crops, whereby an annual payment 
is due for any of his/her Product or Products of this crop, independent of whether or 
not the Product is available without restriction, and whether or not they incorporate 
materials accessed through an SMTA. The rate of payment is 0.5 of sales..8
If an SMTA material is crossed with a non-SMTA material, the result of the cross may 
only be transferred to a third party under an SMTA, thus creating a chain of SMTAs from 
initial access to commercialized product,9 and binding all recipients in this chain to the 
terms and conditions of the SMTA.
3   Treaty Article 15.1a.
4   Treaty Article 15.1b and IT/GB-2/07/Report, Paras. 67 and 68.
5   Treaty Article 13.2d (ii).
6  The Treaty foresees that the Governing Body may vary payment conditions, including the levels of payment, 
and whether payments are mandatory or voluntary: “The Governing Body may, from time to time, review 
the levels of payment with a view to achieving fair and equitable sharing of benefits, and it may also assess, 
within a period of five years from the entry into force of this Treaty, whether the mandatory payment 
requirement in the MTA shall apply also in cases where such commercialized products are available without 
restriction for further research and breeding” (Article 13.2d(ii)). The Governing Body has postponed the 
deadline for the review, currently until its Fifth Session in 2013.
7   SMTA  Annex 2, 1a.
8   SMTA  Annex 3, 1.
9   SMTA, Article 6.5.
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3.1.4 Cumulative and distributive models
There are two basic methodologies by which this process could be modelled:
•	 by identifying the number and kind of materials that have been accessed under 
SMTAs since the adoption of the SMTA, projecting forward the likely releases of 
further materials under the SMTA, and then attempting to estimate the products 
derived from them over time, and their likely value. This can be characterized as a 
cumulative approach;
•	 by valuing the part of the international seed and planting materials market of crops 
for which SMTAs have been issued, and within this part, the proportion of products 
of these crops that are likely, at a given date, to contain material derived from the 
Multilateral System. This can be characterized as a distributive approach.
A cumulative model is likely to have a wider range of error than a distributive model 
due to the uncertainty and imprecision of the data available, which accumulate with each 
step. The distributive model, on the other hand, starts from observed empirical values and 
applies a number of functions to them in order to estimate that part of the international 
seed and planting materials market, to which the terms and conditions of the SMTA will 
apply at a particular time because the products incorporate material accessed under an 
SMTA. The absolute margin of error therefore lies within the bounds of these observed 
values, and is likely to be less subject to cumulative error than in the case of the cumulative 
model. This study has therefore used a distributive model.
3.1.5 Basic assumptions and structure of the model
The basic assumptions on which the model is based are as follows:
1. Individual crops/crop groups are modelled separately, since different factors are in 
play during product development and commercialization. 
2. The model begins with information on world holdings of PGR for food and 
agriculture in ex situ collections for these crops and crop groups. The holdings of 
all countries and major international institutions are included, whether or not they 
are members of the Treaty.
3. It then establishes the PGR for food and agriculture that are known to be 
currently available under an SMTA (‘SMTA material’). This is achieved by applying 
a ‘performance’ factor to the holdings of members10 of the Treaty.
4. Due to a lack of data, no attempt is made to include information on materials 
held by natural and legal persons in the model.11
10   Here, ‘member’ is used to denote both Contracting Parties and International Institutions with Article 15 
Agreements.
11   For the currently known inclusions of natural and legal persons, see www.planttreaty.org/inclusions. In 
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5. It is assumed that the ratio of materials that enter plant breeding annually (the sum 
of materials in plant breeding at any time is characterized as the ‘breeding pool’) 
reflects the ratio of SMTA materials/non-SMTA materials available to breeders, 
subject to various factors that influence the use of material under an SMTA.
6. No attempt is made to measure or estimate the actual number of units of PGR in 
the breeding pool at any time.
7. Crossing between SMTA materials and non-SMTA materials in the breeding 
pool (‘diffusion’) will over time increase the proportion of SMTA materials, and a 
function is implemented to model this.
8. An average time between a material entering the breeding pool and a commercial 
product incorporating this material is evaluated (‘development time’), and a 
specific factor applied for this purpose.
9. It is assumed that the ratio of products subject to an SMTA/products not subject to 
the SMTA, at the distance of the development time from any point in time within 
the breeding pool, will reflect the ratio of SMTA materials/non-SMTA materials, 
subject to a number of factors that influence product development. The products 
at any one time together make up the ‘product pool’. 
10. As with the breeding pool, no attempt is made to measure or estimate the actual 
number of products in the product pool at any time.
11. The ratio of products subject to an SMTA/products not subject to an SMTA is 
assumed to be proportionally reflected in the market value of the international 
seed trade.
12. Income to the Benefit-sharing Fund is estimated on the basis of the provisions 
of SMTA Articles 6.7 and 6.8. Since payments under Article 6.8 are voluntary, 
a performance factor is in this case applied to simulate the ‘effective rate of 
payment’. 
13. No attempt is made to consider the probable income under SMTA Article 6.11 
within the model. Article 6.11 is considered separately in section 3.3 below.12
14. The model assumes that values of the international seed market are stable and 
unvarying over time. All values are expressed in constant 2011 US dollars.
The major structural elements of the model, as constructed on the basis of these 
assumptions, are shown schematically in Figure 3.1. 
its Third Session, the Governing Body “expresses its concern that information on the inclusion of plant 
genetic resource for food and agriculture in the Multilateral System by natural and legal persons within the 
jurisdiction of Contracting Parties on which to base its assessment of the progress in including these plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture in the Multilateral System, is not yet available”.
12  At the time of writing, no valid acceptance of the alternative payment scheme of Article 6.11 has yet been 
received.
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3.1.6 Use of terminology and symbols
As is usual in a mathematical model of this nature, we express the elements of the 
model in scientific notation, using a set of symbols, and in Appendix 3.2 we describe the 
mathematical algorithm that implements the model in scientific notation. The format used 
is as follows:
IndIces
c Crop/crop group
h Holders of materials
t Time.
GIven data
C(c) World holdings of crop/crop group c, measured in terms of accessions in ex 
situ collections
H(h) Holdings of crop/crop group c, measured in terms of accessions in ex situ 
collections, by holder (country and by international institution), h
V(c) The commercial value of crop/crop group c, in the world seed and planting 
material market, v.
OutcOme
Q(c)t	 Monies due to the Treaty at time t for crop c.
Figure 3.1 Structural elements of the model
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The terminology used in mathematical modelling differs greatly between the social 
sciences and economics. For example, economists may use the terms ‘exogenous variable’ 
and ‘endogenous variable’, while social scientists would probably use ‘given data’ and 
‘outcome’, respectively.
In the present chapter, the terminology adopted is as follows: indices are called sets, 
given data are called factors, outcomes are called computational objects, and the variables 
in the equations modelling given data in order to calculate outcomes are called functions.
3.1.7 Factors used in the model and definitions
Table 3.1 lists in algorithm order the factors that are used in the model. These are then 
defined, and their role in the model is described.
Table 3.1 Factors used in the model
C(c) World crop 
holdings, by 
crop
C1 Wheat 
C2 Rice
C3 Maize
C4 Other Annex 1 crops, taken together
C5 Non-Annex 1 food and agriculture crops
H(h) World crop 
holdings, by 
holder
H1 States that are Contracting Parties
H2 International institutions that have signed Article 15 Agreements
H3 States that are not Contracting Parties
H4 International institutions that have not signed Article 15 Agreements
π Availability A performance factor, defined as the part of H1–H5 that is effectively 
available from the holder under a SMTA
t Time All events (such as adherence of a Contracting Party, or a change in π) 
enters the model at a date, and all projections evolve along t
B Breeding Pool A conceptual object (the total breeding stock per crop in breeding at any 
time), used for evaluating the ratio of A/B
A SMTA material 
in the breeding 
pool
A conceptual object (that part of a crop’s breeding stock containing 
SMTA material at any time), used for evaluating the ratio of A/B
α Introduction of 
material into 
the breeding 
pool
α1 The annual rate at which accessions without SMTAs enter B 
α2 The annual rate at which accessions with SMTAs from national collections 
enter B
α3 The annual rate at which accessions with SMTAs from international 
institutions enter B
υ Avoidance Deliberate avoidance of material under SMTAs
λ Diffusion The effect of crossing of SMTA materials and non-SMTA materials within 
B 
P Product pool A conceptual object: the total number of products commercialized at any 
time
MODELL ING PAYMENTS TO THE BENEFIT-SHARING FUND
125
Chapter 3
t Products subject 
to SMTAs
A conceptual object: that part of a crop/crop group’s product pool 
incorporating SMTA material at any one time
κ Development 
time
Average time, per crop/crop group, from access to product
β Research 
intensity
Investment in research and development, in a crop/crop group, relative to 
other crops
γ Improved 
materials
The proportion of improved materials in α
δ Consequences 
of γ
δ1 The speed of uptake of materials
δ2 The proportion of materials leading to products
V(c) Commercial 
value of the 
world seed 
and planting 
material market
V1 Wheat
V2 Rice
V3 Maize
V4 Other Annex 1 crops
V5 Non-Annex 1 food and agriculture crops
ι IP status The ratio, per crop/crop group, of products under patents
Q Moniess due to 
the Treaty
Q1 In accordance with SMTA Article 6.7
Q2 In accordance with SMTA Article 6.8
μ Payment rate For both Q1 and Q2, ‘one point-one percent (1.1) of the sales of the 
product or products less thirty percent (30)’
ρ Real payment A performance factor: the fraction of Q2 that is actually paid.
3.1.8 Materials that may be accessed under SMTAs
C: world crop holdings, by crop
C represents the total ex situ world holdings of PGR for food and agriculture, quantified 
in terms of number of accessions. In this first iteration of the model, only the holdings of 
national PGR systems and of international institutions are listed. No attempt is made to 
model the holdings of natural and legal persons.
In this first conceptualization, five crops/crop groups are modelled:13
C1: Wheat
C2: Rice
C3: Maize
C4: Other Annex 1 crops
C5: Non-Annex 1 food and agriculture crops.
13   Due to time and resource constrictions, it was necessary to limit its focus on a few important crops for which 
information was available and easily accessible. Wheat, maize and rice were chosen as objects of study with 
these characteristics, as large crops expected to contribute a substantial part of the overall income to the 
Treaty, and as mandate crops of the CIMMYT, IRRI and the Africa Rice Centre. Despite this limitation, the two 
general categories – other Annex 1 crops and non-Annex 1 crops – make it possible to investigate the values 
of all PGR for food and agriculture.
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C1–C4 are Annex 1 crops, to which the provisions of the Multilateral System apply. 
International Institutions are also obliged to make certain C5, non-Annex 1, holdings 
available, in accordance with Treaty Article 15.1b. Both these sets of material are to be 
distributed under an SMTA.
C5 groups all non-Annex 1 PGR for food and agriculture.
 
H: world crop holdings, by holder
H represents the number of accessions of all five crops/crop groups held in ex situ 
collections by countries and international institutions, both by members of the Treaty, and 
non-members. The model distinguishes four categories of holders, which have different 
obligations towards the Treaty regarding the use of SMTAs:
1. States that are Contracting Parties, which must use SMTAs for their Annex 1 
materials;
2. International Institutions that have signed Treaty Article 15 Agreements, 
which must use SMTAs for their Annex 1 materials, and distribute their non-
Annex 1 materials under the terms and conditions of the SMTA;
3. States that are not Contracting Parties; and
4. International institutions that have not signed Treaty Article 15 Agreements. 
Neither point (3) nor point (4) is under any obligation to use the SMTA in distributing 
materials, and there is no information suggesting that any of them are doing so. In 
addition, a number of Contracting Parties have decided, as an independent sovereign 
decision, to make non-Annex 1 materials available under the terms and conditions of the 
SMTA; the term ‘SMTA’ is used for all of them.
 
Figure 3.2 Crops, holders and use of the SMTA
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π: availability of materials
For members of the Treaty, H constitutes the set of materials potentially available under 
SMTAs, both from the Multilateral System (C1–C4), and outside the Multilateral System 
(C5, in the case of international institutions only). A performance factor, π, is applied to 
materials that the Treaty obliges members to make available, to specify the part of the 
full potential set that is actually being made available. It is not applied to materials that a 
Treaty member is not obliged to make available.
3.1.9 Build-up of SMTA materials in the breeding pool
 
t: time
The model is diachronic, that is, all events (such as the adherence of a new Contracting 
Party) enter the model at a specified point in the time. All projections (e.g. of products 
subject to the terms and conditions of the SMTA, and payments due to the Benefit-sharing 
Fund) evolve along the time-line.
B: Breeding pool  
A: SMtA materials in the breeding pool 
B represents the fraction of world crop holdings deployed in all breeding programmes, 
at any one time. For the purposes of the model, it is assumed to be of stable volume over 
time. A represents that fraction of B that consists of SMTA materials. One of the outcomes 
of the model is the evaluation over time of the evolving ratio of A to B. A and B are 
therefore conceptual objects without absolute numerical dimension.
Figure 3.3 Build-up of SMTA materials in the breeding pool
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α: Introduction of materials into the breeding pool 
α represents an annual rate of introduction of materials into B, and comprises three 
parts: non-SMTA materials (α1); SMTA materials from national collections (α2); and SMTA 
materials from international institutions (α3).	α is estimated empirically, and expressed as 
a fraction of B.
 
υ: Avoidance of materials under an SMtA
There is evidence that some commercial entities have adopted a strategy of avoiding the 
use of materials that require acceptance of an SMTA, either in the belief that doing so will 
maximize their profits, or that the transaction costs involved are excessive, due to technical 
difficulties in tracking individual genetic contributions in plant variety development.14 There 
is reason to believe that this behaviour varies according to crop, and relates largely to crops 
where a substantial proportion of products are commercialized under patent protection. 
υ therefore represents avoidance of material that must be accessed under an SMTA. It is 
a stochastic factor, where empirical evidence is hard to find. It is included in the model in 
order to be able to investigate its theoretical importance through the scenarios.
14   See also Chapter 2 above and the Annex.
Figure 3.4 Relationship of the breeding pool to the product pool
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λ: diffusion in B of SMtA materials
Once SMTA materials enter the product pool, they will be crossed with other breeding 
materials. Since the terms and conditions of the SMTA extend to any material that 
contains genetic parts and components introduced from a material accessed under an 
SMTA, diffusion (λ) occurs, at a rate that depends on assumptions regarding the rate at 
which SMTA material is crossed with non-SMTA materials in the breeding pool. 
3.1.10 Build-up of SMTA materials in the product pool
 
P: Product pool  
t: Commercial products subject to SMtAs 
κ: development time
The model evaluates how the ratio of t/P evolves over time. t and P are conceptual 
objects without absolute numerical dimension. P represents the pool of products being 
commercialized at any one time. For the purposes of the model, it is assumed to be of 
stable volume over time. t represents that fraction of P that is made up of products that 
incorporate SMTA materials.
κ represents the average time, per crop, between access to a breeding material and 
commercialization of a product that has been incorporates that material. It may be 
estimated on the basis of empirical evidence. 
t/P is derived directly from A/B, conditioned by a number of factors influencing product 
development (β, γ, δ1 and δ2). 
The relationship of A/B to t/P, over time, is shown schematically in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 Build-up of SMTA materials and SMTA products over time
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β: Research intensity
β represents research intensity per crop/crop group: this variable is a function of variation 
from an average research intensity for all crops generally. It is assessed on the basis of 
empirical evidence. It has a specific function varying the ratio the products derived from 
the different crops/crop groups in t/P.
 
 γ: Proportion of improved materials released by international institutions 
δ1: Speed of uptake of materials 
δ2: Proportion of materials leading to products
γ represents the ratio in annual introductions into the breeding pool of improved to 
unimproved materials in SMTA materials/improved to unimproved materials in non-SMTA 
materials. 
No easy estimate of this ratio is currently available, and the ratio of materials of improved/
unimproved materials accessed from International Institutions under SMTAs15 is used as 
the basis of a proxy, and applied to their releases only (α3). These are a large part of 
improved materials entering the breeding pool, and are greater than average contributors 
to products developed from materials accessed under SMTAs.
The effect of γ on t/P is expressed through two separate functions, δ1 and δ2. According 
to the dimension of γ:
δ1, ‘speed of uptake of materials’, varies the length of the breeding period (κ), in 
that improved materials are assumed to be incorporated in products faster than 
unimproved materials;
δ2, ‘proportion of materials leading to products’, varies the ratio of t/P, in that a 
greater number of improved materials than unimproved materials are assumed to 
be incorporated in products.
3.1.11 Monetary benefit-sharing 
V: Commercial value
t may be expressed in monetary terms, by applying the variable t/P as a fraction of the 
total commercial market for a crop C, V(c).
V represents the monetary value of P, that is, the total value of the world seed and planting 
material market, per crop/crop group (V1–V5), evaluated from empirical observed data. 
V is fractioned according to the ratio of t/P, and Vt = V*(t/P) is assumed to be the 
monetary value of that fraction of the world market that is subject to the terms and 
conditions of the SMTA.
15   This figure is high because a considerable part of annual releases from the CGIAR under SMTAs is of improved 
materials deriving from the Centres’ breeding programmes. Cf. tables 2 (p. 13) and table 3 (p. 14) of IT/GB-
4/11/12, Report on the implementation of the multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing.
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ι: Intellectual property status
ι represents the proportion of V, per crop/crop group that is commercialized under 
intellectual property rights such that the product is not freely available without restriction 
to others for further research and breeding. It can be estimated empirically. 
 
Q: Payments due
Q is a direct derivation of the monies due to the Benefit-sharing Fund from commercial 
products that incorporate materials subject to the terms and conditions of the SMTA (Vt), 
after application of ι:
Q1 represents payments due for products derived from SMTA material, per crop/
crop group, expressed in terms of value, where these are protected by intellectual 
property rights, and subject to mandatory annual payment, in accordance with 
Article 6.7 of the SMTA.
Q2 represents payments due for products derived from SMTA material, per crop/
crop group, expressed in terms of value, where the products are not protected 
by intellectual property rights, and subject to voluntary annual payment, in 
accordance with Article 6.8 of the SMTA.
μ: Payment rate
For both QI and Q2, the payment rate is set at 1.1, less 30, of total annual product sales, 
which is the rate established in the SMTA, under Article 6.7. 
 
ρ: the effective rate of payment
ρ is a performance factor, and represents that fraction of Q2 that is actually paid. In the case 
Figure 3.6 Projected products and monetary benefit-sharing
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of Q1, this is assumed to be 100. In the case of Q2, this is a factor that cannot currently be 
predicted, since there is still no empirical evidence in this regard. It is included, however, 
in order to be able to test its importance through the scenarios, since the effective level of 
payments to the Benefit-sharing Fund will substantially depend on it. 
3.2 Scenarios
3.2.1 Methodology
The scenarios each consist of one or more ‘runs’ of the model (Table 3.2). Each takes 
the form of a projection of income to the Treaty until the various projections approach 
saturation, at about 2081. A specific set of assumptions governs each run, as listed in 
Table 3.2. For each run, two graphs are generated: a stacked area graph, summing income 
from all five crops/crop groups; and a line graph showing the values of each crop/crop 
group separately. The reference run is Run 1, which models the current situation: the data 
on which it is based are given in Appendix 3.1. The algorithm that implements the model 
is described in Appendix 3.2.16
16  The raw data generated by the model is available at www.planttreaty.org/sites/default/files/Results%20
of%20the%20runs%20of%20the%20model.pdf.
Figure 3.7 Payments under SMTA Articles 6.7 and 6.8
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3.2.2 Scenarios analysed
The following scenarios were analysed using the information generated by these runs. For 
the discussion in this section, other graphs were also generated, and are shown in the text, 
in order to compare the results of relevant runs.
Scenario 1 valuates potential income with the current membership of the 
Treaty, and the material that current Treaty members are making available, 
and compares this with the effects of members making available more of their 
holdings.
Scenario 2 tests the effects of the Treaty’s membership growing.
Scenario 3 quantifies the potential benefits deriving from the respective 
holdings of developing countries, and of developed countries.
Scenario 4 quantifies the potential benefits deriving from the respective 
holdings of countries, and of international institutions.
Scenario 5 tests the relative importance of mandatory and voluntary payments, 
and of differing effective levels of voluntary payment.
Scenario 6 tests the effect of avoidance of the use of material under SMTA 
conditions.
Scenario 7 quantifies and compares the total potential value deriving from 
Annex 1 material, with the values that could be derived from non-Annex 1 
materials, should the Governing Body of the Treaty decide to increase the list 
of crops in Annex 1.
Scenario 8 summarizes and quantifies potential income to the Treaty, under 
optimal assumptions.
Scenario 9 tests the importance of the rate of crossing, in the breeding pool.
Scenario 10 tests the importance of the increased likelihood of a product being 
produced, where improved materials have been accessed for use in a breeding 
programme.
Scenario 11 tests the effect of varying values of α, the annual rate of incorporation 
of new materials in breeding programmes. 
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Scenario 1: the current situation
Scenario 1 (runs 1, 2, 3 and 4) tests the effects of varying the percentage of members’ 
holdings that are effectively available through the Multilateral System. It projects 
potential income, with the current membership of the Treaty, on the basis of only the 
materials that have been notified to the Secretariat as available under SMTAs; at least 33 
percent, 66 percent, or 100 percent of their holdings. The values of ‘t’, as far as possible, 
have been established empirically. The rate of effective voluntary payment is assumed 
to be 50.
As is self-evident, income flow into the Benefit-sharing Fund is crucially dependent 
on members effectively making their materials available under SMTAs. In this scenario, 
the annual income predicted by 2081, which is near peak income, is approximately $28 
million on the basis of current holdings, $38 million at 33 percent availability, $49 million 
at 66 availability, and $60 million at 100 percent availability. 
The Governing Body has established a current fund-raising target of $116 million, 
for the period between July 2009 and December 2014;17 this translates to an annual 
target of $21 million. Under this scenario, based on currently available holdings, the 
equivalent of the annual fund-raising target would be achieved in 2049, and half of 
17   From voluntary contributions by donors, rather than from benefit-sharing payments due on the 
commercialization of products incorporating plant genetic resources accessed under an SMTA.
Figure 3.8 Potential income, based on holdings made available under SMTAs
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the full potential income would be available by 2035. For comparison, if 100 percent of 
current members’ holdings were immediately available, the current fund-raising target 
could be reached by 2029, and 50 percent of the full potential income by 2034.
Using the same set of values, Figure 3.9 models income by crop for the current situation. 
The lower line estimates income from non-Annex 1 material from members who are 
already releasing such material under SMTA terms and conditions. By far the largest 
income is projected to derive from maize. Both wheat and other Annex 1 crops, taken as a 
group, also make substantial contributions, with rice providing a smaller income. It should 
be borne in mind that the figure for maize reflects the fact that about 26 percent of the 
world’s area planted to maize of transgenic varieties,18 and such materials, being marketed 
under patents, are subject to full mandatory payments. For this reason, an avoidance rate 
of 13 percent (equivalent to half this area) has accordingly been applied to maize, and a 
background avoidance rate of 5 percent to other crops, except for non-Annex 1, where 
0 percent is applied.19 The effective payment rate of 50 percent is optimistic, and a lower 
voluntary payment rate would lower the relative contribution of all crops, from products 
that are not subject to patents, where only voluntary payments are foreseen. Scenario 5 
specifically tests the importance of voluntary payments.
18   Chapter 2, Figure 2.10.
19   Except where otherwise mentioned, these avoidance assumptions are applied as standard in other scenarios.
Figure 3.9 Crop-specific income, based on holdings made available under SMTAs
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IdentIfyIng BenefIt flowS 
138 Equity and food for all
Figure 3.10 shows, for comparison, the income that might be expected from the different 
crops and crop groups, on the assumption that members make 100 percent of their 
holdings immediately available. The importance of maize is even greater.
Scenario 2:  expanding membership
A further critical factor in projecting income is the membership of the Treaty. Scenario 2 
(runs 1, 5 and 6) tests the effects of the Treaty’s membership growing, to include: the three 
largest missing holders of material (China, Japan and the United States) and all potential 
members.
Figure 3.10 Crop-specific income, if all holdings were made immediately available
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Figure 3.11 assumes that members make 100 percent of their holdings available, and 
applies the standard avoidance rates and an effective voluntary payment rate of 50 percent. 
While income with current membership is estimated at about $60 million by 2081 under 
these assumptions, it is estimated at about $73 million, if the three non-member countries 
holding the largest ex situ collections (China, Japan and the United States) join, and at $93 
million if all potential members join.
In this context, it should be borne in mind that the largest ex situ collections held by 
international institutions, which account for by far the largest  part of international holdings 
– those of the CGIAR – have already been brought into the Multilateral System. They 
account for a good part of the current projection. The part of international institutions 
cannot therefore be expected to grow substantially.
Scenario 3: the relative contribution of developing and developed countries’ 
collections
The model also makes it possible to evaluate the relative contribution of materials held 
by developing and developed country Contracting Parties. In this scenario (runs 7, 8, 9 
and 10), effective voluntary payment is set at 50, avoidance at the standard rate, and 
the non-Annex 1 material includes only that certain members have already been made 
available under the terms and conditions of the SMTA. Two projections at 2081 have been 
made, the first at current availability, and the second at 100 percent availability; they are 
presented in Table 3.3.
Figure 3.11 Membership and income 
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Table 3.3 The relative contribution of developing and developed countries’ 
collections
developing countries developed countries
Current availability $0.55 million $7.67 million
100% availability $3.53 million $43.37 million
It should be borne in mind that developing countries may require a longer period to 
make the necessary arrangements to provide their materials to the Multilateral System, in 
accordance with the Treaty. Moreover, while developing countries, as a group, maintain 
proportionally fewer and smaller ex situ collections, they are as a group rich in in situ 
material of interest to food and agriculture, which does not feature in this analysis, and is 
difficult to quantify.
Figure 3.12 illustrates the differing value by crop of developing and developed country 
releases, projected at 2081. 
Figure 3.12 Crops in developing and developed countries releases
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Scenario 4: the relative contribution of countries’ and international institutions’ 
collections
The model also makes it possible to assess the relative contribution of materials held by 
international institutions and by countries that are currently members. In this scenario 
(runs 11, 12 and 13), effective voluntary payment is set at 50 percent. Two projections 
until 2081 have been made, the first at current availability, and the second at 100 
percent availability. The standard avoidance rate and 50 percent voluntary payment are 
assumed.
Figure 3.13 shows the evolution of the contributions to income of these two sources, 
collections of countries and international institutions, over time. In the early days of the 
Treaty, and until Contracting Parties have substantially increased the availability of their 
materials, the ex situ collections of international institutions, which are already making 
available all of their collections, are the major source of income to the Benefit-sharing 
Fund of the Treaty.  Since the great bulk of the international institutions materials have 
already been included in the Multilateral System, the projection for these materials 
does not change, but the contribution of international institutions is underrepresented 
in Figure 3.13. Only releases from their ex situ collections are covered, and as noted 
above, the CGIAR Centres reported in 2011 that, for Annex 1, 71 percent of their 
distributions were of improved materials from their breeding programmes, rather than 
Figure 3.13 Relative contribution of countries’ and international institutions’ collections
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from their ex situ collections, and for non-Annex 1, 31 percent.20 This means that 
a large part of their releases under SMTAs are of improved materials, with a high 
multiplier effect on the development of commercial products, which this projection 
does not fully account for.
Figure 3.14 illustrates the differing composition by crop of international institutions and 
countries country releases, projected at 2081.
 
20   IT/GB-4/11/Inf.5, Experience of the International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research with the Implementation of the Agreements with the Governing Body, 
with Particular Reference to the Use of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement for Annex 1 and non-
Annex 1 Crops, p. 5.
Figure 3.14 Crops in international institutions’ and countries’ releases
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Scenario 5: the relative importance of mandatory and voluntary payments 
Scenario 5 (runs 14, 15, 16 and 17) deals with a matter of particular importance in estimating 
likely income for the Benefit-sharing Fund, namely, the level of voluntary payments in 
accordance with Article 6.7 of the SMTA. The scenario tests the effects of various levels 
of such payments: at 0 percent, 33 percent, 66 percent, and 100 percent, assuming that 
the same rate of payment (1.1 percent, less 30 percent, of the annual commercial sales 
of a product) applies to both mandatory and voluntary payments. Avoidance is set at the 
standard rate.
The scenario presented in Figure 3.15, shows clearly the great dependence of the Treaty 
on substantial voluntary payments. At 2081, the projected annual income under this 
scenario is as follows.
 
Table 3.4 Projections at 2081, at varying degrees of voluntary payment
0% 33% 66% 100%
$23 million $47 million $69 million $97 million
In Chapter 2, it is estimated that the upper levels of potential mandatory and voluntary 
payments, on the basis of the historical use of past CGIAR material, at $10 million and $37 
million, respectively, for a total income of US$47 million annually, which would be reached 
by 2030, at a 100 percent voluntary payment rate. The methodology used in Chapter 2 
Figure 3.15 The relative importance of mandatory and voluntary payments
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is separate and different than that used in the model, and the build-up of the projected 
income is not articulated over time. 
The initial survey of plant-breeding experts (see Annex to this volume) suggests that, at 
least in the private sector, it is believed that voluntary payments are in practice likely to be 
minimal.   
The scenario points out the critical importance for the Treaty of the mandatory payments 
that potentially flow from maize varieties, if these are commercialized under patents. 
Figure 3.16 shows the break-down, by crops and crop groups, of the income projection 
at 0 percent voluntary payment, in which case income to the Treaty would flow almost 
exclusively from maize.
A games theory analysis (Box 3.1) suggests that no company can afford to make voluntary 
payments that its competitors avoid, because this would result in uneven competition, and 
a substantial market disadvantage for the company paying. The lack of certainty about 
competitors’ intentions therefore results in a situation where a company hesitates to be 
the first to make substantial voluntary payments, which this creates a vicious circle.
Box 3.1 Games theory analysis
If one company makes a voluntary payment (cooperates), and the other does not (defects), 
the company that defects has a strategic advantage over the company that cooperates. This 
advantage can:
1. be taken as increased profit; 
2. provide an research and development advantage; or 
3. be used to lower the sales price of a competitor product.
The advantage is always to the company that defects, and represents a substantial part of profits. 
Profit in plant breeding is low. If we assume a profit range of 4 to 6 percent, 0.77 percent of sales 
equals 19.25 to 12.83 percent of profits.
No company can therefore make the first move and cooperate because of the risk that other 
companies defect.
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Figure 3.17 shows income by crop at 2081, at 33 percent and 100 percent voluntary 
payment. Even at 100 percent voluntary payment, maize remains the single most important 
crop currently in the Multilateral System.
Scenario 6:  Avoidance of the use of material under SMtA conditions 
Scenario 6 (runs 2, 18 and 19) tests the effect of avoidance of material under SMTA 
conditions. This is a further crucial factor in evaluating the likely income for the Treaty, and 
very little hard evidence is available on which to base an estimate. 
Figure 3.16 Income by crop and crop group at 0% voluntary payment
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17 Income by crop group, at 33% and 100% voluntary payment
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In most developing countries, the public sector has been and remains the dominant 
player in plant breeding research, although the private sector is playing an increasing role 
in several crops. In developed countries, the role of the public sector in ‘near-market’ plant 
breeding research has declined over the last two decades, with the private sector playing 
a dominant role in the breeding of new varieties of key crops, such as maize in the United 
States, particularly those involving the application of biotechnology.
The emergence of the CBD, the extended negotiation process leading to the Treaty, and 
the uncertainties surrounding the nature of the plant genetic resource exchange regime 
that would eventually emerge may have created strong incentives for private sector 
breeding programmes to stockpile materials before the Treaty came into force, to adopt 
breeding strategies that avoid the use of materials accessed under SMTA conditions, and, 
if necessary, to acquire the same genetic material from collections that do not form part 
of the Multilateral System. The preliminary survey of plant breeders (see the Annex) found 
some indication of explicit avoidance in private sector breeding.21
Such avoidance is most likely to occur in cases where the volume of sales is large, and the 
overall profits are high. Moreover, since voluntary payments cannot be enforced, avoidance 
is most likely where the product is to be commercialized under patent protection. These 
factors all point to avoidance being most likely in the case of maize.
As a general rule in the scenarios, a background rate of avoidance is assumed: 5 for 
Annex 1 crops, and 0 for non-Annex 1 crops. In addition, in the case of maize, an additional 
21   See Annex, section A.4.
Figure 3.18 Avoidance of SMTA material
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avoidance of one half of the percentage of the area of maize planted to transgenics (i.e. 
half of 26,22 or 13) is added. Scenario 6 compares a projection at these levels with a 
projection that doubles the background rate to 10, and assumes 100 avoidance for the 
full market share of transgenic maize (i.e. adds the full 26).
However, the use of areas planted to maize as the basis of the assumptions is conservative, 
because while transgenic varieties represent 26 percent of the area planted to maize, they 
represent fully 57 percent of the value of the international maize seed market.23 A third 
projection is therefore made on the basis of a background rate of 10 precent, and 100 
percent avoidance of the full market share of transgenic maize (i.e. adds a full 57 percent).
The difference between the projections under these three sets of projections is shown in 
Table 3.5, in US dollar terms, and as a percentage decline from the higher rate. 
Table 3.5 Projections at varying degrees of avoidance, at 2081
Avoidance US$ million Percentage
5% +13% for maize 55.99
10% +26% for maize 56.33 -6
10% +57% for maize 48.31 -19.5
While these projections show the importance of mandatory payments for potential 
income to the Treaty, this factor must be viewed in conjunction with the rate of voluntary 
payment, which is analysed in scenario 5, because the whole area of Figure 3.18 under the 
lower line derives from voluntary payments, here at 50 percent. 
Scenario 7: the value of Annex 1 and the potential value of non-Annex 1 material 
The Multilateral System covers only those crops currently in Annex 1 to the Treaty. In all the 
other scenarios, only those non-Annex 1 materials that are already being made available 
under the terms and conditions of the SMTA as a sovereign decision of the countries 
involved are valued. This scenario (runs 2, 21, 22 and 23), however, projects and compares 
the values that derive from Annex 1 materials, and the values that might derive from 
non-Annex 1 materials, should the Governing Body decide to expand the list of crops in 
Annex 1. Four projections are made, on the basis of membership, and of whether non-
Annex 1 materials are included. In each projection, the assumptions are that the materials 
in question (Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 materials) are made fully available, that voluntary 
payments are made at 100 percent, and the standard avoidance rate is assumed.
Figure 3.19 shows nearly the full potential of the Treaty, under each of these sets 
of assumptions. Projected total income at 2081 for each of these is summarized in 
Figure 3.20. The growth of membership from the current situation to all possible members 
would increase the potential annual income by 59.5 percent. The expansion of the list to 
non-Annex 1 material would increase the potential annual income by 47.5 percent.
22   Chapter 2, Figure 2.10.
23   Calculated from Appendix 3.1, Table 5.
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Figure 3.19 The potential of increased membership and the possible expansion of Annex 1
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT
Figure 3.20 Increased membership and the possible expansion of Annex 1
projected annual income, at 2081 (US$ million)        
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Scenario 8:  levels and speed of income under various scenarios
Figure 3.21 (runs 2, 23, 24, 25 and 26) provides a summarized overview of the relative 
levels of potential income to the Treaty, under different sets of assumptions. A 50 percent 
voluntary payment rate is assumed in all cases, as is the standard avoidance rate. 
The variables in Figure 3.21 and projected annual values may be tabulated as follows 
(Table 3.6):
 
Table 3.6 Projections by membership, and Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 material,  
at 2081
Members Availability Annex 1 non-Annex 1 US$ million
 Current Current Yes No 28
 Current 100 Yes No 60
 All 100 Yes No 93
 Current 100 Yes Yes 100
 All 100 Yes Yes 176
Figure 3.21 Levels and speed of income under various scenarios
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An alternative set of projections, which do not include the possibility of an expansion of 
the list in Annex 1 is provided in Figure 3.22, which expresses the assumptions in Table 3.7.
 
Table 3.7 Projections by membership, availability, voluntary payment and 
avoidance, at 2081
Members Availability-(%)
Voluntary 
payment (%)
Avoidance (%)
Current Current 50 5 + 13
Current 100 50 5 + 13
Current 100 50 10 + 26
Current 100 50 5 + 13
All 100 100 5 + 13
On the basis of these assumptions, Figure 3.22 displays the projected annual income at 
2030, 2050 and 2080.
Of crucial importance for understanding the potential development of the benefit-
sharing potential of the Treaty is the time factor, that is, the speed at which income is 
likely to build up. Two indexes that can help visualize the time factor in the these scenarios 
are:  the number of years it would take to reach a level equal to the current annual fund 
Figure 3.22 Income at 2081, under various scenarios
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raising target, which the Governing Body currently set at $21 million annually; and the 
time it would take to reach half the projected maximum annual income, as presented in 
Figure 3.23.
Scenario 9:  The effect of crossing in the breeding pool
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 9:  The effect of crossing in the breeding pool.
Figure 3.23 The time factor
Figure 3.24 The effect of various rates of crossing in the breeding pool
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The effect of the crossing of SMTA materials with non-SMTA materials in the breeding pool, 
addressed in this scenario (runs 2, 26, 27 and 28), and presented in Figure 3.24, is to place all 
products of the cross under the terms and conditions of the SMTA, either if then transferred 
to a third party, or incorporated in a commercialized product. In effect, a single SMTA material 
in the ancestry of a commercial product renders voluntary or mandatory payment obligatory. 
This factor is therefore very sensitive. Expressed in terms of an annual crossing rate, a 
4 percent increase in the rate, from 1 percent to 5 percent, translates into an increase 
of 25 percent (from a projected $56–71 million) in income, at 2081. It therefore has a 
substantial multiplier effect, and in this light the accuracy in the estimate of this factor is 
as yet inadequate.
Scenario 10: The increased likelihood of a product being produced when improved 
materials have been accessed
Scenario 10 (runs 2, 30, 31 and 32) compares various rates of the factor that models 
the effects of the proportion of improved materials to the number of products.24 In this 
iteration of the model, this factor is applied only to the materials of the CGIAR, which 
represent about 14 percent of total current holdings at 100 percent availability.25 For 
24   δ1 in notations. See Appendix 3.1.
25   See Table 3.8: 628 200 of 4 504 641 accessions.
Figure 3.25 The effects of the use of improved materials on the proportion of materials leading 
to products         
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Annex 1 materials, between about 85 percent and 95 percent of the CGIAR’s releases 
are of improved materials.26 Given the limited number of accessions to which this factor 
has been applied, the factor is sensitive, as Figure 3.25 shows. Its effects are significant, 
at the values assumed in the model. Moreover, unlike the effect of the annual rate of 
introduction of material into the breeding pool, discussed in scenario 11 below, it affects 
the absolute volume of products, and thus the level, rather than the speed, of income to 
the Treaty.
Scenario 11: The importance of the annual rate of introduction of materials into 
the breeding pool
Scenario 11 (runs 2, 33 and 34) varies the speed at which material enters the breeding 
pool. The proportion of the constituents of the annual increment (material without SMTAs, 
with SMTAs from national collections, and with SMTAs from international institutions) is 
unchanged, so the percentages applied here do not refer only to material subject to an 
SMTA. As Figure 3.26 shows, the effect of increasing the rate of introduction is not to 
increase the absolute terminal level of income, but to increase the speed at which income 
builds up. To illustrate this, the percentage difference in income at various dates is given 
in Table 3.8.
26   γ in notations. See Appendix 3.1.
Figure 3.26 The effects of differing annual rates of introduction of materials into the breeding 
pool         
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Table 3.8 Increase in speed of income with increase of the introduction rate
2024 2034 2064 
Incorporation rate 
(%)
US$ million % US$ million % US$ million %
2% 5.38 – 18.02 – 45.59 –
4.20% 10.39 48 30.53 41% 55.82 18
6% 13.92 25 37.31 18% 57.82 3
The speed of increase is greatest in the early period, and the effect tapers off after 
peaking at a date that is earlier, the higher the incorporation rate assumed.
3.3 the alternative payment option in SMtA Article 6.11
It has not been not possible to incorporate in the model consideration of the possible 
income that may derive from the alternative payment option under SMTA 6.11. Too 
many stochastic variables are involved. This is because the payment provisions of Article 
6.11 are structurally different to those of Articles 6.7 and 6.8. Whereas the latter provide 
for payments, from the time of commercialization, for a product derived from a specific 
plant genetic resource received under an SMTA, the provisions of Article 6.11 require 
an immediate mandatory yearly payment by the subscriber for any of his product of the 
crop in question, whether or not these are available without restriction, and whether 
or not they incorporate materials accessed through an SMTA. There is also no basis on 
which one may estimate the relative number of recipients who might opt for the Article 
6.11 option. To date, no recipient has accepted to accept this option, and discussion 
with the industry confirms that the rate of payment of 0.5 percent of sales on all one’s 
products is seen as much more onerous than the payment of 1.1percent, less 30 percent 
(i.e. an effective rate of 0.77 percent) on the sales of a single product.
A totally hypothetical projection of maximum possible income at 2081 can be made, 
however, by running the model with the following set of assumptions: that all recipients 
have already agreed to accept Article 6.11, and therefore that mandatory payment 
applies to all products, at the rate of payment of 0.5 percent of the sales price of all 
products. It is then possible to test the effects of varying membership; whether Annex 1 
material only, or whether both Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 material is included, and what 
level of availability is assumed. The relative value of the different crops/crop groups can 
also be projected. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 3.9.
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Table 3.9 Hypothetical projection of maximum possible income from SMTA 
Article 6.11 (US$ million)
At a payment rate of 0.5%
wheat Rice Maize other Annex 1 non-Annex 1 total
Current members, Annex 1 only, and current availability
 7.53  3.41  9.82  11.34  -    32.11 
Current members, Annex 1 only, and 100% availability
 11.83  5.41  26.20  21.54  -    64.97 
All possible members, Annex 1 only, and 100% availability
 15.18  7.38  44.05  27.34  -    93.95 
All possible members, Annex 1 and non-Annex 1,  and 100% availability
 15.18  7.38  44.05  27.34  84.32 
3.4  Conclusions of the modelling exercise
The first conclusion that can be drawn concerns the overall potential of benefit-sharing 
under the Treaty. If other factors are favourable, the annual sums that could become 
available are large. Even without the possibility of an expansion of Annex 1, if current 
members make all their resources available immediately, the evaluated annual return 
by 2030 could reach $24 million. The projection with the material currently known to 
be available, however, is only $10 million. A corollary of this point is that the effective 
availability of materials by the current membership should be an immediate priority. Every 
delay in reaching full availability will reduce the amount available at any future date, 
and push forward the date of reaching the current annual target. A further factor that 
would substantially increase the flow of funds is membership. If all potential members had 
already joined the Treaty, $39 million annually might be available in 2030. 
The model has shown the key importance of the ex situ collections of international 
institutions, as well as the substantial potential value of the non-Annex 1 materials that 
a number of members are already making available under the terms and conditions of 
the SMTA. Further availability of non-Annex 1 materials would increase this promising 
additional revenue stream. Similarly, any decision by the Governing Body to expand the 
list of crops in Annex 1 has the potential to greatly expand the flow of income to the 
Benefit-sharing Fund.
The sums cited in these conclusions are based on the assumption that voluntary payments 
will be made at rate of 50 percent. This assumption is based on no evidence, and there 
is much to suggest – in particular, the comments made by industry peer reviewers on an 
initial report – that voluntary payments will never be significant. Indeed, a games theory 
analysis shows the impracticality of a system based on voluntary payment, when no single 
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recipient can afford to make substantial payments, without competitors having to make 
similar payments. A second factor of great importance is the likely avoidance of the use 
of materials from the Multilateral System, which will reduce income proportionally. The 
scenarios have shown the key role of maize in the potential income to the Treaty, because it 
is currently the only crop in which a substantial proportion of seed – of transgenic varieties 
– is marketed under patents, and therefore attracts mandatory payments. Avoidance by 
breeders of transgenic varieties would proportionally reduce the only mandatory source of 
income. Combined with a failure to make substantial voluntary payments, the projected 
income to the Treaty would evaporate. While members may take actions to increase 
their performance, avoidance and voluntary payments are solely at the discretion of 
recipients of PGR, in accordance with the current provisions of the Treaty, and there is no 
legal obligation on them either to use materials that require agreeing to the terms and 
conditions of the SMTA, or to make voluntary payments.
Finally, the model suggests that, even under favourable assumptions, the initial build-up 
of income will be slow: with current membership and availability, it will be 38 years before 
the current fund-raising target is reached. Furthermore, this does not take into account 
possible technological developments that may change the process of plant breeding, 
and possibly reduce the use of plant genetic materials from the Multilateral System. Even 
under two highly favourable sets of assumptions – (i) that all members immediately make 
available all their material, and that voluntary payments in fact reach the same level as 
mandatory payments; or (ii) that all potential members immediately join the Treaty and 
make available all their materials, and voluntary payments reach a 50 level – it would take 
approximately 15 years before the current annual target is reached.
The potential income, then, is high, but current projections are low, and obstacles to 
substantial success under the current arrangements cannot be ignored.
3.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the model
The model, although rudimentary, appears to be robust and capable of providing useful 
policy insights.
The model provides information on the effects of the behaviour of Treaty members, 
simulating their effectively making available or not making available their Annex 1 
materials, in accordance with the Treaty, and the impact that this will have for the time 
required for the build-up of substantial income to the Benefit-sharing fund. It is also useful 
in quantifying the potential return to the Treaty from non-Annex 1 materials that countries 
are, as a sovereign decision, already making available under the terms and conditions of 
the SMTA, as well as the total potential value of non-Annex 1 materials.
The main data sets that the model manipulates (world crop holdings, C; and the 
commercial value of the world seed and planting material market, V) would benefit from 
improvement, but already appear to be relatively sound. Of the two, V is the less certain, 
as is clear from the review of available data, and from the many proxies that were needed 
to develop the estimates, in Chapter 2. Further research could improve these values.
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An important but opaque set of factors relates to the behaviour of users of materials 
available under SMTAs, and, in particular, to two factors:  avoidance (υ) and the real rate 
of voluntary payment (ρ). Hard information on these factors is not only not available, 
but is unlikely to become available for a considerable period of time, and then only from 
analysing the data regarding accessions released and payments made. Nonetheless, the 
survey presented in the Annex shows that many actors in the plant breeding industry 
expect avoidance to be very high, and voluntary payments to be very few. The model, in 
scenarios 5 and 6, is able to simulate how real behaviour, with regard to these two factors, 
is likely to condition the Treaty. They are critical in any realistic evaluation of the benefit-
sharing potential of the Treaty.
A further set of factors are related to technical issues, where improvements in 
the information base and in the construction of the model could greatly improve its 
performance. These include relatively static factors, in particular, the development time per 
crop/crop group (κ) and research intensity (β), although, as currently constructed, they do 
not have extremely large effects on the projections of the model. More important factors 
are:  the introduction of material (α), diffusion (λ), and the ratio of improved materials/
unimproved materials (γ) and its consequences for the speed of uptake of material (δ1) 
and the proportion of materials leading to products (δ2). These are all factors that have 
a high multiplier effect within the algorithm, and their more precise calibration would 
increase its predictive power.
In considering the time factor, it is obvious that the further the projection into the 
future, the more likely it is that the current dominating conditions will have changed. 
Given the speed at which technology is developing, the use of genetic material in plant 
breeding will undoubtedly be very different from what we know today, even in 20 years. 
Projecting ahead to 2081, the world is sure to have changed so much that the economics 
of plant breeding and the structure of the market will be very different, with unpredictable 
implications for the Treaty. No model can intelligently address such unpredictability. This is 
not a weakness of this particular model, but a general fact.
Major current weaknesses in the model include the lack of a methodology and data 
to model the value of materials that do not proceed directly from ex situ collections, 
but from breeding programmes. The volume of such materials is currently uncertain, 
except in the case of the CGIAR collections, and the model would benefit from covering 
such materials as well. Similarly, a methodology to reflect the materials that are made 
available by natural and legal persons would be of value, including through their release 
as commercial products, and as contributions both to ex situ collections and to further 
breeding programmes.
A more difficult task would be to assess the potential volumes and value of in situ 
materials, which are to be made available in accordance with Article 12.3h of the Treaty. 
The incorporation of such an element in the model has the potential to reflect with greater 
accuracy the importance of materials held by developing countries.
The expansion to other crops, in particular to a representative sample of vegetable crops, 
would appear to be a priority for further work. Discussions with breeders suggest that these 
materials are of high value, and the identification of individual crop seed market values and 
the calibration of the factors that describe their use would be an important next step.
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This kind of model is primarily an analytical tool, rather than a predictive instrument. 
For this reason, we would suggest focusing any further development of the model 
on identifying the most important questions to be addressed, and on improving and 
extending the model with these questions in mind, rather than complicating the algorithm 
by introducing a wide range of other factors that are not of analytical value for policy 
development. Diminishing returns to increased effort and investment will otherwise soon 
set in.
The model has not attempted to simulate directly the possible income to the Treaty from 
the workings of Article 6.11, because the factors involved are very different. We suggest 
not attempting to introduce it directly into the logarithm.
Finally, the initial survey of plant breeders (see Annex) that sought values, however 
approximate, with which to populate the model, has shown the willingness of breeders 
in both the public and private sectors to contribute their knowledge and experience. Any 
further development of the model should seek to draw plant breeders more closely into 
its design, and into the generation of the data necessary to make it function effectively.
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Chapter 4
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTy, 
INFORMATICS AND PLANT 
GENETIC RESOURCES
Paul Oldham and Stephen Hall
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4.1 Introductory note
This chapter focuses on the intellectual property issues around PGR under the Treaty. 
Specifically, it focuses on the use of informatics techniques to identify PGR for food and 
agriculture within the international patent system. 
The extension of intellectual property protection to agricultural crops and forages has 
been a significant focus of debate, in particular, the extension of patent protection to 
plants and their components; an extensive literature exists that considers the implications 
of property protection for food and agriculture. However, intense interest in patent 
protection in the field of food and agriculture has not been accompanied by equally intense 
interest in generating empirical data on what is actually happening with respect to patent 
activity for food and agriculture. This is a common pattern in international debates on 
genetic resources in general. This chapter aims to contribute to resolving this problem in 
the case of the world’s major food crops and forages by providing a statistical baseline for 
the analysis and interrogation of trends in patent activity. As such, this chapter focuses on 
methodological issues in establishing baseline data and explores potential ways forward 
in addressing more complex questions such as the relationship between public germplasm 
collections, research and development, and intellectual property.   
The main focus of this chapter is on patent activity. We divided our empirical work on 
patent activity into two segments: 
•	 the elucidation of patent statistics for PGR for food and agriculture in general; 
•	 the elucidation of patent statistics for Annex 1 food crops and forages in particular. 
The patent system is a global electronic information system consisting of in excess 
of 60 million documents in multiple languages. One of the primary purposes of the 
system is information retrieval for assessing prior art during the examination process and 
fulfilling the longer-term purpose of the patent system, which is to disclose new and 
useful inventions to the public for wider use. Considerable advances have been made in 
recent years to make patent information more widely accessible to the public through 
the development of public electronic databases such as the European Patent Office (EPO) 
esp@cenet worldwide database. In addition, in 2006, the EPO released the World Patent 
Statistical Database (PATSTAT) in order to facilitate the development of gold standard 
patent statistics. This initiative forms part of wider work by the OECD Patent Statistics 
Taskforce to advance methodological development for patent statistics and initiatives by 
individual agencies such as WIPO in promoting methodological development in the form 
of patent landscape studies. This chapter builds on these advances and applies them to 
PGR for food and agriculture. 
In approaching the presence of food and agriculture in the patent system, researchers 
are immediately confronted by the problem of where and how to begin in interrogating 
a system consisting of millions of documents. In practice, there are two main approaches:
•	 use of the IPC as a system of over 70 000 alphanumeric classification codes used 
to describe the contents of patent documents developed by the IPC Union and 
administered by WIPO;
IntelleCtUAl PRoPeRty, InfoRMAtICS And PlAnt genetIC ReSoURCeS
163 
Chapter 4
•	 searches by species and common names in patent texts using whole text databases.
In approaching patent activity, there is also the question of which tools to use. Thus, public 
databases such as EPO esp@cenet are excellent for access to individual or small numbers 
of records, but it is not readily possible to conduct large-scale analysis using these tools. 
In contrast, commercial database providers, notably Thomson Innovation, give detailed 
access to patent activity from the main patent jurisdictions and allow to download up to 
30 000 records at a time. However, the data are limited to the main patent jurisdictions, 
as are opportunities for interrogating patent data using large numbers of species names. 
In contrast, PATSTAT provides access to over 60 million records for statistical analysis. 
However, PATSTAT is limited to data fields such as the titles and abstracts together with 
other information fields, and cannot be used for large-scale text mining. 
In developing a statistical baseline for patent activity for food and agriculture in general 
and food crops and forages covered under Annex 1 in particular, a hybrid approach is 
required. This approach recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of existing tools and 
exploits the increasing availability of large-scale computing power to overcome obstacles 
in interrogating patent data. 
The following section focuses on establishing the statistical context for patent activity 
for PGR using three main tools: 
•	 the IPC;
•	 the Thomson Reuters commercial database Thomson Innovation focusing on the 
main patent jurisdictions;
•	 the EPO World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) for the elaboration of global 
statistical trends.
The key outcome of this approach is to progressively capture and expand the statistical 
context of patent activity for PGR by progressively scaling up. This approach then provides 
the context for identifying Annex 1 species discussed in Section 4.3. We now turn to the 
use of the IPC as a means of defining PRG in the patent system. 
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4.2 establishing the statistical context for patent activity for plant 
genetic resources
4.2.1 Introduction:  the International Patent Classification
The international patent system uses a hierarchical alphanumeric classification system, 
the IPC, to describe the contents of patent documents. The IPC consists of approximately 
70 000 classification codes and is regularly reviewed and updated. As demand for patent 
information grows, there is an increasing tendency to use classification codes to describe 
the contents of documents as fully as possible. This means that patent documents are 
frequently awarded classification codes in more than one technology area. 
We initiated our research by selecting a sample of 70 969 patent documents across all 
years in Thomson Innovation with the classification code A01H for New Plants or Processes 
for producing them. By adopting this approach, we began with a known starting point 
for PGR. Using Vantage Point analytics and text mining software from Search Technology 
Inc., we then reviewed all other IPC codes that were linked to A01H in the data to identify 
additional areas of the classification that specifically refer to PGR. Our assumption in 
adopting this approach was that patent activity involving PGR in areas outside A01H 
would inevitably become linked to A01H over time.   
In practice, agricultural PGR are confined to three main areas of the patent classification: 
(i) new plants or processes for producing them (A01H); (ii) peptides (C07K); and (iii) genetic 
engineering (C12N). Other important areas of the classification system of direct relevance 
to plants include biocides (A01N), biotechnology processes using microorganisms (i.e. 
C12P), A23L (foodstuffs) together with recombination DNA technology (C12N15/09) and 
measuring or testing using nucleic acids (for DNA sequencing under C12Q1/68). However, 
for the purposes of information retrieval to inform policy debates, it is important to note 
that these classification codes do not necessarily involve claims over plant genetic material 
or are very general (i.e. recombinant DNA technology). The inclusion of these types of 
codes for statistical purposes would seriously distort the resulting statistics by including 
data on a range of other organisms (i.e. humans, animals, etc.). We therefore focused on 
defining the classification as tightly as possible while seeking to ensure data capture for 
the majority of patents involving claims over PGR. 
Table 4.1 sets out the main classification codes deployed for information retrieval for 
patent statistics for the period 1900 to January 2012. 
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Table 4.1 Primary international patent classification codes for plant genetic 
resources
Classification code description level
A01H
New plants or processes for 
obtaining them; plant reproduction 
by tissue culture techniques
Sub-class
C07K14/415
Peptides having more than 20 
amino acids –from plants
Sub-group
C12N05/04
Undifferentiated human, animal of 
plant cells, e.g. cell lines; tissues, 
cultivation or maintenance thereof; 
culture media thereof – plant cells or 
tissues
Sub-group
C12N15/05
Mutation or genetic engineering – 
preparation of hybrid cells by fusion 
of two or more cells, e.g. protoplast 
fusion – plant cells
Sub-group
C12N15/29
Mutation or genetic engineering – 
genes encoding plant proteins, e.g. 
thaumatin
Sub-group
C12N15/82 Mutation or genetic engineering for plant cells Sub-group
Our research was limited to the main jurisdictions in the Thomson Innovation commercial 
patent database consisting of the United States, the EPO, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan. Wider work using PATSTAT is discussed 
below.
The Thomson Innovation specific query used was (A01H) OR (C07K0014415) OR 
(C12N000504) OR (C12N001505) OR (C12N001529) OR (C12N001582). The classification 
codes provided in the Table 4.1 can be adapted to meet the specific formatting requirements 
for querying other patent databases. 
At this exploratory stage of the research using Thomson Innovation we were able to 
identify a total of 89 912 documents for PGR as defined by the IPC Classification Codes 
provided above. 
4.2.2 Trends in the major patent jurisdictions
We began our analysis of the statistical context by focusing on results from Thomson 
Innovation using Vantage Point analytics software. This allows researchers to gain easy 
access to all the major patent data fields and to review thousands of documents in an 
efficient manner. 
We would emphasize that patent data requires considerable care in interpretation. As a 
starting point, it is important to note that raw US patent data from Thomson Innovation 
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includes data on US Plant Patents as a specific form of protection for plants in the United 
States that is distinct from utility patents. In Thomson Innovation these documents are 
generally labelled USPP, where the PP stands for Plant Patent, or with the kind code P (i.e. 
P1, P2, P3, P9). US Plant Patents typically involve only one claim over a specific plant variety 
and are dominated by ornamental plants.
A total of 21 795 US Plant Patent publications were identified in the data with 68 111 
documents identified as patent publications. For the purposes of this study we decided to 
simply exclude US Plant Patents from the analysis in the interest of methodological clarity. 
As with PVP, it remains to be seen whether the material claimed contains contributions 
from plant genetic material covered under the Multilateral System. Plant Patents are not 
further considered in this chapter.
Patent data can be counted in three primary ways: (i) first or ‘priority’ filings that can 
be measured using INPADOC first family member identifiers; (ii) patent publications of 
applications and grants, and; (iii) publications of linked applications and grants in the 
form of family members.1 Each of these types of counts provides an important layer of 
information in developing an understanding of activity for PGR. Counts by family members 
in Thomson Innovation are complicated by multiplier effects from combinations of records 
and data on family trends is therefore considered using PATSTAT. Table 4.2 illustrates the 
basic activity for PGR in the main jurisdictions using the INPADOC first family member (for 
International Patent Documentation Centre under the EPO) as the first filings. 
Table 4.2 Patent activity by publication authority, 1900 – Jan 2012
Publication authority InPAdoC first family Members 
(First filings) Publications main jurisdictions
EPO 6 400 13 146
EPO applications - 10 661
EPO grants - 2 485
France applications 1 425 1 459
Germany 2 056 2 477
Germany applications - 840
Germany European translations - 1 303
Germany grants - 334
Japan 7 401 10 906
Japan Applications - 7 964
Japan grants - 2 942
1   First filings were calculated by combining the 68 111 publications onto their respective 23 193 INPADOC first 
family members, which reduces the data to the earliest known filings. EPO and PCT (WO) filings are typically 
secondary filings except where applicants choose to file directly with the relevant offices.
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Publication authority InPAdoC first family Members 
UK applications 301 326
US 14 349 25 690
US applications - 12 672
US grants - 13 018
4.2.3 Trends in first filings
First filings of patent applications are commonly used as an indicator in economic studies 
because they are the closest in terms of time to the date of innovation of a claimed 
invention and research and development expenditure. The count of first filings presented 
in Figure 4.1 was developed by duplicating the 68 111 patent publications identified 
above onto their respective INPADOC First Family Member numbers. This has the effect 
of reducing the data to only the first (and earliest) filing in the data set. In total, excluding 
plant patents, we identified 23 193 first filings in the data. Data on first filings only refers 
to patent applications rather than subsequent grants. Figure 4.1 shows trends in first 
filings displayed by the priority year (year of first filing).
Figure 4.1 Patent trends by first filings, priority year
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Figure 4.1 only presents data from 1980 onwards with very limited activity traceable 
in the data back to the first record in 1907. This will typically involve documents that 
have been reclassified in subsequent years as the IPC system developed. A brief review 
of the titles of historic documents suggested that they were mainly concerned with 
methods and apparatus that relate to plants and agriculture. 
In considering Figure 4.1, it should be noted that activity for France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom is low, falling in the 100–200 filings mark and is therefore not 
displayed. In practice this low activity may reflect the use of regional and international 
instruments as the preferred route to pursuing patent rights by applicants from these 
countries. In the case of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), it should be noted that 
these applications are typically preceded by a first filing in a national office, and are 
shown here to demonstrate trends (measured on one publication only) in filings over 
time. 
On balance, and consistent with previous research, we observe an increasing trend 
in filings into the 1990s with activity levelling off and beginning to display a declining 
trend from 2000/01 onwards. In the United States, following significant growth until 
2000, the situation becomes unclear from 2001 onwards. In wider research, a decline 
in filing activity after 2000 and notably in 2001 has been interpreted as reflecting 
the bursting of the biotechnology bubble and the tightening of patent office rules 
regarding biotechnology patents (i.e. for Expressed Sequence Tags, or ESTs). Filings 
then staged a partial recovery before showing a decline in 2008 that is likely to reflect 
the financial crisis. Because of lag times in the availability of data on first filings (see 
below), the apparent decline into 2009 is likely to be exaggerated by a lack of data. 
However, a decline in filing trends is clearly visible in US filings prior to the onset of the 
data lag. 
With respect to PGR, it should be noted that patent data may also be susceptible to 
decisions by applicants on whether to pursue PVP or both plant variety protection and 
patent protection based on considerations of cost (notably for patent protection). In 
future research, it would be interesting to compare trends in patent activity with trends 
in filings for PVP to assess whether applicants decided to concentrate on PVP filings at 
the expense of patent filings during the financial crisis. 
With respect to the PCT (WO), patent trends are more significant than for any single 
patent office because they reflect demand for patent rights in more than one country. 
Under the PCT, an applicant submits a single patent application and then, within set 
time periods, makes decisions about which jurisdictions they wish to pursue protection 
in. This takes the form of regional/national level applications (referred to as ‘entering the 
regional/national phase’) at which point the application becomes a formal application 
in the member state and, if relevant fees are paid, may be examined and become a 
patent grant. As such, PCT documents are always applications and cannot themselves 
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be grants. What is clear in the PCT data is that after a period of growth in the 1990s, 
the number of filings had entered a trough and flattened out before showing signs of 
pick up in the late 2000s (see below). Data for the European Patent Convention (EPC) 
closely match the trends for the Patent Cooperation Treaty but appears to show a more 
radical decline than the PCT (WO).
Considerable care is required in interpreting data on first filings as it moves closer to 
the present day. The reason for this is that patent applications and grants are typically 
published two years after they are filed. As a result, there is a time lag factor of at least 
two years in filing data, which creates the impression of a radical downturn the closer 
we move to the present. For this reason, filing data are only shown until 2009, with 
a reporting effect that is probably observable for data for this year. Accurate data for 
this year will only become apparent when more data enter the system in future years. 
As highlighted in wider work by the OECD, this serves to illustrate that timeliness 
is a major issue in using patent data to develop indicators. To address this problem, 
organizations such as the OECD have developed ‘now casting’ methods that could 
potentially be applied in future analysis of trends for PGR. 
4.2.4 Publication trends
As an original application passes through the system en route to becoming a potential 
patent grant, it is republished. When viewed as a global system, the republication of 
patent documents introduces a radical multiplier effect into patent statistics. Thus, a 
single application may be published in a single country as an application, a divisional or 
continuation application, a grant or a grant with corrections. In the case of international 
and regional patent applications, the original application is typically republished with 
a search report. When an application moves into the regional or international system, 
this effect multiples in accordance with the number of countries involved and can be 
mapped using patent family data (see below). In the case of PGR, our 23 193 patent 
filings resulted in 68 111 patent publications in the main jurisdictions, suggesting that 
each original filing is published approximately 2.9 times.
The importance of patent publications is that they are publicly accessible and allow 
researchers to identify trends in applications and patent grants. Figure 4.2 sets out 
trends in patent publications for the individual countries and instruments. When 
comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2, note that the trends will be the same, but the peaks 
or troughs observable in Figure 4.1 for filing trends will typically appear two to three 
years later in Figure 4.2 on publications trends. Figure 4.3 breaks down the data for 
applications and grants.
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Figure 4.2 Patent publication trends by jurisdiction/instrument
Publication trends
        
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Patent trends by applications and grants
Applications trends
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In considering Figures 4.2 and 4.3 a number of important observations need to be 
made. 
First, prior to 2001, US Patents were only published when granted. From 2001 onwards, 
US patent documents were also published at the application and the grant stage in 
conformity with wider international practice. In order to distinguish patent applications 
and grants in the US data, patent publications prior to 2001 were reclassified as patent 
grants. The impact of the change to publishing patent applications and grants in the 
United States can be clearly seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. From 2001 onwards, there 
appears to be a radical spike in activity. This is, in fact, a reporting effect arising from 
the publication of applications rather than a dramatic increase in activity. In future 
work, it might be useful to ‘back cast’ US Patent application activity to minimize the 
impact of this reporting effect and to more accurately reflect US Patent activity for PGR 
in previous years. 
Second, in Germany, a very high proportion of activity is reported as translations of 
EPC documents originally submitted in English or French into German. Under the EPC, 
applications may be granted by the EPO, and then enter into the national phase of the 
procedure where they are examined prior to award of a grant. What is unclear in the 
case of translated documents is whether they enjoy status as grants or applications. 
For this reason they are maintained as a separate category in the data. Future work 
could clarify this issue by engaging with legal status codes in the patent data to clarify 
if translations have become grants in Germany or other European countries under the 
EPC. 
Third, Thomson Innovation data for certain jurisdictions, notably France and the United 
Kingdom, are confined to patent applications. In the case of the PCT administered by 
WIPO, applicants submit applications through one of the major offices or WIPO and 
subsequently make a decision about which countries they wish to pursue protection in. 
As such, and in contrast with the EPO, patent grants are not awarded under the PCT. 
4.2.5 Priority filing countries
Up until now we have focused on establishing patent trends by using the patent 
publication authority. However, under the 1883 Paris Convention and regional and 
international patent instruments, patent applications may pursue protection in more 
than one country. Thus, in the United States, in excess of 40 percent of patent 
applications are filed by non-nationals of the United States. Insight into the origins of 
patent filings is provided by information on priority countries (countries of origin of 
filings) in patent data. Table 4.3 sets out the priority countries for patent activity in the 
main jurisdictions.
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Table 4.3 Priority countries (first filings in major jurisdictions), 1980–2010
Rank Priority country Records Rank Priority country Records
1 United States of America 15 887 21 Austria 35
2 WIPO (PCT) 9 863 22 Finland 34
3 Japan 7 500 23 Hungary 28
4 European Patent Office 6 723 24 Taiwan 25
5 Germany 1 906 25 Belgium 12
6 France 538 26 Malaysia 20
7 United Kingdom 898 27 South Africa 19
8 Australia 307 28 Brazil 19
9 Italy 90 29 Russian Federation 9
10 Republic of Korea 245 30 Iceland 7
11 China 141 31 Singapore 7
12 Denmark 101 32
German Democratic Republic 
(GDR)
5
13 Spain 95 33 Mexico 6
14 Canada 92 34 Poland 6
15 India 89 35 Cuba 5
16 Netherlands 73 36 Czechoslovakia 1
17 Israel 67 37 Portugal 4
18 New Zealand 59 38 Colombia 3
19 Switzerland 36 39 Czech Republic 3
20 Sweden 40 40 Luxembourg 2
In interpreting Table 4.3, it is useful to break down the data to identify the filings 
originating from other countries in a single jurisdiction. In total, in the period between 
1980 and 2010, we identified 22 670 patent publications in the United States for PGR 
(excluding US plant patents). These publications originated from 12 679 first filings 
(INPADOC first family members).2 To calculate the origins of the filings, we combined the 
data onto the INPADOC first family members to reduce the data to the original filings. We 
focus here on data from the United States.   
Table 4.4 shows the top 20 countries/instruments of origin for patent publications for 
PGR in the United States. 
2   Minor variance in the total number of U.S. first family members (12 685) is observed in Table 4.4 compared 
with the total numbers of first family members (12 679). This may potentially arise from combinations of first 
family numbers. 
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Table 4.4 Priority countries in US Patent data for plant genetic resources, 1980–20103
Priority country US filings US grants US applications
United States of America 12 685 8 522 7 947
WIPO (PCT) 3 260 1 502 2 630
Japan 692 453 415
European Patent Office 597 242 489
United Kingdom 410 271 210
Germany 328 201 220
France 180 115 100
Australia 172 93 127
Republic of Korea 127 58 111
Canada 59 46 32
Denmark 56 18 47
Israel 42 29 19
India 41 17 34
Italy 40 18 27
Netherlands 37 31 13
China 33 20 26
New Zealand 31 20 20
Spain 31 19 23
Switzerland 21 18 5
Sweden 20 13 14
In interpreting Table 4.4, it is important to note that references to the PCT as a priority 
refer to applications that enter a country through the PCT route, i.e. filed nationally or 
regionally and subsequently through the PCT for wider protection in multiple countries.
4.2.6 Patent applicants
Patent applicants (assignees) can be ranked using a variety of measures. However, it is 
important to note that patent applicant data are affected by the use of multiple variant 
spellings of names and subsidiaries that affects the status of the rankings. Cleaning patent 
applicant data is thus a significant issue in the development of statistics. Previous work to 
engage in large-scale assignee name cleaning has demonstrated that the effect of cleaning 
measures is to reinforce the position of top ranking applicants and to adjust the relative 
3   A first filing may be published more than once (i.e. as an application and grant) or subdivided into separate 
applications. Therefore the US grants and US applications figures will be higher than the number of filings 
linked to a particular country/instrument. 
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rankings. In future work on patent statistics for PGR, we propose that analysis should use the 
EEE-PPAT patent harmonized names list developed by Eurostat and the Catholic University of 
Leuven, and we illustrate this approach below for global PATSTAT data and Annex 1.4 
In order to develop an indicative list to inform validation of the wider research, we engaged 
in basic cleaning of assignee names by using the Thomson Innovation long names approach. 
Thomson Innovation long names include codes that seek to identify common assignees that 
display multiple spellings and allow a means to exclude individuals. We excluded individuals 
using this approach and then grouped assignees names based on co-occurrence with an 
INPADOC first filing number. This approach captures and groups the majority of variant 
names. The top results are provided in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Top patent assignees (major jurisdictions, publication counts)
Rank Assignee 1980–2010
1 Pioneer Hi-Bred Int Inc (Du Pont) 4 265
2 Monsanto Technology LLC 4 127
3 E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company 1 941
4 Syngenta Participations AG 1 890
5 Basf Plant Sci Gmbh 1 618
6 Bayer Cropscience Gmbh 940
7 Univ California 823
8 Novartis AG 731
9 Stine Seed Farm Inc. 716
10 Calgene LLC 628
11 Zeneca Ltd. 624
12 Dokuritsu Gyosei Hojin Nogyo Seibutsu SH 586
13 Aventis Cropscience N.V. 565
14 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 483
15 Dow Agrosciences LLC 454
16 Bayer Bioscience N.V. 437
17 Cornell Research Foundation Inc. 429
18 Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science (German: Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e. V)
415
19 Cropdesign N.V. 408
20 Hoechst-Schering Agrevo Gmbh 408
Table 4.5 presents the top 20 of the 5 365 patent assignees identified in the Thomson 
Innovation data. The top rankings in terms of activity are what would be expected within 
the agricultural sector. However, it is also apparent that additional work is desirable to identify 
4   See Du Plessis et al., 2009; Magerman et al., 2009; Peeters et al., 2009.
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company and organizational ownership. Thus, Du Pont acquired Pioneer Hi-Bred in 1999 and 
will rise to the top of the rankings if this acquisition is taken into account.5 In addition, the 
profile for the sector could shift if rankings were measured on, inter alia, patent grants and 
patents in force. Future work would ideally include analysis of company ownership and also 
examine institutional types (i.e. companies and universities) based on the standardized tables 
developed by EEE-PPAT for use with the World Patent Statistical Database. 
Having demonstrated that it is possible to define PGR within the patent system and then 
move into the analysis of statistical trends within the main patent jurisdictions, we now 
move to the analysis of global level trends using the EPO World Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT) to gain a fuller picture. 
4.2.7 The global picture
The analysis of patent activity in this chapter has focused on the use of Thomson Innovation 
data and will be discussed in more detail below in relation to the Treaty. However, it 
is important to highlight that the international standard for the generation of patent 
statistics is the PATSTAT, which enables the generation of global statistics based on the 
DOCDB database of world patent data of the EPO. The limitation of PATSTAT compared 
with Thomson Innovation is that data are confined to the information on the front page 
of patent documents and text information is limited to the titles and abstracts. As we will 
see, this is an important limitation when seeking to identify plant genetic material under 
the Multilateral System with precision.  
We briefly demonstrate this wider worldwide data using the October 2011 edition of 
PATSTAT using the same IPC criteria provided in Table 4.1. 
4.2.8 Global trends
In interpreting this data, priority applications refers to the number of first filings (documents 
are counted only once). The availability of priority data decreases from 2008 onwards. 
Families refers to counts of the number of patent families based on INPADOC data. Counts 
of Main trends refers to counts of patent publications.
In total, across all years, we identified 43 288 priority filings, 34 830 patent families, 
124 921 publications, and 136 030 family members based on the IPC definition for PGR.6 
In the period 1980–2010, we identified 40 970 first filings belonging to 32 391 patent 
families, 116 795 patent publications and 131 505 family members worldwide. 
5   One limitation in taking into account mergers and acquisitions is that a company patent portfolio may be sold off 
or transferred in part to other companies. It cannot therefore simply be assumed that a patent portfolio is simply 
transferred wholesale to the new owners; this would require detailed analysis of data on patent reassignments.
6   The total numbers of global publications and the total number of family members should exactly match. In 
practice, calculation of global family members in PATSTAT is affected by ‘artificial priorities’. Typically, artificial 
priorities arise from US provisional applications (priority filings that are not published and are thus artificial). In 
addition, artificial priorities arise from the loss of connection to a priority filing and year data that are grouped 
into the ‘900’ identifier series in PATSTAT. For this reason, we focus only on total calculable publications. 
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4.2.7.2 Priority filing countries 
Table 4.6 repeats the exercise in identifying the priority countries of filing using PATSTAT 
across all years from 1907 as the data source. This immediately makes it clear that China, 
which ranks 16th as the country of priority in the main jurisdictions, rises to second place 
above Japan. This reflects a wider trend in which residents of China are pursuing patent 
protection across a range of sectors. However, patent applicants are primarily filed at the 
national level and do not presently have much impact on international activity compared 
with other countries such as Japan. The rise of Hungary in the overall rankings may require 
further investigation and, as with the Russian Federation, may reflect historic rather than 
recent patent activity.  
Table 4.6 Priority countries by priority filings (PATSTAT 1907–2011)
Priority country first filings
United States 17 656
China 6 130
Japan 5 154
European Patent Convention 1 866
        
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Global trends, 1980–2010 (PATSTAT, Oct. 2011)
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Priority country first filings
Hungary 1 616
Republic of Korea 1 381
France 1 229
Russian Federation 1 603
United Kingdom 1 038
Germany 945
Australia 878
Bulgaria 774
Romania 460
Spain 230
Italy 208
Canada 206
Belgium 200
Morocco 186
Denmark 151
Ukraine 143
United States 17 656
China 6 130
Japan 5 154
4.2.7.3 Publication countries (PATSTAT, 1907–2011)
Table 4.7 provides data on the main publication countries involved in patent activity for 
PGR.
Table 4.7 Publication countries (PATSTAT, 1907–2011)
Publication country Publications
United States 24 086
PCT 13 517
European Patent Convention 12 383
China 11 605
Japan 10 942
Australia 10 364
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Publication country Publications
Canada 6 420
Hungary 5 009
Germany 4 456
Republic of Korea 2 196
France 1 882
Austria 1 861
Brazil 1 809
Spain 1 784
United Kingdom 1 147
Russian Federation 2 111
Mexico 1 119
Israel 1 069
New Zealand 1 033
United States 24 086
PCT 13 517
Table 4.8 sets out the top patent assignees in global data on PGR from PATSTAT. In 
contrast with Thomson Innovation data, patent names have been harmonized using EEE-
PPAT. This pattern confirms the prominence of DuPont (including Pioneer), Monsanto, 
Syngenta and BASF Plant Science. However, it also raises the profile of universities such as 
the University of California and Cornell, together with companies involved in other sectors 
and national research organizations, such as the CSIR (Australia), the National Institute of 
Agrobiological Sciences, and the National Research Council of Canada.
Table 4.8 Top patent assignees for plant genetic resources (PATSTAT 1907–2011)
Assignee Publications
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Du Pont) 7 063
Monsanto 5 883
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company 3 087
Syngenta 2 619
Basf Plant Science Gmbh 2 326
Regents of the University Of California 1 322
Calgene Llc 975
Bayer Cropscience 941
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Assignee Publications
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 904
Cropdesign N.V. 820
Zeneca Limited 807
Stine Seed Farm, Inc. 746
Bayer Bioscience 739
Dow Agrosciences LLC 723
Cornell Research Foundation, Inc. 717
Novartis AG 676
Japan Tobacco Inc. 651
National Institute of Agrobiological Sciences 641
Ciba-Geigy 623
Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie 582
Institut national de la recherche agronomique 553
Weyerhaeuser Company 551
Icon Genetics Gmbh 513
Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc. 498
BASF AG 460
Mycogen Cororation 440
Biogemma UK 434
Consejo Superior De Investigaciones Cientificas 429
Ceres, Inc. 428
Plant Bioscience Limited 417
Novozymes 410
Dekalb Genetics Coporation 377
North Carolina State University 372
Mogen International N.V. 367
Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) 350
Washington State University Research Foundation 348
Cargill, Incorporated 333
National Research Council of Canada 330
Limagrain Genetics Grandes Cultures S.A. 329
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Du Pont) 7 063
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Assignee Publications
Monsanto 5 883
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company 3 087
Syngenta 2 619
Basf Plant Science Gmbh 2 326
Regents of the University of California 1 322
Calgene LLC 975
Bayer Cropscience 941
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization 904
Cropdesign N.V. 820
4.2.9 Conclusion
In this section, we have focused on elaborating the statistical context for patent activity 
for PGR. Any future work in this area would ideally focus on refining this approach and in 
particular, the analysis of the structure of corporate ownership of patent assignees. 
The main outcome of this analysis is the elucidation of statistics on trends based on an 
IPC definition of PGR. In approaching the definition of PGR, we deliberately adopted a 
conservative approach that only includes the IPCs that explicitly make reference to plants. 
On a more advanced level, the data provided above could be expanded to include legal 
status data to determine the number of patents in force at a given time and the degradation 
curve in the maintenance of patents. Furthermore, legal status data could provide the 
basis for empirical analysis of patent licensing practices in this field. Specifically, patent 
data could be used to identify cases of the transfer of rights or issuance of a licence, which 
could be followed by qualitative research with companies and universities to map out the 
structure and dynamics of activity linked to licensing. 
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4.3 Patent informatics and Annex 1 species
4.3.1 Introduction
The discussion of patent statistics presented above provides an overview of the global 
context of patent activity for PGR. We now turn to the species and genera falling within 
Annex 1 of the Plant Treaty. 
The main methodological challenge in identifying Annex 1 species and genera in the 
patent system is that the IPC does not provide further guidance on the types of species 
appearing in patent documents. This is a possible area where cooperation could be sought 
from WIPO and the EPO (as the custodian of the world’s patent information) in order 
to meet the information needs of Contracting Parties and organizations concerned with 
trends in activity for PGR. Specifically, we recommend consideration of the use of ‘tagging’ 
patent documents for relevant genera under Annex 1 based on the experience of the 
EPO with introducing tags for nanotechnology and climate change-related technologies. 
This informal approach could provide an important first step towards meeting patent 
information needs under the Plant Treaty.  
In order to examine the presence of PGR covered by Annex 1 in patent data, we used 
advanced text mining techniques, which will be discussed in this section, focusing on 
three issues:
•	 identification of Annex 1 species and genera;
•	 the problem of common names in patent data on PGR;
•	 experimental work in searching for CGIAR Centre names and plant variety names 
and codes. 
4.3.2 Species and genera
Annex 1 of the Plant Treaty covers 64 basic genera and associated species, with some 
explicit exclusions and inclusions; however, some of the categories within Annex 1 include 
multiple genera. Thus, the Brassica complex consists of 13 distinct genera, which brings 
the total to 76 genera, while the Major aroids category (two genera) increases genera 
covered to 77. Wheat includes three genera (Agropyron, Elymus and Secale), which 
increases the genera count to 79. 
In some cases, a genus covered under the Treaty covers only one representative (i.e. 
breadfruit is confined to Artocarpus altilis), while in other cases, i.e. the Brassica complex, 
many hundreds of species may be involved. In other categories under Annex 1, specific 
species may be excluded, e.g. Lepidium meyenii in the case of the Brassica complex and 
Zea perennis, in the case of wheat. The structure of the Annex 1 therefore requires careful 
attention in preparing for the identification of species in patent documents. 
As noted above, there is growing demand for patent information on biological organisms 
across a spectrum of international policy instruments and debates. In response to this, in 
2011, with support from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) the authors 
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of this chapter initiated the creation of an index of species appearing in patent data. This 
involved acquiring the whole texts of the United States patent collection, the European 
Patent collection and the PCT (WO) collection, totalling 11 million patent documents. 
With the kind assistance of the Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) and the 
Encyclopedia of Life (EOL), the authors were provided with access to the world’s major 
taxonomic backbone consisting of 19 million records of species names, including multiple 
spellings that resolve to a list of six million species names. 
Using computational pattern matching algorithms developed by Dr. Stephen Hall, the 
corpus of 11 million patent documents was searched for the six million species names 
using Lancaster University’s High End Computing (HEC) facility. The HEC consists of 1 700 
computer processing cores running in parallel and is ideal for large-scale text searching 
of the type described here. In order to respond to the emerging demand for patent 
information in the field of genetic resources, the outputs of the searches are collated into 
an index. 
As part of the present research, all genera and species falling under Annex 1 of the Plant 
Treaty (taking into account explicit inclusions and exclusions) were identified. The results 
were then compiled into a distinct Plant Treaty Index. This approach was based exclusively 
on the appearance of Latin names in the texts of patent documents. Issues involving the 
use of common names in this sector are discussed in further detail below. 
Our approach also involved distinguishing the appearance of Latin species names 
in either the title, abstract, description and claims sections of patent documents. This 
distinction is important because the appearance of a species name in the title, abstract or 
claims section of a patent document is a strong indicator that the patent fundamentally 
concerns that species or its genetic components. In contrast, a species name may appear 
in the description section for a variety of reasons either as a direct focus of a claimed 
invention, as a passing comparative reference, or in cited literature. We therefore focus 
primarily on the results in either the title, abstract or the claims, with a particular focus on 
the claims. 
Figure 4.5 sets out the top results for Annex 1 species names appearing in patent 
documents. These data are not constrained by IPC codes and therefore refer to all areas 
of technology in the patent system that make reference to an Annex 1 species. Figure 4.6 
breaks out the data to display the relevant sub-species captured during the search. Here, 
we would note that grouping is based on GBIF data and includes variant species names. 
For each species we have also been able to break down the data by the overall number of 
publications from the selected jurisdictions that contain the species name and the number 
of occurrences of the species names in the claims. This provides a useful indicator of the 
intensity of references to a particular species within the document set and, in particular, 
the intensity of claims around a particular species. 
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Figure 4.5 Top Plant Treaty species (Latin names only) 
        
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Top Plant Treaty species breakout (Latin names only)
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As we will see below, in practice, it is desirable to include common names in the search 
criteria to generate a fuller view. However, for the present, this approach demonstrates 
that it is possible to identify species-level activity for Annex 1 within the texts of patent 
documents. Figure 4.7 breaks out the data to demonstrate trends over time for applications 
and grants. To generate this data, patent document, kind code A has been used to indicate 
trends in applications (blue) and kind code B has been used for the measurement of 
grants. Due to the varying uses of kind codes, some further work would be desirable to 
clean these data. Nevertheless, they provide a useful demonstration of trends in activity 
by species over time. 
The analysis of patent activity for Annex 1 species by Latin names also allows for the 
identification of patent assignees. This data have been harmonized using the EEE-PPAT 
table discussed above, but no attempt has been made to group data based on corporate 
ownership. Figure 4.8 shows the data for top assignees. 
        
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Patent trends for top Annex 1 species (Latin names only)
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In considering Figure 4.8, as we might expect, the top patent assignees closely 
match the top assignees for the IPC-based statistics presented above. However, we 
would note that the index presently only includes patent data from the United States, 
the EPC and the PCT. While capturing the most important patent documents, the 
approach could usefully be extended to other collections if they are available in whole 
text form. 
Furthermore, and in contrast with the Thomson Innovation data, the assignee list 
presented above has been cleaned using the harmonized patent assignee data developed 
by the ECOOM-Eurostat-EPO PATSTAT Person Augmented Table (EEE-PPAT) project (EEE-
PPAT 2011 edition).7 This project developed harmonization methods for millions of assignee 
names within patent data and provides the most complete data available for assignees. 
However, we would once again emphasize that no attempt has been made to harmonize 
patent data based on the ownership structure of the companies involved (for example, 
Pioneer Hi-Bred is owned by Du Pont). We would also note that additional name cleaning 
is likely to be desirable in this sector to improve the accuracy of data capture beyond the 
advances made by EEE-PPAT. 
7   See Du Plessis et al., 2009; Magerman et al., 2009; Peeters et al., 2009.
Figure 4.8 Top patent assignees for Annex 1 species
        
 
 
 
 
Top assignees
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The most important constraint with the indexing approach to date is the use of Latin 
species names. The use of common names in patent documents for species under Annex 1 
is discussed below. 
4.3.3 Addressing common names in patent data
Up until now, we have elucidated statistics for plant agriculture using two approaches: 
the first depends on the use of IPC codes and is useful for developing statistics on overall 
activity; and the second used large-scale text mining for Latin species names and allows for 
the identification of species and trends by species falling within Annex 1 of the Plant Treaty. 
However, a limitation of this approach is that it only focuses on the use of Latin species 
names in patent documents. In the case of plant agriculture, this is a significant problem 
because, for common crops, patent applicants frequently use common names such 
as potato, corn/maize and rice, including in relation to varieties involved in a claimed 
invention. 
Data capture could be addressed by simply introducing the common names into searches. 
However, this creates ‘the potato problem’, where patent applicants may be claiming 
potato chips, potato peelers or cookers, and so on. While a partial solution is provided 
by restricting searches to specific areas of the IPC (i.e. exclusion of kitchen equipment), 
the problem of precision remains for cases where an applicant makes a claim over plant 
genetic material using a common name rather than a species name.
In order to identify possible solutions to this problem, we returned to the original 
patent collection from Thomson Innovation based on the IPC definition for PGR provided 
above. This time, however, the focus is on the claims section of the patent documents 
using Vantage Point text mining and natural language processing software from Search 
Technology Inc. in the United States. The aim was to clarify the extent to which applicants 
for PGR were using common names in the claims section of patent documents compared 
with the use of Latin species names. 
Within the dataset of 71 496 patent documents, a total of 47 183 claims were available 
for 67 percent of the documents within the dataset. Table 4.9 shows the results of searches 
of 1 328 982 words and phrases appearing in the claims by Latin genus name, and English 
common name for the comparison of data capture.
Table 4.9 Testing data capture for species and common names in patent claim
term latin name Common name Variance
Zea/maize/corn 1 682 11 533 14.58% (85.42)
Triticum/wheat 596 5 917 10.07% (89.93)
Oryza/rice 991 6 904 14.35% (85.65)
Table 4.9 reveals that the variance between data capture on Latin names and common 
names within the claims section of the dataset is very significant in terms of the loss of 
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data capture. In essence, patent applicants in this area of technology more frequently 
use common names in the claims section of patent documents than Latin names. In our 
experience with patent data, this is distinctive in the agriculture sector. 
To address this problem, we identified known English common names for Annex 1 
species with a view to conducting additional searches using High-End Computing to 
improve data capture. 
A major consideration in conducting these searches was a need to minimize noise. As 
noted above, common names such as potato or rice may appear in patent documents 
across a spectrum of technologies (i.e. potato fryers, potato peelers, rice cookers) or 
appear as part of other names (i.e. potato mosaic virus) that do not refer to or involve the 
target species as a plant genetic resource. In short, the use of common names poses the 
risk of very large numbers of irrelevant results. 
To control for this problem, the searches for common names were restricted in two ways: 
•	 We limited the searches to the IPC-based definition of PGR identified at the 
beginning of this chapter. The aim here was to remove the danger of including 
equipment and apparatus for preparing the target species and other areas of 
science and technology involving the species (i.e. cosmetics) except where these 
areas of technology are specifically linked to the IPC based definition.  
•	 We focused on the results from the Titles, Abstracts and Claims of the patent 
documents. This has the effect of including only those documents that are in a 
fundamental sense about these species. 
4.3.4 Results
The results of this exercise were then incorporated into ABSPAT. In incorporating the results 
of common names searches into Annex 1 we decided that the most sensible approach 
was to group the common names under the accepted scientific name. In one case, beans, 
this did not prove possible because this single common name is associated with a large 
number of species. This exposes some of the challenges involved in using common names. 
Table 4.10 shows the top results from this exercise including the grouping of common 
names onto their respective accepted Latin name. 
What can immediately be seen is that the results for Zea mays, Oryza sativa and Brassica 
napus, among others, increase dramatically. Specifically, the impact of the use of common 
names in the claims section of patent documents becomes apparent in the data. As such, 
any future work on patent activity for PGR should recognize the importance of including 
both Latin names and common names in search criteria and adopting appropriate controls 
to limit the data to PGR as provided by the IPC definition in this chapter. 
Figure 4.9 shows a summary of the top results for Annex 1 species including the results 
of common name searches aggregated on the accepted scientific name. As noted above, 
the category ‘beans’ is presently ambiguous and requires further work. Furthermore, we 
believe that while the restrictions adopted by common name are reasonable, further work 
may be required to remove noise in the results.
However, it is immediately clear from this analysis that the bulk of references to major 
IdentIfyIng BenefIt flowS 
188 Equity and food for all
Annex 1 species such as Zea mays and Oryza sativa are in fact occupied by common 
names appearing in the claims section of patent documents. Figure 4.10 shows the results 
aggregated onto the scientific name including the unresolved name beans (undefined) 
and references to species within a genus (i.e. citrus spp.).
Figure 4.11 shows the trends in patent publications over time for Annex 1 species and 
associated common names. Figures 4.12 to 4.15 demonstrate that it is also possible to 
break down the data on patent assignees by their corresponding sectors using the sector 
allocations within EEE-PPAT. This approach has the considerable advantage of allowing 
policy makers to examine the different types of organization involved in research and 
development resulting in patent activity for PGR.
Figure 4.9 Top species including common names in titles, abstract and claims using the IPC 
definition of plant genetic resources         
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Figure 4.10 shows the top results by species grouped under the scientific name.
Figure 4.10 Top species including common names
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Figure 4.11 Patent publication trends by applications and grants (including common names)
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Figure 4.12 Top assignees (all) ranked by claims
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Figure 4.13 Top assignees (companies) ranked by claims
Top assignees
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Figure 4.14 Top assignees (universities) ranked by claims
        
 
 
 
 
Top assignees
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4.3.5 Conclusion
In this section, we have demonstrated that it is possible to identify patent trends for 
PGR falling within Annex 1 of the Plant Treaty using large-scale text mining techniques. 
We have further demonstrated that in this particular sector, patent applicants are more 
likely to use common names for species than Latin names in constructing their claims. 
To address this problem we engaged in additional searches for common names and 
restricted the results to the IPC definition of PGR and the title, abstract and claims of 
patent documents. This combined approach takes us much closer than has previously 
been possible to a full picture of patent activity for Annex 1 species and genera. 
In addition, in closing this discussion we have demonstrated that advances in the 
Figure 4.15 Top assignees (government non-profit) ranked by claims
        
 
 
 
 
Top assignees
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harmonization of patent assignee names have made it possible to arrive at a detailed 
breakdown of organizations by sector of activity. We believe that this is an important 
advance because it could allow future research to target particular sectors of activity 
engaged in patent activity on genetic resources such as universities. Analysis of co-
patenting activity between companies and other organizations might also allow for 
the mapping of networks of relationships between patent applicants to provide a 
fuller picture of research and development for PGR. In particular, this may provide 
a way forward in mapping networks of linkages between organizations accessing 
public collections and the research and development chain. In the final section of this 
chapter, we provide an illustration of network mapping using the scientific literature 
that illustrates the feasibility of this approach. 
As highlighted above, further research is desirable to refine patent analysis using 
common names. Taking into account the data provided above, a fruitful way forward 
in making patent information available to policy makers would be to explore the 
possibility of tagging patents of direct relevance to the Plant Treaty in patent databases 
using informal classification codes following the approach pioneered by the EPO. 
Given that Annex 1 covers very large numbers of species, this approach could focus 
on tagging genera while taking into account issues around common names and the 
specific inclusions and exclusions of species in Annex 1.  
4.4 Plant genetic resource collections and informatics
4.4.1 Introduction
In this section we briefly discuss approaches to text mining patent data to scope out 
available information on PGR appearing in patent data that may originate from the 
multilateral system. We also discuss searches in relation to plant breeders’ rights (PBR) 
in patent documents. Finally, we discuss the development of additional software tools to 
complement the existing International Crop Information System (ICIS) system by facilitating 
large-scale extraction and analysis of the parentage of plant varieties.
4.4.2 Text mining for collections and related bodies: preliminary results
To test for information on the potential contribution of CGIAR Centres and treaty bodies 
to innovations in the patent system, we conducted a series of searches in the main patent 
jurisdictions using the Thomson Innovation commercial patent database. The search terms 
and search results counted on the number of patent publications, and the original filings 
(INPADOC filings) to which they belong are show in Table 4.10.
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Table 4.10 Text searches in Thomson Innovation for collections and related terms
Search query
Publications (major 
jurisdictions)
InPAdoC 
families
Accession 178 805 +30 041
"Africa Rice Center" or "Africa Rice Centre" 0 0
"Bioversity International" 0 0
CIAT OR Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical 863 823
"CIFOR" OR "Center for International Forestry Research" 38 37
"CIMMYT" OR "Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y 
Trigo" OR "International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center" 
OR "International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre"
269 131
["CIP" OR "Centro Internacional de la Papa" OR "International 
Potato Center" OR "International Potato Centre"]
[45 555] [+22 312]
"Centro Internacional de la Papa" OR "International Potato Center" 
OR "International Potato Centre"
33 14
"ICARDA" OR "International Center for Agricultural Research in the 
Dry Areas" OR "International Center for Agricultural Research in 
Dry Areas" OR "International Centre for Agricultural Research in the 
Dry Areas" OR "International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry 
Areas"
2 1
"ICRISAT" OR "International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics" OR "International Crops Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics"
41 22
IFPRI OR International Food Policy Research Institute 41 19
"IITA" OR "International Institute of Tropical Agriculture" 2 273 1 585
"ILRI" OR "International Livestock Research Institute" 279 263
"International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture" OR "plant treaty"
0 0
"IRRI" OR "International Rice Research Institute" 2 210 1 925
"IWMI" OR "International Water Management Institute" 58 45
“ICRAF” OR “World Agroforestry Centre” OR “World Agroforestry 
Center”
6 6
"Worldfish center" or "world fish center" or "worldfish centre" or 
"world fish centre"
0 0
"CGIAR" OR "Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research"
14 7
other Art 15 Bodies
"Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center" or 
"Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Centre"
0 0
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Search query
Publications (major 
jurisdictions)
InPAdoC 
families
"International Coconut Genebank for African and the Indian Ocean" 
OR "International Coconut Genebank for African and the Indian 
Ocean" OR "International Coconut Gene bank for Africa and the 
Indian Ocean" OR "International Coconut Gene bank for Africa and 
the Indian Ocean"
0 0
"International Coconut Genebank for the South Pacific" or 
"International Coconut Gene bank for the South Pacific"
0 0
"Mutant Germplasm Repository of the FAO/IAEA Joint Division" 0 0
"International Cocoa Genebank" OR "International Cocoa Gene 
bank"
0 0
"CEPACT" OR "Centre for Pacific Crops and Trees" 0 0
potato park no valid no valid
AFSA OR Association Française des Semences de céréales à paille et 
autres espèces Autogames
153 69
Table 4.10 reveals that there are a limited number of references to the search terms 
with respect to CGIAR and related centres. With respect to the International Potato 
Centre, the results are very heavily affected by noise on the term ‘CIP’. The results for 
the Potato Centre are included purely for the purpose of illustrating the problem of 
noisy terms, rather than as an indicator of actual activity. In the absence of carefully 
standardized terms such as distinctive institutional codes, this type of problem will 
repeatedly be encountered in research on patent activity.  
To examine the data in more detail, the whole texts of the corresponding patent 
documents were exported for analysis in Wordsmith Corpus Linguistics software. This 
allows a term of interest, such as CGIAR, to be identified in a document together with 
the sentence of which if forms a part. The results are known as a concordance. 
We tested a number of the resulting datasets to assess levels of data capture and 
noise. Typically, as in the case of CIP, we encountered significant numbers of irrelevant 
results on acronyms resulting from the presence of machine code in the texts (i.e. IRRI 
produced results for ‘irri-tation’ owing to the presence of the hyphen in the text). In 
other cases, an abbreviation referred to either a mechanical or chemical process that 
was not relevant to plant agriculture. The second largest group of results was made 
up of references to scientific literature either published by, or involving, researchers 
from a particular research centre. The frequency of references to scientific literature 
from CGIAR Centres or researchers at the CGIAR is a potentially important finding 
in revealing the contribution of these Centres to trends in research and innovation in 
agriculture. 
In the following pages, we provide samples of concordances from some of the results 
to give an idea of the references. 
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Concordance sample for CGIAR
1 In 1993, the Consultant group on International Agricultural Research (CgIAR) 
suggested that increasing the mineral uptake of plants could be used to 
address the problems associated with deficiency of zinc and other nutrients 
(Ruel and Bouis, 1998). 
2 ...on all types of productive soils will be enormous (McCalla A (1994) Agriculture and 
Food Needs to 2025: why we should be concerned, Sir John Crowford Memorial 
lecture, washington dC, Secretariat, Consultative group on International 
Agricultural Research (CIgAR) c/o the world Bank; Leach G (1995) Global land 
and food in the twenty-first century, Trends and issues for sustainability, SEI, Polestar 5, 
p
3  ....developing a transgenic potato resistant to Ralstonia. However, such a product 
has not yet been developed, and even if developed, public acceptance of such a 
product cannot be predicted. Although the Consultative group on International 
Agricultural Research has recently concluded that appropriate chemical control 
measures that are practical and effective do not exist, U.S. Pat. no. 6,015,830 
to M
4  ...the U.S. the third largest exporter worldwide. Approximately 99 of the rice 
varieties currently grown are the result of public breeding programmes, many 
originating from breeding programmes sponsored by CgIAR international 
research centres such as International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and 
International Center for tropical Agriculture (CIAt). The majority of U.S. rice 
varieties are developed...
Concordance sample for the International Rice Research Institute
1 the reverse drooping flag leaf character can be introduced into the perennial 
female fertile male sterile seed parent by crossing with RgS20, which is 
publicly available from IRRI (Philippines). The reverse drooping flag leaf character 
is particularly suited for use with perennial female fertile male sterile rice plants which 
possess genetic male sterility since such trait has been found capable of being closely 
linked with such male sterility and is further useful as a marker during the initial 
establishment of such male sterile plants as discussed hereafter. pn  - US5304722A 
pad  - RING AROUND PRODUCTS INC tie  - Hybrid rice production utilizing perennial 
male sterile rice plants
2 Biological material: the biological material used are the two parental lines 
(samples IR20 and 6383) from a f2 population of Rice. the parental lines 
were acquired from the IRRI in the Philippines. ad  - KEYGENE NV tie  - METHOD 
FOR GENERATING OLIGONUCLEOTIDES, IN PARTICULAR FOR THE DETECTION OF 
AMPLIFIED RESTRICTION FRAGMENTS OBTAINED USING AFLP
3 However, resistance breaking biotypes have developed in some localities to the extent 
that local rice production is threatened. As fast as new BPH resistant varieties 
come out of the IRRI programme, new resistance breaking biotypes of the 
insect evolve. There is thus a continuous need for novel sources of BPH resistance 
genes to incorporate into the breeding programme.... Genetic engineering may make 
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a useful contribution here since it allows genes encoding insecticidal proteins to be 
inserted into elite lines of crop plants in a single step irrespective of the natural source 
of the protein or its ability to cross-breed with the host. EP600993B1. NOVARTIS AG. 
tie  – PROTEINS WITH INSECTICIDAL PROPERTIES AGAINST HOMOPTERAN INSECTS 
AND THEIR USE IN PLANT PROTECTION
4 Plant materials and growth. the f1 hybrid seeds of 78-1-5 BC2f3 and IR24 were 
obtained from the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) (R. Nelson and 
G. Khush). Plants of 78-1-5 DC2F3 were derived from a cross between O. sativa 
cv IR31917-45-3-2 and O. minuta Acc. 10141 (Amante-Bordeos et al. 1992). pn  - 
US20060143734A1 pad  - TEMASEK LIFE SCIENCES LABOATOR. tie  - Nucleic acids 
from rice conferring resistance to bacterial blight disease caused by xanthomonas spp. 
What is claimed is: 1. An isolated nucleic acid sequence comprising SEQ ID NO: 1 or an 
isolated nucleic acid comprising a polynucleotide sequence of greater than about fifty 
nucleotides which hybridizes under stringent conditions to SEQ ID NO:1 and provides 
a plant with resistance to Xanthomonas when transfected into the plant. 
Concordance sample for CIMMYT and ICRISAT
1 EXAMPLE 8 Wheat Regeneration. Immature embryos were isolated from seeds of 
the wheat Triticum aestivium S-5704 (CIMMYT 1981) when they were 1.0-2.0 mm 
in length, in the same procedure as described for barley in Example 3. The embryos 
were plated onto callus induction medium C having 3 mg/l 2,4-D, 2 mg/l NAA and 
2 mg/l IBA, and cultured in the light for 20 days.... This procedure was repeated for 
immature embryos isolated from Triticum aestivium S-5829 (CIMMYT 1981) and 
Triticum aestivium S-6006 (CIMMYT 1981). Plants were obtained in each instance. 
pn - US4666844A. pa - Sungene Technologies Corporation, Palo Alto, CA, US. ti - 
Process for regenerating cereals. What is claimed is: 1. A process for regenerating 
cereal plantlets from cell or tissue culture which comprises the steps of: (a) culturing 
tissue obtained from a cereal plant selected from the group consisting of barley, corn 
which is capable of being regenerated on medium containing 2,4-D, wheat, rice and 
sorghum on a callus induction medium comprising mineral salts, vitamins, sucrose 
and a hormone selected from the group consisting of (A) 2,4-D, (B) a mixture of 
2,4-D and IAA, (C) a mixture of 2,4-D, NAA and IBA, and (D) a mixture of 2,4-D, 
IAA and NAA, in an amount sufficient to insure callus formation; (b) culturing said 
callus on a series of media for differentiation, said series comprises utilizing one to 
four media selected from the group consisting of medium 1, medium 2, medium 3, 
medium 4 and medium 5, each medium comprises mineral salts, vitamins, sucrose and 
a hormone in an amount sufficient to insure differentiation to plantlets having shoots 
and roots after culturing on said series, said hormone of medium 1 comprising 2,4-D 
and coconut milk, of medium 2 comprising IBA and BA, of medium 3 comprising 2,4-
D, GA3, BA and coconut milk, of medium 4 comprising 2,4-D, BA and coconut milk, 
and of medium 5 comprising the hormone of said callus induction medium, with the 
proviso that medium 5 alone is not said series when the tissue is from wheat or corn 
wherein medium 1 is capable of enhancing proliferation of embryogenic callus tissue 
and sustaining donor tissue, medium 2 is capable of separating embryogenic tissue 
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into a loose mass and enhancing differentiation of somatic embryoids or morphogenic 
structures, medium 3 is capable of promoting shoot and root formation from somatic 
embryoids, medium 4 is capable of promoting differentiation to shoots and roots from 
morphogenic callus and medium 5 is capable of promoting plantlet formation; and (c) 
culturing said plantlets on an establishment medium comprising mineral salts, vitamins 
and sucrose, whereby plants are obtained capable of growth in soil.
2 Sexual.sup.b ICRISAT (IP8627) pn - US5811636A pa - The United States of America 
as represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, Washington, DC, US. ti - Apomixis 
for producing true-breeding plant progenies. We claim: 1. A cultivated apomictic 
Pennisetum plant comprising a genome which contains a genetic material from E111, 
designated by ATCC accession No. 97273, for the expression of apomixis, wherein said 
material is transferred from Pennisetum squamulatum.
These brief illustrations serve to demonstrate the range of possible references to CGIAR 
Centres that we encountered in the data and make it clear that CGIAR Centres may appear 
in patent texts for a variety of reasons. These examples also illustrate some of the challenges 
that need to be addressed in text mining patent data for PGR referring to these Centres. 
In methodological terms, if it is desirable to generate information on the role of CGIAR 
collections in future patent activity, it will be important to introduce a clear and unambiguous 
unique identification system, possibly as part of material transfer agreements. A useful 
example of this is provided by the reference to ATCC accession No. 97273 in example 
6. This refers to an accession from the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) and can 
be readily retrieved through a search for the term ‘ATCC accession’. Furthermore, patent 
applicants are already familiar with requirements to provide information on accessions under 
the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of Microorganisms for the Purposes 
of Patent Procedure (as amended in 1980), which established a number of International 
Depositary Authority (ISA) organizations such as the American Type Culture Collection. 
In the case of CGIAR Centres, the role of accessions from the centres in research and 
development could be greatly clarified by drawing on lessons learned from the Budapest 
Treaty and focusing on clarifying information on accessions within patent documents. The 
importance of clarification of information inside patent data comes into very sharp focus when 
considering the results of research to identify germplasm accession codes in the patent data. 
4.4.3 Identifying plant germplasm accession codes
In an effort to more accurately target the plant genetic source materials, we identified the 
12 311 parent documents (first family members) from our Plant Treaty Index using Latin 
species names for Annex 1 crops and forages. We then restricted the results to only those 
documents that were classified in either A01H or C12 in the IPC system. This has the 
effect of removing documents that involve species in areas such as foodstuffs or cosmetics 
(where, for example, Solanum tuberosum or the potato is an important ingredient). The 
result of this exercise was a dataset consisting of 4 287 documents. The full texts of these 
documents were then exported for further processing using Wordsmith. 
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As we have seen in some of the examples above, in some cases, patent applicants include 
references to particular genetic resource names, i.e. S-5704 (CIMMYT 1981). However, 
from a research perspective, the reference to the genetic resources is not commonly 
accompanied by uniform use of the full name or abbreviation of the source collection. 
In order to improve data capture, we also searched the document subset on a smaller 
variety of terms directed towards capturing references to genetic resources through their 
codes, i.e. S-5704. The objective of this exercise was to use commonly used terms for 
varieties in order to identify variety code references adjacent to the common terms. Based 
on a manual review of results, the search terms chosen were “parent*, parental line*, 
breeding line*, seeds of, seeds from, crossing with, cross with, variety, varieties”. The 
aim of this approach was to move closer inside our 4 287 texts to the likely location of an 
accession code. 
This produced a dataset of 348 454 concordance lines, including many duplicates 
from duplicate publications in the dataset, for further work. The results were exported 
from Wordsmith to an Excel dataset based on a search horizon of 100 characters from 
the target term. The aim here was to try to capture complete codes as far as possible. 
The Excel table consisted of simple lines of 100 characters of text and the patent file 
name from Thomson Innovation. An example of the results is provided in Table 4.11.8
Table 4.11 Targeting variety codes through adjacent terms
Concordance Set
iological and morphological characteristics of the variety, and of regenerating plants 
having substa variety
tantially the same genotype as other plants of the variety. Examples of some of the 
physiological an variety
 tissue culture of regenerable cells of a plant of variety CV914011 is provided. The 
tissue culture variety
 be pollinated by a maintainer version of the same variety, which has a normal 
cytoplasm but lacks t variety
 can be restored by a restorer version of the same variety, which must have the restorer 
gene(s) in variety
This table demonstrates that it is possible to capture the text around a target term 
(variety) and that, in some cases, a variety code will be included in the results (entry 3). 
In order to focus on the codes for the target species of wheat, rice and maize, the 
348 454 Wordsmith Concordance lines were imported into Vantage Point analytics 
software in order to exploit its Natural Language Processing functions. Natural Language 
Processing involves an algorithm that breaks text into its constituent words and phrases. 
8   File: First Family Breeding Line Related Searches.xls
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The result of this exercise was a reduced dataset of 71 520 multi-word phrases. These 
phrases were manually reviewed to select results containing obvious plant variety codes 
(i.e. corn variety CV914011) or likely plant variety codes (i.e. DP 488 BG/RR). This allowed to 
create separate datasets for corn/maize (8 595), rice (130), and wheat (216), respectively. 
We would emphasize that our purpose was not to achieve comprehensive coverage, since 
this would only be possible by searching using lists of variety codes and denominations 
from PGR datasets within the whole texts of the sample; rather our aim was to test 
whether it might be possible to link variety codes with International Crop Information 
Systems (ICIS) PGR databases for generating mendelgrams and assessing the link between 
PGR from collections and patent activity as an indicator of commercial activity.
A short sample of the results of this exercise is provided in Table 4.12.  
Table 4.12 Plant variety codes sample in patents for corn
Our experimental results were then separated into datasets for rice (130), wheat (216) 
and corn/maize (8 595), respectively. 
In order to retrieve information on the parentage of the plant variety referenced in the 
patent document, it was first necessary to look up the variety code in an effort to identify 
the corresponding germplasm IDs (GIDs). This could have provided the foundation for 
generating mendelgrams, as explained in Chapter 2.However, our efforts in this area using 
this sample data failed. We presume that this was because the codes in our sample referred 
to commercial varieties that are not referenced in public collection databases. Furthermore, 
we encountered significant variations in the formats of codes,which makes reading data 
across databases difficult. We propose that any future work to text mine patent data 
for accession or variety codes should actually begin by obtaining a comprehensive list of 
accession or variety codes from public collections. These accession codes should then be 
used to text mine the corresponding data. In this way the research would proceed from 
known codes to establish the link with the patent data. 
4.4.4  Informatics development
One of the challenges involved in the research presented here has been the need to use 
large-scale data from a range of different sources. In particular, we wished to provide 
Records Concordance results
53 Corn variety I156024
53 Corn variety I161538
52 Corn variety I180421
51 Corn variety I294213
51 Maize variety 34Y02
50 Corn variety CV443328
50 Corn variety CV875318
50 Corn variety I322683
Records Concordance results
48 Corn variety CV897903
48 Maize variety 35K02
47 Corn variety CV338423
47 Corn variety CV589782
47 Corn variety I130248
47 Maize variety 39B22
47 Maize variety 6746633
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support for the analysis of the parentage of commercial plant varieties as a basis for 
economic assessment of the contribution of materials under the Multilateral System. 
Plant genetic information exists in a variety of public databases notably the International 
Crop Information System (ICIS). However, we confronted challenges in accessing the data 
on the scale that was needed. 
To address this we created a web-based portal to the International Crop Information 
System (ICIS) that provides automated access to the crop genealogy tools. ICIS is a 
platform available on Windows 32 bit systems that allows interaction with the Genealogy 
Management System (GMS) and the Data Management System (DMS) for environmental, 
characterization and evaluation purposes. ICIS was developed by research centres under 
the umbrella of the CGIAR. Central implementation of the GMS and DMS exist for major 
crops including Wheat, Maize (by CIMMYT) and Rice (by IRRI). Information on ICIS is 
available at http://www.icis.cgiar.org/icis/index.php/Main_Page.
The problem for our partners was that extracting data from the GMS was limited by 
the platform characteristics. Of interest was the calculation of Mendelgrams, a table of 
        
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16 Mendelgram for wheat variety Sonalika (Germplasm 6387)
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progenitors for a given germplasm and their relevant contribution as shown in Figure 4.16. 
Additionally, our partners needed to calculate matrices of Coefficient of Parentage (COP).9 
The existing ICIS browse interface, known simply as ‘browse’, made it difficult and 
time-consuming for our partners to copy data into a spread sheet enabling proper data 
interrogation and reporting.  
Our proposal was to host the existing ICIS tools and wrap them in an internet service 
(the ICIS service) in order to provide the data in tabular form to our partners on demand. 
To streamline access to the ICIS services, we provided gadgets within our web platform the 
Research Desktop (available at http://researchdesktop.org/). 
Co-hosted with the ICIS installation upon the Windows 32 machine, we created an ASP.
NET (v4) and Internet Information Services (IIS v7.5) installation. Development took place 
in Visual Studio 2010. The ICIS service simply started an invisible instance of the browse 
tool. Our service ensured that the browse tool was pointing at the relevant GMS database 
(IWIS, IRIS or IMIS). We then sequentially called the browse function for each germplasm 
input returning the results in tabular format. In addition to the information from the browse 
application, our installation was able to access the database of the GMS directly to obtain data 
such as germplasm creation and naming dates. Another service we provided was germplasm 
identifier discovery by given variety names. This accessed the GMS database directly.
The Research Desktop simply called upon our ICIS Internet service to provide the data 
as a streamed download. Germplasm identifiers or variety names are entered through the 
desktop keywords gadget, which allows them to be uploaded in large numbers from a file. 
9   http://cropwiki.irri.org/icis/index.php/TDM_GMS_Browse
        
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17 The ICIS Web Interface on the Research Desktop
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The appropriate ICIS gadget is enabled by the user, and when the search is initiated from 
the keyword gadget a save as box will be shown. This allows the data to be downloaded 
or opened with a spread sheet application such as Excel, as shown in Figure 4.17. 
The development of these apparently simple tools took approximately four weeks to create, 
mainly due to the specific requirements of the different ICIS installations. For example, IWIS 
(Wheat) requires MySQL server to be installed, but only works on Windows 32. 
4.4.5 Plant varieties and plant breeders’ rights
One important research question was whether specific plant varieties could be identified in 
the patent data and whether a link could be established between any PBR over these varieties 
and the pursuit of patent protection. A twin-track approach was adopted to these questions. 
Unique identifiers
On the first track we searched the patent collections for a list of 23 000 PBR unique 
identifiers. Using the HEC, this produced zero results. To cross test the validity of these 
results, we searched for 1 000 PBR identifiers in the Thomson Innovation whole text patent 
database. This also produced zero results. 
Search terms
As a further test, we then searched in the commercial Thomson Innovation database across 
the major patent jurisdictions for the simple term ‘PBR’ to stand for plant breeders’ rights. 
This generated 20 978 results. The result set was exported for processing in Vantage Point 
text mining and analytics software. Specifically, we were concerned with testing whether 
any instances of the term PBR fell into areas of the patent system known to be associated 
with new varieties of plants, specifically under IPC code A01H for New Varieties of Plants. 
This revealed 442 results for the simple PBR term search falling into IPC code A01H. The 
publication numbers for these records were imported into Thomson Innovation and the 
whole texts of the results were exported for review in Word Smith text mining software. 
To improve data capture, we conducted additional searches in the main jurisdictions for 
PBR and PVP using Thomson Innovation for the period from 1900 to 2012. The raw results 
and results of manual review are provided in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13 PBR searches
term Raw Results
PBR 20 978
Plant Breeders Rights or Plant Breeders Right 1 422
Plant Variety Protection 3 450
Community Plant Variety 181
PVP (A01H only) 1 706
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This raw data suggested that, at least in principle, it would be possible to text mine the patent 
data for data relating to PBR. However, we would emphasize that the above data could 
include very significant noise (i.e. on the term ‘PBR’) and should be regarded as experimental.
4.4.6 Text mining patent data for PBR information
In the third step of the research on PBRs, we focused on obtaining data on PBRs from UPOV 
to use in text mining the patent data. In practice, we experienced difficulty in obtaining 
the required information from the UPOV CD ROM and instead used the new UPOV PLUTO 
database to extract information for rice, wheat and maize. However, we would note that 
downloads of this data are formally restricted to 2000 records at a time. We therefore believe 
that it would be helpful if UPOV could make a data product available permitting the download 
of all data (i.e. in an XML format) to aid with large scale research of the type conducted for 
this study. Nevertheless, the PLUTO database is a major improvement in accessing UPOV data. 
Our text mining efforts using UPOV data focused on experimenting with the variety 
name or denomination. Table 4.14 shows a partial sample of data for wheat downloaded 
from the UPOV database for wheat. 
Table 4.14 Sample data for wheat from the UPOV PLUTO database
Denomination Latin Name Record Type Country Denom Text Parties
CHATSWORTH
Triticum 
aestivum L.
PBR GB
: CHATSWORTH: 
proposed;2000-06-01: 
CHATSWORTH: approved
LIMAGRAIN UK LTD: Applicant;LIMAGRAIN 
UK LTD: Breeder;LIMAGRAIN UK LTD: AGT
CHAUCER
Triticum 
aestivum L.
PBR GB
: CHAUCER: 
proposed;1995-09-01: 
CHAUCER: approved
ELSOMS LTD: Applicant;ELSOMS LTD: 
Breeder;ELSOMS LTD: AGT
CHEETAH
Triticum 
aestivum L.
PBR GB
: CHEETAH: 
proposed;: PANTHER: 
proposed;1990-01-03: 
PANTHER: rejected
LIMAGRAIN UK LTD: Applicant;LIMAGRAIN 
UK LTD: Breeder;LIMAGRAIN UK LTD: AGT
Chelsea
Triticum 
aestivum L.
PBR US
1993-09-14: Chelsea: 
proposed;1994-03-14: 
Chelsea: 
published;1996-11-29: 
Chelsea: approved
Michigan State University: 
Applicant;Michigan State University: 
Breeder;Michigan State University: Title 
holder
Cheops
Triticum 
aestivum L.
PBR NL
1997-02-20: Cheops: 
proposed;1997-03-16: 
Cheops: 
published;1997-05-07: 
Cheops: rejected
Wiersum-Zelder, De Samenwerkende 
Graankweekbedrijven    Postbus 26,  6590 
AA  GENNEP, NL: Applicant;Wiersum-
Zelder, De Samenwerkende 
Graankweekbedrijven    Postbus 26,  6590 
AA  GENNEP, NL: Breeder;Wiersum-Zelder, 
De Samenwerkende Graankweekbedrijven    
Postbus 26,  6590 AA  GENNEP, NL: Title 
holder
CHEQUER
Triticum 
aestivum L.
PBR GB
: CHEQUER: 
proposed;2000-07-01: 
CHEQUER: approved
SYNGENTA SEEDS LTD: 
Applicant;SYNGENTA SEEDS LTD: 
Breeder;SYNGENTA SEEDS LTD: AGT
Cherokee
Triticum 
aestivum L.
PBR US
1990-02-27: Cherokee: 
proposed;1990-08-27: 
Cherokee: published
Agripro Seeds, Inc.: Applicant;Agripro 
Seeds, Inc.: Breeder
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We would note that Table 4.14 does not show all available data fields from the PLUTO 
database, such as grant date. We were interested in the Denominations and the possibility 
of text mining our data for denomination names. 
For each of the three target species (rice, wheat and maize), we conducted searches of 
the patent data using high-end computing. In the case of the USPTO, this generated 1.3 
gigabytes of raw data; at the EPO, this was 122 megabytes, and at WIPO, 480 megabytes. 
Box 4.1 Selected results of text mining for UPOV-protected variety 
denominations
chatsworth EP1997899A1//20081203 description nium hydrochloride) on a Ni2+-NTA-agarose 
column, according to the manufacturer’s protocol (Qiagen, |Chatsworth, CA). After dialysis against 
PBS, a mixture of the soluble and insoluble APP polypeptides was used to immunize two New Zealand 
White rabbits following a standard immunization protocol (Harlow and Lane, 1988). For the Western 
blot analysis, proteins were resolved by denaturing SDS-PAGE (Sam
chevalier EP2128251A1//20091202 description lication cell cycles  --> more for less. Cell 105, 297-
306. (Non-Patent Document 2) Joubes, J., and |Chevalier, C. (2000) Endoreduplication in higher 
plants. Plant Mol. Biol. 43, 735-745. (Non-Patent Document 3) De Veylder, L., Beeckman, T., Beemster, 
G.T., Krols, L., Terras, F., Landrieu, I., van der Schueren, E., Maes, S., Naudts, M., and InzÃ©, D. (2001) 
Functional analysis of cyclin-dependent kin 
chiyohonami EP0902089A2//19990317 description present invention is not limited to such 
examples. (Example 1) Production of a transgenic rice (cv. |Chiyohonami) (1) Preparation of a thionin 
gene A thionin gene was obtained by PCR using a cDNA clone of a thionin gene designated LTH92 
(Japanese Laid-open Publication No. 8-266279, supra) and one pair of primers, in which additional 
restriction sites for BamHI and SacI were respectively added to eac
christine EP1293569A2//20030319 description “9) of “Method in Molecular Biology” (Humana 
Press) series, “Chaperonin Protocols” (Eds., Schneider, |Christine, 2000); “Development and/or 
differentiation-related protein” “ Developmental Biology Protocols” (Eds., ROBERT EISENTHAL and 
MICHAEL J. DANSON, 1992) of “Method in Molecular Biology” (Humana Press) series;” DNA- and/or 
RNA-binding protein” “ DNA-Protein Interactions Principles and Protocols” (Ed”
chukar EP1270746A1//20030102 description  Ovomucoid (third domain) from Aburria pipile, 
Aepypodius arfakianus, Afropavo congensis, Alectoris |chukar, Alectoris rufa, Anas platyrhynchos, 
Chloephaga picta, Cyanochen cyanop --> tera, Neochen jubata, Tadorna radjah, Lophonetta 
specularioides, Anas capensis, Aix galericulata, Aix sponsa, Sarkidiornis melanotos, Alopochen 
aegyptiaca, Mergus cucullatus, Anhinga novaehollandiae, Anser anser anser,
churchill EP0969092A1//20000105 description ing, the 89th meeting). In the analysis, the pool 
sampling method was applied to minimize the task (|Churchill et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 90 
16-20 (1993)). To increase the accuracy of linkage analysis, it is necessary to increase the number of 
DNA markers near the target gene and to enlarge the sampling population. Accordingly, YAC clones 
carrying the Pi-b locus, which was determined by the
cl121 EP2113172A1//20091104 description nde Gen aus E. coli wurde als Selektionsmarker 
eingefÃ¼hrt, um Transformanten zu identfizieren. B-82 |CL121, CL141, CFX51 Oryza sativa (Reis) 
BASF Inc. Toleranz fÃ¼r das Imidazolinonherbizid Imazethapyr wurde durch chemische Mutagenese 
des Enzyms Acetolactatsynthase (ALS) 
clemens EP1427285B1//20070822 description  HÃ¼bner), navel orangeworm (Amyelois transitella 
Walker), corn root webworm (Crambus caliginosellus |Clemens), sod webworm (Herpetogramma 
licarsisalis Walker)); leafrollers, budworms, seed worms, and fruit worms in the family Tortricidae (e.g. 
codling moth (Cydia pomonella L. (L. means Linnaeus)), grape berry moth (Endopiza viteana Clemens), 
oriental fruit moth (Grapholita molesta Busck));
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The results were then cleaned. A selection of the results from text mining is shown in Box 
4.1 with search terms highlighted in bold.
As will readily be appreciated, the results of text mining patent data for UPOV 
denomination names reveals many of the same problems that were exposed in searching 
for CGIAR centre names. Specifically, the denominations used to designate varieties for 
UPOV protection are frequently, but not exclusively surnames. This produces the problem 
of many irrelevant results in a given patent dataset even where, as in this case, the searches 
are conducted in a dataset focusing on PGR. 
As the situation stands, in the absence of other search criteria or criteria that can be used to 
cross-reference and thereby filter the results, our research has reached a temporary impasse. 
4.4.7 Conclusion
This section was concerned with using text mining to interrogate patent data on PGR for 
references to the CGIAR collections, variety and accession codes and for UPOV variety 
denomination names. The wider objective of this exploratory work was to investigate the 
linkage between accessions from public collections and commercially oriented research 
and development. While it was possible to mine the data for relevant search categories, in 
practice, the results revealed large- scale problems with noise. Based on these exploratory 
results, the authors believe that the most practical way forward for any follow-on research 
would be to compile distinctive variety and accession codes as the basis for searching the 
patent data. In our view, this would provide the most reliable means for retrieving data. 
This would also greatly facilitate the identification of the contribution of accessions from 
public collections to commercial research and development involving PGR. 
While the experiments conducted within the constraints of this study did not establish a 
clear linkage between plant germplasm in public collections and patent data, this should 
not be interpreted to mean that this relationship does not exist. Furthermore, in practical 
terms, an important insight was acquired into practical measures that might be taken 
by CGIAR Centres to ensure the increased visibility of information on CGIAR accessions. 
This would have to include a requirement and a standard format for recording CGIAR 
contributions in material transfer agreements. This approach would mean that the Centres 
would be able to readily retrieve information on accessions appearing in patent data and 
that policy makers would be provided with an insight into the role of germplasm from 
public collections in patent activity. 
4.5 non-monetary benefit-sharing and the scientific literature
4.5.1 Introduction
Non-monetary benefit sharing is generally acknowledged as being important in 
international agreements involving genetic resources. However, non-monetary benefit 
sharing is frequently seen as the poor relation of monetary benefit sharing for the 
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straightforward reason that non-monetary benefit sharing is much more difficult to 
count. The vagueness of non-monetary benefit sharing is the greatest enemy of its full 
recognition.
In preparing this research, a discussion was held between the team on possible 
approaches to addressing non-monetary benefit sharing. Drawing on the relevance 
of scientometrics or bibliometrics (the analysis of scientific literature), it was realized 
that published research is generally the outcome of monetary investments in particular 
research projects (which can be accounted for in national systems and by research 
organizations). Second, it was recognized that in the 21st century, research is typically 
international in nature and serves to promote international collaborations between 
countries. This is particularly true in the biosciences where research in areas such as 
genomics frequently involves research teams in multiple countries and investments by 
multiple funding organizations crossing both the public and private sector. A good 
example of such collaborations is provided by the sequencing of the rice genome by 
the researchers at the Beijing Institute for Genetics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(ssp. indica) and Syngenta (ssp. japonica) in 2002. 
In order to explore the possibilities of mapping non-monetary benefit sharing in the 
scientific literature, we selected a sample of 1 314 publications recorded in Thomson 
Reuters Web of Science for 2011 of a total of 17 350 publications containing this topic. 
Using a combination of Vantage Point analytics and Tableau visualization software, it 
becomes possible to visualize the global distribution of researchers publishing on rice 
in 2011, the subject category areas in which they are publishing and the affiliations of 
the authors. This data is summarized in Figure 4.18. 
4.5.2 Exploratory mapping of research networks on rice (Oryza sativa)
We can immediately see that, in 2011, research on rice was led by research organizations 
in China, followed by the United States. We can also see that most publications were 
in the plant sciences, followed by agriculture, biochemistry and molecular biology. A 
selection of titles is shown to illustrate the research being published.
In practice, publications frequently involve collaborations between countries and 
organizations. These networks can be mapped using network visualization tools such 
as Gephi. Figure 4.19 shows the network of cooperation between researchers involved 
in the publications, and demonstrates multiple linkages between countries where node 
sized is based on the number of publications and the strengths of the links indicates the 
strength of co-publication. Due to the complexity of the network, there may be overlaps 
between nodes and connections.  
This type of approach can also be applied to authors and to institutions, but involves 
intensive data cleaning. Figure 4.20 shows the network of relations between organizations 
publishing on rice in 2011 with nine or more records in the data.
In considering Figure 4.20, we are coming closer to identifying non-monetary benefits 
in terms of actual collaborations between researchers and in terms of the training of 
students, post-doctoral researchers and staff, and their exchange between institutions. 
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These collaborations embody knowledge exchange and transfers within networks and 
can be considered a major component of non-monetary benefit-sharing. 
We can, however, move a step closer to the monetary dimensions of research through 
the recent inclusion of information on the funding bodies supporting research in scientific 
publication data (Figure 4.21). These data are inherently noisy and require extensive 
cleaning; Figure 4.2.1 is therefore for illustration purposes. 
Figure 4.18 Distribution of researchers publishing on Oryza sativa/rice 
(Web of Science, 2011)         
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Figure 4.19 Country Co-publication network on Oryza sativa (Web of Science, 2011)
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Figure 4.20 Institutional co-authorship network (+9 records) 
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4.5.3 Conclusion
This section has provided an exploratory analysis of the potential of scientometrics techniques 
for examining non-monetary benefit-sharing focusing on a sample of the scientific literature. 
While the importance of non-monetary benefit sharing is widely recognized as a major area of 
benefit sharing, its quantification has proved elusive. This exploratory analysis has demonstrated 
that it is possible to map one of the primary routes for non-monetary benefit sharing:  the 
generation and exchange of new knowledge about important agricultural species.
With respect to future work, it would be possible to develop fuller datasets of scientific 
literature on specific species covered by Annex 1 and to map networks of countries, 
organizations, researchers and funding agencies involved in research for particular species. 
This would also open the way for examining which of the organizations in these networks 
have signed the SMTA and to model non-monetary benefit sharing under the Treaty. 
Although this will involve significant challenges, notably in terms of acquiring and analysing 
data, this would provide a new path for the analysis of non-monetary benefit sharing in the 
field of genetic resources.  
        
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.21 Funding Organization 9 plus records for Oryza sativa or rice in 2011
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4.6 Key findings and further research
4.6.1 Patent activity in the main jurisdictions 
In the period from 1900 to 2010, a total of 23 193 patents applications were filed for 
PGR at the major patent offices consisting of the EPC, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
the United States and Japan (Dashboard 1 Priority Filings).10 Trends in the first filings of 
patent applications provide a proxy indicator for Research and Development investments 
and for innovative activity in a given field.
As regards the EPC and Japan (JP), patent filings show a declining trend from the late 
1990s onwards. In contrast, patent filings in the United States displayed a rising trend 
until 2000, followed by sharp decline and gradual recovery before accelerating in 2007. 
A steep decline in filing after 2008 may reflect the impact of the financial crisis. This 
trend is reflected in activity under the International Patent Cooperation Treaty (WO), 
which provides applicants with a means to seek protection in multiple countries. For 
the PCT, a declining trend in first filings was observed between 2000 and 2006 when 
applications began to show a marked upward trend. 
As patent applications move into the system they are published and republished 
multiple times as applications and grants (Dashboard 1 Publication Trends). In total, we 
identified 68 111 patent publications in the major jurisdictions for PGR in the period 
to the end of 2010. This data excludes 21 795 US Plant Patents which offer a lower 
form of protection than standard utility patents. We would note that the data do not 
provide an insight into the number of patent grants in force at a given time. In the case 
of the United States, an apparent sharp increase in the number of patent applications 
is observable from 2001 onwards throughout the statistics. This sharp increase is in fact 
a reporting effect originating from a change in US Patent Office practice that initiated 
publication of patent documents at the application stage from 2001 onwards.
Patent applications within the major jurisdictions were originally filed in a total of 58 
countries led by the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France 
followed by Australia. The top assignees pursuing protection for PGR in the main patent 
jurisdictions include Pioneer Hi-Bred (Du Pont), Monsanto, Du Pont, Syngenta, BASF 
Plant Science, Bayer Cropscience, the University of California and Novartis (Dashboard 1 
Main Assignees). However, the data do not address the structure of corporate ownership 
in the sector (i.e. Pioneer Hi-Bred is owned by Du Pont). 
The main strength of research on trends in the main patent jurisdictions is that it 
provided a means to clearly define patent activity for PGR within patent data and to chart 
activity in the jurisdictions that account for over 80 percent of global patent activity. This 
section of the report therefore provided a platform for the analysis of global trends in 
patent activity using the EPO World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT, October 2011 
edition). 
10  The main jurisdictions include the United States, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the European Patent 
Convention, Japan, Germany, France (applications only) and the United Kingdom (applications only).
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4.6.2 Global trends
The EPO World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT, October 2011 edition) provides 
the gold standard for the generation of international patent statistics. Dashboard 2 
summarizes the available data for global patent activity for PGR in the period from 
1900 to October 2011.11
Analysis of patent activity for PGR in the 1980–2010 period revealed 40 970 first 
filings belonging to 32 391 patent families, and 116 795 patent publications linked 
to 131 505 family members worldwide. When viewed from a global perspective the 
top countries of first filing of patent applications were the United States, China and 
Japan with Hungary and the Republic of Korea rising in the rankings (Dashboard 2 
Priority Country). Important changes were also observed in terms of the countries of 
publication of patent applications as an indicator of where patents are being sought. On 
this measure, the top five countries were the United States, China, Japan, Canada and 
11   Since data for 2011 are incomplete and will therefore show a declining trend, they are excluded. 
Dashboard 1 Main trends
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Australia (Dashboard 2 Publication Country).12 This clearly shows that other countries, 
notably China, are emerging as important actors in patent activity and as countries 
where patent rights are important to companies and research institutions. In terms of 
patent activity, the top organizations involved mirror those in the main jurisdictions and 
include, Pioneer Hi Bred (Du Pont), Monsanto, Du Pont, Syngenta and BASF Plant Science 
(Dashboard 2 Assignees). However, while specific companies dominate the top rankings, 
it is also important to highlight that universities, such as the University of California, and 
government institutions such as the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization (Australia), the National Institute of Agrobiological Sciences (Japan) and 
National Research Council of Canada also feature prominently in the top 50 results. As 
such, it is important not to lose sight of the various types of organizations involved in patent 
activity for PGR. Furthermore, while falling outside the present study, it is possible that 
patent applications originate from networks of collaboration in research and development 
between organizations of more than one type. This is an important avenue for future 
research in examining patent activity for PGR of relevance to the Treaty. 
12   Patent data for Australia are affected by patent counting practices for Patent Cooperation Treaty applications. 
For a period from 1900 to the early 2000s, designations under the PCT were recorded as actual applications. 
This practice will therefore overcount actual demand for patent rights in Australia. For this reason, data on 
Australia should be approached with caution pending further clarification. 
Dashboard 2 Global trends
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4.6.3 Annex 1 of the Treaty
The analysis above focuses on the global context of patent activity for PGR and contributes 
to advancing knowledge and understanding by establishing a straightforward definition 
that can be used for the future elaboration of patent statistics. However, Annex 1 of the 
Treaty sets out a list of specific genera and species that are covered under the Treaty. It is 
therefore important to identify patent activity on the species level. 
In practice, Annex 1 of the Treaty focuses on the genus level and contains specific 
inclusions and exclusions for species (i.e. Lepidium meyenii) arising from the concerns of 
Parties at the time that the Treaty was negotiated. The patent system and the IPC do not 
provide a ready guide to the identification of Annex 1 species for statistical purposes. We 
recommend that the EPO and WIPO contribute to statistical analysis through the further 
elucidation of classification codes or, as appropriate, tags for Annex 1 genera in electronic 
patent databases.
The analysis of patent activity for Annex 1 species exploited the availability of a High-End 
Computing facility. This involved text mining 11 million patent documents from the United 
States PTO, the EPO and the Patent Cooperation Treaty for Latin species names falling 
under Annex 1. Analysis of patent claims from the main patent jurisdictions in Section 4.2 
revealed that patent applicants in this sector generally use the common names of food 
crops. We responded by identifying the main common names for these species. To limit 
the possibility of noise, the searches by common names were confined to documents 
falling within the definition of PGR identified in Section 4.2 and further restricted to data 
appearing in the Titles, Abstracts and Claims of patent documents. This has the effect of 
limiting the data on common names to those documents that are in an important sense 
‘about’ the species concerned. The results were then grouped on the accepted scientific 
names for the species. The results are summarized in Dashboard 3. 
In total, we identified 1 014 species falling under Annex 1 within the three patent 
jurisdictions, including non-specific applications involving members of a particular genus 
(i.e. Triticum spp.). In total, we identified 55 531 patent publications originating from 
26 145 original filings in the 11 million documents from the main jurisdictions. This 
strongly suggests that patent activity for PGR is likely to be dominated by Annex 1 
species. 
With respect to individual Annex 1 species, patent activity is dominated by maize, rice 
and Brassica napus (rapeseed), followed by wheat (Triticum spp.). In the case of beans, 
we experienced difficulty in allocating common name data to specific species within the 
bean group and have marked the data accordingly. In terms of patent claims, Dashboard 
3 makes it clear that patent claims relating to Annex 1 species are dominated by maize 
by a very considerable margin, suggesting a concentration of research and development 
in maize. In an important methodological advance, we were also able to chart patent 
activity by applications and grants for the individual species covered by Annex 1. This 
raises the possibility of longer- term analysis of patent activity on an individual species 
basis.  
Dashboard 3 also reveals that the top applicants for patent rights in relation to Annex 1 
species mirror the applicants from the main jurisdictions and globally using PATSTAT. 
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However, it is also possible to break down the applications by organization type as set out 
in Dashboard 4. Looking beyond the top ranking companies, Dashboard 4 reveals that 
universities and government organizations (principally government research organizations) 
are also significant actors in patent activity involving Annex 1 species. This type of 
data opens the possibility of increasing engagement with companies, universities and 
government research organizations in pursuing the objectives of the Treaty by opening a 
constructive dialogue with the range of actors involved in patent activity. 
Dashboard 3 Annex 1 patent activity
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4.6.4 CGIAR Centres, plant varieties and UPOV
One of the significant challenges involved in this research was identifying the role of PGR 
under the multilateral system and applications for PBR. This poses a formidable challenge 
because there is no standardized system for identifying accessions from CGIAR Centres 
within patent or similar documents, and we know of no existing methodologies or tools 
for retrieving such data. 
Our research therefore focused on exploring this issue using informatics techniques. As 
a starting point, the research focused on searching the whole text of patent collections 
for references to the names and abbreviations for CGIAR Centres. The results were then 
reviewed line by line using corpus linguistics tools to examine the contexts in which 
references occurred. 
In the majority of cases, the analysis revealed that references were being made to 
research and publications from CGIAR Centres and general references such as: “In 1993 
the Consultation Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) suggested that 
increasing the mineral uptake of plants could be used to address the problems associated 
with deficiency of zinc and other nutrients (Ruel and Bouis, 1998).” In other cases, specific 
references were made to the acquisition of biological material from a specific collection, 
        
 
 
 
 
Dashboard 4 Annex 1 assignees by sector
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for example, “The reverse drooping flag leaf character can be introduced into the perennial 
female fertile male seed parent by crossing with RGS20, which is publicly available from 
IRRI (Philippines)” (US5304722A). However, as this data suggest, the provision of this 
information is inconsistent and varies in form, making data retrieval difficult and time-
consuming. 
We then turned to the identification of plant germplasm accession codes. During the 
experiments, it became clear that patent applicants routinely make reference to accessions 
with an estimated 178 805 patent publications in the main jurisdictions making reference 
to the term accessions across all patents. In particular, under the Budapest Treaty on 
the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of 
Patent Procedure (1977, amended 1980), patent applicants routinely deposit samples 
with recognized international depositary authorities and refer to accessions, i.e. at the 
American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) with the corresponding accession number in 
their applications. 
To test this type of approach we searched the whole texts of 4 287 patent documents 
containing Latin species names for Annex 1 species. Due to the lack of uniformity of 
accession codes, which typically take alphanumeric form, the research focused on 
identifying accession codes that were adjacent in the texts to relevant terms, such as 
parent, parental line, breeding line, seeds of, cross with, variety, and varieties, among 
others. This resulted in 348 454 lines of text containing these terms. We then reviewed 
the texts within 100 characters of these target terms to identify accession numbers, i.e. 
CV914011 and DP488/BG/RR. The largest number of results appeared for corn/maize 
(8 595), rice (130) and wheat (216) in our sample. 
We then sought to use the identified variety codes to track back to the ICIS germplasm 
databases to see if we could link back from the patents into the data to generate 
mendelgrams. However, we were unsuccessful in this experiment with the sample data 
available to us. In our view, this probably arose because our sample contained references 
to commercial varieties that are not present in the ICIS public database. In addition, since 
the form of expression of variety codes is not uniform across the data, the same variety 
code may not map across databases. 
We believe that it should be possible to link accession information from patents back 
into the public germplasm collections. However, the most efficient method for achieving 
this goal would be to reverse the methodology that we employed; that is, in any future 
work, effort should focus on acquiring a complete list of accession numbers from the 
public collections for a target species (i.e. maize/rice/wheat) and then text mining the 
patent data for these codes. 
We then turned to testing patent data for information on PGR protected under UPOV. 
We were able to obtain UPOV data for rice, wheat and maize from the new UPOV PLUTO 
database and conducted searches of the relevant data from the major collections using 
the plant variety denominations recorded in UPOV data. This generated large numbers 
of results but exposed significant problems with noise in patent data. Specifically, UPOV 
denominations are frequently, but not exclusively, surnames, place names and other 
common names. This produces very large levels of background noise, even in data related 
to PGR. Our experiments suggest that retrieving UPOV-related information from patent 
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databases will be a major undertaking that would require additional match criteria to 
filter for noise. One possibility in this area would be to use narrow search margins where 
a denomination would only be included for further review where it is adjacent to the Latin 
species name. 
4.6.5 The scientific literature and non-monetary benefit-sharing
Non-monetary benefit-sharing has repeatedly been highlighted as an important form of 
benefit-sharing for PGR and in wider international policy debates on genetic resources 
and benefit-sharing. However, the measurement, quantification and visualization of 
non-monetary benefit-sharing have proved elusive. As a contribution to methodological 
development in this area we engaged in an experiment with the application of 
scientometrics techniques to the analysis of non-monetary benefit-sharing. Scientometrics 
focuses on the analysis of scientific literature to identify key topics, networks and trends in 
specific areas of science and technology. 
For this experiment we selected a sample of 1 314 scientific publications on Oryza sativa 
(rice) in 2011 from Thomson Reuters Web of Science. Using a combination of Vantage 
Point Analytics software and Gephi network visualization software, we were then able to 
map networks of collaboration between countries, research organizations and funding 
organizations (Dashboard 5). 
The key insight that emerges from the application of scientometrics approaches 
to benefit-sharing is that it becomes possible to identify and visualize networks of 
collaboration between countries, research organizations, funding bodies and ultimately 
researchers involved in research on Annex 1 species. Each of these areas involves 
investments in research that are potentially measurable and also provides a potential route 
to the identification of knowledge transfer as a form of benefit-sharing (i.e. exchange and 
training of staff and students between countries and organizations). As such, network 
mapping of this type provides a potential route forward in the evidence-based analysis 
of non-monetary benefit-sharing. This approach could usefully be used to examine inter-
country collaborations in particular areas of plant genetic research or to target issues of 
particular relevance to developing countries. 
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4.6.6 Recommendations
The research presented in this chapter provides the most complete overview to date of 
patent activity for PGR and represents a major advance in the analysis of patent activity for 
Annex 1 species and genera. Any future work in this area would ideally focus on: 
•	 testing and refining the IPC based definition of PGR developed for this chapter; 
•	 aggregating patent assignee data using verifiable data on the structure of 
corporate ownership within the sector; 
•	 examining legal status data to identify the number of patents in force at a given 
time and trends in the maintenance of patent rights over time;
•	 analysing patent activity by organizational sectors provided in this chapter, which 
provides opportunities for engagement with the users of PGR directed towards 
realizing the objectives of the Treaty. Any future work should consider using 
patent data by organizational sector as an engagement tool;
•	 analysing licensing data and licensing practices within this sector;
•	 testing and refining large-scale text mining of patent data for Annex 1 species 
by focusing on common names for species in claims over PGR improving the 
transparency of patent information on PGR under Annex 1 of the Treaty by 
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developing classification codes or tags for the major genera or species within 
patent databases in close collaboration with information systems specialists 
at the EPO and the WIPO to identify the most appropriate means for meeting 
information needs in this area;
•	 improving the transparency of information on the origin of plant germplasm 
and especially on the uses of germplasm from public collections by including 
requirements for recipients of germplasm to use standardized codes in patent 
documents as part of Material Transfer Agreements; 
•	 improving the transparency of information on plant germplasm originating with 
public collections or in the UPOV system. This would be achieved by drawing on 
lessons learned by the International Depository Authorities under the Budapest 
Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure, which could provide practical guidance on meeting 
informational needs while minimizing any possible requirements from applicants 
or patent offices;
•	 developing the application of scientometric techniques to the analysis of the 
scientific literature as a promising route for the quantification and visualization of 
non-monetary benefit-sharing;
•	 applying scientometrics approaches to the analysis of networks of research 
organizations and patent applicants by focusing on particular species or particular 
issues of relevance to developing countries. 
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A.1 Summary
This report presents the results of a survey of plant breeding practitioners, which was 
carried out in order to inform the mathematical model presented in Chapter 3. Rather 
than generating representative data at the initial stage of the project, this survey has 
focused primarily on establishing initial contacts with industry and other experts, 
providing best estimates for those factors of the mathematical model for which 
information was difficult to obtain elsewhere. 
Six questions regarding aspects of breeding of three major crops (wheat, maize, 
rice) were posed (see the Questionnaire in section A.3 below) and 34 completed 
questionnaires were received, covering 13 countries for data on wheat, maize and rice. 
Additionally, we received responses with regard to tomato as well as single data on 
canola, forage and lettuce, which were included in the evaluation in order to provide a 
comparison to the main crops of analysis. 
The average number of years for the development of a variety using landraces or 
wild species as parent lines is 16.9 for wheat, 12.4 for maize, 11.5 for rice and 9.8 for 
tomato, which decreases to 9.5, 8.1, 7.9 and 5.9, respectively, when using pre-bred 
and improved material rather than landraces or wild species. Improved material is used 
mostly for breeding with 92 percent for wheat, 94 percent for maize and 87 percent 
for rice and tomato. Varieties remain on the market 6–8 years for wheat, maize and 
tomato, and 10–11 years for rice. The use of SMTA is low, on average 5–6 percent for 
wheat, maize, tomato, and 12 percent for rice. The experts indicated that there is a 
clear trend to avoid SMTA since the commercial results of the incorporation of materials 
accessed under SMTAs are so uncertain. The private holdings differ widely by crop and 
country. On average, world holdings are estimated at 32 percent for wheat, and 27 
percent for rice, and at a much higher level for maize and tomato, at 63 percent and 
65 percent, respectively.
The questionnaires provide a view from practitioners and as such are extremely 
helpful as another source of information for the algorithm. The results, however, need 
to be taken with great caution, because this survey has two major weaknesses, the 
small sample size and the limitations of the questionnaire itself, both of which will be 
discussed in section A.5 below. The main objective has been to pave the way for future 
work in this area.
A.2 Methodology
A questionnaire was developed to obtain information from practitioners in order to 
provide figures to populate the algorithm developed in Chapter 3 to estimate the future 
income into the Benefit-sharing Fund of the Treaty under a number of different scenarios. 
In particular, it was designed to provide a better estimate of some of the factors of the 
algorithm (see Table A.1). 
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Table A.1  Factors for which data were requested, by questionnaire
κ Development time  Average time, per crop/crop group, from access to product.
γ
Ratio of improved/
unimproved A
The ratio, per crop/crop group, of improved/unimproved accessions released 
under SMTAs.
l Product life The average period of sale of a product, per crop/crop group.
u Avoidance Deliberate avoidance of material under SMTAs.
C Crops
Total world holdings of PGR for food and agriculture. The first iteration of 
the model initially tracks five crops/crop groups: rice, wheat, maize, other 
Annex I, non-Annex 1 crops/crop groups.
The questionnaire includes six questions (see section below) to cover information for 
these factors. At this stage, the data were used in conjunction with data from other 
sources (including those presented in Chapter 2 and 4) to populate the algorithm and 
check its functioning. Due to limited time and data constraints, the research project 
was restricted in order to focus its analyses on the three key crops – rice, wheat, and 
maize; other crops had to be grouped into the two crop groups, “other Annex 1 crops” 
and “non-Annex 1 crops”, making reference to the 64 crops covered by the Multilateral 
System of Access and Benefit-Sharing (the Multilateral System of Access) of the Treaty, 
which are listed in its Annex 1. The initial draft of the questionnaire was elaborated 
by the research team and revised according to the feedback received from experts in 
private industry as well as in public institutions.
The questionnaire was to be filled by plant breeders or other experts in plant breeding. 
Contact with respondents was made through the International Seed Federation (ISF), 
Plantum NL, the Global Partnership Initiative for Plant Breeding Capacity Building (GIPB), 
the Generation Challenge Programme (GCP) of the CGIAR, the Treaty Secretariat as well 
as by direct initiative of the research team. Since the objective of the questionnaire was 
to collect some initial data and not to generate geographically representative data, the 
above approach aimed to establish an initial contact with some of the main breeding 
organizations. 
A total of 34 completed questionnaires have been received. Most of the answers 
were obtained in writing and for three of them, the data we recollected during a 
phone interview. Three of the questionnaires combined the views of several experts, 
one received through the International Seed Federation (ISF) and two from Italy (nine 
answers in Italy representing 19 experts). Twenty-four questionnaires covered wheat; 
18 covered maize; 15 covered rice; five covered tomato; and one covered rapeseed. 
A list of the respondents is included at the end of this report. Global geographical 
coverage was not expected for this phase of the project; nonetheless, 13 countries 
were represented as in Table A.2. 
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Table A.2  No. of answers by countries and crops
Country 
no. of 
respondents
wheat Maize Rice other
Argentina 1 1 1 1
Australia 1 1 Rapeseed 1
China 2 2 1 2
France 5 3 2 1
Germany 3 2 2 1
Italy 9 8 8 7 Tomato 5
Kenya 1 1 1 1
Norway 1 1
Peru 1 1
Switzerland 2 2
Thailand 1 1
USA 1 1 1
Venezuela 1 1 1
Anonymous 5 4 3 1 forage, 
1 lettuce
total 34 26 20 15 6
Twenty out of 34 answers, or 59 percent, were from Europe, two (6%) from Latin 
America, one (3%) from the United States, three (9%) from Latin America, three (9%) 
from Asia, one (3%) from Oceania and one (3%) from Africa; five answers (15%) were 
anonymous.
The results will be presented by crop, and the impact of the geography will be highlighted 
when and where it adds variability. Among the 34 institutions from which responses were 
received, 15 were public and 20 are private. This is likely to explain further some of the 
variability in the answers. The sample size is obviously too small to allow drawing anything 
more than merely indicative conclusions; however, the discussion below provides a good 
entry point for further work in this area. 
A.3 Questionnaire
For plant breeders and other PGRFA experts
How long would you say it takes on average to develop a commercial variety (from access 
of parent lines to market introduction) for each of the following crops? Please specify an 
average number of (A) years and (B) breeding cycles for development with (1) landraces 
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or wild species as parent lines, and with (2) improved or pre-bred varieties as parent lines.
Average no. of years for development of 
commercial variety
Average no. of breeding cycles for the 
development of commercial variety
Landraces or wild 
species as parent 
lines
Pre-bred and 
improved material 
as parent lines
Land races or wild 
species as parent 
lines
Pre-bred and 
improved material 
as parent lines
Wheat
Maize
Rice
What do you believe to be the proportion of pre-bred and improved materials vs. 
unimproved materials (landraces, wild species) that are currently being used in breeding 
for each of the following crops?
Proportion improved (pre-bred): unimproved 
(landraces, wild species)
Wheat   
Maize
Rice   
Please indicate what you believe to be the average length of time that a seed variety 
remains on sale for each crop.
Average length of time (in years)
Wheat  
Maize  
Rice
Tomato  
What do you estimate to be the percentage of materials accessed via an SMTA that are 
currently being used in breeding for the following crops?
Percentage of breeding material that was accessed via an SMtA
In all breeding programmes In breeding programmes of your organization
Wheat
Maize
Rice
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Do you think that there is a tendency to avoid use of materials brought under SMTA 
conditions in commercial breeding?
YES /NO
If so, why do you think that is? _____________________
Of the world’s total PGR of each of the following crops, what do you estimate to be the 
percentage that is held by the private sector?
Percentage held by the 
private sector in your 
country
Percentage held by the 
private sector globally
Wheat
Maize
Rice
Other Annex 1 crops (taken together)
Non-Annex 1 food and agricultural 
crops
A.4 data
This section presents the results for each question. 
Question 1: How long would you say it takes on average to develop a commercial 
variety (from access of parent lines to market introduction) for each of the 
following crops? Please specify an average number of (A) years and (B) breeding 
cycles for development with (1) landraces or wild species as parent lines, and 
with (2) improved or pre-bred varieties as parent lines.
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Table A.3 Results of Question 1
Average no. of years for development of 
commercial variety
Average no. of breeding cycles for development 
of commercial variety
landraces or wild 
species as parent 
lines
Pre-bred and 
improved material 
as parent lines
landraces or wild 
species as parent lines
Pre-bred and 
improved material as 
parent lines
wheat 16.9
Range: 4–50 
Average: 13.8–20 
Mini: 4–30 
Max:  4–50
 9.5
Range: 1–40 
Average: 7 –11.9
Mini: 1.7–11 
Max: 1–40
10.1
Range: 1–25 
Average: 9.2–10.9 
Mini: 1 –25 
Max: 1.7–25
6.7
Range:1 –16
Average: 5.8–7.5  
Mini: 1–16 
Max: 1–16
Maize 12.4
Range: 5–20 
Average: 7.3–8.9  
Mini: 5–20 
Max: 6–20
8.1
Range: 2–12 
Average:  7.3–8.9 
Mini:  2–9
Max: 3–12
9
Range: 3–16 
Average: 8.6–9.3
Mini: 3 –16 
Max: 3 –16
8.2
Range: 1–12
Average: 7.9–8.5 
Mini: 1–10 
Max: 1–12
Rice 11.5
Range: 5–16 
Average: 10.6–12.3 
Mini: 5–15 
Max: 6–16
7.9
Range: 3–12 
Average:   7.4–8.4  
Mini:  3–10
Max: 4–12
14
Range: 5–24  
Average: 13.8–14.1 
Mini: 5–24
Max: 5–24
9.5
Range: 3–17
Average: 9.3–9.6 
Mini:  3–17 
Max: 3–17
tomato 9.8
Range: 5–16 
Average: 6.5–13 
Mini: 5–8 
Max: 6–16
5.9
Range: 2–12 
Average: 4–7.7  
Mini: 2–6
Max: 3–12
6.3
Range: 5–10  
Average: 5–7.5 
Mini: 5 
Max: 5 –10
5.7
Range: 3–8
Average: 5–6.3 
Mini: 3–8 
Max: 3–8
forage 21–24 13–15 9–10 7
lettuce 8 5 10 7
A data point has been calculated using simple averages in the table. Given the small 
sample size and the large data variability, the global range, the average range as well as 
the lowest and highest values range are presented.
The average number of years for the development of commercial varieties of wheat 
from landraces or wild species is much higher, i.e. 16.9 years compared to 12.4 for maize; 
11.5 for rice; and 9.8 for tomato. Wheat has also the largest variability, since breeding 
a successful variety can take as long as 50 years, depending on the desired traits, while 
only up to 20 years, 16 years and 13 years are indicated for maize, rice and tomato, 
IdentIfyIng BenefIt flowS 
232 Equity and food for all
respectively. The use of pre-bred or improved material as parent lines shortens the time to 
commercialization by almost seven years to 9.5 for wheat, by four years to 8.1 for maize, 
and by three years to 7.9 for rice and to 5.9 for tomato. Wheat requires the longest time 
on average in comparison to maize, rice, and tomato, with the use of both landraces/wild 
species and pre-bred material. It must be noted, however, that the use of modern breeding 
techniques (such as molecular markers) can reduce the total time period to 4–5 years for 
unimproved material and one year for improved material in some cases. 
The average number of breeding cycles is highest for rice, with 14 and 9.5 cycles for 
landraces/wild species and pre-bred, respectively, whereas wheat has 10.1 and 6.7 average 
cycles, respectively; maize has 9 and 8.2 average cycles, respectively; and tomato has 
the smallest number, 6.3 and 5.7, respectively. Wheat has the highest variability for the 
unimproved material, ranging from 1 to 25, followed by rice, ranging from 5 to 24; maize 
and tomato are much lower, 3 to 16, and 5 to 10, respectively. Improved material displays a 
shorter range, 1 to 16 for wheat; 1 to 12 for maize; 3 to 17 for rice; and 3 to 8 for tomato.
The data provided for forages show the longest development time of all crops (21–24 
years with landraces, 13–15 years with improved material), whereas lettuce has the shortest 
development time, of eight years using landraces and five years with improved material.
Question 2: what do you believe to be the proportion of pre-bred and improved 
materials vs. unimproved materials (landraces, wild species) that are currently 
being used in breeding for each of the following crops?
Table A.4: Results of question 2
Proportion improved (pre-bred): 
unimproved (landraces, wild species)
Range for improved 
materials (%)
Range for 
unimproved 
materials (%)
 Wheat 92: 8 70–100 1–30
 Maize 94: 6 80–100 0–20
 Rice 87: 13 50–98 2–50
 Tomato 87: 13 80–90 10–20
 Forages 98: 2
 Lettuce 90: 10    
All questionnaire responses pointed to a wide use of improved material, 92 percent 
and 94 percent, respectively, for wheat and maize, and about 5 percent less for rice and 
tomato, at 87 percent. Some experts reported that they use up to 100 percent of improved 
material for wheat and maize, and 98 percent for rice, while for tomato, the maximum 
was 90 percent. The proportion of landraces and wild species may increase to up to 50 
percent for rice, while their maximum estimated utilization is 30 percent for wheat, and 
20 for maize and tomato. Forages and lettuce are presented on the basis of a single data 
point only. Forages would be the highest user of improved material with 98 percent while 
lettuce with 90 percent would be slightly above tomato and rice.
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Question 3: Please indicate what you believe to be the average length of time 
that a seed variety remains on sale for each crop.
Table A.5: Results of Question 3
Average length of time (in years) Range
Wheat 7–8 years   2–15
Maize 6–8 years   3–25
Rice 10–11 years  3–30
Tomato 6–9 years   4–15
Lettuce 5 years   
On average, wheat varieties remain on the market for 7–8 years; maize varieties for 
6–8 years; rice varieties a little bit longer, an average of 10–11 years; and tomato varieties, 
6–9 years. As different varieties bring different traits to the market, those with particularly 
desirable characteristics have a much longer market life. This is the case for rice with 
30 years, maize with 25 years and wheat and tomato with 15 years each. There are 
important exceptions like for example one wheat variety in Switzerland which has been on 
the market for 30 years, but this value was not included so as not to distort the average. 
On the lower end of the spectrum, certain wheat varieties remain on the market for only 
two years, certain maize and rice varieties for only three years and a few tomato varieties 
for four years. The single data point for lettuce presents the shortest length of market 
presence. 
Question 4: what do you estimate to be the percentage of materials accessed via 
an SMtA that are currently being used in breeding for the following crops?
 Table A.6: Results of Question 4
Percentage of breeding material that 
was accessed via an SMtA
Range of values for the percentage 
accessed via an SMtA
In all breeding 
programmes
In breeding 
programmes of 
your organization
In all breeding 
programmes
In breeding 
programmes 
of your 
organization
Wheat 8.7 (5.2) 5.4  (2) 0–60 0–60
Maize 7 (2.4) 5.9 (1.5) 0–65 0–40
Rice 12.3 (5.9) 13.3 (7.0) 0–70 0–90
Tomato 6.2 1–10
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Lettuce 3.3
On average, the percentage of breeding materials accessed via an SMTA in all breeding 
programmes is estimated to be 8.7 percent for wheat, 7 percent for maize, 12.3 percent 
for rice and 6.2 percent for tomato. Most figures provided were below 10 percent, but 
one expert estimated it at 60 percent, 65 percent, and 90 percent, respectively, for wheat, 
maize and rice. When this estimate is excluded, the global average is 5.9 percent, 3.0 
percent, and 5.9 percent, respectively. 
The estimate of the percentage of breeding materials accessed via an SMTA in the 
respondents’ organizations was reported at 3 percent and 1 percent lower for wheat 
and maize compared to the percentage given for all breeding programmes, while it was 
reported at 1 percent higher for rice. The single data point for lettuce 3.3 percent is much 
lower than the other crops.
Question 5:  do you think that there is a tendency to avoid use of materials 
brought under SMtA conditions in commercial breeding?
 
Table A.7 Results of Question 5
Answer no. of respondents
Yes 20
No 11
Not available 3
Most of the respondents (20) affirmed the tendency to avoid the use of materials 
brought under SMTA conditions, while 11 disagreed, three of which answered in the 
negative for maize; three respondents did not know.
Some of the reasons given for the lack of a tendency to avoidance were linked to 
the usefulness, quality of material and ease of SMTA exchange, as indicated in the 
following comments received: 
•  If the genetic material accessed through an SMTA is useful to a particular breeding 
programme, then the payment of a royalty will not be an issue.
•  Scientists need to understand the new possibilities offered. Use of such material 
is more for scientific research than for practical breeding, but there is no special 
avoidance of the SMTA.
•  Since the material from gene banks already has a certain age, breeders are unlikely 
to find interesting material. There is a limited knowledge among breeders on what 
material is actually available in a gene bank and what traits this material has. Some 
traits such as disease resistance do not always transfer. Therefore, there is no special 
avoidance; only a generally limited use of material in gene banks among commercial 
breeders.
•  Exchange is important to provide variability if the administrative burden to access it 
is not too high.
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•  For maize in particular, genetic modification is widespread and current techniques 
work with specific alleles found in isogenic lines in order to facilitate introgression 
into elite lines. In this context, the material available via SMTAs is not very interesting, 
but there is no explicit avoidance.
The main reason for avoiding the use of SMTAs is the perception that one thereby 
avoids issues related to rights for commercial use. The uncertainty of the commercial 
results of the incorporation of materials accessed under SMTAs is the main driver 
behind avoiding SMTAs. One respondent noted that this tendency is changing as the 
understanding increases that SMTAs do not call for mandatory benefit sharing if a new 
variety is protected under PVP rather than patents. The implication being that voluntary 
payments are in practice likely to be minimal. Below are some additional rationales 
evoked:
• Firms use their own material.
• Given the unpredictability of success, there is a lack of knowledge about what needs to 
be paid in case of success. Furthermore, if some exotic gene was used initially without 
real added value, it is also costly to get rid of it, thus remaining in the genome and 
calling for payment. Given this uncertainty and the costly tracking that this would be 
required, there is a general tendency of avoidance. Some companies even view this 
uncertainty as an unacceptable business risk except under rare circumstances.
• One company had concerns about the SMTA definition of “available without 
restriction”, the minimum threshold for a genetic resource to be eligible for benefit 
sharing, and benefit sharing in perpetuity. However, it is the cost of compliance due to 
the excessive uncertainties created by the SMTA that make the business risks too great.
•  “We are facing a new situation with the status of genetic resources (GR). On one hand, 
we are very pleased with the Treaty because it is simpler than what has been agreed 
with the CBD. Nevertheless, the new concept of property for the genetic resources is 
impacting the way to do breeding. In the past, we were using GR without any concern 
or restriction. We also did so in our country (France) since varieties are freely accessible 
for further breeding due to the UPOV convention. Now we have to pay more attention 
to the use of genetic resources (GRs). One key point is to evaluate the real interest of 
a GR in a breeding programme. This delays and restricts the introduction of GR in our 
programmes. In addition, the uncertainty about the consequence in terms of ABS also 
limits this use.”
• In wheat breeding, there is so little profit made that no money is available for benefit 
sharing with regard to SMTA-derived varieties. Additionally, resistances that mostly 
come from landraces or wild species are not paid much attention in agricultural 
practice.
• One Asian respondent feared that using SMTA materials may increase the cost of 
developing varieties for the poor farmers.
• For rice, a specific tendency to avoid the SMTA in Thailand was pointed out because 
only one particular rice variety (KDML105, the number one export variety) is to be used 
for research. In another country, avoidance was noted for phytosanitary reasons as well 
as due to a lack of knowledge of the specific performances of the accessions.
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Question 6:  of the world’s total PgR of each of the following crops, what do you 
estimate to be the percentage held by the private sector?
The average percentage of the genetic resources held by the private sector varies 
substantially from country to country, as shown in Table A.8.  
Table A.8 Percentage of genetic resources holdings by country 
 wheat Maize Rice tomato
 Country world Country world Country world Country world
France 70 50 70 80 10 10  
Italy 61 65 91 84 50 47.5 76   65   
Germany 30 15 73 60 n.a. n.a.   
Switzerland 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.   
Norway n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.   
Europe 40 43 78 75 30 29
Australia n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a.   
USA 30 20 80 75 n.a. n.a.   
Kenya 5 15 20 25 1 5   
Argentina 30 30 60 60 30 30   
Peru n.a. n.a. 60 60 n.a. n.a.   
Venezuela n.a. n.a. 99 90 20 20   
Latin America 30 30 73 70 25 25   
China 7 30 20 38 30 50   
Thailand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.   
Asia 7 30 20 38 30 50   
Country average 29 32 64 63 24 27 76 65
Given the small sample size and the predominance of data points for European countries 
compared to other geographical zones, the results are only indicative of the private 
holdings in the country, and the variation of holdings between crops as well as in the 
world. All these estimates are likely to be biased towards Europe. 
The tomato holdings by private sector are the highest, at 76 percent in the country and 
65 percent globally; this was followed by maize, at 64 percent and 63 percent respectively; 
wheat, 29 percent and 32 percent, respectively; and rice, the lowest, at 24 percent and 
27 percent, respectively. It is also interesting to note that the average of the 13 countries 
covered provide an estimate in a similar range than the world estimate. While the figures 
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have to be taken with caution, they nevertheless show that for hybrid plants like tomato 
and maize, holdings tend to be higher in the private sector.
In wheat, France has the highest percentage of resources held by private sector, with an 
estimated 70 percent, followed by Italy at 61 percent, Argentina and US private holdings 
estimated at 30, China at 7 percent, and Kenya at 5 percent. In Switzerland, all research 
is conducted publicly. The world private holdings in wheat are estimated at an average of 
30 percent. 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has the highest percentage of private holdings 
of maize, at 99 percent, followed by Italy at 91 percent, the United States at 80 percent, 
Germany at 73 percent, France at70 percent, Argentina and Peru at 60 percent, and Kenya 
and China at 20 percent. The average world private holdings of maize are estimated at 63. 
The highest percentage of private holding of rice is in Italy at 50 percent, followed by 
Argentina and China at 30 percent; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at 20 percent; and 
finally, Kenya at 1 percent. The world’s private holdings are estimated at 27 percent.
The only estimates available for private resources holdings of tomato have been made 
by Italian experts, at 76 percent for Italy and 65 percent globally.
These figures do not provide a complete worldview, but are indicative of how public 
versus private research is distributed in the countries of the respondents.
A.5 discussion
The questionnaires provide a view from practitioners and are thus extremely helpful as 
another source of information for the algorithm. The results need to be taken with great 
caution due to two major weaknesses in this survey – the small sample size and the 
limitations of the questionnaire. The time to perform the study did not allow to target 
breeders more widely and systematically; hence, the sample size was relatively small. In 
order to facilitate the engagement of experts, the questionnaire was intentionally restricted 
to six major questions.
A.5.1 Sample size
Thirty-four answers were received through different channels. The respondents were 
both from the private and the public sector. Small- and medium-sized enterprises, as well 
as some of the large seed companies were represented from the private sector, which 
shows a general willingness to engage with Treaty work. The current structure of the 
seed sector, where a few large seed companies are dominating the market, led us to try 
to systematically engage with the major companies. Different strategies were adopted, 
and contacts with the major players in the seed market were made both through ISF 
and through a direct initiative by the research team. While we received a few completed 
questionnaires from the largest companies, several others declined to answer. The reasons 
for this were particularly well expressed by this reply: “Unfortunately, it will not be possible 
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for us to answer your questionnaire. The scientists are reluctant to give any information on 
breeding because our company does not allow us to make such communication.”
The five answers received through ISF were anonymous, possibly showing caution from 
some actors in the seed industry towards the study.
In order to increase the sample size as well as the geographic distribution in the future, 
we envisage a more systematic coverage by contacting all national seed associations.
A.5.2 Geographical representation
This study did not focus on having a full geographic coverage. Due to varying climates, 
geography influences the type of traits and crops being considered in breeding; thus, 
geography is likely to influence the length of breeding and number of breeding cycles 
(Question 1). The sample size did not allow such differentiation to be part of the analysis. 
Question 6 results differed widely according to the country of the respondent in terms of 
the holdings between private and public sector of genetic resources. 
The country where the respondent was based corresponded to the country under 
consideration (question 6). The answers have not been differentiated by company size for 
statistical purposes. Since the country was a key factor of differentiation, this should be 
clarified in future work. In order to capture the geographical difference, large companies 
having a presence in different countries could have several answers where they specify 
their location. This would have to be weighted by their relative importance in the country, 
and an exact methodology remains be determined in order not to outweigh the answers 
of smaller companies.
A.5.3 Limitations of the Questionnaire
Some respondents found that it was difficult to answer the questionnaire because several 
of the questions included ambiguities.
Question 1 particularly needs to be modified in order to be more specific and to allow for 
several possible answers: 
1. It was pointed out that ‘landraces’ and ‘wild species’ are not the same. A definition 
should be provided and the two terms used separately since they require for different 
answers.
2. ‘Pre-bred and improved’ should be defined. It was suggested to include another 
distinction between ‘improved’ and ‘elite lines’.
3. The question should allow a specification of the type of wheat. Durum wheat and soft 
wheat results are different. Winter wheat and spring wheat also require a different 
commercialization time.
4. The type of breeding technique used, for example, the use of marker, can shorten 
the commercialization time. Reference to the specific techniques is extremely 
important because it can have a huge impact on the data (Question 1 as well as 
Questions 2 and 3). 
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Question 2 should refer to the definition of terms landrace, wild race, pre-bred, 
unimproved and improved.
Question 3 should allow for information specific to the market of reference since the 
average time the crop remains on sale will depend on the country. Question 6 should allow 
for specific information on the country of reference of the respondent (see geographic 
representation).
The ambiguities of the questions were partly a result of the fact that the questionnaire 
was purposely designed to minimize the time involvement of industry experts, and hence 
simplified and shortened the issues at hand. The questions were of technical nature and 
not on the company information itself, except Question 4b. Given the ambiguities in the 
questions and the potential reluctance of some companies to answer, it is also possible 
that some of the data are underestimated; the sample size did not make it possible to 
analyse this.
A.5.4 Use of SMTA
Several respondents of Question 5 questioned the value of the genetic resources available 
under SMTAs. It would hence be important to improve the accessibility of information 
with regard to the genetic resources available under SMTA by having a better reference 
to the type of resources, traits and age of the material in order to better communicate its 
value and thereby facilitate the use of the material in the Multilateral System. 
The uncertainty of the results of the use of SMTA material was a key impeding factor 
linked to the uncertainty about the fees associated with the use of SMTA. Furthermore, 
it was indicated that, at times, genetic materials might be used initially, but not actually 
bring any valuable traits to the final plant variety in the end, and yet, removal of such 
material is impractical. Hence, if such material was accessed by means of an SMTA, 
payment provisions would still apply. This uncertainty is the main factor of avoidance 
of use of SMTA. A different payment system could be explored to minimize such 
uncertainty.
A.6 Conclusion
Despite all these weaknesses, this preliminary survey enabled an initial appraisal of the 
use of PGR for food and agriculture in plant breeding, which is required for the modelling 
of benefit flows to be expected under the Treaty. It is an important part of the research 
project “Identifying the potential monetary and non-monetary benefits arising from the 
utilization of PGR under the Multilateral System of the International Plant Treaty”, since 
it will enable a confrontation of the practitioners’ views with the results of the algorithm 
simulation and data gathered elsewhere.
IdentIfyIng BenefIt flowS 
240 Equity and food for all
The following are some of the areas to be considered for future work, as suggested by the 
answers received: 
•  Revise the questionnaire to be more specific in its terminology as suggested, and especially 
to include the subcategory of the crops (e.g. winter wheat), the countries of reference, 
and to distinguish between type of plant breeding technologies used.
•  Expand the questionnaire to cover the other Annex 1 crops. 
•  Engage the plant breeding sector more broadly in order to validate the information and to 
open dialogue on the SMTA funding mechanism. As such, the result of this survey as well 
as the initial estimates from the algorithm provide a concrete basis and should reassure 
the seed industry, thus promoting a greater engagement in the future. It provided an 
initial contact. Creating an open communication channel with the SMTA system users to 
better understand their perspectives is extremely important. This would allow the SMTA 
system to be adapted, if needed, to better serve the goals of the seed industry while 
achieving the Treaty’s goals to protect genetic resources and farmers’ rights and while 
contributing to the benefit-sharing mechanism. 
•  The passport data of the genetic resources available for use with SMTA should be improved 
and information should be better disseminated to the potential users. Having a strong 
communication strategy would facilitate the use of the material.
As an initial step to engaging the plant breeding sector, this survey is important. However, 
it must be carried much further, beyond the study, to become a usual way of operating. 
Setting up an open dialogue channel between the Treaty, the various gene banks and the 
plant breeding sector is essential for the various partners to better understand each other, 
and in order to more accurately value the benefits of the available genetic resources and of 
the Treaty work in general.
A.7 list of respondents
 
We would like to thank all the experts, institutions and companies who answered the survey. 
1 Argentina INTA
2 Australia Nufarm Australia Ltd.
3 China CAAS
4 China Yunnan Academy
5 France BAYER
6 France Limagrain
7 France RAGT
8 France Secobra
9 France Syngenta
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10 Germany Dow AgroSciences
11 Germany DSV Saaten
12 Germany Maisadour
13 Italy Agricultural University of Perugia
14 Italy Agricultural University of Pisa
15 Italy Agricultural Research Council (CRA)
16 Italy Agricultural Research Council (CRA)
17 Italy CGS Sementi Spa
18 Italy INRAN-ENSE
19 Italy ISTA Sementi
20 Italy ISI Sementi
21 Italy Pro Sementi
22 Kenya Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, Mwea-Tebere
23 Norway Nordgen (Nordic Council)
24 Peru CGIAR
25 Switzerland Agroscope
26 Switzerland Agroscope
27 Thailand Kasetsart University
28 USA Monsanto
29 Venezuela Fundación Danac Venezuela
30 ISF members
31 ISF members
32 ISF members
33 ISF members
34 ISF members
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Appendices
Appendices to Chapter 1
Appendix 1.1 Search-theoretic frameworks
Search-theoretic frameworks attempt to simulate the stochastic nature of breeding 
research and they successes and failures. When the probability of failure is non-zero, 
the search must be conducted in order to determine whether particular genetic traits 
may be useful. Thus, the search process may be time-consuming and costly due to all 
the activities required for the trait evaluation, such as molecular screening or agronomic 
tests (set by Zohrabian et al., 2003, at approximately $7 per accession, per single trait), 
in addition to the acquisition-transaction costs. This aspect of the research enterprise 
is worth emphasizing because often the germplasm stored in public gene banks lacks 
detailed information concerning genetic characterization and the likelihood that a single 
accession will be useful. In addition, breeding outcomes can be quite unpredictable 
because of the unpredictable nature of genotype environment interactions. The search 
methodology assigns a present value to the expected future benefits of the research 
activity wherein benefits are compared to costs in order to optimize the search activity. In 
the specific case of PGR for food and agriculture, the probability of discovering a valuable 
trait during the search process is combined with its expected yield enhancement effects 
in order to evaluate the worth of a single germplasm accession.
Seminal work of Evenson and Kislev (1976) gave impetus to several studies in valuing 
genetic stocks through this approach. This methodology, which is the first to apply 
search theory to genetic resource evaluation, has roots grounded in a classic paper 
by Stigler (1961), who models consumer demand when a consumer, facing a price 
proposition, is uncertain as to whether it is a minimum among possible alternatives. It 
is worth mentioning that this basic idea of Stigler (1961) spawned a large and growing 
literature related to job search, unemployment and related macroeconomic phenomena. 
An introduction to search formal analysis is contained in Sargent (1987) and Rogerson 
et al. (2005) present a recent literature survey on the subject. In the context of genetic 
resources, Evenson and Kislev (1976) consider the discovery of sugar-cane varieties and 
model search within a distribution of the genetic trait – the random variable of interest 
– and assume that research effort can shift the mean of the distribution, change the 
variance or generate new distributions when new technologies are discovered. In their 
context, it is possible to determine an optimal search strategy, and evaluate the impact 
that a gene stock might have, at least conceptually.
A subsequent application by Gollin et al. (2000) extends the basic idea that search, 
which is costly, generates potential benefits and that these benefits have probability 
distributions attached to them. By exploiting the basic principle that the marginal cost of 
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an accession search should never exceed the marginal expected benefit that it generates, 
the authors simulated a search process and conducted Monte Carlo experiments, 
drawing probability distributions for the ‘useful’ trait from the Monte Carlo simulations. 
Gollin et al. (2000) evaluate the optimal size of a ‘search’ for a genetic trait, judging 
the usefulness of large collections characterized by low utilization, modelling the search 
for a resistance trait in wheat germplasm. Significantly, they note that a gene bank’s 
existence value is justified, despite possible infrequent utilization whenever maintained 
traits are rare and economically relevant. Clearly, determining the latter is sometimes 
very difficult, given the data constraints that typically occur.
Notwithstanding this feature of the data-generating environment, search theory has 
inspired several noteworthy recent contributions. For example, with reference to crop 
breeding, Zohrabian et al. (2003) estimate the marginal value of the genetic material 
held in the U.S. National Plant Germplasm System. The genesis of their work is the 
common denominator in the contributions exploring search, namely the notion that 
search, which is costly, generates potential benefits. Exploiting this notion, they employ 
maximum entropy methods to estimate research success probabilities of discovering the 
trait for resistance to soybean cyst nematode. Data on soybean prices and area planted 
are used in order to evaluate the present value of the benefits deriving from search. 
Finally, the authors determine that even when the marginal values of accessions are low, 
they may still outweigh their maintenance costs.
Along similar lines, Simpson et al. (1999) assess the probability for a marginal species 
to be used in a commercial product for pharmaceutical purposes. They consider the 
search process as a sequence of Bernoulli trials in which the outcome is a discrete 
random variable assuming one of the two results, namely ‘success’ or ‘failure’. The 
Bernoulli distributions adapt well to simulate the search for both qualitative (discrete) 
and quantitative genetic traits. Even if the characteristic of the quantitative trait is 
a continuous outcome, by imposing a threshold value it can be easily adapted to a 
Bernoulli trials; success if the value exceeds the threshold and failure otherwise. They 
use their model to assess the marginal economic value of a single ‘species’ held in-situ. 
The authors conclude that, in general, genetic resources stocks are characterized by low 
value and diminished attractiveness for pharmaceutical purposes.
Using the search-theoretic framework, it is possible to derive a function of germplasm 
demand, and therefore to infer factors determining the distribution of germplasm. 
Any changes in trends of distribution of PGR for food and agriculture reflect changes 
arising in the perceived costs and benefits of sourcing accessions. Following this idea, 
Gotor and Caracciolo (2010) empirically analysed the influence of a change in policy 
environment (the 1994 In-Trust Agreements, or ITAs, signed by the CGIAR Centres with 
FAO, under the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, the non-binding 
predecessor of the Treaty) on the genetic stocks’ distribution held by IRRI. Empirical 
analysis suggested that demand of IRRI accessions benefitted the establishment of a 
stable policy environment provided by the ITAs.
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Appendix 1.2 Returns to plant breeding
Several recent empirical studies (e.g. Alene et al., 2009; Maredia et al., 2010; Brennan 
and Malabayabas, 2011) focus their effort only on the estimation of the direct use value 
of crop germplasm stocks, valuing the monetary benefits of breeding resulting from the 
improvement of crop varieties on agricultural productivity, or as a result of cost reduction. 
These studies also focus on the overall plant breeding research, because it becomes trickier 
for economists to separate the contribution of human capital from that of the unimproved 
genetic resources’ contribution in the breeding and genetic selection activity. For the 
above reason, many authors prefer simply to focus the study on ‘genetic enhancement’ 
valuation (Rubenstein et al., 2005). The basic idea behind these studies is simple: ‘genetic 
enhancement’ generates benefits when the resulting improved crops are effectively 
adopted and grown by farmers.
From an empirical point of view, the economic benefit of ‘genetic enhancement’ has 
been often measured using the Griliches (1958) approximation:  the benefits are measured 
by the value of production (P⋅Q), where P is the price and Q is the produced quantity 
of the crops, multiplied by the proportional gain in yield (k) associated with the crop 
improvement (Pardey et al., 2006):
(4) Benefit = k P Q
In order to assign a specific contribution k to the evaluated genetic resource, several 
approaches have been applied, most of which refer to hedonic price modelling and 
“breeding production function” analysis (Evenson et al., 1998; Milne et al., 2002).
A hedonic approach makes use of a resource’s market value, through regression 
estimation of the explicit price of the tradable product against the implicit prices of the 
non-marketable good’s individual attributes. An analogous principle has been applied by 
Evenson and Gollin (1997) to assign the contribution of the International Rice Germplasm 
Collection at IRRI.
Pardey et al. (2006) applied two different rules to assess the incidence of a crop 
improvement in the pedigrees of crop varieties, namely, the ‘last-cross’ rule and the 
geometric rule.
a) “Last-cross rule. This rule gives all the credit for a particular variety to the breeder who 
produced it, none to its parents that still exist as varieties in their own right. This is a 0 or 
1 index, which is 1 for varieties (or breeding lines) released by the program and 0 for all 
others”.
b) “Geometric rule. This rule uses a geometrically declining set of weights, mimicking 
somewhat the share of genetic material carried forward from earlier nodes in the pedigree 
into the present variety according to Mendel’s law of heredity. When the allocation stops 
at generation G, 1/2(2G) of the benefits are attributed to that generation, in order to 
arrive at attribution shares that sum to 1. Thus, applying the rule through the level of 
grandparents, 1/23 (that is 1/8) of the benefit would be attributed to the breeders of 
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each of the parents (generation 1) and 1/24 (that is 1/16) to the breeders of each of the 
grandparents (generation 2).”
Finally, Brennan and Malabayabas (2011) employed a simpler ‘rule of thumb’ approach, 
as can be seen in Table a.1.2, to attribute the IRRI contribution to commercial rice varieties, 
given limited data availability.
table a.1.2 IRRI contribution to varieties released
origin of variety IRRI contribution 
IRRI cross with two IRRI lines as parents 100
IRRI cross with one IRRI line as a parent 50
IRRI cross with no IRRI lines as parents 0
NARES cross with two IRRI lines as parents 100
NARES cross with one IRRI line as a parent 50
NARES cross with other IRRI ancestry 25
NARES cross without IRRI connection 0
Source: Brennan and Malabayas, 2011.
Although there is merit in the simplicity of the approach, several empirical problems occur 
in applied works, which, according to Morris and Heisey (2003), can be grouped in three 
categories: (i) problems in estimating the effective magnitude and the dynamics of the 
improved crop adoption; (ii) problems in estimating the specific benefits of the improved 
crop; and (iii) problems involved in considering research lags and research spillovers. Alston 
et al. (2010) note that identifying the ‘by whom’ part of the attribution problem and 
the lag structure involved in the research processes (the ‘when’ part) represents a ‘tricky 
business’.
Problems related to the first area include specifically the identification of the varieties 
produced by the ‘genetic enhancement’ through time: genetic changes may occur 
intentionally or not over successive generations of crop grown from replanting seeds. 
Although the area planted to the specific varieties at a given point in time may be evaluated 
through seed sales data and survey micro-data (Morris and Heisey, 2003), the rate of crop 
adoption and diffusion varies over time with several unpredictable factors, most notably 
pest infestations, pedoclimatic changes, seed premiums, crop prices and all the related 
structural economic factors.
As concerns the problems stated in (ii), attributing the right agronomic gains to the 
conserved germplasm used in a crop production system seems empirically highly 
problematic (Pardey et al., 2001). Although during experimental yield trials the agronomic 
gains associated with the introduction of a variety causing higher crop production or lower 
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tilling costs may be easily observable, in the open field, several components can interact 
with each other, enhancing or thwarting the effects. This makes it hard to separate the 
productive gain resulting from the breeding activity from new agricultural adoptions, 
changes in crop management practices, and specific climatic and soil characteristics. This 
is why, according to Pardey et al. (2001), methodologies developed to date are mainly 
unreliable.
The last set of problems, (iii), refers to the fact that ‘genetic enhancement’ is a continuous 
process wherein new varieties are bred by crossing already enhanced parents. Since 
improved crops are often the product of generations of informal innovations (Drucker 
et al., 2005), overall benefits are increased by the existence of research spillovers, but 
problems occur in attributing the share of a specific stream of benefits to all the different 
contributors (Pardey et al., 2006). An outstanding example of latter is represented by the 
sorghum variety S 35, developed from the ICRISAT breeding programme in India, and later 
advanced and promoted in Cameroon and Chad (Yapi et al., 1999).
Appendix 1.3 Examples of CGIAR collection impacts
Centre output outcome Ultimate impact
CIMMYT The CIMMYT-derived 
wheat varieties make 
better use of water 
and nutrients, are 
more tolerant of 
environmental stresses, 
and possess durable 
resistance to diseases.
New varieties that reduce 
the amount of fertilizer and 
pesticides that farmers apply 
to their fields.
Increasing yields, bringing environmental, 
economic and health benefits.
In developing countries, some 55 million ha 
are now sown to CIMMYT-based bread 
wheat, representing 80 of production.
ICRISAT Pigeon pea variety 
resistant to fusarium 
wilt
The variety now holds sway 
in the wilt-epidemic regions 
of India through farmer-to-
farmer distribution of seeds.
Increasing yields. The variety also out-
yielded the best cultivar previously 
available by about 57 percent. It reduced 
the unit cost to farmers by 42 percent 
and added a value of $62 million to 
the Indian economy. The variety is now 
extensively used in the wilt-epidemic 
regions of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra through farmer-to-farmer 
seed distribution.
ICRISAT Researchers from 
Cameroon selected 
the drought-resistant 
sorghum variety S35 
from the collection held 
by the Centre
During the 1984 drought 
in northern Cameroon, 
scientists recorded a yield 
of 1 300 kg per ha for S35, 
compared with 719 kg  
per ha for the farmers’ local 
variety – a gain of  
85 percent. This was 
achieved without the use of 
irrigation or fertilizers.
Supporting livelihoods in marginal 
environments. By 1995, S35 covered 
around 44 000 ha in Cameroon and 
64 000 in Chad – around 32% and 27%, 
respectively, of each countries’ rainfed 
sorghum areas.
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WARDA NERICA (New Rice 
for Africa) varieties 
combine the high yields 
of Asian rice with the 
suitability of African rice 
to the continent’s harsh 
growing conditions.
About 150 000 ha across 
the continent are planted 
with NERICA varieties.
Supporting livelihoods in marginal 
environments. Numerous reports from 
sub-Saharan Africa document the positive 
impact of the new rice on the livelihoods 
of farm families.
CIP CIP developed 40 new 
varieties of the orange-
fleshed sweet potato 
that have high levels 
of beta-carotene and 
are well adapted to 
growing conditions in 
Africa.
These were distributed to 
farmers and consumers 
in several countries 
and awareness-raising 
campaigns and community 
education programmes were 
carried out, focusing on the 
health of young children.
Combating human and crop diseases; 
approximately 50 million children under 
six could benefit from this.
IITA/
CIAT
Cassava varieties 
resistant to the major 
pests and diseases that 
occur in Africa.
In 1996, IITA distributed 
plantlets from 308 new 
clones held in tissue culture 
to national institutes for test 
planting by farmers in East, 
Southern, West and Central 
Africa.
Combating human and crop diseases. 
Farmers reported yields up to five times 
greater than many susceptible varieties 
damaged by disease.
ICARDA Seven new pest and 
disease-resistant faba 
bean varieties for 
cultivation in the diverse 
environments in the 
Nile Valley region.
Development of the new 
varieties.
Combating human and crop diseases. The 
new variety stemmed yield losses and, 
by 1983, self-sufficiency in faba bean 
production was restored. By 1996, Egypt 
was able to export the crop and is now 
the world’s third-highest producer of faba 
beans.
CIAT/IITA
Bioversity/
ICRISAT/
IRRI/ICRAF
During the 1991 war 
in Rwanda, the Centres 
helped aid agencies 
obtain good quality 
seed of appropriate 
crop varieties for large-
scale multiplication and 
targeted distribution to 
farmers in need.
ICRAF assisted returning 
refugees by training 
students, field technicians 
and farmers who would play 
leading roles in rehabilitating 
the country’s agriculture.
Helping communities recover from natural 
disasters and human conflicts.
IRRI Scientists had collected 
more than 750 rice 
accessions when 
the Khmer Rouge 
were gaining power, 
adding them to the 
55 Cambodian rice 
varieties already in 
the IRRI gene bank. 
These materials were 
duplicated and the 
duplicates eventually 
repatriated to 
Cambodia.
IRRI scientists collected an 
additional 3 800 traditional 
rice varieties as well as 
1 100 wild rice accessions 
in cooperation with 
Cambodian researchers
Helping communities recover from natural 
disasters and human conflicts.
IRRI As a response to the 
2004 Tsunami, IRRI, 
which had more than 
40 salt-tolerant rice 
varieties, answered calls 
for assistance, providing 
six tolerant varieties 
suited to the hard-hit 
countries.
Since then, Sri Lanka’s and 
Malaysia’s rice production 
has increased by 70%, 
and for the past ten years, 
it has produced small rice 
surpluses for export
Helping communities recover from natural 
disasters and human conflicts.
Source: SGRP. Available at: http://www.sgrp.cgiar.org/?q=impact  
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Appendix 1.4 types of non-monetary benefit
 (Visser et al., 2005) 
exchange of 
information
Information on collaborative efforts
Sharing of research and development results
Access to databases
General sharing of information relevant for conservation and use
Access to scientific information relevant to conservation and use of plant genetic
Resources for food and agriculture
Improved knowledge of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
Improved knowledge of natural environment
Access to and 
transfer of 
technology
Access to materials
Access to collections
Access to products
Access to commercially released varieties for further research and breeding
Access to relevant technologies
Transfer of knowledge and technology 
Transfer of equipment, software, know-how
Joint ventures for the creation of technological foundations
Participation in product development
Participation in planning and decision- making
Undertaking commercial production, processing or manufacture
Creation of alternative industries or crops
Partnership in the economic exploitation of processes and products
Sharing of rights
Joint ownership or sole ownership of intellectual property rights
Free licensing for the utilization of patented processes and products 
Capacity 
building
Cooperation in scientific research and development programmes
Facilitation of research partnerships
Formation of collaborative agreements with local institutions
Co-operative scientific research and technological development
Consolidation of scientific research infrastructure
Providing institution conducting fields trials
Research directed to priority needs, such as food security
Participation of source country scientists in research
Cooperation in conservation efforts
In-kind support for conservation (e.g. genebank facilities)
Benefits in kind e.g. augmentation of national collections
Increased opportunities for developing multilateral strategies for conservation and use 
Voucher specimens to be left in national institutions
Cooperation in education and training
Training in bio-prospecting methods etc.
Training in science, in situ and ex situ conservation and management, information
Technology and management/administration of ABS
Institutional capacity –building
Increased scientific capacity
Strengthening capacities for technology transfer 
Investment in research and development infrastructure 
Investment in the capacity of local industry
Undertaking commercial production, processing or manufacture
Resources for the implementation of access regulations
Institutional and professional relationships
Exchange of staff
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 Appendix 1.5  Interdependence of genetic resources
As can be seen in Table a.1.5.1, the main staple foods, largely covered in Annex I, 
represent, on average, 70 of all the dietary energy supply in developing countries. The 
relevance of crop germplasm collections increases when considering that all countries are 
heavily dependent on PGR for food and agriculture from other regions (according to some 
estimates, by more than 50) (Palacios, 1998; Fowler and Hodgkin, 2004), which is likely 
to increase in the future under climate change (Jarvis et al., 2011). Gollin (1998) analysed 
the pedigrees of 1709 rice varieties, discovering that more than 90 of the parents of the 
investigated varieties come from other countries (Table a.1.5.2).
A common example in literature is provided by Sonalika wheat variety developed by 
CIMMYT and largely used in breeding programmes (Srinivasan, 2003; Smolders, 2005):  
its pedigree includes more than 30 parents from more than 15 countries, demonstrating 
again the entity of countries interdependence and the importance of access, use and 
exchange of PGFRA to agriculture and food security (Fowler and Hodgkin, 2004).
table a.1.5.1. dietary energy supply (deS) of main staple foods
 total food
Vegetable 
products Cereals wheat Rice Maize Roots Pulses oilcrops
 
kcal per 
capita 
per day
des (%) des (%) des (%) des (%) des (%) des (%) des (%) des (%)
World 2 796 82.8 55.7 22.9 23.0 6.0 6.0 2.6 2.3
Net food-
importing 
developing 
countries
2 326 90.1 60.0 18.2 22.6 11.6 9.7 4.2 1.9
Least developed 
countries
2 157 93.0 61.6 8.3 30.0 11.7 13.0 4.5 2.2
Eastern Africa 2 045 92.9 53.6 8.8 7.3 24.6 17.2 6.7 1.8
Central Africa 1 860 95.2 34.4 7.0 5.7 13.5 37.7 3.1 4.1
Northern Africa 3 016 88.9 65.5 39.2 6.3 11.3 2.3 2.4 1.4
Southern Africa 2 918 86.3 62.0 18.6 7.2 34.3 3.1 1.4 0.9
Western Africa 2 649 95.5 49.2 5.6 12.8 8.9 19.2 3.8 3.4
Source: Authors, based on FAO, 2007.
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table a.1.5.2. Summary of international flows of rice landrace ancestors in 
selected countries
Country total landrace progenitors in all released varieties own landraces
Borrowed 
landraces
Bangladesh 233 4 229
Brazil 460 80 380
Myanmar 442 31 411
China 888 157 731
India 3 917 1 559 2 358
Indonesia 463 43 420
Nepal 142 2 140
Nigeria 195 15 180
Pakistan 195 0 195
Philippines 518 34 484
Sri Lanka 386 64 322
Taiwan 20 3 17
Thailand 154 27 127
United States 325 219 106
Viet Nam 517 20 497
Source: Gollin, 1998.
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Appendix 2 PVP certificates granted for Annex I crops/genera in UPOV member 
countries
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Food 
Cereal Oat Avena 0 10 26 37 58 66 123 192 190 208 81 991
Cereal Finger millet Eleusine 0
Cereal Barley Hordeum 1 26 64 136 267 327 578 708 697 752 212 3768
Cereal Rice Oryza 13 50 86 119 191 421 321 144 1345
Cereal Pearl millet Pennisetum 2 3 1 1 7
Cereal Rye Secale 5 8 13 18 47 81 76 58 18 324
Cereal Sorghum Sorghum 3 3 26 83 63 85 123 60 446
Cereal Triticale Triticosecale 1 4 18 77 106 115 165 38 524
Cereal Wheat Triticum 8 93 136 320 403 688 1065 1282 1527 474 5996
Cereal Maize Zea 4 180 380 631 1605 1984 1855 1649 554 8842
Fruit Breadfruit Artocarpus
Fruit Strawberry Fragaria 24 29 51 85 240 281 316 321 97 1444
Fruit Apple Malus 2 7 11 57 142 249 411 415 436 116 1846
Fruit Banana/ plantain Musa 1 2 9 1 2 15
Oilseed Brassica complex Brassica 0 1 18 60 124 204 386 917 792 921 412 3835
Oilseed Coconut Cocos 0
Oilseed Sunflower Helianthus 15 49 239 523 593 355 348 125 2247
Pulse Pigeon pea Cajanus 1 1
Pulse Chickpea Cicer 4 16 8 19 6 53
Pulse Citrus Citrus 34 28 35 49 56 129 31 362
Pulse Grass pea Lathyrus 1 7 1 1 2 10 23 4 49
Pulse Lentil Lens 1 0 5 5 6 12 6 35
Pulse
Faba bean / 
Vetch Vicia 6 8 11 66 81 96 80 80 18 446
Pulse Cowpea et al. Vigna 2 4 7 12 11 13 15 7 71
Root and 
tuber Major aroids Colocasia 1 2 0 1 3 1 8
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Root and 
tuber Major aroids Xanthosoma 0
Root and 
tuber Yams Dioscorea 1 3 6 11 4 0 25
Root and 
tuber Sweet Potato Ipomoea 2 11 5 15 33 47 33 146
Root and 
tuber Cassava Manihot 0
Root and 
tuber Potato Solanum 1 22 104 142 265 353 668 1133 886 1049 378 5001
Vegetable Asparagus Asparagus 0 0 0 3 1 7 12 26 32 25 12 118
Vegetable Beet Beta 0 3 15 30 25 59 55 89 174 100 38 588
Vegetable Brassica complex Armoracia 1 1
Vegetable Brassica complex Barbarea
Vegetable Brassica complex Camelina, 4 8 1 2 3 18
Vegetable Brassica complex Crambe 6 2 5 3 16
Vegetable Brassica complex Diplotaxis 4 1 5
Vegetable Brassica complex Eruca 2 6 8
Vegetable Brassica complex Isatis 0
Vegetable Brassica complex Lepidium 1 1 1 0 1 0 4
Vegetable Brassica complex Raphanobrassica 0
Vegetable Brassica complex Raphanus 32 24 47 73 83 111 56 426
Vegetable Brassica complex Rorippa 0
Vegetable Brassica complex Sinapis 3 5 16 22 41 45 37 16 185
Vegetable Carrot Daucus 1 2 5 21 16 37 45 63 48 238
Vegetable Beans Phaseolus 2 79 140 152 219 376 291 367 336 108 2070
Vegetable Pea Pisum 3 71 129 174 258 434 461 452 369 115 2466
Vegetable Eggplant Solanum 5 15 5 17 53 19 114
Forage
Grass  Andropogon gayanus 1 1
Grass Agropyron 1 4 2 0 7
Grass Agrostis tenuis 6 5 6 5 15 28 34 45 2 146
Grass Alopecurus pratensis 2 1 1 1 4 1 0 10
Grass Arrhenatherum elatius 1 2 1 0 1 0 5
Grass Dactylis glomerata 1 5 12 6 20 43 38 27 6 158
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Grass Festuca 7 17 40 84 138 165 194 249 247 56 1197
Grass Lolium 4 22 76 164 251 337 458 445 444 139 2340
Grass Phalaris 1 0 3 4 8 4 4 4 28
Grass Phleum 2 8 9 13 14 32 26 32 4 140
Grass Poa 1 1 15 37 37 68 65 67 123 89 29 532
Grass Tripsacum laxum 1 2 0 3
Grass Atriplex 1 1
Grass Salsola vermiculata 0
Legume Astragalus Chinensis 2 2
Legume Astragalus Cicer 1 1
Legume Astragalus arenarius 0 0
Legume Canavalia ensiformis 0
Legume Coronilla varia 0
Legume Hedysarum coronarium 1 2 1 0 0 4
Legume Lathyrus cicera 0
Legume Lathyrus ciliolatus 0
Legume Lathyrus hirsutus 0
Legume Lathyrus ochrus 0
Legume Lathyrus odoratus 2 8 6 21 3 40
Legume Lathyrus sativus 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 9
Legume Lespedeza 2 2 4
Legume Lotus 1 0 2 3 5 8 6 3 2 30
Legume Lupinus 2 0 2 7 20 52 47 57 12 199
Legume Medicago 8 18 33 66 123 166 86 65 13 578
Legume Melilotus 1 0 1 1 0 3
Legume Onobrychis viciifolia 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 6
Legume Ornithopus sativus 2 1 4 4 3 2 16
Legume Prosopis pallida 0
Legume Pueraria phaseo-loides 0
Legume Trifolium 15 13 24 28 55 108 147 99 28 517
Total Annex1 
crops 3 89 608
1 
298
2 
465
3 
917 7 352 10 153
10 
161
10 
468 3 547 50 061
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All crops All crops 4 124 965
2 
313
5 
560
10 
283 20 122 28 916
33 
196
35 
599
11 
321
148 
403
Share of Annex I 75 72 63 56 44 38 37 35 31 29 31 34
Source: UPOV PLUTO PVO Database.
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Appendices to Chapter 3
 
Appendix 3.1 Values used in Scenario 1:  the current situation
Table a.3.1.1 World crop genetic resources and material available under SMTAs
 
Table a.3.1.1 lists the information available, per crop/crop group, for H (ex situ holdings, 
by country or international institution); (π, the percentage of H known to be available for 
access under an SMTA); and H*π (holdings actually available). This is the basic set of data 
that the model manipulates to project the build-up of SMTA material in the breeding pool, 
and from that, the build-up of products containing material accessed from the Multilateral 
System in the product pool, and the partition of the annual market values of seeds and 
plant materials of the crops/crop groups, C1–C5.
The sum of all H = the sum of all C, that is, all world ex situ holdings of accessions of 
PGR for food and agriculture. These data are drawn from the World Information and Early 
Warning System (WIEWS).1 These are the same, slightly updated data that were used in 
SoWPGR-2.2 
H*π is established, for the Annex 1 (C1–C4) holdings of Contracting Parties, on the 
basis of notifications to the Secretariat of material made available through the Multilateral 
System,3 in accordance with Treaty Article 11.2.4 In most cases, the notifications did not 
provide actual figures for H*π, but provided references to websites where the information 
was available, which have been analysed in order to populate the table. For countries 
in the European Region, the information in EURISCO5 was used, because it indicates 
materials offered for access from the Multilateral System. For international institutions 
that have concluded an Article 15 agreement with the Treaty, it is assumed that π = 100.
It should be noted that the countries’ notifications vary widely, by country and by crop/
crop group. This is an indication of limitations to the accuracy of projections by the model, 
stemming from less than complete data on either C or H.
For the countries known to be releasing C5 materials under the terms and conditions 
of the SMTA, information on H*π for C5 is included in Table a.3.1.1. In Europe, these 
countries are: Armenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Romania, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
1    Available at: www.fao.org/agriculture/crops/core-themes/theme/seeds-pgr/wiews/en.
2   Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, FAO, Rome, 2010, Table A2, Germplasm 
collections by crop, pp. 244-283. These figures are as at 28 December 2009.
3   Available at: www.planttreaty.org/inclusions.
4   “The Multilateral System … shall include all plant genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I 
that are under the management and control the Contracting Parties and in the public domain.”
5   Available at: www.eurisco.ecpgr.org.
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Norway and Sweden), the situation is nuanced. These countries hold most of their PGR 
for food and agriculture in common, in the Nordic Gene bank. The Nordic Council of 
Ministers decided that “the Nordic Gene Bank should provide access to all its accessions 
on equal terms, regardless of whether they are covered by the scope of the multilateral 
system of the IT-PGRFA or not.”6 In implementing this, however, the Nordic Gene Bank is 
using a separate material transfer agreement (MTA, which does not distinguish between 
products to which mandatory monetary benefit-sharing applies (i.e. the provisions of 
SMTA Article 6.7) and those to which voluntary benefit-sharing applies (i.e. the provisions 
of SMTA Article 6.8), but applies the provisions of SMTA Article 6.8 to both. Canada 
has informed the Secretariat that the “[P]lant genetic resources [in the collections that it 
indicated] are available under the terms of the whether they are within the MLS or not.” 
Table a.3.1.2: Examples of countries making non-Annex 1 materials available 
with SMTAs
C1–C4 
Annex 1
C5 
non-Annex 1
Canada (releases, July 2008 to June 2010) 87 13
Germany (releases, July 2010 to June 2011) 41 59
NorGen (releases, 2011) 69 31
The volume of C5 materials being distributed under an SMTA is creating a substantial 
potential income for the Benefit-sharing Fund.
α: Introduction of material into the breeding pool (C)
C1 
Wheat
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
Other Annex 1
C5 
Non-Annex 1
4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
 
α is calculated from SoWPGR-2,7 which provides information on the distribution of 
germplasm by Ethiopia, China, India, Japan, Germany, Pakistan, Poland, Switzerland and 
the CGIAR. Taking into account only countries, annual distributions/H*π = 6.7. The figure 
for the CGIAR is 3.3. A weighted average for countries and CGIAR combined (allowing for 
the relative numbers of accessions each holds) is 4.2. It is assumed to be the same for all 
crops/crop groups and to be a good proxy for the rate of introduction of material.
α comprises three elements: non-SMTA materials (α1), SMTA materials from national 
collections (α2), and from international institutions (α3).
For the purposes of Scenario 1 (run 1), it is assumed that materials that Contracting 
Parties have not yet designated as being in the Multilateral System are not being distributed. 
6   By Nordic Ministerial Declaration, Access and Rights to Genetic Resources, 2003.
7 Section 3.9, Germplasm movement, pp. 84-86.
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υ : Avoidance
C1 
wheat 
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
other Annex 1
C5 
non-Annex 1
Standard 5 5 5 + 13 5 0
High 10 10 10 + 26 10 0
Value-based 10 10 10 + 57 10 0
 
Studies 3 and 5 consider the likelihood of breeders and breeding companies avoiding the 
use of materials that must be accessed under an SMTA. 
This factor is constructed to contain two elements, a ‘background rate’ of avoidance 
for all crops/crop groups except C5, which is set to 0, plus a specific rate for maize. 
This is because the likelihood of avoidance is highest where intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) over commercial products are most prevalent, and give rise to mandatory payment 
obligations, which is the case for maize: “An important factor … is the significant share 
(26) of transgenic maize in the global maize area. … transgenic (GM) varieties are invariably 
protected by patents rather than PVP” (p. 58).
Three levels of avoidance, υ, are tested in scenario 6. The ‘standard’ rate applied in 
most scenarios assumes a background rate of 5 percent, and an avoidance of maize equal 
to half the area planted to transgenics. The ‘high’ rate assumes a background rate of 
10 percent, and an avoidance for maize equal to the full area planted to transgenics. 
However, both these rates are conservative, because, while transgenic varieties represent 
26 percent of the area planted to maize, they represent fully 57 percent of the value of 
the international maize seed market.8 A ‘value-based’ rate is therefore also tested. This 
assumes a background rate of 10 percent, plus an avoidance for maize equal to the full 
share in value of transgenic maize in the seed market. 
λ  Crossing rate
No empirical evidence could be found regarding the frequency with which SMTA material 
is crossed with SMTA material, within the breeding pool. A number of simulations were 
made, to estimate what appears to be a reasonable rate, which has arbitrarily been set at 2.
κ: development time (in years)
C1 
wheat 
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
other Annex 1
C5 
non-Annex 1
9.8 8.4 6.7 8.3 8.3
κ is derived from a questionnaire (see Annex) responded to by some 30 experts or 
breeders, in the public and private sectors in 13 countries, whose opinion was asked 
8   This is calculated from Table a.3.1.3.
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as to the development time for products derived from (a) improved materials and 
(b) unimproved materials (landraces). The question was asked regarding only the three 
crops: wheat, rice and maize, and the following ranges of values were suggested:
C1, wheat, years C2, rice, years C3, maize, years
Improved Unimproved Improved Unimproved Improved Unimproved
Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Max. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max.
7.0 11.5 12.7 19.3 5.5 7.2 10.5 12.8 7.4 8.4 10.6 12.3
In response to the same questionnaire, the ratio of improved/unimproved material in 
breeding programmes was estimated as follows.
C1, wheat C2, rice C3, maize
Improved Unimproved Improved Unimproved Improved Unimproved
92 8 87 13 93 7
κ has therefore been calculated as the mid-point of the ranges of each of these crops, 
weighted by their ratio of improved/unimproved materials. The average of these three 
ratios has then been applied, on an arbitrary basis, to C4 and C5, for which there are no 
direct estimates.
β: Research intensity
C1 
wheat
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
other Annex 1
C5 
non-Annex 1
120 30 150 100 100
β represents research intensity in each crop/crop group, as a function of variation from 
an average research intensity for all crops generally. Because of the different agricultural 
economies of developed and developing countries, separate indicators for these two 
groups of countries were first calculated and then combined into a single average, 
weighted using the area harvested (FAOSTAT, 2010).
For developed countries, the indicator of innovation activity of crops/crops group used 
was the number of PVP certificates issued from 1960 to 2010, taken from UPOV’s PLUTO: 
Plant Variety Database.9 For developing countries, the certificates are not a good indicator, 
because most of them have not implemented PVP or intellectual property rights, or are 
at the very early stages of doing so. The indicator used was therefore the FTE of plant 
breeders in a country, weighted by the resources allocated to the crop/crop groups, drawn 
9   International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV); PLUTO is available at http://www.
upov.int/pluto/en/.
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from the Global Partnership Initiative for Plant Breeding Capacity Building (GIPB) capacity 
assessment database.10
γ: Proportion of improved materials released by international institutions
C1 
wheat 
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
other Annex 1 
C5 
non-Annex 1 
94.2 85.2 94.2 89.8 15
It is assumed that most improved materials for Annex 1 crops accessed under SMTAs 
originate from CGIAR Centres and other international institutions, because these maintain 
substantial breeding programmes, in addition to their gene banks, release the products 
of their breeding programmes under SMTAs. Little empirical evidence is available for the 
relative amounts of improved and unimproved germplasm released by others. In these 
circumstances, γ has therefore been applied only to the improved materials of the CGIAR 
Centres (their H), and serves to distinguish their contributions to α3 only. 
The CGIAR Centres reported to the Governing Body in March 2011 on their distributions 
from both their ex situ collections and their breeding programmes.11 γ has been calculated 
by comparing the ratios of improved/unimproved materials distributed by CIMMYT (for 
wheat and maize, C1 and C3), by IRRI (for rice, C2), and by other Centres (for other Annex 
1 crops, C4). C5 has been established arbitrarily. This is in all likelihood an underestimation 
of γ, because the improved materials of CGIAR Centres are probably accessed more 
frequently than most materials, and because materials are released directly from their 
breeding programmes, as well as from their ex situ collections.
δ: Speed of uptake of materials
C1 
wheat 
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
other Annex 1 
C5 
non-Annex 1 
58 69 55 60 60
δ1 is derived from Question one of the questionnaire. It calculates the variance around 
the average development time, for wheat, rice and maize, of the maximum and minimum 
suggested development times, and expresses this as a ratio applied to κ, representing the 
shortening of time when using improved materials. The averages of these three crops have 
been assumed for C4 and C5.
10   Available at http://km.fao.org/gipb/.
11   IT/GB-4/11/Inf.5, Experience of the International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research with the implementation of the agreements with the Governing 
Body, with particular reference to the use of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement for Annex 1 and 
non-Annex 1 crops (www.itpgrfa.net/International/sites/default/files/gb4i05e.pdf). Table 2 of the document 
reports on distributions from ex situ collections, and Table 3 reports on distributions from breeding 
programmes. 
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δ2 : Proportion of materials leading to products
C1 
wheat 
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
other Annex 1 
C5 
non-Annex 1 
217 296 180 197 204
δ2 estimates the probability of the increased incorporation of improved material in 
products, based on the area share of varieties incorporating CGIAR germplasm, on the basis 
of samples of varieties per crop/crop group (about ten each for wheat, rice and maize). Their 
pedigrees have been expanded to five generations for wheat, six generations for rice and ten 
generations for maize (on the basis of information from the survey presented in the Annex to 
this book), and the ratio of CGIAR materials (assumed to be largely improved) to non-CGIAR 
materials (assumed to be largely unimproved) has then been calculated.12
C1 
wheat 
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
other Annex 1 
C5 
non-Annex 1 
659 896 545 597 618
However, these figures give an unnaturally high effect and probably overestimate the 
effect of the use of improved materials. This is probably because a bias towards the use of 
improved materials has already entered the average, as is shown by breeders’ responses 
when asked about the relative quantities of improved and unimproved materials used, 
in the Annex. Breeders estimated the ratio of improved/unimproved material in breeding 
programmes for wheat, rice and maize as the follows:
C1 
wheat 
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
Improved Unimproved Improved Unimproved Improved Unimproved
92 8 87 13 93 7
An arbitrary decision was therefore made to use a rate of 33 percent of the above 
calculations. δ2 is applied to the T/P ratio, for α3 only.
V: Commercial value of the world seed and planting materials market (US$ billion)
V1 
wheat
V2 
Rice
V3 
Maize
V4 
other Annex 1
V5 
non-Annex 1
3.07 1.87 8.86 5.6 17.4
12   The contribution of unimproved material appears to be greater in wheat and rice than in maize, possibly 
because maize has seen much more breeding activity and thus many more cycles of improvement than 
wheat or rice.
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Chapter 2 investigates the commercial value of the world seed and planting material 
market, and the figures cited here are drawn from it.13 Table 2.22 of Chapter 2 summarizes 
the information available on the total current annual value of the global market of seeds 
and planting materials, for food and agriculture:  the total estimated value is $36.8 billion.
Table 2.23 of Chapter 2, reproduced below, provides the basis for estimating V per crop/
crop group of the model.
Crop group/value 
segment
Share of Annex I 
crops in total 
area harvested  
(2010) (%)b
Share of Annex I 
crop in total 
production  
(2010)b (%)
Commercial 
seed market for 
crop group/
value segment  
(US$ billion)a
Commercial seed 
market value for 
Annex I crops 
 (US$ billion)
Cereals/grains  99.5 99 13.94 13.8 
Pulses and lentils 92 92 n.a n.a 
Roots and tubers 98 98 n.a 0.2* 
Oilseeds 33 17 5.40 0.9 
Vegetable seeds 20 19 4.34 0.8 
Fruit seeds 42 54 2.51 1.4 
Forage seeds n.a.  n.a 2.89 2.3** 
total    19.4
a      Source: Seeds, a Global Strategic Business Report – MCP-4055. Global Industry Analysts, Inc., USA.
b      FAOSTAT data.
*      Represents the value of annual exports of potato seeds, based on average international export prices. 
**    On the assumption that temperate forage seeds account for 80 percent of commercial seed sales. 
In order to distribute this commercial value among the five crops/crop groups, the 
following information is used.
1. The commercial seed market of Annex I crops is worth $19.4 billion.
2. Annex I cereals and grains (which include maize, wheat and rice) are worth $13.8 
billion (Chapter 2, Table 2.23).
3. The GM maize market is estimated at $5.063 billion (Chapter 2, Figure 2.12).
4. Chapter 2 estimates the upper bounds of the potential contributions to the Treaty, 
13   The information available on the seed market is highly aggregated at the level of crop groups. The figures 
used here include some flower seeds, lawn seeds and miscellaneous seeds. In all EU and OECD statistics, the 
output value of ornamentals is included in the value of ‘agricultural’ output.
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resulting from sales of conventional seeds of rice (Figure 2.15), maize (Figure 2.17) and 
wheat (Figure 2.19). These can be used as proxies to divide up the value of the total 
conventional cereal seed market.14  
5. The GM canola market is worth $0.26 billion (Chapter 2, Figure 2.12).
6. The total market for GM sees is worth $10.57 billion (Chapter 2, Figure 2.11).
With this information, it is possible to estimate V1–V5, as follows;
 
Table a.3.1.3 Values of the International Seed Market
US$ billion
Wheat V1 3.07
Rice V2 1.87
Genetically modified (GM) maize 5.06
Conventional maize 3.80
Total maize V3 8.86
Total grains 13.80
Other Annex I (GM) 0.26
Other Annex I (conventional) 5.34
Total Other Annex I V4 5.6
Non-Annex I (GM) 5.25
Non-Annex I (no GM) 12.15
Total Non-Annex I V5 17.4
Total 36.8
ι: Intellectual property status
C1 
wheat
C2 
Rice
C3 
Maize
C4 
other Annex 1
C5 
non-Annex 1
0 0 57 4.6 30
 
ι is calculated directly from Table a.3.1.3.
14  “It should be emphasized that this upper bound figure does not reflect a realistic assessment of potential 
benefit-sharing payments, but is only indicative of the broad orders of magnitude relevant for discussion of 
the impact of access and benefit-sharing arrangements introduced by the International Treaty.” Chapter 2 of 
this pubication. 
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ρ Real voluntary payment
The SMTA provides for mandatory payment of monetary benefit-sharing in Article 6.7 
and voluntary benefit-sharing in Article 6.8. These two revenue streams are modelled 
as Q1 and Q2, respectively. In the case of payments due under Article 6.7 (Q1), the 
SMTA stipulates the rate of payment as “one point-one percent (1.1%) of the sales of the 
product or products less thirty percent (30%)”. In the case of payments due under Article 
6.8 (Q2), no rate of payment is specified.
At the time of preparing this study, no voluntary payments (and indeed, no mandatory 
payments) had yet been made to the Benefit-sharing Fund, and there is no empirical 
basis for estimating what the real level of voluntary payments may be. For the sake of 
the model, a rate of payment equal to that for mandatory payments is assumed, and a 
performance factor, ρ, is applied. In this scenario, it is arbitrarily set at 50 percent.
Appendix 3.2 The mathematical algorithm 
The concept of the algorithm is simple. While there is great uncertainty over the volume 
of products derived from materials accessed under an SMTA, and the timing with which 
they will come to market, the annual value total commercial value of the world seed and 
planting material market may be estimated with some degree of accuracy. For this reason, 
the model evaluates first the segment of the world market of seeds and planting materials 
of crops that are available under the SMTA, and within this, the proportion, over time, of 
products that are likely to have been developed from materials accessed under an SMTA. 
This proportion is simulated for the five crops/crop group, c = 1, 2..., 5. For simplicity, the 
c index is suppressed in the following equations.
Table 3.1: Factors used in the model, in Chapter 3, lists the variables implemented, and 
the symbols used. Section 3.1.5 of the chapter describes the structure of the model in 
mechanical terms. Appendix 3.1 sets out the rationale behind the decisions as to the values 
used for the base scenario (the ‘current situation’), and the data sources. This information 
is not repeated here, where the same model is described separately in mathematical terms.
dd defines the number of germplasm samples distributed per year from the ex situ 
collections listed in the second report, the State of the world’s plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture. d is indexed over c and over d: d = 1 refers to non-SMTA materials, 
d = 2 to SMTA materials from national collections, and d = 3 to SMTA materials from the 
collections of international institutions. 
The first step is to identify αd, the annual rate of introduction of material into the 
breeding pool, where H represents the holdings of Treaty members, and π a performance 
factor, namely that part of their holdings that they are effectively making available:
αd is defined as: 
(1)               αd = (dd/H) π for each d = 1, 2... 3.
αd describes the change over time in the set of breeding materials in the breeding pool, 
B, defined as the total materials being used by plant breeders at any time. In particular, it 
describes the growing proportion of SMTA materials within B:  this ratio is defined as At/B.
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B is a dimensionless quantity, and constant over time. The model computes the At/B 
dynamics, primarily as a result of annual grow at αd rate. The dynamics of the At/B ratio 
do not depend on αd alone, but must take into account a separate factor, υ (avoidance 
by breeders of SMTA materials), which directly impacts on At. υ, is indexed over c, and 
enters the computation of At/B as a multiplicative parameter, with a negative impact on 
the dynamic properties of the model. 
At/B is therefore calculated as:
(2)                      At/B =  
The diffusion of SMTA materials within B is influenced by cross-breeding with non-SMTA 
materials, since the terms and conditions of the SMTA extend to any material that contains 
genetic parts and components introduced from a material accessed under an SMTA: this 
is represented by λ, defined as that part of the breeding pool that is each year randomly 
crossed with other parts of the breeding pool. 
The At/B ratio, including the λ component, can be written as:
(3)                      At/B = 
f (λ) has been identified empirically and it assumes the following form:
(4) 
Once calculated, the At/B ratio can be utilized to derive the tt+κ/P ratio (the part of 
products under the terms and conditions of the SMTA within the product pool), by 
applying the development time, κ; the value used in the computation is weighted by the 
improved/unimproved ratio (γ). The effect of γ on κ is expressed by δ1. δ1 is indexed over c 
and shortens the product development time,	κ, when improved materials are used.
(5)   
where κi and κu are, respectively, the time of product development starting from improved, 
or unimproved materials.
In order to determine tt+κ/P, two other parameters that impact on product development 
dynamics are taken into account: β (development intensity per crop/crop group), and δ2 
(the effect of γ on the number of products). β is indexed over c, and enters the equation as 
multiplicative parameter, which differentiates the growth of SMTA products among crops/ 
crop groups. δ2 is indexed over d.
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On this basis, Tt+κ/P is computed as:
(6)  Tt+κ /P= 
Equation 6 describes the dynamics of products that incorporate materials subject to the 
terms and conditions of the SMTA. The monetary flows to the Benefit-sharing Fund from 
commercial products are evaluated as a constituent of V, that is, the total value of the 
world seed and planting material market, per crop/crop group. 
Q represents that part of V that is subject to the terms and conditions of the SMTA. 
These differ according as to whether or not the product is available without restriction to 
others for further research and breeding. The intellectual property status (ι) of products is 
therefore included in the computation. Q1 is that portion of V that derives from products 
commercialized under intellectual property protection, and is subject to the mandatory 
annual payment rate, μ, in accordance with Article 6.7 of the SMTA. Q2 is that portion 
of V that derives from products commercialized without intellectual property protection, 
and therefore subject to voluntary annual payment, in accordance with Article 6.8 of the 
SMTA. In order to characterize the stochastic nature of the voluntary payment rate in Q2, 
the μ rate is multiplied by a performance factor, ρ. Q1t+κ and Q2t+κ are then computed as 
follows:
(7)  Q1t+κ = ιμ (Tt+κ /P)  V
(8) Q2t+κ= ρ (1 - ι) μ (Tt+κ /P) V
and the total monetary flow to the Benefit-sharing Fund from commercial products is the 
sum of Q1t+κ and Q2t+κ :
(9) Q1t+κ + Q2t+κ = V[ρ(1 - ι) m + ιm] (Tt+κ /P)
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Conclusions and recommendations 
for further research
The Treaty’s overall economic benefits are extensive and reach far beyond the commercial 
value of PGR for food and agriculture. Through promotion of the conservation and 
sustainable use of PGR for food and agriculture, the Treaty supports climate change 
adaptation and contributes to food security, both of which underpin global economic 
and social development. However, quantification of its total economic contribution is 
complex and requires comparison with alternative institutional arrangements in which 
the bilateral exchange of PGR and/or open access predominates. An assessment of the 
most promising methodological approaches to the quantification of the Treaty’s overall 
economic contribution has been provided in Chapter 1.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this book have focused on the potential monetary benefit flows 
arising from the use of the SMTA. They show that the evaluation of these flows is a 
challenging proposition, given the paucity of useful and reliable data over a long enough 
period of time and the lack of experience of the actual workings of the system. The SMTA 
was only adopted in 2006, and the build-up of a steady stream of monetary benefits 
will take many years. This is due not only to the slow nature of plant breeding, but also 
to a large number of Contracting Parties that have not yet made all or part of their PGR 
available under SMTAs. Moreover, the unpredictability of technological development in 
plant breeding complicates projections as to the time required for maximum annual levels 
of income to be reached.
Furthermore, mobilization by the Treaty of international level monetary benefits 
translates through projects supported by the Benefit-sharing Fund into non-monetary 
goods and services at the national or local level. Multiplier effects and the generation of 
a broad range of non-monetary benefits must then be taken into account to provide a 
full understanding of the total economic values generated. Nevertheless, estimation of 
possible or probable Benefit-sharing Fund income at least provides a lower-bound value 
for such non-monetary benefit estimation.
An accurate empirical assessment of the potential magnitude of Benefit-sharing Fund 
income would require substantially better data on the use of plant genetic materials under 
SMTAs in product development than currently exists. The complexity of this exercise ought 
not to be underestimated given that genetic material is exchanged through a complex maze 
of transactions across institutions and countries. The eventual use of materials exchanged 
under SMTAs in a final product may occur after a long series of transactions, at a point 
far removed from the first recipient of the material. Moreover, materials exchanged under 
SMTAs may be subject to transformation through several rounds of breeding before they 
are incorporated into a final product. Information on genetic material flows within and 
across national boundaries, and their use in long-term crop improvement programmes are 
extremely limited. Empirical assessment of the contribution of materials exchanged under 
SMTAs requires an identification of relevant products around the globe, and concomitant 
exploration of their genealogies and detailed breeding histories. Informatics-based 
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approaches could be used to this end, but may be feasible only over the longer term. 
Given that exchange of material under SMTAs has only been practised for around seven 
years, and taking into consideration the lengthy process of plant variety development, 
it may be too early to use informatics-based approaches to discover linkages between 
exchange of genetic materials and the commercialization of products.
In the light of current data and methodological constraints, this book has presented two 
separate methodologies to assess the potential magnitude of benefit-sharing payments, 
neither of which relies upon linking individual PGR to individual products. These were: (i) a 
data-based approach to the estimation of income through an analysis of past use of CGIAR 
materials (Chapter 2); and (ii) the development of a mathematical model simulating the 
various stages of accessing materials and developing and marketing products (Chapter 3), 
so as to estimate the part of the market to which the terms and conditions of the SMTA 
apply, at any time. Both approaches lead to the key conclusion that potential income to 
the Benefit-sharing Fund is high, but that projections based on current arrangements are 
low, and that obstacles to substantial success under present arrangements cannot be 
ignored.
Benefit flows are contingent on a range of factors. The scenarios simulated in Chapter 3 
underline the single and combined importance of: effective performance of Treaty 
members, expansion of Treaty membership, levels of avoidance of material under SMTAs, 
and actual levels of voluntary payments.
A robust, detailed evaluation of the relevant economic values (i.e. of both monetary 
and non-monetary benefits flowing from the Treaty as a whole, and the workings of its 
Multilateral System in particular) would be an important contribution to policy discussions 
involving Treaty stakeholders. The research undertaken by the authors is a first step, and a 
number of areas for possible future research have been identified.
Data regarding the quantification of benefit flows are currently extremely deficient, 
and the figures used to populate mathematical algorithm and project benefit flows in 
alternative future scenarios should be improved as follows:
•	 Further work on the economics of non-monetary benefits is essential. Chapter 1 
indicates that such benefits are substantial, but their quantification remains elusive. 
Non-monetary benefits, as part of the Treaty’s overall economic value, should be 
assessed in relation to alternative exchange scenarios. The methodologies currently 
used in the valuation of PGR require significant refining.
•	 Since there is no obligation to report on non-monetary benefits shared in accordance 
with Article 6.9 of the SMTA, evidence of these benefits is virtually non-existent. This is 
a major weakness when evaluating the full economic potential of the Treaty, and ways 
to document these elusive benefit flows should be explored. Scientometrics offers an 
innovative approach to this task.
•	 While information on SMTAs entered into by the CGIAR is relatively rich, much less is 
known about those issued by Contracting Parties and natural persons. Obtaining such 
information should be a priority.
•	 The model of Chapter 3 would benefit from covering not only materials in ex situ 
collections, but also materials from breeding programmes. Similarly, it would be valuable 
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to develop a methodology to reflect materials made available by natural and legal 
persons, including through their release as commercial products, and as contributions 
both to ex situ collections and to further breeding programmes.
•	 The coverage of in situ materials, to be made available in accordance with Article 12.3h 
of the Treaty, has the potential to more accurately reflect the importance of materials 
held by developing countries.
•	 The expansion of the model to other crops, in particular to a representative sample 
of vegetable crops, is a possible priority for further work. Discussions with breeders 
suggest that these materials are of high value. An important next step would be to 
identify individual crop seed market values and calibrate the factors that describe their 
use.
•	 It should be a priority to obtain a clearer picture of the degree to which breeders and 
breeding programmes are replacing or avoiding materials under SMTA conditions.
•	 The preliminary consultation of plant breeding experts undertaken (see the Annex) 
highlighted the willingness of industry experts to provide useful information and 
suggestions. Any further development of the model should seek to draw plant breeders 
more closely into its design, and into the generation of the data necessary to make it 
function effectively.
•	 The feasibility of applying informatics-based approaches such as those tested in Chapter 
4 would dramatically improve if: (i) patent and PVP applications for plant variety 
innovations were required to provide information on the source of parental material 
used in an innovation, or if intellectual property regulations were amended to make it 
mandatory for applicants to acknowledge their possible use of material under SMTA 
conditions; and (ii) if a standardized system of nomenclature or coding were developed 
and applied for all transfer of Multilateral System materials from international and 
national gene banks and repositories.
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